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1.  Introduction: European regulatory governance of pharmaceuticals  
“Since the beginning of its presence in the world, man has been fighting against pain, 
unhappiness, and diseases. For this purpose, several means have been tried; among them, the 
most frequently used has been (and is still) drugs.” (Mbongue, 2005: 309) 
“Adverse drug reactions (ADRs – a response to a medicine which is noxious and unintended) 
present a major public health burden in the EU. […] It is estimated that 197,000 deaths per 
year in the EU are caused by ADRs and that the total societal cost of ADRs in the EU is €79 
billion. [original emphasis]” (European Commission, 2008: 3) 
Pharmaceuticals represent a commonly used therapeutic intervention and can help to avoid 
more extensive and costly forms of medical treatment (Lichtenberg, 1996; Neumann et al., 
2000). Beyond its functional importance, the production of pharmaceuticals represents an 
important industrial sector, on the global and national scale. The same is true for the European 
Union (EU): due to its high-technology profile and the importance for employment and job 
growth, it ranked high on the EU’s important Lisbon strategy and played a key role in the 
European Commission’s new Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010; Koivusalo, 
2006). Traditionally, the pharmaceutical sector has been the target of far reaching public 
intervention, transforming the pharmaceutical market and industry into one of the most highly 
regulated fields (Mossialos et al., 2004: 1). The main component of pharmaceutical regulation 
can be characterized as safety regulation of pharmaceutical products. Looking at the EU, the 
high degree of regulation has been mainly driven by a tragic event, namely the Thalidomide 
disaster.1 However, regulation is not confined to pharmaceutical safety. Based on the peculiar 
character of pharmaceutical demand and supply, the control of pharmaceutical prices and 
expenditure represents another area of regulatory intervention. Given severe budget 
constraints and constantly rising pharmaceutical expenditure, European member states 
adopted a plethora of measures to regulate prices (Lauterbach, 2004; Zweifel et al., 2009). 
While the regulation of costs in EU member states has remained largely unaffected by EU 
influence, the opposite is true for the regulation of pharmaceutical safety. Since the 
Thalidomide crisis, supranational influence has constantly and continuously expanded in this 
regulatory field: Starting with the first directive issued in 1965, effectively establishing 
binding criteria for market approval (quality, safety and efficacy) to the creation of 
                                                 
1
  Released in 1957 in West Germany under the imprint Contergan, the sleeping pill caused peripheral neuritis 
in pregnant women and lead to the birth of babies with congenital anomalies in several thousand cases 
(Permanand, 2006: 1).   
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manufacturing standards, several attempts to establish European approval procedures and, 
perhaps most importantly, the creation of an independent EU agency, the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) in 1995.2  
 
1.1 Research questions 
The witnessed developments raise two interrelated questions, forming the central pattern of 
investigation of this study.  
The first question relates to the delegation of regulatory competencies in the pharmaceutical 
sector. Pharmaceuticals are important for the maintenance of public health but at the same 
time represent a consumption risk. Therefore, the need for public intervention arises. 
Governments play an important role in the financing of pharmaceuticals and the protection of 
their citizens from potentially harmful products. The protection of its citizens is one of the key 
tasks of the state. The evident delegation of regulatory powers to the European level in the 
field of risk regulation thus seems to be at odds with the member states’ need to legitimize 
their activities. In light of this contradiction, the first question underlying this study is: why 
are member states willing to delegate competencies in the area of pharmaceutical regulation 
and in the field of risk regulation in more general terms? 
Following from the witnessed delegation of (risk) regulatory tasks in the pharmaceutical 
sector, the second research question is, in how far the Europeanization of pharmaceutical 
regulation has impacted on the quality of regulation and its effectiveness. Delegation to the 
supranational level is commonly justified on efficiency grounds and functional reasons, while 
European regulatory quality seems to be perceived as a given (Dehousse, 2008; Haas, 1958; 
Majone, 1996b, 2006). However, the superiority of European regulation and the performance 
of the European regulatory state no longer remain unchallenged. While European regulatory 
activity has expanded in many fields, it does not seem to coincide with a higher acceptance of 
the European regulatory state and the European Union at large. In fact, the EU is claimed to 
face a severe social legitimatory crisis (Arnull & Wincott, 2002b), often related to a 
democratic deficit. As better output and therefore regulation seems to be the main lever in 
order to advance the social legitimacy of the European Union (Scharpf, 1999), the analysis of 
existing regulatory policy and governance structures is necessary. This is even more important 
given the constant evolution of European regulatory structures resulting in independent 
                                                 
2
  Until December 2009 the EMA has been called European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
(EMEA). For the sake of consistency, the term EMA will be used throughout this study.    
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regulatory agencies (Bernstein, 1972; Chiti, 2000) linked through a rather long chain of 
indirect legitimacy to the European demos. 
The study thus tries to assess European pharmaceutical regulation against the backdrop of 
European integration, risk regulatory theory and the overall social legitimacy of the European 
Union. Before turning to the theoretical base, research design and structure of the inquiry, the 
present study has to be put into the context of former research on the subject.  
 
1.2 Previous research on European pharmaceutical regulation 
Even though pharmaceutical regulation and especially the respective independent regulatory 
agency (EMA) have been mentioned in a vast number of European studies, European 
pharmaceutical regulation still represents an under-researched field. Most studies mainly use 
the case of pharmaceutical regulation as an example of (successful) sectoral integration and/or 
to test theories of European integration (Kelemen, 2004; Majone, 1997, 1999; Vogel, 1998, 
2001). A second strand of research focuses exclusively on the regulatory structure and more 
specifically the EMA as an example of a strong European independent agency (Borrás et al., 
2007; Chiti, 2000; Eberlein & Grande, 2005; Fleischer, 2007; Groenleer, 2009; R. D. 
Kelemen, 2004). In contrast, only few authors have focused exclusively on the field of 
pharmaceutical regulation in their studies. The works of Jürgen Feick (Broscheid & Feick, 
2005; Feick, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008), John Abraham (Abraham, 1994, 2002a, 
2003, 2005; Abraham & Davis, 2007; Abraham & Lewis, 2000) and Elias Mossialos ( 
Mossialos & McKee, 2002; Mossialos et al., 1997; Permanand et al., 2006) have to be 
highlighted in this regard.  Beyond the studies already mentioned, only three monographs, 
analyzing European pharmaceutical regulation from a political science perspective, have been 
published so far.  
The first one, Regulating medicines in Europe by John Abraham and Graham Lewis (2000), 
reviews pharmaceutical regulation from the perspective of medical sociology and focuses on 
“how medicines are controlled in the European Union (EU), with particular emphasis on the 
sociology and political economy of medicines regulation” (2000: 1). Drawing on the political 
economy of regulation, Abraham & Lewis analysed both European level regulatory structures 
as well as national regulatory systems in Germany, Sweden and the UK. The study is based 
on interviews conducted with various stakeholders from both the private and public sphere. 
Abraham and Lewis identify a neo-corporate bias, regulatory capture and a strong focus on 
1.2 Previous research on European pharmaceutical regulation 
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efficiency in pharmaceutical regulation. Furthermore, the current system is classified as a 
closed system, ignoring the public interest and effectively blocking the inclusion of lay 
perceptions in drug approval (2000: 202-218).  
As the title EU pharmaceutical regulation – the politics of policy making indicates, Govin 
Permanand (2006) focuses on the policy making process and the interaction of affected 
stakeholders leading to the European pharmaceutical regime. Instead of perceiving the 
confluence between industry’s interests and the European Commission’s free market agenda 
as a problem per se, he considers it as an explanatory factor for the emerging regulatory 
regime. Using a policy network approach, Permanand goes on to analyze European 
pharmaceutical regulation based on three case studies: the transformation of the property 
protection regime affecting pharmaceuticals, the establishment of the EMA and the lack of a 
reimbursement and pricing policy on the European level (2006: 13). As his interest is mainly 
on how “policies are made” (2006: 201) Permanand draws heavily on a concept by James Q. 
Wilson (1980), distinguishing between different distributions of policy costs and benefits and 
the resulting policy-making dynamics. Based on this politics of policy concept, Permanand 
derives at several conclusions regarding the emergence of the current European regulatory 
framework. In his view, pharmaceutical regulation is the result of a struggle between various 
stakeholder interests, although heavily influenced by industry’s preferences. The dominance 
of industrial interests results from the consistency of industrial preferences over time, the 
confluence between the Commission’s and the pharmaceutical industry’s interests and the 
wish of the Commission to expand its power in “pharmaceutical matters” (Permanand, 2006: 
194). Regarding his second research question he concludes that the current state of 
pharmaceutical regulation ”shows a regime that ultimately favors producer interests before 
those of consumers” (2006: 204).  
The latest in-depth study has been Risk regulation in the single market: the governance of 
foodstuff and pharmaceuticals in the European Union by Sebastian Krapohl (2008). Krapohl 
uses a comparative research design in order to answer three interrelated questions: 
“Why did different supranational regulatory institutions for products traded on the single market evolve? 
Are some regulatory institutions more efficient than others, and, if so, why? What are the factors that 
determine their democratic legitimacy and their acceptance by EU citizens?” (Krapohl, 2008: 2) 
He applies a historical-institutionalist approach to analyse the respective regulatory regimes. 
Krapohl applies a more general research design as he traces the developments in the 
respective policy fields as a whole. While the study is partially designed to test hypotheses 
1. Introduction: European regulatory governance of pharmaceuticals 
 
 
 
5 
 
derived from historical institutionalism regarding the institutional development in both 
sectors, emphasis is put on the efficiency and legitimacy of the regulatory regimes. Turning to 
the findings of his analysis, Krapohl views the emergence of European pharmaceutical 
regulation as the result of path-dependencies. The set-up of comparatively strong national 
regulatory agencies in the aftermath of the Thalidomide crisis rendered European integration 
via mutual recognition impossible and led to the emergence of a new European regulatory 
procedure and agency (Krapohl, 2008: 185). The efficiency of the regulatory regime in his 
view results from the credible commitment of member states, the high degree of legalisation 
and the continuous scrutiny of European courts. Finally, Krapohl identifies output legitimacy 
as the key lever to legitimize the European regulatory regime, as input legitimacy is limited 
by the credible commitments of member states to the respective regime (Krapohl, 2008: 185-
189).  
 
1.3 Research focus of the present study 
Considering the research focus and approach of previous research on European 
pharmaceutical regulation, the present study differs in terms of the main research interests, the 
theoretical foundations and the design of the inquiry. The main aim is neither to test theories 
of European integration nor to reanalyze the policy-making process. Instead the study 
provides an analysis of regulatory quality and effectiveness, focusing on the governance of 
the sector and the implementation stage. Whereas Krapohl addresses the issue of regulatory 
quality to some extent, the efficiency of the current regulatory regime is not the main focus of 
the inquiry. Instead, the effectiveness of the current regime, depicting the degree of regulatory 
goal attainment, serves as a yardstick for evaluation. While the importance of regulatory 
governance and outcomes is at least mentioned by all previous studies, the concrete 
evaluation of regulatory governance features more prominently in this inquiry. It thus tries to 
provide a more inclusive analysis of European pharmaceutical regulation. 
 
1.3.1 Theoretical approach, research design and methodology   
The study applies a rational choice-institutionalist approach (Peters, 2000) to analyze the 
regulatory regime and to explain the emergence of European competencies in this sector. 
While sharing Krapohl’s theoretical approach at least to a certain degree, it does not share the 
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perception that the emergence of European pharmaceutical regulation can be explained solely 
by invoking functional reasons e.g. being a credible commitment of the member states 
(Krapohl, 2008: 23). In contrast, it offers an additional (and micro-founded) explanatory 
factor for the delegation of risk regulation to the European level by drawing on the concept of 
blame avoidance (Hood, 2002; Hood & Rothstein, 2001; Weaver, 1986) and depoliticisation 
(Burnham, 2001; Flinders & Buller, 2006).3 While an analysis of regulation must include 
preferences and goals of stakeholders, this study does not share the assumptions put forward 
by some of the previous works in the field. Acknowledging the importance of scientific 
objectivity (Weber, 1904), a more neutral perspective on stakeholders and the pharmaceutical 
industry more specifically is advocated.  
In order to answer the underlying research questions, the study employs a predominantly 
qualitative approach, drawing on existing data, official documentation and secondary sources. 
In an attempt to derive partially generalisable results, quantitative data is utilized. Beyond 
publicly available basic health statistics as well as pharmaceutical market and demographic 
data, however, data availability and reliability proofed to be a major challenge.4 As it will be 
discussed in greater detail, transparency is very limited in the pharmaceutical sector, 
expanding to the availability of data (Abraham & Lewis, 1998).5 While market data would be 
principally available through specialized commercial providers, this would imply 
considerable costs. While it has been possible to obtain information by drawing on secondary 
sources, industrial associations and regulatory resources, data remains incomplete. The 
utilized data must be interpreted cautiously, since vested interests feature prominently in the 
pharmaceutical sector (Godlee, 2010; Wilson, 1980). Moreover, the reliability of health 
outcome data proofed to be problematic as well, calling for a cautious interpretation of the 
results presented in this study. In light of these restrictions, the study adopts a predominantly 
qualitative approach, incorporating quantitative analysis to complement (qualitatively) 
derived findings to the extent possible. The employed research design and methodology 
therefore partially draws on an approach that has recently risen to prominence within the 
                                                 
3
  The idea of using blame avoidance for the explanation has been mentioned, although to a very limited extent, 
by Jürgen Feick (2002). 
4
 An additional indication of data restrictions can be seen in the relatively small number of comparative health 
economic studies of the European pharmaceutical sector. 
5
 This problem seems to be specifically striking compared to the situation in the US. Furthermore, data 
shortages might explain the lack of previous research on European pharmaceutical regulation especially from 
the perspective of health economics.   
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social science under the common heading of triangulation.6 By applying different methods 
and perspectives on the underlying research object, a more holistic understanding is enabled 
while the hazard of a systematic research bias, caused by the employment of single and 
unfitting analytical approaches, is effectively reduced (Pickel, 2009; Wolf, 2007).    
The conclusions and findings developed in this study are mainly drawn from two types of 
sources. First, the study employs secondary literature from the field of political science, 
medicine, (health) economics and law as well as sociology, anthropology and psychology, 
partially covering the underlying research questions. Second, the inquiry uses primary 
sources, comprised of European legislation, in form of directives and regulations, official 
European and national documents as well as publications of national and European regulatory 
authorities, associations and interest groups. The methodological challenge must therefore be 
seen in the linkage of these specific sources, written for different purposes and heterogeneous 
target audiences and often resonating vested interests, with the overarching research questions 
of the present inquiry. In order to meet this challenge, interpretation of secondary sources, 
even though mainly based on a political science perspective, has to apply a multidisciplinary 
view on the regulation of pharmaceuticals including legal, economic, sociological and 
medical perspectives.       
Turning to the actual research design, this study will focus on the analysis of European 
pharmaceutical regulation. This limitation seems to be justified by the specific character of 
pharmaceutical regulation, rendering the comparison to other regulatory fields unsuitable. The 
study thus tries to capture and evaluate (regulatory) developments on the policy, governance 
and outcome level throughout time. Given the specific regulatory structure of European 
pharmaceutical regulation, no in–depth assessment of national structures and their changes is 
pursued. Instead of assessing the relative degree of quality and effectiveness by comparing 
policy fields, the study develops a general, normative framework for the evaluation of 
regulation. The selected approach allows assessing developments over time and deriving more 
general conclusions on the overall effectiveness of European pharmaceutical regulation.  
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 Besides an increased number of textbooks addressing triangulation and the use of mixed methods (Creswell, 
2009; Flick, 2008; Pickel, 2009), the Journal of Mixed Methods Research, published for the first time in 
2007, dedicates itself to the advancement of the approach. 
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1.3.2  Scope of the study 
Since pharmaceutical regulation represents a complex and multifaceted subject, it is necessary 
to clearly define the boundaries of this enquiry. The study investigates the regulation of 
pharmaceutical safety in the European Union, focusing on the regulation of prescription 
medicine, leaving the regulation of homeopathic and herbal medicine aside. While the inquiry 
focuses on the old EU 15 member states, the regulatory impact on the whole European Union 
of 27 member states will be discussed to the extent possible.7 The research period covers the 
period from the beginnings of modern European pharmaceutical regulation in the late 1950s 
until the end of 2008, even though more recent developments in the sector will be considered 
as well.8 In late 2007, a new legislative cycle of European pharmaceutical regulation has 
started and has still been ongoing at the time of writing.  
While the regulation of reimbursement, pharmaceutical pricing and intellectual property rights 
are important in their own right an evaluation of these aspects is beyond the scope of this 
study.9 However, due to their closeness and (perceived) impact on the effectiveness of 
European pharmaceutical regulation, these issues will be addressed to the extent possible. 
Another important aspect not covered in this study is the regulation of liability and 
compensation for pharmaceutical damages within the European Union.10 While this is 
undoubtedly an important topic for further inquiry, the complexity of the issue would require 
a separate assessment.  
  
1.4 Outline of the study 
The study consists of two main parts. The first part, consisting of three chapters, develops the 
main research question and the framework for the subsequent assessment. The second part, 
consisting of four chapters focuses on the empirical investigation of European pharmaceutical 
regulation.  
                                                 
7
 The decision to focus on the EU 15 has been based on two reasons. While the accession member states have 
taken over most of the European pharmaceutical regulation the EU 15 were involved in the process of 
establishing the current regulatory framework. Moreover, the EU 15 and more specifically the founding 
members represent the overwhelming majority (roughly 70% market share) of the European pharmaceutical 
demand (DG Competition, 2009: 20).     
8
 In late 2007, a new legislative cycle of European pharmaceutical regulation has started and has still been 
ongoing at the time of writing. 
9
 For an overview covering most of the EU 15 member states see the recent OECD study (2008b). 
10
 Comparative research in this area has been very limited. For an overview of national and European 
developments, see (Cavaliere, 2004; Gaßner & Reich-Malter, 2006; Hodges, 2005; Jenke, 2004).   
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The second chapter starts with a discussion of European health policy. More specifically, it 
reassesses previously made claims that a European health policy has emerged. The 
quantitative method employed, using existing databases of European legislation will be 
introduced in order to substantiate former claims of a European health policy. The third 
chapter addresses the delegation of pharmaceutical and risk regulation in the European Union 
from a theoretical perspective. It proposes blame avoidance theory and more importantly the 
reduction of underlying (political) uncertainty as a complementing explanation for the 
delegation of risk regulatory competencies. By explaining delegation based on political 
preferences instead of purely functional reasons, the superiority of technocratic and neutral 
European regulation is put into question. In a second step, the relevance of regulatory quality 
in the European context will be discussed by drawing on the official European better 
regulation discourse. As it will be shown, the European Commission conceptualizes 
regulatory quality mainly as a question of efficiency, reflecting a strong economic business 
perspective on regulation. This proves to be a problem regarding the social legitimacy 
(Arnull, 2002) of the European regulatory state, which has not been tackled adequately by the 
ongoing better regulation debate on the European level emerging in the late 1990s. 
Consequently, an alternative conceptualization of regulatory quality emphasizing the 
importance of effectiveness from the perspective of European citizens is proposed in the 
following chapter. Moreover, a framework for the assessment of regulatory quality focusing 
on the legal framework, governance structures and outcomes is developed.  
The second part starts with an introduction to the specific characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical market as well as regulatory goals, tools and challenges. Such an excursion 
seems to be necessary given the complexity of the pharmaceutical sector and shall facilitate 
the understanding of the empirical investigation conducted in the following three chapters.  
The sixth chapter discusses the preconditions for effective regulation and engages in the 
analysis of the current regulatory framework by focusing on the policies on which regulation 
is based. Furthermore an overview of the developments leading to the present regulatory 
regime is provided. This allows for the assessment of the de jure effectiveness of the given 
regulatory system. Acknowledging the multi-national and multi-level character of the 
European regulatory state, the chapter will subsequently assess the transposition of and 
compliance with European regulation by European member states. The legal analysis is 
supplemented by the investigation of governance structures carried out in chapter seven. 
Based on the (neo)institutionalist claim that institutions matter and that the quality and 
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effectiveness of regulation depends heavily on the respective governance structure, the 
institutional set-up and impact of European pharmaceutical regulation is assessed. Special 
attention has to be given to the analysis of the EMA and the European approval regime 
created in 1995, as their establishment marked a watershed of European pharmaceutical 
regulation in many respects. Moreover, it will be discussed in how far regulation has been 
able to solve regulatory problems and contribute to the attainment of regulatory goals. 
Drawing on the results of previous chapters, the eighth chapter assesses the impact of 
pharmaceutical regulation on the realization of regulatory goals, by discussing regulatory 
outcomes. Given the previously mentioned data restrictions the chapter relies on previous 
studies of regulatory performance and proxy measures in assessing the outcome/output 
dimension. The ninth and final chapter summarizes the theoretical and empirical findings as 
well as discussing their relevance for the field of European pharmaceutical regulation and 
beyond. Moreover, further research needs, current political developments and some tentative 
conclusions for the advancement of regulatory effectiveness in the pharmaceutical sector will 
be presented. 
 
2. The puzzle of European health policy 
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2.  The puzzle of European health policy 
The role and competencies of national states and an increased influence of the European level 
has been the subject of a vital political and scientific discussion. While the debate has been 
particularly intense regarding economic policy (Müller, 1994), other fields have long been 
spared. The dominant role of national governments has largely remained uncontested in 
public policy such as defence, welfare, education and above all, the field of health policy 
(Alesina et al., 2005; Alesina & Perotti, 2004). Health policy represents a core policy field 
from the perspective of government since a close connection between the maintenance of 
public health and economic (and societal) performance exists (Bhargava et al., 2001; Bloom 
et al., 2004). A functioning health system plays an important role for political stability in 
general (Steffen et al., 2005: 1) and even though the role of the state in healthcare might be 
changing (Rothgang et al., 2005), European citizens still expect their governments to provide 
quality healthcare. Policy failures would thus most certainly result in a decrease of political 
support and potentially reduced legitimacy of their national governments. An explanation for 
the limited discussion of a supranational transfer of competences in health care may be the 
defensive if not protective stance towards a loss of authority in this field (Greer, 2006: 134). 
While health policy clearly represents a sensitive issue with high domestic salience and is of 
high political importance, the reluctance relates to the connected high costs of health 
provision. Since the delegation of competence would inevitably result in less national 
influence on financing, the Europeanization of health policy is perceived as an undesirable 
strategy. Health expenditure accounts for a significant share of gross domestic product. At the 
same time, healthcare in the majority of European countries is financed predominantly 
through public authorities (Thomson et al., 2009). Allowing the expansion of European 
competencies in this area would potentially reduce member states’ discretion in deciding on 
resource allocation, which runs counter member states basic preferences. These national 
policy preferences are reflected in the current legal framework, with the European treaty 
providing nation states with exclusive competencies in the field of health policy (Hervey, 
2005).11 Notwithstanding the clear preference of member states and judicial protective 
measures, the clearly assigned roles and responsibilities between the national and European 
level seem to erode in the field of health. 
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Graph 1: Total health expenditure as % of gross domestic product (GDP) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
France Germany Greece Sweden United
Kingdom
EU 15 EU 27
To
ta
l h
ea
lth
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
as
 
%
 
of
 
gr
os
s 
do
m
es
tic
 
pr
od
uc
t (G
DP
)
1995
2000
2005
2008
 
Source: WHO health for all database 
Graph 2: Public sector health expenditure as % of total health expenditure 
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A rising number of studies assert the emergence of a European health policy (Gerlinger & 
Urban, 2007; Greer, 2006; Hervey, 2002; Lamping & Steffen, 2004; Randall, 2000; Steffen, 
2005). This trend has been echoed in the official dialogue as well, as the Lisbon strategy 
explicitly advocates the modernisation of European social systems including health systems 
(Klusen, 2006).12 The rise of European health policy seems puzzling, as it challenges the 
previously outlined relationship between member states and the European Union in the policy 
field. The question arises, how such assessments could emerge and how the political reality 
could be adequately described. Since concepts and definitions of as well Europeanization as 
health policy might be the reason for the controversial finding of a European health policy, a 
brief reassessment of previous studies serves as a starting point.
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 Another health-relevant aspect of this strategy could be seen in the publication of EU health strategies by the 
Commission.  
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2.1 Europeanization of health policy – research, methods and definitions 
The number of studies on the influence of the EU on health policy has been rising slowly but 
constantly. Comparing recent contributions, the methodological closeness of these works 
becomes apparent. In depth case studies form the mainstream analytical approach, relying 
heavily on the discussion of official EU documents and legislation (Gerlinger & Urban, 2007; 
Hervey, 2002; Lamping & Steffen, 2004; Randall, 2000; Steffen, 2005). This document-based 
approach is occasionally complemented by interviews with relevant European and national 
level actors (Greer, 2006). Turning to the underlying concepts of Europeanization and health 
policy, the different studies reveal significant differences. Hans-Jürgen Urban and Thomas 
Gerlinger (2007) for example, define Europeanization as, the gradual expansion of European 
regulatory competencies in the field of prevention and the increased trend towards a market-
based organisation of health care systems built upon the four freedoms of the single market. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is singled out as the main driver of this development, 
limiting member states’ capacity in designing and reforming their national health care 
systems. In addition, Europeanization is seen in the establishment of European ideas and 
framing of problems. This trend becomes visible in the number of official publications lining 
out concrete benchmarks and targets for national reforms of health care systems increases. As 
the authors rightfully note, these publications have a non-binding character but still have an 
enormous leverage potential in context of the open method of coordination (2007: 136-137). 
Even though no clear definition of Europeanization is given by Urban and Gerlinger, the 
concept seems to be defined twofold: the increase of European competencies and the (harder 
to capture) emergence of a European agenda. Health policy is defined by two dimensions: 
prevention and the organisation of health care.  
A significantly broader definition of health policy is offered by Tamara Hervey analyzing the 
process of Europeanization of health policy from a judicial point of view (2002: 69): „Health 
policy is defined broadly ,and thus a number of areas of Community law may contribute to 
such an EU ‘health policy’ [original emphasis]“. As she highlights the contribution of other 
areas to health policy, the emphasis on spill over effects is evident. In line with the results of 
Urban and Gerlinger, Hervey stresses the connection between the realisation of the common 
market and the resulting limitations for national policy-making. Her analysis focuses mainly 
on changes in contractual frameworks and European competencies in the field of health, 
issued regulations and European case law. While no clear definition of Europeanization is 
provided by Hervey, the fragmented character of what is labelled European health policy 
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becomes evident: it is the sum of several spill over effects, including for example working 
time regulations which affect employees in the health sector (Hervey, 2002: 87).  
In contrast to the previously mentioned studies, the book edited by Wolfram Lamping, Stefan 
Lehto and Monika Steffen offers a distinct discussion of European health policy. In the 
introductory chapter Lamping and Steffen (2004) start with a non-finding: from their point of 
view no real European health policy exists. Upon closer review, this non-finding can be 
qualified: it is based on the fact that there is no European competence for the provision of 
medical services: „the EU is not a provider of services or an agency of distribution and re-
distribution, rather it primarily rules by regulation” (2004: 2). Using such restricted definition 
regarding the European level and its policy activities turns out to be rather problematic. If 
European policy were restricted to distributive and redistributive activities, European policy 
as a whole would be virtually nonexistent. The predominantly regulatory character of 
European policy has been acknowledged for quite some time, resulting in the much cited 
labelling of the European Union as a “regulatory state” (Majone, 1994b).  
Instead of distributional activities, it is the occurrence of regulatory activity that should be 
perceived as a proof of European policy. Interestingly enough, Lamping and Steffen continue 
to identify exactly the same general trend previous studies identified when they highlight the 
indirect nature of European health policy:  
“Given the fact that health policy and health care is an intrinsic and considerable part of the European 
market of goods and services, it is not surprising that large parts of it have meanwhile been affected by 
European policy-making via single market compatibility, co-ordination, and harmonization” (Lamping & 
Steffen, 2004: 2). 
The used definition of health policy is slender and consists of the two dimensions „‘public 
health’ (management of collective health risks) on the one hand and ‘health care’ (treatment 
of individual illness) on the other [original emphasis]” (2004: 5). A useful distinction is 
introduced with these two dimensions. While Europeanization in the aforementioned meaning 
is traceable in the public health dimension, the authors point out that such influence or 
tendency is very limited in the area of health care and mainly results from European Court’s 
activities (2004, 5). The authors identify the creation of the single market, public health crises 
as well as policy diffusion and European discourse as the main drivers of the development in 
public health (2004, 2).13 
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While no clear definitions of concepts are offered in his study, Ed Randall (2000) views the 
emergence of transnational  health crises, e.g. the case of BSE, as the trigger of a stronger 
European involvement in health matters. According to his research European activity is 
confined to the field of public health. As the previously cited authors, Randall stresses the 
piecemeal and haphazard character of Europeanization of health policy: 
“The development of the EU’s role in health policy has – for the most part – been opportunistic and 
accidental, in some cases serendipitous, and, in public health terms, largely ineffective. Opportunism has, 
however, been an essential ingredient for getting the EU health policy show on the road and keeping it 
there.” (2000: 139) 
The contribution by Scott L. Greer does not identify a European health policy in the sense of 
direct and active European level steering. Again, the indirect character of European health 
policy manifested in spill-over effects is emphasized: „If something got into health service, it 
came via a market. That is the basis on which EU powers not originally directed at health 
come to shape the environments of EU health systems, despite the explicit refusal of member 
states to create EU health service competencies“ (Greer, 2006: 145). The cited mechanism is 
exemplified by the impact of the Working Time Directive (93/104/EC) dating back to 1993. 
While the directive originally was drafted as an instrument for the completion of the single 
market regarding labour law, it had some serious consequences for national health policy. The 
main objective of the said directive was the improvement of working condition within the 
European Union in general, affecting employees in the health sector alike, expanding to 
doctors-in-training since 2000 (Sheldon, 2004). The negative consequences did not result 
from the original directive but from legal interpretation through the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) (Nowak, 2008). As the court decided to use a limited definition of working time, 
maximal working time for doctors were reduced extensively, with severe consequences for 
the provision of medical care (Greer, 2006: 141).  
Summing up the results of previous research, the finding of Europeanized health policy can be 
possibly attributed to the definitions used. There seems to be supportive evidence for the 
existence of European health policy claim as long as health policy is conceptualized as public 
health, and Europeanization is understood as an indirect spill-over rather than intentional 
process including the explicit transfer of competences. In light of such inclusive concepts, the 
controversial finding becomes less surprising. However, the evidence compiled by previous 
studies does not support a definitive conclusion concerning the question if a European health 
policy has emerged, is emerging or may start to emerge. Strictly speaking, no systematic 
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analysis of what could be understood as European health policy has been conducted by 
previous studies. To remedy this shortcoming, a more systematic analysis is needed. A 
precondition for such reassessment is a brief theoretical discussion of the key concepts 
Europeanization and health policy. 
  
2.2 Concepts of Europeanization 
The concept of Europeanization is a comparatively young and only partially established one 
within the wider field of research on the European Union (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 
2003: 34). In contrast to the broader notion of political integration, Europeanization has a 
narrower but at the same time multilayered focus. Rainer Eising identifies three different 
notions of the concept in EU research, varying in focus and the respective object of 
investigation (2003: 393). While the focus of Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James 
Caporaso (2001a) in defining Europeanization  is on the establishment of structures on the 
European level (1), Robert Ladrech (1994) focuses on the influence of European activity on 
domestic/national politics and the underlying logic of this development (2). The most 
complex and inclusive definition is offered by Claudio Radaelli (2000), including the 
emergence of institutions on the European level and the policy dynamics between the 
supranational and national under the term of Europeanization (3). In order to clarify the 
relation between the different notions one could organize the three perspectives on a common 
scale. While the influence on the national level (Ladrech) can be seen as the first step towards 
Europeanization, the emergence of structure (Risse and his colleagues) the final establishment 
of institutions on the European level and the resulting interaction between national and 
European level (Radaelli), can be understood as consecutive steps of this development. 
Understanding Europeanization in line with the concept developed by Thomas Risse and his 
colleagues, describing a process of emergence of specific structures on the European level, the 
finding of Europeanization of health policy seems to be supported by little evidence: There 
are no significant and established structures defined by a regulatory framework on EU level 
which would serve as a proof of such a process (Steffen et al., 2005: 5).14 
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DG focusing on monitoring and the development of strategies.   
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Graph 3: Different notions of Europeanization 
 
Source: author’s own 
Applying the concept of Ladrech, and in a more limited sense the concept of Radaelli, 
speaking of an Europeanization in health policy is at least theoretically possible. Even though 
the previously discussed studies do not explicitly refer to these authors, they seem to adopt 
their concepts. Europeanization is thus conceptualized as European influence on national 
policy even if no „distinct structure of governance“ (Risse et al., 2001a: 2) exist. An 
alternative differentiation of Europeanization developed in context of European health policy 
is offered by Monika Steffen, Wolfram Lamping und Juhani Lehto (2005, 4-8). They propose 
at least five distinct perspectives on Europeanization: 
• A traditional perspective, conceptualizing Europeanization as the emergence of institutions and 
directly binding political decisions at the European level. 
• A transformative perspective which focuses on the changes in national institutional structures and 
policy styles caused by European influence.15  
• A political perspective, viewing Europeanisation as the result of a complex interactive process of 
mutual alignment and shifting of topics between the two levels.  
• A constructivist perspective which focuses on the transfer of ideas and framing of problems leading 
to a change in perception of issues on the national level.   
• A restructuring perspective, identifying Europeanization as a change in national opportunity 
structures through European influence, which may change the national rules of the game and 
coalitions of actors.   
The key difference of the presented perspectives can be attributed to the conception of the 
relationship between the national and the European level. While the second perspective 
conceptualizes the national level as a dependent variable, all other perspectives focus on the 
processes of transfer between the two levels. Conceptualizing interaction of the two levels this 
way seems to describe reality more adequate. A balance of power rather than a clear 
subordination between the member states and the federal European level exists, even though it 
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 The term transformative has not been used by Steffen and her colleagues, but was supplemented to increase 
consistency.   
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is a contested one (Haltern, 2005: 113). A second distinction can be based on the degree of 
institutionalisation with different levels of consolidation corresponding to a narrower 
definition of Europeanization. Conceptualizing Europeanization from such procedural 
perspective avoids the risk of mislabelling such tendencies as Europeanization. It is 
reasonable to assume that the emergence of a European discourse represents the precursor of 
Europeanization of a given policy field. The emergence of discourse might be interpreted as 
heralding signs of Europeanization, even though the next steps in the process might not 
follow automatically. To speak of European policy however, would presume that these 
consecutive steps actually have taken place. Therefore, Europeanization as defined in this 
study is limited to direct and targeted intervention of the European level. Using such a 
definition, the concept is able to discriminate between EU influences limiting national room 
to manoeuvre (even accidentally) and the explicit intentional intervention in a specific policy 
field. 
 
2.3 Demarking European policy fields: the case of health policy 
A fundamental conceptual problem for the analysis of European policy fields is the proper 
demarcation, depicting the conceptual clarification of what constitutes a policy field. 
Acknowledging this problem, Kennet Lyngaard (2007: 294) recently proposed a definition. 
According to his definition four main characteristics are relevant: Based on a common topic (1), 
a group of actors (2) operate within a distinct institutional and procedural setting (3) which 
could be distinguished from other (identical) systems (4). While offering a simple and 
comprehensive conceptualisation the contribution to reduce the problem of demarcation is 
limited. In the case of health policy, defining the common topic already proves to be complex. 
Looking at the public debate, the concept falls prey to two truncations (Gerlinger & 
Rosenbrock, 2006: 12). First of all, health policy is limited to the concept of (individual) 
health care. Secondly, the discussion is dominated by expenditure and cost cutting in health 
services while the larger implications of health policy on society and the measures taken to 
improve public health are neglected. To clarify the underlying common topic of health policy, 
existing definitions of health policy must be reviewed. A typology developed by Steffen, 
Lamping and Lehto (2005: 8-10) defines a concept which consists of five different 
characteristics or meanings of health policy. 
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1. „Policies that focus on the development of medical care, and the organisation of healthcare systems. [...] 
This part of the subject may be called medical care policy.“ 
2. „In a broader context, the focus tends to be on the social security system and the regime of social 
protection in the case of sickness. [...] This part of the subject may be called social security policy 
covering sickness.“ 
3. „Health policies may also be viewed from the perspective of health determinants such as work and 
living conditions, environment, traffic safety, nutrition, smoking and physical exercise, in addition to 
health education, vaccinations and screenings [...] this global public health approach could be called 
health system policy.“ 
4. „From the perspective of the economic interests related to this area, health policies may also be seen as 
policies creating growth potential for health-related industry.“ 
5. „Quite often, policies with other primary goals may also promote health. [...] In addition to policies, 
activities and institutions that have health as their primary goal, the concept could also cover those that 
have an impact on health, even if it’s only a secondary or tertiary goal or no goal at all of the considered 
policy, activity or institution [...] This dimension of health policy should be recognized as policies with 
health impact. [original emphasis]” 
Against the backdrop of Lyngaard’s definition, the object of investigation can now be 
clarified. Following from this definition the policy field health would only include the 
characteristics of medical care policy (1) and health system policy (3) while the other three 
characteristics would fall outside a strict definition of health policy. Using a narrow definition 
seems to be of great importance, as one of the main problems of health policy research in the 
European context is the tendency to use elusive concepts.  
Such conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970) can result in impure definitions of the concept and 
runs the risks to include components which are not constitutive to the concept. Conceptual 
stretching constitutes a problem for the definition of national policy fields and European 
policy alike. While the argument of spill over effects may justify the usage of broader 
concepts, using a definition as broad as the one proposed by Steffen and her colleagues would 
include aspects of social policy (2), industrial policy (4) or, as in the case of policies with 
health impact (5), any political activity with an immediate influence on health policy. As a 
result, the concept would become useless as an analytical tool. This is not to say that spill 
over effects do not influence national policy discretion and the operation of health care 
systems. It is true that a lot of European influence happens indirectly, but the need to 
distinguish between the Europeanization of policy fields and European influence on national 
policy remains. While European influence in general is conceptualized in a broader way 
including spill over effects, Europeanization is treated as distinct in this context. If the 
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purpose of a definition is to grasp the conceptual core, a definition of health policy should be 
build upon the two core components of the term: the organisation of healthcare systems 
(medical care policy) and the safeguarding of public health (health system policy). It includes 
only those aspects aiming primarily at the common topic of health. Furthermore, it reduces 
the concept of health policy to direct (and intentional) intervention. In congruence with this 
concept, the health policy model of Gerlinger and Rosenbrock (2006) consists of two 
dimensions: prevention (“Prävention”) and a system of medical treatment or health care 
(“System der Krankenversorgung”).16 The first dimension of prevention resembles the 
concept health system policy, while the second dimension entails most elements of the 
concept of medical care policy. In terms of sequence, prevention takes place before health is 
negatively affected. Health policy in terms of prevention therefore entails all societal or 
political efforts aiming at the protection of public health in general (Baggott, 2000). Turning 
to the definition of the second dimension of health policy, Gerlinger and Rosenbrock (2006) 
identify five relevant subfields: health insurance (Krankenvesicherung), ambulatory care 
(ambulante Versorgung), inpatient treatment (Stationäre Versorgung), supply of 
pharmaceuticals (Arzneimittelversorgung) and care (Pflege). According to this 
characterization, the dimension organisation of healthcare systems contains the provision and 
steering of the defined areas and services. In contrast to prevention, the second dimension 
predominantly deals with issues concerning the improvement of an already negatively 
affected health. This two-dimensional definition of health policy offers a clear-cut yet 
sufficiently complex concept. It allows for the differentiation between health policy in a 
narrow sense and political decisions in general which might influence health policy even 
though health policy is not their primary focus.  
 
2.4 Quantitative re-analysis of the European health policy claim 
As previously stated, the majority of studies on European health policy employ case studies 
and descriptions of single events. The qualitative focus represents a general tendency within 
the broader field of European studies comprised of detailed case studies in policy fields, 
European regulatory activity and the national reactions to these European influences (Majone, 
1996b, 1992; Windhoff-Héritier, 2001; Windhoff-Héritier & Knill, 2000). Case studies are 
very useful to track short term developments and the testing of integration theories, but their 
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 The high congruence between the two concepts could as well be seen as an external concept validation.  
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usefulness is more limited in tracing general tendencies mainly consisting of incremental 
changes over a long period of time. In order to trace the existence and expansion of 
Europeanization of policy fields a quantitative analysis of European (legislative) activity 
seems to represent a more promising research design complementing qualitative research. 
Such an assessment can draw on the (economic) study of Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni 
and Ludger Schuhknecht (2005). While the focus of their study is the analysis of European 
activity regarding its responsiveness to public demands and preference their method of 
measuring European activity – a comparison of the number of issued documents and legal 
acts – can easily be transferred to the present research question.17  
The following analysis tries to track the emergence of a European health policy 
operationalised through an increase in the number of legal acts directly linked to the issue of 
health. Health policy is defined as all activities aiming primarily at health. Activities that have 
an influence on health policy or the management of health in general, while being focused 
primarily on a different policy objective are excluded from this definition. It therefore 
excludes spill over effects, as they should not be considered as intentional policy intervention 
in a strict sense. Furthermore, an exclusive definition of Europeanization is applied, as only 
legally binding activities are included. The general advantage of such a definition is a higher 
discriminatory power between actual activity in the sense of legislation or judicial activity 
and all other activities that could be labelled as soft coordination and steering e.g. official 
communications and position papers. Even though these soft instruments may often serve as a 
pre-stage for later legislative activity in line with a gradual understanding of Europeanization, 
this is by no means an automatism. The previous considerations can be merged into two 
hypotheses which will be tested in the following analysis.  
1. Europeanization of health policy should be traceable through an increase in European (secondary) law 
focusing primarily on health. 
2. European health policy in a broader sense should be traceable in all relevant sub-dimensions of health 
policy. 
 
2.4.1 Operationalisation of Europeanization 
Logically, the attempt to quantify Europeanization starts on the most basic level: the level of 
the treaties. The treaties basically codify the competencies and responsibilities of the 
                                                 
17
 A general discussion on the usefulness and usability of the proposed approach can be found in Alesina, 
Angeloni and Schuhknecht (2005). 
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European Union and the respective institutions (Herdegen, 2007: 69). An analytical problem 
regarding the analysis of contractual competencies is that they are contingent upon the 
respective interpretation of the treaties and „if one takes an extensive interpretation of the 
Treaties, the EU seems to have some say in almost all policy areas“ (Alesina et al., 2005: 
279). Furthermore, European activity is not confined to the laid down competencies in the 
treaties. In fact, the European Union is active in areas where its competencies are at best 
vaguely defined (2005: 279). What has to be developed is an analytical distinction between 
competencies and activities. If the focus of the assessment is to track the competencies of the 
Union, it has to be based on the treaties. However, if the focus is on factual activity of the 
European Union such analysis has to go beyond the narrow focus of the treaties. In order to 
track the degree of Europeanization in a given policy field, the research focus has to be 
shifted. Rather than focusing on the competencies codified in the treaties, the activities of the 
European institutions, especially the Commission and the ECJ, should be reviewed. 
Regarding their activities, analysis should focus on the different instruments of secondary 
law, non-binding declarations and case law. According to Alesina and his colleagues the 
following instruments should be differentiated and considered: 
”1. Regulations contain general provisions, fully binding vis-a-vis all parties in all member states. They 
are directly applicable without need for national implementation; 
2. Directives are binding vis-a-vis all member states addressed. They specify the results to be achieved 
but leave member states the choice of form and methods to implement them. They need not apply to all 
member states (although they usually do) and are rather general, often specifying outcomes that national 
measures are supposed to attain;  
3. Decisions are binding vis-a-vis all parties addressed. They may be addressed to one, several, or all 
parties or member states. They can be very specific, like administrative acts, or rather general; 
4. In addition, the EU Commission issues a number of ‘softer’ acts, or documents, of non-binding 
nature. Occasionally, particularly when new policy initiatives are envisaged, the Commission publishes 
White Papers to outline their legislative strategies. [original emphasis]” (2005: 287) 
In light of the previous discussion on the definition of health policy and Europeanization, 
non-binding documents and the other instruments mentioned in the fourth point should be 
excluded. Turning to the measurement, the number of relevant European documents is 
counted. More specifically, relevant legislation is counted. While this may only serve as a 
proxy measure, it provides a basic insight into European activity in particular policy fields. 
Compared to the predominantly qualitative approach used in European studies the presented 
method enables the tracking of changes over longer periods of time in an intuitive and 
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comprehensive way. This sensitivity regarding developments over time seems to be especially 
useful in order to trace the emergence of European policy fields.  
Data was retrieved from the EUR-Lex data base (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/). The inbuilt search 
function can be used to identify previously defined documents. Based on the concept of 
Gerlinger and Rosenbrock (2006), two dimensions and five sub dimensions can be singled 
out, each representing a distinct feature of health policy. The originally developed sub 
dimension of Care was left out, as a search based on this term would yield results hard to 
interpret.18 Furthermore, the concept of Care is partially covered in the dimensions of 
ambulatory care. The site search option provides two different search modes. Either, 
documents are identified based on the title or on title and text. Both methods are used in the 
following computation. Additionally, the search function for key terms can be limited to 
specific types of documents. The search of secondary legislation was conducted based on the 
three different types of documents: Regulations, Directives and Decisions. Another 
specification of the simple search is reached by organizing the results over time. To improve 
the usability and comprehensibility of the computation, the total period of examination 
spanning from the 1970 until 2008 was split into five year intervals. Thus the last interval 
includes only 3-years - a fact that has to be taken into account when it comes to the 
interpretation of the results.19  
Graph 4: Specified concept of health policy  
 
Source: author’s own based on Gerlinger & Rosenbrock (2006) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Using the search term results in a large number of hits not related to health policy. 
19
 To ensure the replicability of the computation, the process is exemplified in the appendix (A.1). 
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2.4.2 Computation results 
A first overview of the general development of European level legislative activity is given in 
the following table displaying the total number of documents produced between 1970 and 
2008.  
Results at this highly aggregated level already show a continuous expansion of overall 
European legislative activity. The expansion is especially evident in the case of regulations 
with the number of regulations issued between 1970-1975 doubling in the period between 
1991 and 1995. Focusing on the initial research question, all relevant documents regarding 
health policy in general are counted.  
Table 1: European legislative activity (1970-2008) 
Period 1970-1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2008 
Total documents 33439 38505 51066 62772 73444 86211 83834 40581 
Legislation 
Regulations 6246 8224 8659 10411 12114 16512 14186 6774 
Directives 385 644 653 793 1011 1146 1144 936 
Source: Eur-lex 
The database is evaluated based on the outlined process using the search term health.20 The 
results of the computation are shown in tables two and three. Both search modes support the 
first two formulated hypothesises. A clear trend towards more activity is traceable at least 
since the beginning of the 1980s. Changes have been most significant regarding regulations as 
the number of issued documents doubled in the period from 2001-2005. Generally speaking, 
European health policy measured in the broad sense of European activity obviously seems to 
exist. The trend manifests itself in a rise of legislation thus confirming the importance of the 
legislative actors in the expansion of European competencies beyond the contractual agreed 
competencies. However, the explanatory power of this highly aggregated analysis should not 
be overstated. This reservation holds especially true for the results of computations based on 
                                                 
20
 The search was run using both full text and title analysis, as the two possibilities reflect different premises: 
Using full text will naturally result in a higher number of counted documents, offering a stronger support for 
the general hypothesis that an expansion of European influence in the field of health policy has happened. 
Restricting search to the title, will result in a more exact result: if the relevant term is already mentioned in the 
title, the chance of a wrong classification of documents is reduced as one could reasonably expect that using 
the word in the title assigns greater weight and meaning to it. 
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title and full text and calls for a cautious interpretation of the results. The computation merely 
provides an overview of the growth of the usage of the term health throughout time. 
Nevertheless, the used approach offers an approximate quantitative analysis of the process of 
Europeanization. Using title search the results could be reasonably expected to represent a 
change in importance of health as a political issue for the European political actors. 
Table 2: Legislation: health (title search) 
  
1970-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2008 
Legislation 
Regulations 6246 8224 8659 10411 12114 16512 14186 6774 
Health 1 0 2 5 9 6 20 28 
Directive 385 644 653 793 1011 1146 1144 936 
Health 25 23 26 47 80 49 32 23 
Decisions 2052 3485 3148 3448 4944 5950 6435 4568 
Health 9 63 109 90 197 175 265 108 
Source: Eur-lex 
Table 3: Legislation; health (title and full text search) 
  
1970-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2008 
Legislation   
Regulations 6246 8224 8659 10411 12114 16512 14186 6774 
Health 21 37 114 192 265 278 655 628 
Directives 385 644 653 793 1011 1146 1144 936 
Health 25 123 149 247 366 357 478 330 
Decisions 2052 3485 3148 3448 4944 5950 6435 4568 
Health 17 115 455 470 1075 1279 1762 1271 
Source: Eur-lex 
Since the previously identified trend is evident in this case as well, the initially forwarded 
claim of an increase in European activity seems to be supported. In order to verify the third 
hypothesis and investigate the form and content of the supposed Europeanization of health 
matters, the mode of analysis has to be modified and differentiated further. Differentiation is 
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achieved by combining the used approach and the concept of health policy as outlined in the 
previous sections. By conducting a detailed analysis, the claim of a European health policy 
can be tested.21 Looking at the aggregated results of the restrictive computation, focusing on 
document titles, an interesting picture emerges: The dominant trend at the higher level of 
aggregation only incorporating the concept of health seems to disappear in the more detailed 
computation of legislative activity.22 
Graph 5: Legislative activity: health dimensions (1970-2008) (title search) 
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Source: Eur-lex; Note: A logarithmic scale was used.  
While there are virtually no results for most sub-dimensions, only the pharmaceutical sub-
dimension yields results, hereby even outnumbering regulations that contain the term health 
in several periods.23 The computation thus points to an increased direct involvement of the 
European level in pharmaceutical matters. The second hypothesis is obviously not supported 
by the data. Using the inclusive search, the results change only slightly. In addition to the 
trend within the sub dimension pharmaceuticals, a rising number of documents can be traced 
within the dimension of public health and the sub dimension of prevention. This pattern is 
unsurprising, as the search terms used are not limited to the field of health policy but represent 
                                                 
21
 The same method was used and the search was conducted using both the restrictive and the inclusive 
alternative. Based on the underlying logic of the health policy concept a knotted search was employed, 
counting documents, which addressed one dimension and one sub-dimension e.g. public health and 
prevention. 
22
 For the detailed results regarding legislative activity see the appendix (A.2).   
23
  However, the comparatively high level is at least partially explained by the use of three different terms to 
operationalise the same sub dimension.   
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issues familiar to a vast array of policy fields. It points to one of the major limitations of the 
proposed approach. 
Graph 6: Legislative activity: health dimensions (1970-2008) (title and full text 
search) 
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Source: Eur-lex 
While the method can be used to track the changes in frequency, the usage of words and their 
literal sense and meaning in a specific context cannot be traced by using single word search. 
This limitation is especially important in the case of a full text search as the matter of context 
becomes increasingly relevant.24 In addition, the explanatory power of the inclusive search 
mode compared to the restrictive one is diminished by the higher basic probability to find the 
specific term in a given document. One possibility to remedy this shortcoming is the 
combination of search terms in order to reduce the number of wrong attributions. 
Furthermore, the quantitative approach could be supplemented by qualitative text-analysis of 
the respective legal documents to reconfirm and validate the results. However, such an 
approach is much more complex and the respective costs clearly exceed those associated to 
the presented quantitative approach. Since the main focus of this study is not on an in-depth 
discussion of European health policy the presented crude measure can be regarded as 
sufficient. Against this backdrop, the restrictive search seems to be the more appropriate 
approach, since the context seems to be of lesser importance in this case. The titles of specific 
legal documents consists of a limited number of words, the probability of a wrong attribution 
decreases significantly. 
                                                 
24
 The issue of context is a general problem of text based quantitative methods. See, for example, the discussion 
on the Wordfish approach (Proksch & Slapin, 2009) 
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2.5 Conclusion: Clarifying the puzzle of European health policy  
As it was outlined at the beginning of this chapter, an increasing number of authors identify 
the emergence of a European health policy. These results were challenged based on the 
current legal framework as outlined in the treaties blocking the shift of competencies to the 
European level. Moreover, the field has been identified as a key area of state activity and has 
traditionally been treated as a reserved domain of member states. It turned out that the studies 
shared relatively broad concepts of health policy, including activities primarily from other 
policy fields while causing spill-over effects on health policy. A second common feature of 
the studies discussed is the approach used to support the basic claim. Researchers use case 
studies and discuss singular events in order to find evidence for the emergence of a long-term 
development. European health policy thus is deflected from single events and decisions. 
Against this backdrop, the true nature of what was called a European health policy could be 
delineated further. What is traceable is an increase of indirect European influence limiting 
member states' room to manoeuvre. The reduction of discretion for member states should, 
however, not be confused with the emergence of a European health policy. What is missing is 
direct and intentional activity on the European level, focusing exclusively on the issue of 
health. This perception has been confirmed by computation pointing to a rise of importance of 
the health topic on the European agenda. However, the existence of a European health policy, 
including all relevant dimensions of the concept was disconfirmed. Legislative activity 
regarding the topic of health increased considerably, yet the development is only traceable on 
a very general level and should not be confused with the emergence of a European health 
policy in a general sense. For most constitutive elements of health policy, no activity is 
measurable. Instead of a European health policy, a European pharmaceutical policy has 
emerged. While this finding helps to clarify the puzzle of European health policy, it is in itself 
puzzling. On first sight, a strong European influence in this field is less surprising since in 
contrast to health policy, pharmaceuticals are first and foremost tradable goods. The 
harmonisation and completion of the single market could be understood as a catalyst of 
European activity exempting the pharmaceuticals from the reserved domain of national health 
policy. While this explains the easier access of the European level, the expansion of 
competencies still needs some further clarification. As pharmaceuticals constitute one of the 
key levers regarding the financing of national health systems, simply accepting increased 
European influence interpreted as less national policy discretion seems to be counter inductive 
from a member states perspective.  
3.  Re-theorizing the delegation of pharmaceutical risk regulation 
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The discussion of the research on European health policy conducted in the previous chapter 
revealed an interesting finding: while no European health policy in broader terms is traceable, 
a European pharmaceutical policy has emerged over the last four decades. Considering the 
focus of pharmaceutical policy however, the emergence of European level policy activities, 
raises question(s) similar to the case of health policy.  
 
3.1 Defining pharmaceutical policy 
Pharmaceutical policy can be conceptualized by applying different approaches. One option to 
clarify the boundaries of the policy field could be seen in the different policy objectives 
influencing pharmaceutical policy. Govin Permanand distinguishes three policy objectives: 
“public health policy (drug quality, safety and efficacy); healthcare (financing and reimbursing 
medicines); and, in some countries industrial policy (ensuring a successful and productive 
pharmaceutical sector)” (2006: 4). All three objectives directly refer to pharmaceuticals as a 
product. While pharmaceutical policy is defined as a dimension of health policy, this 
definition point to the coeval notions of consumer and industrial policy. Pharmaceutical policy 
can be conceptualized either as drug safety policy, as drug financing policy or as competition 
policy. These different possibilities of interpretation reveal the possible tensions and potential 
tradeoffs within pharmaceutical policy, between the aims of safety and financing on the one 
side and the aim of industrial policy on the other (Valverde, 2006). An alternative approach is 
offered by Vittorio Fattorusso (1979) focusing on the aim of pharmaceutical policy. Based on 
the concept of a pharmaceutical supply system, including all activities regarding the supply of 
medicine to the population, pharmaceutical policy focuses on its’ improvement. In essence, 
pharmaceutical policy should ensure “to render accessible to the whole population the most 
effective and safe pharmaceutical products of established quality at reasonable cost” (1979: 1-
2). While the issue of industrial policy is excluded in this definition, the author highlights its 
importance, since: “it is not uncommon, to find that drug policies are directed mainly towards 
industrial and trade development and sometimes contradictory policies exist independently 
[…] in different sectors of the government” (1979: 2). A third definition of pharmaceutical 
policy is provided by Rob Summers focusing on the purpose of pharmaceutical policy which 
“generally aims to make safe and efficacious drugs available and affordable to the entire 
population, and to ensure that they are used appropriately by prescribers, dispensers and 
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patients” (2004: 89). Summers emphasizes that the most important components of 
pharmaceutical policy are drug legislation and regulation, since privately organized and 
informal control of this sector is insufficient.25 Such regulation ought to include “the 
manufacture, purchase, donation, import, export, distribution, supply, information, advertising 
and sale of drugs, and monitoring of adverse reactions” (2004: 98). While his definition can be 
rendered as rather inclusive, it reflects the same basic goals expressed in the previously cited 
definitions. Moreover, it points to predominant regulatory character of pharmaceutical policy.  
Drawing on previous definitions, this study defines pharmaceutical policy as all (political) 
activities aiming at the provision of safe medicine to the public. Pharmaceutical policy is thus 
organized along the chain of production starting with the development of a medicinal product 
and ending with its consumption. Pharmaceutical policy therefore entails both aspects of safety 
and financing, revealing the political salience and societal importance of the policy field.    
 
3.2 The political relevance of pharmaceutical policy: costs and risks 
Governments take a key role in the pharmaceutical supply system, the financing of 
consumption and the provision of access to medicine. In the last decades, the majority of 
European member states were confronted with rising healthcare and pharmaceutical costs, 
growing faster than their gross national product (Ess et al., 2003: 90-91). As data by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) indicates, the average share of pharmaceutical expenditure on the 
overall health budget in the EU 15 is growing, even though subject to variation on the member 
state level.26 In fact, the data used is under-estimating the real dimension of expenditure, since 
it only includes expenditure on pharmaceuticals bought in pharmacies (WHO, 2006). Given 
the fact, that pharmaceuticals constitute a main component of inpatient treatment and inpatient 
care is mainly financed through public funds, the eventual public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals can be expected to be much higher.27 Looking at the per capita 
pharmaceutical expenditure within the EU 15, the increasing financial pressure on healthcare 
system emerges regarding pharmaceutical consumption becomes apparent.  
 
                                                 
25
 In line with former studies on the sector, the terms pharmaceuticals, drugs and medicinal products are used 
synonymously.    
26
  Obviously, the fact that the pharmaceutical share of the health care budget is growing could be partially 
explained by cuts in other forms of health care. However, as it will be shown below, the absolute figures are 
rising in the countries as well. 
27
 In 2005, public expenditure of total inpatient expenditure in the EU 15 countries covered in the HFA-DB 
database was between 83,8% (Austria) and 97,1% (Sweden) (WHO, 2006). Moreover, treatments 
administered under surveillance (in hospitals) can be expected to be more expensive.  
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 Graph 7: Pharmaceutical expenditure EU 15 (in % of total health expenditure)  
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Source: WHO European health for all database (HFA-DB); Note: * No data for 1980 was available for Austria and Italy. ** Since 
no value for 2005 for Belgium and the Netherlands was available, values from 2004 (Belgium) and 2002 (Netherlands) were 
supplemented. 
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Graph 8: Pharmaceutical expenditure in the five biggest European markets 
1980-2008 (PPP$ per capita) 
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Source: WHO European health for all database (HFA-DB); Note: EU 15 has been calculated based on national values. In 1980 
and 1985, no data was available for Austria, Italy and Luxembourg. Data for Luxembourg and for the Netherlands was also 
missing for 2005 and 2008. In several cases data was supplemented by drawing on preceding years.   
Both in the largest five national pharmaceutical markets and the EU 15 as a whole there has 
been a continuous rise in per capita consumption. In light of decreasing tax revenues and rising 
health expenditures, governments in Europe developed individual strategies to provide 
medicine at reasonable costs and keep health budgets balanced.  
Table 4: EU 15 public pharmaceutical expenditure as % of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure (1980-2005) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Austria 52,2 58,4 66,7 64,3 
Belgium* 46,8 43,0 48,9 54,2 
Denmark 34,2 48,6 48,7 55,8 
Finland 47,4 47,6 48,1 52,3 
France 61,9 63,0 66,9 69,4 
Germany 73,1 71,0 72,5 73,6 
Greece 56,7 70,9 62,9 72,9 
Ireland 64,8 62,8 63,9 70,5 
Italy 60,5 38,5 44,6 49,7 
Luxembourg 84,6 81,7 81,6 83,5 
Netherlands** 66,6 88,8 58,3 57,2 
Portugal 62,3 63,3 56,2 57,5 
Spain 71,7 71,1 73,5 72,0 
Sweden 71,7 73,4 70,0 60,4 
United Kingdom 66,6 63,5 78,4 83,3 
EU 15 average 61,4 63,0 62,7 65,1 
Source: WHO European health for all database (HFA-DB); Note: * data for 2000 was not available for Belgium. An estimate was 
calculated based on the values from 1997 and 2003. ** Data for 2005 for the Netherlands represents 2002.   
 
3.2 The political relevance of pharmaceutical policy: costs and risks 
 
 
 
33 
 
Despite the common interest in cost-containment, national health authorities have adopted 
different supply and demand based mechanisms to achieve these goals, representing a major 
obstacle to European integration (Hutton, 1994). The national interest and measures taken may 
at times conflict with European priorities as in the case of cost containment versus market 
liberalization (Permanand & Altenstetter, 2004: 41). 
Given these divergent interests, the willingness of member states to grant European influence 
in the field of pharmaceutical policy ought to be very limited. Beyond the autonomy of 
financing a second reason for the sensitivity of pharmaceutical policy flows from the specific 
characteristic of pharmaceuticals as potentially harmful products. While the regulation of cost 
represents an important activity to ensure access for their citizens, governments must engage 
in activities to protect their citizens from the potential adverse effects and risks connected to 
the consumption of pharmaceuticals as one of the key responsibilities of governments is to 
protect its citizens from harm. Clearly, this task goes well beyond the field of pharmaceutical 
policy. It relates to the responsibility of governments in more general terms and its crucial role 
in the field of risk regulation (Hood et al., 1999; Scheu, 2003). Even if this might be a 
dramatization, the prime raison d’être of the state is to guarantee the safety of its citizens. It 
thus represents the basis of its legitimacy, conceptualizing the state as a guardian and 
“Schutzstaat” (Stoll, 2003: 5). Obviously, this concept conceives the state as a sovereign, 
primarily keeping individuals from harming each other rather than saving them from more 
abstract risks threatening society. Therefore, the function of the state providing safety rather 
than (only) peace seems to be limited. Nevertheless, the principle idea has been adopted in 
contemporary constitutional law, viewing the provision of safety as one of the key functions of 
the modern state, while at the same time expanding the notion of safety beyond its initial 
meaning (Stoll, 2003: 4). Today, citizens in risk societies (Beck, 1996) expect their 
governments to protect them from the multitude of risks and uncertainties that modern life 
provides. The modern state is thus confronted with a more complex task. Governments have to 
react to public demands by providing adequate policies. Given the central importance of 
protection as a core task of the state, the fulfilment of these demands is directly linked to the 
legitimacy of the state and government more specifically. If legislators fail to provide adequate 
policies, public support and therefore state legitimacy are most likely to erode (Majone, 1999). 
Since democratic governments need legitimacy and public support in order to survive in the 
political game, shifting powers to the European level could result in a reduced room to 
manoeuvre. The choice of policies to achieve safety and therefore generate legitimacy will be 
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effectively reduced by European influence and harmonisation measures, as this has been the 
case in other areas (Börzel, 2002; Risse et al., 2001b; Scharpf, 2002). Considering the 
implications for national autonomy both from the perspective of financing and regulation of 
risk, Europeanization of pharmaceutical policy should be rather improbable. First, a higher 
degree of Europeanization promoting free markets would render state intervention in pricing 
and cost containment as market distortions.28 Second, the provision of safety represents one of 
the key functions of the modern state and its realization serves as an important source of 
legitimacy. Constituencies preferring national over European regulation serve as an additional 
reason for this position. While the influence of the European level grew constantly in many 
areas, public trust in the capabilities of the European Union to govern effectively did not 
(Hooghe, 2003; Kaase, 1999; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005). As voters could be expected to 
oppose deeper integration in some areas, member state governments should adopt a reluctant 
stance towards such decisions. 
 
3.3 The puzzle of European pharmaceutical policy 
Given the identified implications for member states, the Europeanization of pharmaceutical 
policy comes as a surprise. A closer look at the results of the computation conducted in the 
second chapter, clarifies this paradox from the perspective of financing. While legislative 
activity regarding pharmaceuticals was high compared to other aspects of health policy, 
European activity focuses almost exclusively on safety aspects while leaving the issue of 
financing of pharmaceutical consumption untouched.  
The identified regulations mainly addressed general questions related to the trade in 
pharmaceuticals and questions regarding market authorisation. Released directives mainly 
cover the approximation of testing standards regarding pharmaceutical safety, good 
manufacturing and clinical practice and market authorisation. The only notable exception in 
this regard has been directive No. 89/105/EEC, addressing the transparency of measures 
regulating the prices for medicinal product. As in the case of health policy, European 
pharmaceutical policy must therefore be described as fragmented rather than holistic. In fact, it 
would be even more precise to characterize European pharmaceutical policy as safety or risk 
regulation in the first place. This might explain why member states at least not actively oppose 
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 European governments can draw such conclusions from other regulatory and policy fields, for example 
environmental policy (Jordan, 2002) or economic policy (Schmidt, 2002b), where Europeanization has been 
more advanced. 
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European activity since it does not interfere with the national autonomy regarding the 
financing of pharmaceutical expenditure. However, the question why member states would be 
willing to give up their autonomy in the area of pharmaceutical safety still remains 
unanswered. As previously stated, the importance of this question is going beyond the narrow 
field of pharmaceutical regulation. The general question is, why states delegate competencies 
in sensitive regulatory fields especially in the field of risk regulation, a trend that has not gone 
unnoticed(Alemanno, 2008a, 2008b; Klinke et al., 2006; Vogel, 2001, 2003; Vos, 2008). In 
order to derive an answer to this question one can turn to the rich body of literature on the 
subject starting on the most general theoretical level of European Integration. 
 
3.3.1 Explaining delegation and shifting of competencies in the European context 
European integration constitutes a research field of its own within European studies and is 
characterized by constant evolution. Most of the theories originated from the field of 
international relations and therefore do not exclusively focus on the European development. 
Nevertheless, they all share a common cognitive interest in describing the European 
integration process. Especially in the case of the two main schools of European integration 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, this interest focuses on the larger developments 
and integration steps on the European level.  
Classical studies on the European integration process offer two competing explanations, why 
integration and a shift of competencies to the European level take place. While 
neofunctionalist accounts stress the importance of the European institutions as driving factors 
and characterize integration as a self-sustaining process, intergovernmentalists view the 
member states in the driver seat of further integration (Pollack, 2000). Unfortunately, due to 
the procedural focus neither of the two theories provides an (explicit) explanation for the 
reasons of initial integration. 
While Ernst B. Haas (1958) as the most prominent representative of neo-functionalism focuses 
on the interdependency of nation state rather than on their interests and motivation for 
integration (Wolf, 2006: 67), representatives of intergovernmentalism focus on the state. 
Accordingly, at least a functional explanation is offered by intergovernmentalism. Integration 
and collaboration takes place, “when joint actions produce better results, for each member, 
than ‘uncoordinated individual calculations of self-interest’.[original emphasis]” (Hoffmann, 
1982: 33-34). However, the preferences of the state and how these preferences are formed 
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remain concealed in this explanation. This blind spot of European integration was remedied 
soon after. Starting from the premises of intergovernmentalism and liberal theory Andrew 
Moravcsik introduced a model of preferences underlying state action. In his view, integration 
could be explained by a combination of member states’ preferences and interstate strategic 
interaction (1993: 482).29 The basic dynamics of preference formation on the domestic level 
are easily traceable:  
“The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this 
requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose 
views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political 
representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to 
international negotiations.“ (Moravcsik, 1993: 483) 
But how does this mechanism serve as an explanation beyond economic integration, the main 
focus of Moravcsik’s enquiry, for example regarding sectoral integration and the growth of 
European regulation? He emphasizes the need for collective action as a reason for the 
Europeanization of regulation. If domestic policies are not capable to solve domestic problems 
because of interference from foreign governments, incentives for coordination arise. Such 
coordination will most likely involve the transfer of certain powers to a supranational actor 
(1993: 492). The preferences for coordination result from societal pressure, pushing 
governments into a certain direction. In some way liberal intergovernmentalism could be seen 
as precursor of the shift from the neofunctionalist/intergovernmentalist divide towards a 
rationalist/constructivist debate. 
With this shift in debate the question of how was replaced by the question of why integration, 
or – to use a term central to rational choice theory – delegation to a supranational actor takes 
place. Rational choice approaches, especially rational institutionalism, therefore gained 
popularity among scholars of European integration.30 One advantage compared to previous 
grand theories can be seen in the higher degree of sensitivity. Rational choice can be applied 
to both large integration steps as well as to incremental change at the European level and in 
different sectors. Within rational choice theory, Principal Agent theory (P-A) serves as a 
“common anchoring” (Tallberg, 2002b: 24) of existing literature, studying delegation. 
Member states act as principals delegating power to an agent, in this case the institutions of the 
                                                 
29
 Even though Moravcsik rejected the underlying concepts of neo-functionalism, the basic mechanism of 
preference formation can be found in supranationalist theories. Societal groups are perceived as the main 
factor shaping nation states and European institutions preferences for further European integration (Nölke, 
2006). 
30
 For an excellent overview and critical discussion of prominent rational choice approaches in European 
integration research see Kassim & Menon (2003). 
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European Union. The basic explanation for delegation resembles the explanation put forward 
by Stanley Hoffmann. According to P-A theory, delegation takes place, when expected 
benefits outweigh expected costs. In essence, this explanation is purely functional (Pollack, 
1997a: 102) since, as Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon put it: “institutions are chosen or 
created because of their intended effects” (2003: 123). Based on this functional argument, 
several scholars attempted to differentiate explanations why states delegate powers either 
internally e.g. by establishing national independent agencies, or externally to supranational 
actors. Drawing on the works of Pollack (1997), Tallberg (2002b) and Kassim & Menon 
(2003), distinct benefits of delegation can be singled out. The first and probably most striking 
one is delegation in order to overcome problems of collective action. A supranational agent is 
installed to act as a monitor on contractual parties capable of convincing politicians to “jointly 
tie their hands” (Tallberg, 2002b: 26). Delegation serves as a mechanism to ensure policy 
stability safeguarding long-term instead of short term interests. Furthermore, the creation of an 
agent can help to solve the problem of inconsistent policy-making as an agent is granted 
agenda setting powers to deliver relatively unbiased policy proposals (Pollack, 1997a: 106). 
Closely connected to these arguments is the issue of incomplete contracting: No contract can 
take into account all factors, which have an impact upon the durability and effectiveness of the 
contract. Thus, an agent is installed ensuring contractual flexibility and adaptation. 
Furthermore, delegation can have a positive effect on policy quality. This argument is 
connected to the issue of asymmetric information. While principals would need to devote time 
to gather policy-relevant expertise, an agent designed exclusively for such a task represents a 
more efficient solution. As agents become experts in a certain policy field, policy efficiency 
increases. Adopting a more pessimistic view, delegation can be abused to lock in distributional 
benefits. Delegation in this context can be used to secure certain gains by exporting them to an 
agent. Finally, delegation can be employed for blame-shifting. As Morris P. Fiorina (1986: 39) 
regarding legislative behaviour rightfully notes: “risk acceptance is not a standard assumption; 
indeed, risk aversion is standard”. Government’s main motivation is to stay in office. This is 
why they probably would shy away from political decisions, which carry a high risk of policy 
failure or, to put it into more general terms, little gains compared to possible high costs. As 
Christopher Hood highlights: “politicians seeking to claim credit and avoid blame from voters 
face a choice of direction or delegation in any policy domain, while voters or citizens choose 
between praising or blaming those who direct responsibility in public policy”. (2002: 17) 
Under such circumstances, politicians delegate in order to shift the blame and escape from 
being held responsible. The identified reasons outlined above surely help to enhance the 
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understanding of delegation. On the downside, they are still extensions of the basic functional 
argument (Flinders, 2008). Therefore, they are affected by the same problem that Hussein 
Kassim and Anand Menon formulated regarding liberal intergovernmentalism:  
“Functional explanation is itself inherently problematic owing to its ex post facto attribution of motives 
without empirical investigation, its stress on interests that remain unelaborated, and its lack of precision 
in identifying the mechanism that links cause to effect” (Kassim & Menon, 2003: 127). 
This criticism touches upon the issue of insufficient micro-foundation of rational choice and P-
A theory. While both theories provide a rationale explanation for action, they do not discuss 
preferences underlying state action beyond the obvious. They do not necessarily advance the 
understanding of states’ motivation to delegate since the reason for delegation is explained by 
what is (rationally) expected from the act of delegation itself. While rational choice based 
theories do provide a broader perspective on integration, especially compared to earlier 
theories, their explanatory power therefore depends on what is under scrutiny. Turning to the 
field of regulatory policy, the theoretical accounts do not offer convincing and holistic 
explanations for the development of (risk) regulation in the EU (Kelemen, 2004). Going back 
to the underlying subject of this study – pharmaceutical policy – most reasons put forward by 
rational choice theory offer little explanation for supranational delegation. If pharmaceutical 
policy is perceived as risk regulation, Moravcsik for example would argue that the traceable 
integration resulted from incentives to cooperate in the first place: effective problem-solving 
could only be achieved by collective action and therefore delegation to a supranational field. 
Yet, it can be argued that national governments – out of legitimacy considerations – still prefer 
to keep regulation under their control, even if it would be rational and efficient to delegate. 
Ensuring a credible commitments or policy stability, there is no reason why they would have 
to delegate the issue to a supranational actor. It would suffice to delegate horizontally, for 
example by establishing a regulatory agency on the national level. Moreover, the explanatory 
value in case of pharmaceutical regulation is diminished by the partial character of delegation. 
While, member states did delegate pharmaceutical risks, financial aspects of regulation, 
despite being subjected to the same potential efficiency gains, remained on the national level. 
The second reason forwarded by Moravcsik identifies societal pressure as an alternative reason 
for the delegation of national competencies to the European level. European integration is thus 
explained by power struggles on the national level, pushing rational governments to legislate 
in favour of dominant interest groups in exchange for vote margins. Business interests try to 
dominate these struggles, and due to their specific interest structure and resources available 
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mostly succeed in this endeavour (Moravcsik, 1993: 483-485). State preferences thus are a 
function of societal power struggles, and the Europeanization of pharmaceutical regulation can 
be explained by a dominance of pharmaceutical industry’s interests (Abraham & Lewis, 1999; 
Abraham & Reed, 2001; Krapohl, 2008; Permanand, 2006). Pharmaceutical industry favours 
European regulation, since it is connected to a lower level of complexity. While this 
explanation of state preferences is convincing, it tends to oversimplify and exaggerate the 
power of business interests. Certain industries have an enormous influence on political actors 
and the pharmaceutical industry - given the importance as an employer and taxpayer - surely 
resides amongst the most influential ones (Abraham, 2002a). Nevertheless, politicians need to 
satisfy the interests of their voters, not necessarily favouring European integration in general. 
While governments will have to account for economic and industrial interests, their focus will 
be on the preferences of the wider public as well.  
Summing up the previous discussion, integration theories offer unsatisfactory explanations for 
the integration of risk regulatory activities in general and more specifically for the 
pharmaceutical sector. Blame avoidance might however be exempted from such theoretical 
objections. While the explanation put forward is functional as well, an individual rationale 
underlying action is implicitly provided: politicians delegate to avoid blame. If a lack of micro 
foundation is perceived as the key theoretical shortcoming and reason for reduced explanatory 
power of rational choice theory, such a micro foundation has to be established and blame 
avoidance – being the only explanation focusing on individual political behaviour – serves as 
the starting point. 
 
3.3.1.1 Delegation, regulation and blame avoidance 
The modern theory of blame avoidance is based on the work of Kent Weaver. In his seminal 
article The Politics of Blame Avoidance (1986), Weaver develops his basic argument. The 
notion modern is used in this study since Weaver himself notes that the idea of blame 
avoidance is traceable throughout political history. A quote by Louis XIV reflects the basic 
logic underlying the avoidance of blame: “Every time I fill an office, I create a hundred 
malcontents and one ingrate” (Weaver, 1986: 371). Initially, Weaver discussed the trend of 
automaticity in modern government, depicting  a tendency of “self-limitation of discretion by 
policymakers” (Weaver, 1986: 371). This voluntary reduction of room to manoeuvre comes as 
a surprise, since politicians normally would be expected to pursue a strategy that maximizes 
their political options. If the assumption that the main interest of any politician is to stay in 
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office is correct, politicians need strategies to achieve this goal. Generally speaking, in order to 
“claim credit” (Fiorina, 1977) politicians need to take action.31 The more options he has to 
take action, the easier it will be to achieve credit maximization. But the tendency to limit these 
options becomes comprehensible as soon as the assumption of credit claiming as the only 
motivation of politicians is modified. While credit claiming might be the dominant interest of 
politicians, it is not the only one. Weaver singles out several non-electoral motivations 
underlying political action (Weaver, 1986: 372). First of all, political behaviour can be 
determined by vote trading. Politicians may for example exchange votes for issues with low 
salience to them or their constituency. Second, politicians can simply be motivated by good 
policy intentions: acting because they (personally) believe that it is worthwhile. The third 
motivation might be seen in power considerations. Action in this case is guided by the 
motivation to improve ones’ position within a respective institution. While these alternative 
motivations do influence politicians’ decisions, Weaver plies for a realistic perspective 
according to which the electoral motivations clearly dominate politicians’ behaviour. Despite 
these non-electoral motivations, Weaver introduces a more important concept into the 
discussion:  
“even choices that appear to offer substantial opportunities for credit-claiming can also create ill will 
from constituencies who feel themselves relatively or absolutely worse off as a result of a decision. 
Politicians must, therefore, be at least as interested in avoiding blame for (perceived or real) losses that 
they either imposed or acquiesced in as they are in ‘claiming credit’ for benefits they have granted. 
[original emphasis]” (Weaver, 1986:372) 
Instead of simply maximizing vote margins, politicians need to include the minimization of 
risk into their respective utility function. As Weaver notes, the calculation of benefits is far 
form an easy task for politicians. Besides differences in how political decisions convey into 
constituency losses or gains, based on the importance of single constituency groups, credit 
claiming seems to be the dominant strategy only under certain conditions. That is, if 
constituencies “respond symmetrically to gains and losses” (Weaver, 1986: 373). In reality, 
there is an uneven perception of gains and losses. Constituencies react more sensible to losses 
than to comparable gains. The implications of this asymmetry are obvious: “the concentrated 
losses to constituents need not outweigh benefits for a policymaker to have strong blame-
avoiding incentives; it is enough that those costs are substantial” (Weaver, 1986: 373).  
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 There are several examples that might prove that doing nothing can be a strategy to stay in office as well, e.g. 
the German example of Gerhard Schröder and his strategy in economic policy during 2001-2002 (Politik der 
ruhigen Hand) (Hasel & Hönigsberger, 2007). However, even if doing nothing can serve as a short-term 
strategy it can potentially backfire in the long run.   
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While the line of argumentation put forward by Weaver is stringent, avoiding blame should 
not be misinterpreted as a dominant strategy per se. In specific situations, political decisions 
can be dominated by non-electoral reasons while the dominance of electoral motivation is 
taking a backseat.32 In addition, the assumption of politicians as risk-averse actors might be 
challenged as well. There are politicians willing to take risks. Weaver is aware of this fact as 
well. However, these objections do not change the validity of the blame avoidance claim itself, 
rather they are a reminder that there is no one size fits all approach in explaining behaviour 
and that the explanatory power of any approach will be highly contingent on its’ context. In 
deciding on the right strategy and in the face of potential losses for their constituency, risk-
averse politicians may consider the delegation to independent regulatory commissions as the 
best solution to avoid blame (Weaver, 1986: 388). Human (and political) risk aversion thus 
provides a micro foundation for the delegation of competencies based on blame avoidance 
theory. Since the concept of blame avoidance is developed in context of the US political 
system, the transferability to the European context and to the issue of supranational delegation 
could be challenged. Yet, further support for the general applicability of blame avoidance 
arguments is provided by the concept of depoliticisation developed by Peter Burnham in the 
European context, sharing its basic assumptions. Based on a study of New Labours economic 
policy, Burnham describes an underlying mechanism that dominates the work of governments: 
“In short, governments must appear to be competent, as a way of gaining market confidence, 
to create credit or leeway in policy terms.” (Burnham, 2001: 128). Confronted with high 
expectations of their constituencies and an even growing number of problems, governments 
may struggle to promote their governing competence in order to ensure political support. 
Therefore, they might employ a strategy of depoliticisation, depicting “reducing the political 
character of decision-making” to absorb the negative effects resulting from heightened (voter) 
expectations (Burnham, 2001: 128-129). Based on the works of Burnham, Jim Buller and 
Matthew Flinders offer a more precise definition of depoliticisation: 
“Depoliticisation can be described as the range tools, mechanisms and institutions through which 
politicians can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos 
that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific 
decision”(Flinders & Buller, 2006: 295-296). 
                                                 
32
 Budget consolidation might serve as a policy example for such behaviour, since consolidation implies losses 
for many societal groups and therefore limited potential to claim credit. For a in-depth study see Wagschal & 
Wenzelburger (2008) and Wenzelburger (2010). 
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As the authors note, the term Burnham coined is imprecise since depoliticisation does not 
mean that an issue is not political any more. Rather, the term depoliticisation should be 
understood as a special mode of governance, which seeks to reduce the direct control and 
intervention of the state. It substitutes it with a depoliticised mode of governance, 
characterized by “the adoption of an relationship (institutional, procedural or ideological) that 
seeks to establish some sort of buffer zone between politicians and certain policy fields”  
(Flinders & Buller, 2006: 297). While the issue of governing competence is forwarded as the 
main reason, the use of depoliticisation can be based on the motivation to avoid blame in order 
to stay in office as well. Depoliticisation “can help to insulate politicians in office from the 
adverse consequences of policy failure.” (Flinders & Buller, 2006: 296). This explanation is 
convincing especially in the case of institutional depoliticisation taking the form of a 
principal-agent relationship and thus delegation. 
In contrast to previously discussed theoretical accounts the concepts of blame avoidance and 
depoliticisation seem to provide a more advanced understanding of European integration 
regarding risk governance in general and the regulation of pharmaceuticals more specifically. 
But how does delegation of competencies to the European level contribute to the claim of 
competent governance and the deflection of blame? It can be argued, that governments given a 
heightened level of scepticism of constituencies towards the European capabilities would be 
better off in keeping such fields under exclusive control. However, as Flinders and Buller 
argue a different logic does apply since “some problems will be either controversial or 
intractable (or both), so much so that any decision runs the risk of making matters worse rather 
than better” (Flinders & Buller, 2006: 296-297). Such risks push governments to delegate, 
even if this means that future opportunities to claim credit are forsaken. If a precondition for 
staying in office is to appear competent, governments need to take the right political decisions 
from a public point of view. Knowing what the public wants can be a tough task in certain 
policy (and regulatory) areas. This holds especially true for areas marked by a high level of 
complexity. In this case politicians do not only struggle with understanding the preferences of 
their voters, but with the fact that actual decisions have to be taken under the condition of 
uncertainty. This is not to say, that there are policy areas where perfect information exist. 
According to Ulrich Beck: “certainly, ultimate security is denied to us human beings” (1992: 
96) and this holds true for politicians as well. Yet the level of uncertainty decision-makers are 
confronted with varies between policy fields. It will be higher in fields which present a new 
challenge, confronting politicians with a lack of experience and policy expertise. The 
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respective level of uncertainty thus seems to be the underlying reason or rationale to delegate 
risk regulation.  
It is important to clarify the distinction between uncertainty and risk at this point (Renn, 2008; 
van Asselt & Vos, 2006). While many authors view both concepts as dichotomous, such a 
separation seems to be inappropriate, since uncertainty and risk are connected rather than 
distinct concepts. Risks can differ in their level of uncertainty, which is determined by the 
possibility to calculate and control them (van Asselt & Vos, 2006: 315). While this clarifies 
the connection between uncertainty and risk, it leaves risk to be defined. Risk can be defined as 
the “possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effect) may occur as a result of 
natural events or human activities” (Renn, 2008: 1). Uncertainty is primarily connected to the 
occurrence of the event, but in addition might be thought as impacting on the definition of an 
effect as adverse. When talking about the modern form of risk, such risks are distinct from 
risks, which could be labelled as strokes of fate. Modern, or as Ulrich Beck calls them, 
industrial risk “presumes techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility” (Beck, 
1992: 98). The risks we are facing are no longer caused by some higher power or nature, but 
could be traced back to human activity. This causes a change in the perception of risk and 
automatically triggers the question of who is responsible.  
“For with the origin of industrial risks in decision-making the problem of social accountability and 
responsibility irrevocably arises, even in those areas where the prevailing rules of science and law permit 
accountability only in exceptional cases. People, firms, state agencies and politicians are responsible for 
industrial risk.” (Beck, 1992: 98) 
From this perspective, the modern risk is no longer viewed as something abstract or from 
above but something that is caused by decisions made by organizations and finally individuals, 
who can be held responsible. As Beck (1992: 103) notes, the attribution of responsibility is 
complicated by the rise of organized irresponsibility: sources of risk intermingle and with the 
number of possible root causes, it gets harder to pinpoint a single cause or the combination of 
several causes for the damage done. Despite this problem, risk societies engage in the 
”calculus of risk” (Beck, 1992: 99); by using statistical description of risks, the issue is 
elevated from the individual to the aggregated level. Through this procedure, risk seems to be 
controllable, since numbers can express the probability that individuals will encounter such a 
risk. Risk becomes a societal phenomenon and the responsibility for the control of these risks 
is handed over to the political actors (Beck, 1992: 99). The initial uncertainty connected to 
risks is not diminished but only transformed: probabilities replace the diffuse concept of 
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uncertainty regarding the occurrence of events. Despite the shared responsibility for risks, 
government can be expected to be the first actor society turns to. The state becomes a risk 
regulatory state responsible for these industrial risks, even though it faces the same level of 
uncertainty regarding the appropriate regulatory intervention. Politicians are thus faced with 
another meaning of uncertainty. While they are aware, that voters want regulation, the right 
form of regulation is unclear. The situation leaves the rational politician with a decision: either 
to adopt a specific regulatory policy, or to delegate the decision. Going back to the argument 
of Fiorina according to whom “risk acceptance is not a standard assumption” (1986: 39) 
adopting the second option becomes highly likely. Delegation to circumvent a tough decision 
under uncertainty, stimulated by the identified risk aversion of political players finally does 
offer an explanation why risk regulation is delegated.  
Delegation of risk regulation may therefore not be viewed as a blame avoiding strategy in the 
first place. The underlying reason for the act of delegation in uncertain policy fields is not to 
avoid blame but uncertainty. The relation between blame avoidance and uncertainty is a 
hierarchical one: uncertainty may lead to blame avoidance. Delegation of risk regulation can 
be explained by the fact that uncertainty is high regarding the aim of regulation, making the 
certainty of political gains hard to compute.33But if this explanation is true, how do risk 
aversion and the avoidance of uncertainty of national governments explain European 
integration in the field of regulation? As most theories of delegation mainly cope with the 
national level, the question arises, why delegation to a national regulatory agency does not 
suffice. An answer is provided by Christopher Hood noting that delegation to avoid blame 
presupposes the willingness of the delegatees to accept their role in the blame game (Hood, 
2002: 27-28). European institutions seem to differ from those in the national setting in this 
regard. The need of national actors to shift blame coincides with the preference for more 
Europe of supranational institutions (Tallberg, 2002b: 27). While national regulatory agencies 
might be reluctant in taking the blame, European institutions accept the blame in exchange for 
more competencies.34 A second reason for the Europeanization of risk regulation can be seen 
in the way such a regulatory structure maximizes the potential for blame avoidance:  
“the ideal design for a regulatory regime is one in which standards are set by international experts, 
monitored by autonomous agencies and enforced by local authorities – leaving those politicians in the 
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 The principle advantage of this explanation is the sound micro foundation based on the concept of human 
risk aversion. Moreover, uncertainty has been identified as a constituting characteristic of risk regulation 
(Breyer, 1993; Fischer, 2009).  
34
 Another argument could be seen in the fact, that the delegation to the European level maximizes the distance 
and buffer zone between national governments and the delegated policy field.  
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happy position of being able to blame everyone else rather than being blamed themselves when things 
go wrong.” (Hood, 2002: 20) 
Moreover, the delegation of risk regulation to Europe often happened after delegation and 
levelling up of regulatory standards on the national level already took place.35 Therefore, it can 
be conceptualized as the second step in the blame avoidance strategy. If blame avoidance and 
underlying uncertainty are perceived as driving forces for delegation in the field of risk 
regulation, the emergence of such diversified structures should be traceable in the respective 
“regulatory regimes” (Hood et al., 2004).  
Summing up the theoretical discussion of the previous sections, Europeanization of risk 
regulation and the fragmented integration of pharmaceutical regulation can be theorized as a 
consequence of the tendency of governments to avoid uncertainty. This explanation should not 
be seen as opposing previous accounts of European integration and delegation. Daniel 
Kelemen and Annand Menon have recently emphasized that “the nature of EC regulatory 
activity is shaped by a myriad of - not least political - forces.” (2007b: 188). In other words, no 
single cause and explanation may be able to account for all aspects of EU regulatory 
integration, let alone the European integration process as a whole. Nevertheless, uncertainty 
avoidance offers an explanation based on a sound micro-foundation circumventing the 
“functionalist fallacy” (Krapohl, 2008: 25). It thus provides an alternative and more specific 
explanation for the Europeanisation of regulatory activities regarding risks.  
 
3.3.2 Re-theorizing the rise of the European (risk) regulatory state 
While the topic of pharmaceutical policy is a rather specific case, the general growth of 
regulatory competencies on the European level has been analyzed extensively (Kelemen, 
2005; Kelemen & Menon, 2007b; Majone, 1999; Moran, 2002). The research on European 
regulation is deeply interwoven with the concept of the regulatory state. The concept 
popularized by Giandomenico Majone focuses on national developments. Modern states ought 
to fulfil three different types of functions: redistribution, stabilization and regulation (Moran, 
2002: 402). The first meaning of the regulatory state can thus be seen in the simple demand for 
state led regulation. The “rise of the regulatory state” (Majone, 1994b), which in essence 
describes a shift in the balance between the three functions of the modern state, is seen as a 
“paradoxical consequence of the international debate about privatization and 
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 The case of pharmaceutical regulation is exceptional in this regard, as the levelling up of national standards 
was mainly caused by a harmonization of European rules (Collatz, 1996).  
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deregulation”(1994b: 77). As regulation by public ownership became unpopular in the late 
1980s, European states started to privatize their key industries. This shift in regulatory tools 
from ownership to the control of now private ownership through regulatory policy, explains 
the rise of the regulatory state on the national level. It would be probably more exact to speak 
of a shift towards the regulatory state, since the main change should be seen in a change of 
tools, not in a change of basic activity. The rise of regulation as a preferred tool of state 
activity on the national level is matched by a similar development on the supranational, 
European level. The preference for regulatory policy-making can be explained by the 
constraints Brussels has to deal with: 
“Because the Community budget is too small to allow large scale initiatives in the core areas of welfare-state 
activities – redistributive social policy and macroeconomic stabilisation – the EU executive could increase its 
influence only by expanding the scope of its regulatory programs: rule making puts a good deal of power in 
the hands of Brussels authorities, in spite of the budgetary constraints imposed by the member states” 
(Majone, 1999: 2). 
While offering a convincing explanation for the strong reliance of the European level on 
regulatory policy the question of delegation from the national perspective is still open. 
Answering this question is of central importance, since Majone views the delegation of 
regulatory competencies itself as one of the driving forces of the changes discussed on the 
national level. The shift from the positive to the regulatory (national) state is accelerated by the 
need of national regulatory systems to meet European requirements (Majone, 1996a). As 
Majone notes, delegation is a tool to enhance the credibility of regulation in order to satisfy 
business needs (Majone, 1999: 6). This explanation is convincing in the field of economic 
regulation. Indeed, a strong growth of regulatory output in the pharmaceutical field can be 
witnessed in relation to the establishment of the common market, namely the adoption of the 
Single European Act (SAE). Even today, market completion serves as a driving factor as 
“most EC regulation […] has been linked, either directly or indirectly, to the drive to 
‘complete’ the Single market [original emphasis]” (Kelemen & Menon, 2007a: 176). What 
could be considered as a paradox in the first place is actually quite the opposite. The creation 
of a single market did not lead to a race to the bottom, but to re-regulation. While the single 
market advocates freedom of trade, such freedom cannot be sustained without any rules. What 
was instilled instead was the replacement of “the patchwork of national regulations with 
harmonized measures at the EC level” (Kelemen & Menon, 2007a: 176). In order to realize the 
benefits of the single market, the shift of regulatory competencies to the European level seems 
to be a necessary step from the perspective of member states. However, this explanation fails 
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to explain the large amount of European regulation that is not connected primarily to the 
realization of the single market for example environmental protection, health, food and 
pharmaceutical safety. Moreover, most of these regulatory policies were developed initially 
without a proper legal mandate or better yet legal competencies on the European level 
(Majone, 1994b: 85).36 This raises the general question how the growth of European regulation 
in fields not primarily linked to the establishment of the single market can be explained. What 
is offered by the prominent scholars of European regulation comes close to the reasons offered 
for delegation in general: more stringent regulation at the European level, higher willingness 
for innovative regulatory solutions on the European level and the relentlessly pushing 
European bureaucracy eager to get more and more regulatory competencies in order to expand 
its powers (Majone, 1994b, 1999). While these arguments certainly are convincing, they 
supersede the question, why member states did not block the expansion of regulatory 
competencies in such sensitive fields as health, and environmental issues. What is ignored by 
such functional explanations is the politics involved in such decisions, especially in politically 
sensitive fields since ”functional pressure rarely translate seamlessly into corresponding 
allocation of regulatory authority” (Eberlein & Grande, 2005: 90). However, delegation should 
not be seen as an automatism, but will depend heavily on the fact, how political gains and 
losses are related in the specific field. In line with the discussion in previous sections, the 
willingness to give up competencies regarding risk regulation can be largely explained by the 
occurrence of uncertainty. It can be reasonably expected, that the level of uncertainty will be 
distinct in fields of high complexity and, due to insufficient policy knowledge, in novel policy 
fields. Policymakers are confronted with regulatory demands by the public, and must take the 
decision if they regulate themselves or decide to delegate regulatory power. This decision 
becomes even more important, given the relative weight that constituencies assign to questions 
of (risk) regulation in comparison to other policy decisions. In light of the general risk-
aversion of policy makers (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Weaver, 1986) the most reasonable 
strategy is to delegate the decision in order to avoid negative consequences of wrong 
regulatory decisions. While this decision led to the emergence of regulatory bodies on the 
national level, the same basic mechanism can serve as an explanation for the rapid growth of 
European risk regulation. In an attempt to reduce uncertainty, national legislators try to 
distribute the policy field between as much actors as possible. This willingness is met by an 
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 As David Vogel (2001: 9-11) notes, subsequent revisions of the treaty expanded regulatory competencies of 
the EU for example in the field of environmental regulation and established the protection of health, safety, 
environmental and consumer protection to be conside
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European Commission seeing “regulatory activity as a means of enhancing the EC’s popular 
appeal by demonstrating its ability to address areas of great public concern, such as social, 
consumer and environmental regulation” (Kelemen & Menon, 2007a: 177). 
Accordingly, a combination of several factors resulted in the emergence of European risk 
regulation. On the level of preferences, national governments are reacting on the increasing 
demand of the public for risk regulation by delegating regulatory power to a European 
Commission with the willingness to take the regulatory burden. A shift in public preferences 
as the initial trigger is especially striking in the case of risk regulation: 
“In sum public support for stricter health, safety and environmental standards is no longer confined to 
northern Europe. Rather in recent years, much of western Europe appears to have developed a common 
civic culture, one which is more risk-averse than in the past, especially with respect to issues of public 
health and which shares higher expectations about the role of governments in protecting both consumers 
and the environment” (Vogel, 2001: 9). 
This change in public preferences can be linked to the previous discussion of the risk society. 
The reaction of governments is understandable: while the potential of credit claiming is high 
given the salience of the issue, the risk to fail is high as well. With public perception turning 
towards a more risk-averse stance supposedly punishing regulatory failure even harder, 
governments’ preferences should be to delegate these issues. Thus, delegation to the European 
level seems to be a strategy to combine the benefit of distance with the potential of claiming 
credit at least indirectly. The discussed theoretical connection between uncertainty, risk 
regulation and delegation is indicated by several developments in the European context 
providing further evidence for the outlined theoretical claim. 
 
3.3.2.1 Uncertainty, national regulatory failure and delegation  
A first supportive observation is provided by elucidating the relation between national 
regulatory failure and the decision to delegate. The connection is evident in the field of 
pharmaceutical regulation, as the first European directive dealing with pharmaceutical safety 
was agreed upon during the aftermath of the Thalidomide disaster.37 In the case of 
pharmaceutical regulation the explanatory value of uncertainty seems to be of even greater 
significance, since the first steps in delegation were taken, even before a single market for 
pharmaceuticals was created (Krapohl, 2008: 8). The explanation of growth of regulation as a 
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 Thalidomide was a sleeping aid pill originally released in 1957 in West Germany under the imprint 
Contergan. It caused peripheral neuritis in pregnant women and lead to prenatal death and the birth of babies 
with congenital anomalies in several thousand cases (Permanand, 2006). 
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logical consequence of the single market does not fit in this case, even though in most fields of 
European regulation it served as a critical juncture. The discussion about harmonized 
European regulation for pharmaceutical products would have been inevitable in connection 
with completion of the common market, but the tragedy “kick started the process” 
(Permanand, 2006: 2), at a time when a single market for pharmaceuticals was not at the centre 
of political negotiations. In this particular case, it was not the well-funded pharmaceutical 
lobby urging governments to regulate in favour of the industry or the need for credible 
regulatory commitment. Instead, a mixture of political strategy and public pressure calling for 
the establishment of effective regulation to prevent another tragedy stimulated policy 
developments. Besides the massive changes in national laws and systems for drug testing that 
resulted from the Thalidomide disaster (Permanand, 2006: 2), limited delegation constituted an 
exit option from the regulatory dead end national regulatory systems had obviously reached. 
Confronted with uncertainty how the safety of drugs should be regulated in the future and the 
failure of previous regulatory decisions in mind, risk averse governments did decide to at least 
pool resources in determining regulatory decisions.  
While the case of pharmaceuticals constitutes a special topic, with a European regulatory 
history spanning more than forty years, the BSE crisis serves as an additional example for the 
causal link between risk aversion and delegation. Caused by the announcement of the British 
government that cases of Creutzfeld Jakob disease in humans were linked to the exposure to 
the cattle disease BSE, regulatory crisis shook the national and European level (Frewer & 
Salter, 2002; Moran, 2001). It lead to drastic measures as the Commission issued a global ban 
but even more important “dramatically exposed the gap between the single market – which 
exposes all European consumers to products produced anywhere within the EU – and the 
inability of European institutions to assure the safety of the products sold within that market” 
(Vogel, 2001: 12). On first sight, there are few parallels between the two examples: While 
delegation of pharmaceutical regulation more or less started from scratch, since effective 
pharmaceutical safety regulation was not in place in most European countries in the 1960s, a 
well established European regulatory regime was in place in the case of food safety.  
However, upon closer review the same basic mechanism of adaption to uncertainty can be 
identified in the latter case, despite an additional shift on the European level. Not only did the 
crisis accelerate the shift of more regulatory competencies to the European level, but changed 
the regulatory architecture as well, calling into question the formerly used advisory boards 
(Thatcher, 2002a). The scandal caused a massive loss of public confidence in European and 
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national regulatory capacities alike, leading to the creation of the European Food Safety 
Agency (EFSA) subsequently to the Nice summit and several institutional repercussions at the 
national level (D. Vogel, 2001: 14). Acknowledging the functional pressure that was present at 
that time, the act of delegation can be interpreted as a response to regulatory failure, and thus 
at least partially connected to the high level of uncertainty at that specific point in time.  
 
3.3.2.2 Uncertainty and European regulatory architecture  
Underlying uncertainty in risk regulation is not only traceable in the delegation of 
competencies but impacts on the European regulatory architecture as well. As in the case of 
the pharmaceutical sector and in the field of foodstuff, community agencies were set up in 
several fields of risk regulation at the European level.38 This “agencification” (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2005) on the European level can be explained by the risk aversion of national and 
European officials. Beyond the functional arguments that were employed to justify their 
creation (Kelemen, 2002: 99-109), the decision reflects the distributed irresponsibility 
highlighted by Beck (1992), leading to the emergence of several actors occupied with the same 
regulatory subject. Risk aversion thus explains the emergence of ideal regulatory regimes, 
consisting of a multiplicity of actors, as Hood (2002: 20) suggested. This line of reasoning 
supports the claims put forward by regulatory federalism (Kelemen, 2004) and the research on 
the emergence of transnational regulatory networks as the dominant structural feature of 
European (risk) regulatory regimes (Dehousse, 1997; Eberlein & Grande, 2005). Regulation is 
based on a division of labor: while federal government will engage in policy making, 
implementation will remain on the state level drawing on national regulatory resources, mostly 
organized within national regulatory agencies (Kelemen, 2004: 9-15). 
 
3.3.2.3 Uncertainty, the impact on risk regulation and the precautionary principle 
While the notion of uncertainty provides a rationale for the decision to delegate and provides 
and explanation for the resulting architecture of European risk regulation, it finally impacts on 
actual regulatory policy-making. As federal regulators try to expand their regulatory 
competencies, they have to take into account the preferences of the public at large and the 
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 Beyond the EMA (pharmaceuticals) and the EFSA (foodstuff), several additional agencies have been created, 
for example the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECA). For a general discussion of the agencies and 
their functions see Geradin and Petit (2004). 
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preferences of the state governments as well. Only if the resulting policies are compatible with 
their preferences, state governments will grant leeway to the federal level. Remember 
however, that given the rise of risk aversion in public opinion (Vogel, 2001), state 
governments probably adopt an even more cautious approach regarding risk regulation. If risk 
aversion influences state level preferences, it can be expected to impact on the general federal 
risk regulatory style. To assess this claim the general characteristics of the regulatory process 
and principles of risk regulation in the European context must be considered.  
Starting with the regulatory process and the regulatory structure a tendency towards functional 
separation of tasks should be traceable. In clearly distinguishing regulatory process steps 
between the actors involved, responsibilities are assigned in a clear-cut way increasing the 
accountability of the regulatory system and reducing uncertainty within the regulatory regime. 
In addition, officials can be expected to prefer a science-based approach to risk regulation, 
relying heavily on scientific expertise. Indeed, one of the defining features of European 
regulatory policy-making, the strict separation of risk assessment and risk management on the 
European level (Vogel, 2001), represents a way to reduce regulatory complexity. The 
production of information on which regulation is based and the actual decision are clearly 
separated. At the same time, this separation leaves politicians with more actors to blame 
publicly: European agencies increasingly taking over the role of risk assessors, while decisions 
are finally taken in a member state committee. Second, the motive of uncertainty will lead to 
stricter regulation regarding the level and the degree of specification. As clear rules are 
crafted, expectations regarding regulatory outcomes can be deducted. As clearer rules give 
clearer guidance, state governments should be in favor of such provisions. Accordingly, 
European risk regulation can be expected to be rather detailed and judicialized (Kelemen, 
2006). Evidence for the stricter character of European risk regulation is provided by the 
comparison with regulation in other jurisdictions. Comparing European and US risk 
regulation, David Vogel (2001, 2003) identifies a European trend towards stricter limits and 
tougher benchmarks. Besides tendencies towards stricter regulation the process of 
implementation becomes increasingly dominated by the issuance of “enforceable goals, 
deadlines, and transparent procedural guidelines” (Kelemen, 2006: 102) from the federal level. 
A second feature of the European regulatory style is the tendency or shift towards adversarial 
legalism amplifying the legalistic style of regulation. This tendency results in longer and more 
detailed European directives, as the research by Fabio Franchino (2006) indicates. While the 
emergence of a more legalized regulatory approach is heavily influenced by the fragmented 
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nature of the European polity, it is also influenced by the mistrust of governments regarding 
the stringent implementation of their peers (Kelemen, 2006). Again, the urge to reduce 
uncertainty serves as driving force for this development. As the degree of detail increases, 
national discretion gets reduced and transforms the former “cooperative, informal, and opaque 
approaches to regulation at the national level” (Kelemen, 2006: 105). This unintended 
consequence is accepted by member states, as stringent implementation serves as a valuable 
tool for avoiding regulatory arbitrage. The result of the transformation is a more adversarial 
instead of cooperative relation between regulator and regulatee as a constituting feature of 
European regulatory style, possibly reducing the flexibility of regulatory approaches. 
Paradoxically, the shift to a more legalized approach led to an open rather than a closed mode 
of regulation. As the old model of closed door bargaining gets pushed back, the increased 
emphasis of European regulation is on procedural formality and transparency (European 
Commission, 2001). This change is probably most significant compared to the former national 
regulatory systems, but could be seen as well in the evolution on the European level: As 
regulation by committee is increasingly supplemented by broader participation and European 
agencies take over more and more tasks in regulation, higher transparency is the unavoidable 
outcome.  
The third and probably most important consequence of the discussed development is the 
preference for safety over scientific certainty. Risk regulation that is influenced by the motive 
of uncertainty thus will be characterized by the desire to be better safe the sorry. In light of this 
guiding regulatory ideal, the emergence of the precautionary principle as a new risk regulatory 
principle in the European context becomes understandable. Officially adopted at the Nice 
summit In 2000, it marks a clear European commitment to risk-averse policies (Vogel, 2001: 
16). Its emergence can be seen as a late-arrival answer to the general mistrust the public 
developed towards the culture of expertise as the dominant regulatory model in deciding what 
level of risk is acceptable (Renn, 2008: 55). Developed in the context of environmental 
regulation, the principle can be generally applied to all areas of risk regulation. The connection 
between uncertainty avoidance and the principle is obvious: it can be invoked to legitimize 
regulatory activity, before the negative impact of risk has been established.39 Despite the 
contested perception of the principle (Feintuck, 2005; Majone, 2002), the European Union and 
Commission more specifically, advocated its usage as the basis for risk regulation, giving the 
principle a high political relevance. Drawing on the previously discussed characteristics, the 
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European risk regulatory approach can be described in broad terms. Considering its structure, 
it is characterized by a clear separation of tasks, with the different areas of regulation assigned 
to different players in the regulatory regime. Separation is both traceable in the use of 
regulatory networks and the separation of policy-making and implementation, leading to the 
description of the European mode of regulation as a two-tier concept (McGowan & Wallace, 
1996). Turning to the European regulatory style, a detailed and judicialized style characterizes 
the current European approach emphasizing clarity of rules and procedures. Finally the 
precautionary principle, underlying European risk regulation leads to a more cautious – and 
potentially politically charged approach to regulation. Instead of granting access to markets 
unless there is a proof of harm, regulation tends to be based on the logic of guilty until proven 
innocent.  
 
3.3.3 European regulation and the logic of efficiency 
Drawing on the previous discussion, uncertainty avoidance proves to be a valuable and 
complementing explanation for the delegation of risk regulatory competencies, the resulting 
regulatory architecture and the European risk regulatory approach. At the same time, it calls 
into question the capacities of the European regulatory state. If regulation is delegated to 
avoid uncertainty and not because European regulation is considered to be better than purely 
national arrangements, it must be questioned in how far European regulation proves to be 
superior.  The described European regulatory approach and the tendency towards stricter and 
more risk averse regulation, can be considered as positive from the public perspective, serving 
as a mechanism to protect citizens from harm. Yet, while the Europeanization of risk 
regulation has lead to stricter regulation, this does not necessarily mean that it conveys into 
better regulation (Vogel, 2001). Doubts regarding the claim of European regulatory 
superiority are amplified further, when the focus and development of debates on governance 
and regulatory quality on the European level is considered. When the Santer Commission 
jointly resigned in 1999, the European political project had reached a watershed. Triggered by 
rising public concerns regarding the expansion of European regulatory responsibilities, the 
permissive consensus for further integration shifted to a more critical stance towards the 
European vision (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hurrelmann, 2007) resulting in a public and 
scientific discussion of legitimacy (Majone, 1999; Scharpf, 1999, 2009) and the democratic 
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deficit of the European Union (Follesdal, 2004; Follesdal & Hix, 2006).40 As a response to the 
political crisis, the Commission decided to engage into a campaign to restore the European 
(regulatory) image and the confidence into the European Union. The so called better 
regulation debate started in 2000. As the Commission's White paper on European governance, 
released in 2001 stated:  
 “Today, political leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox. On the one hand, Europeans want 
them to find solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the other hand, people 
increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not interested in them. […] It is particularly 
acute at the level of the European Union. Many people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and 
complex system to deliver the policies that they want. The Union is often seen as remote and at the same 
time too intrusive.”  (European Commission, 2001:3) 
Starting off as a promising project to overcome the identified shortcomings, the debate took a 
rather disappointing route leaving the fundamental challenges from the perspective of 
European citizens aside. Instead, it shifted towards the question of efficiency and the framing 
of regulation understood as regulatory burden (Radaelli, 2007).41 While such an 
understanding has its merits in the area of economic regulation, it seems to misinterpret the 
purpose of regulation: the debate framed it as costs instead of an instrument for correcting 
market failure and unwanted externalities, reflecting a clear business perspective. Such 
perspective proves to be too limited when the European Union is understood as an economic 
and political project. Given that there are two main stakeholders in European regulation – 
businesses and citizens – these two groups could be thought of as representing different 
preferences and perceptions regarding regulation. For example, these two groups most 
probably will assign a different weight to the improvement of regulation, which is either more 
efficient (1) or more effective (2) regulation. Both parties surely are interested in both aims 
but nevertheless could be thought of as valuing one over the other. Businesses will be more 
interested in the efficiency or better yet cost-effectiveness of regulation. As businesses are 
first and foremost interested in maximizing gains, regulation represents a cost factor, which 
ought to be minimized in order to maximize the total gain. This is not to say, that business is 
always favouring less regulation or is against regulation in general.42 However, if their main 
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  At the heart of legitimacy debate seems to be, what Anthony Arnull has defined as social legitimacy. Social 
legitimacy depicts “the extent to which the allocation and exercise of authority within it commands general 
(is) acceptable.” (2002:4).  
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 For a critical assessment of the white paper and the better regulation debate, supporting the general argument 
of lacking social legitimacy, see Arnull and Wincott (2002a) as well as Eriksen (2001), Hoereth (2001 ), 
Kohler-Koch (2001) Scharpf (2001) , Schmitter (2001) and Steinberg (2001) .  
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 Regulation might not only represent a burden but a competitive advantage for example entry barriers 
protecting (existing) producers from new competitors.   
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concern is to maximize profits, it is plausible to assume a focus on efficient regulation while 
the effectiveness at least might play a subordinate role.  
In contrast to businesses, citizens or consumers can be thought of assigning a higher weight to 
the effectiveness of regulation (Radaelli, 2004: 10). This holds especially true for regulation 
referred to as social regulation and consumer protection. As the costs of regulation are mainly 
borne by the companies, the question of efficiency from a customer perspective might play a 
subordinate role. Turning to economic regulation, efficiency would be the first priority of 
consumers only if this would impact on the price one would have to pay. However this direct 
connection is not apparent in most cases. Even though this argument might run the risk of 
making a generalization, one could say that business focuses on the efficiency while 
customers focus on the effectiveness of regulation. In the case of BSE, for example, citizens 
do not criticize the European Union for too much regulatory burden, but for the lack of 
regulatory effectiveness (Fischer, 2009; Krapohl, 2003). The dominant regulatory logic on the 
European level focusing on efficiency is problematic, as it does not advance the legitimacy of 
the European regulatory state from the perspective of citizens. If the regulatory focus is more 
efficient regulation, this may advance the legitimacy of the regulatory regime towards the 
business community. However, it does not ensure that improving regulation automatically 
translates into more effective regulation. A regulatory state dominated by efficiency 
considerations may secure the support of business but not necessarily public support resulting 
in a further erosion of social legitimacy. In light of delegation in order to avoid uncertainty 
and the European regulatory logic, the superiority of European regulation must be questioned. 
Challenging the common knowledge that European regulation is efficient, effective and its 
problem-solving capacities live up to their expectations (Skogstad, 2003), a reassessment of 
European regulation seems to be necessary. Strikingly, little effort has been made to analyse 
regulatory quality beyond efficiency considerations even though the European Union “is 
before anything else a political system that regulates (and not a system that taxes and offers 
social protection), the first priority of single market governance concerns the quality of 
regulation.” (Radaelli, 1998: 17).43 Only if the European mode of regulation satisfies the 
conditions of effectiveness and efficiency, it will be legitimized from the perspective of 
European citizens. What is needed is not only a proper functioning internal market, but “an 
internal market for the citizens and the firms of the Union” (Radaelli, 1998: 18). This 
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 A notable exception has been the study on consumer safety by Christopher Hodges (2005). A (limited) 
discussion of the efficiency/effectiveness divide of European regulation could be found in Skogstad (2003). 
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necessitates analysis based on a broader understanding of regulatory quality complementing 
existing studies focusing on the quality of regulation in the sense of processes and efficiency 
(Radaelli, 2004, 2007). It must consider the performance and the outcomes of the European 
regulatory structures, considering that the legitimacy of European regulation and the 
European Union primarily rests on output regulation (Krapohl, 2004b; Majone, 2000; 
Scharpf, 2009).  
 
3.4 Conclusion: uncertainty avoidance, delegation and regulatory quality  
This chapter started with a puzzle: an increased European influence in a policy field that is 
highly sensitive, namely the safety of pharmaceuticals. The political sensitivity stems from 
the fact that the provision of safety constitutes one of the core tasks of modern states and thus 
contributes to its legitimacy. Delegation in such fields seems to oppose states’ vital interests. 
The review of European integration theories provided only unsatisfactory explanations, since 
they focus on European integration at large. Starting from the premises of blame avoidance 
theory, risk aversion as a general human and thus political trait was identified as a micro 
foundation for the delegation of regulatory competencies. As national politicians are 
confronted with regulatory demands by their constituencies while at the same time facing a 
high level of uncertainty regarding the appropriate way of regulation, delegation becomes a 
rational strategy. Since politicians want to stay in office, their main aim is to maximize vote 
shares.44 In order to secure support, he is confronted with policy choices. While choosing 
certain policies in order to claim credit for political action, seems to be the appropriate 
strategy in many policy fields, in some policy fields choosing the right policy is complicated. 
Policy fields can be marked by a high level of uncertainty that is, insecurity about the impact 
of policy decisions on constituencies. As it was shown, adopting an alternative strategy, 
namely delegation of the decision seems to be appropriate in such policy fields, considering 
the underlying risk aversion of rational politicians. This micro-founded explanation provides 
an complementing approach to the delegation of regulatory competencies within the European 
Union. The dominance of uncertainty and thus risk-averse behavior does not only provide an 
alternative explanation for delegation of risk regulation, but offers some insight regarding the 
emerging regulatory architecture. As it has been shown, the current approach to European risk 
regulation is influenced at least partially by the avoidance of uncertainty. While this has 
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 Of course the exclusive focus on vote seeking represents a generalized assumption and could be challenged 
in light of the extensive research on different motivations, for example office and policy seeking. For an 
overview see Jäckle (2010).  
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implications for the architecture of the European risk regulatory state as the number of 
regulatory actors involved increases, for example by creating new regulatory agencies, it 
impacts on the actual regulatory policy reflecting an increased tendency towards stricter and 
more risk averse regulation. The Europeanization of risk regulation has lead to stricter 
regulation in general, but this does not necessarily mean that it conveys into better regulation. 
While the regulatory superiority of the European level has been taken for granted, the 
discussion throughout this chapter calls for a critical reassessment of this assumption. The 
understanding of what constitutes good regulation remains limited on the European level, 
focusing on business rather than public preferences. Therefore, rather than assuming that 
European regulation works in effective ways, an analysis of regulation adopting an 
effectiveness perspective is necessary. Accordingly, a framework for the assessment of 
regulatory quality beyond efficiency will be developed in the following chapter.  
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4.  The assessment of regulatory quality  
A broader understanding of regulation going beyond the limited scope of efficiency is 
necessary to fully assess the quality of European regulation since only if European regulation 
meets the standards of both key stakeholders (businesses and citizens alike), the European 
regulatory state can be understood as legitimized sufficiently. The chapter will proceed in five 
steps to develop a more holistic understanding of regulatory quality. First, existing concepts 
of regulation will be discussed briefly to derive at a sound theoretical foundation of core 
concepts. Subsequently, the idea of regulatory quality beyond efficiency considerations will 
be discussed. Drawing on a redefined concept of regulatory quality, existing principles of 
good regulation will be synthesized from previous research. In the next step, the realization of 
regulatory quality within regulatory systems is discussed. In addition, the section will address 
common problems of regulation and their potential negative impact on the realisation of 
regulatory quality. In a fourth step, the implications of risk regulation as a specific type of 
regulation and the European context have to be included to derive a more specific 
understanding of regulatory quality applicable to the field of European pharmaceutical 
regulation. Finally, a general framework for the analysis of regulation in the European context 
is presented. 
 
4.1 Defining regulation: review of previous theory 
Defining regulation is a complex task, given the vast number of distinct definitions used in 
regulatory studies. In addition, the usage of regulation in law, sociology and political science 
context differs tremendously.45 However, it should be at least possible to derive a definition 
that grasps the mutually accepted features of the concept. The first attempts to classify 
regulation from a political science perspective, date back to the studies of Theodore Lowi 
(1964). He identifies regulation as a form of policy, which can be distinguished from 
redistributive and distributive policies. The distinction between the different policy types is 
based on their level of conflict: redistributive policies will naturally create winners and losers, 
while distributive and regulatory policies might do so only to a limited extent (1964a: 690-
692). This dichotomy proves to be problematic: regulatory policy might create winners and 
losers as well, rendering the used differentiation as meaningless (Fischer, 2009: 68). While it 
                                                 
45
 For a general theoretical discussion of regulation and comparable definitions see for example (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999; Ogus, 1999; Quirk, 1981; Wilson, 1980).  
4.1 Defining regulation: review of previous theory 
 
 
 
59 
 
is justifiable to identify regulation as a specific type of policy, the distinction has to be based 
on other criteria than conflict potential. An alternative definition is provided by John G. 
Francis: “regulation occurs when the state constrains private activity in order to promote the 
public interest” (Francis, 1993: 1-2). Following from this, regulation can be understood as an 
instrument to regiment actors’ behaviour. Compared to distributive and redistributive policies, 
regulation is conceptualized as a more indirect way of achieving certain outcomes. Regulation 
therefore is rather about prohibiting and permitting than taking and giving. In other words, 
regulation is about “social control” (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004: 3). Moving beyond this 
rather broad conceptualization of regulation as social control, Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott 
and Christopher Hood synthesize two alternative meanings based on the discussion of 
regulatory studies. The second notion of regulation covers all modes of state intervention in 
the economy. The third and most specific notion renders regulation as a form of governance 
based on the setting of authorative rules (Baldwin et al., 1998: 3-4). Rather than simply 
limiting the second notion of regulation to the economic sphere, interventions in the social 
sphere could be included into the concept as well. Social regulation, as opposed to economic 
regulation mainly aiming at the protection of citizens from high prices and price 
discrimination, covers interventions in order to protect consumers from health and other risks 
(Francis, 1993: 2-3). While actual regulation contains elements of both economic and social 
regulation, the distinction is useful as it differentiates between regulation as a market 
intervention and regulation that tries to reduce the externalities a market might produce. The 
classification of Baldwin, Scott and Hood points to a twofold meaning of regulation. First, 
regulation can be defined as a rule-based intervention into private conduct in both the 
economic and social sphere. Regulation is thus defined as a specific form of policy or more 
general political activity. Second, regulation can be thought of as a specific form of 
governance. The second form of conceptualization implies an institutional perspective on 
regulation. The need to define regulation as a specific form of governance structures is 
obvious in the European context. As regulation takes place in a multi-level system, the 
functioning of regulation will depend on the regulatory system in place and the interaction of 
different stakeholders and levels. Drawing on the concept of Arthur Benz and Burkard 
Eberlein (1999: 331), distinguishing vertical and horizontal governance, all actors within a 
regulatory field on a level (horizontal) and the interaction of different levels on which 
regulation takes place (vertical) have to be considered. This twofold conceptualisation of 
regulation provides a broader and more focused definition, going beyond the definition of 
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regulation as regulatory burden and costs. Based on this concept the next section will try to 
deflect a fitting definition of good regulation or better yet regulatory quality.  
 
4.2 Redefining regulatory quality 
Starting from premises of regulation as a policy, a tentative idea of regulatory quality can be 
drawn. As Francis noted, regulation has to be carried out in order to fulfill the public interest 
(1993: 1-2). Only if the regulation will serve such a higher purpose, the intervention is 
considered as legitimate. Regulatory quality can thus be linked to sufficient justification of 
regulation. A typology is advanced by John G. Francis, distinguishing four general 
justifications: the reduction of risks (1), regulation based on moral grounds (2), setting 
reasonable limits (3) and the provision of stability or an equilibrium (4) (Francis, 1993: 10-
21). However, justifying regulatory intervention does not serve as a sufficient definition of 
regulatory quality. It rather represents a precondition of good regulation and is directly linked 
to the legitimacy of regulation or regulatory activity. Shifting from regulation understood as 
policy, to regulation as a mode of governance, regulatory quality can be defined in a more 
functional way. Given that regulatory intervention in a specific case is legitimized (and 
therefore viewed as a rightful intervention), the quality of regulation will depend on the 
realisation of the underlying regulatory goal (the initial reason for regulatory activity). From 
the perspective of regulatory governance, a “regulatory regime” (Hood et al., 2001: 9) does 
not only serve the public interest, but has a problem-solving and coordinating function.46 
While the European better regulation discourse frames the issue of good regulation as a 
question of regulatory efficiency, the more decisive and preceding question is, if a given 
regulation is able to reach the underlying goal(s). Put differently, regulatory quality depends 
first and foremost on the achievement of effectiveness. A useful definition of effectiveness 
developed in the context of regime theory, is offered by Marc Levy, Oran Young and Michael 
Zürn:  
 “Broadly speaking, effectiveness has to do with the contributions institutions make to solving the 
problems that motivate actors to create them. […] A more applied or policy-oriented definition, which 
appeals to many economists as well as practitioners, focuses on well-defined goals and asks what policy 
adjustments will prove effective in attaining these goals” (Levy et al., 1994: 28-29). 
                                                 
46
 This function has been highlighted by rational choice approaches linking the emergence of regulatory 
institutions to social and economic necessities (Knight, 1992).   
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Linking the definition to the prior thoughts on rational institutionalism, the quality of 
regulation and respective institutions will depend on a set of clear goals and their 
achievement. Reconciling the relationship between regulatory effectiveness and the concept 
of efficiency, the latter should be understood as subordinate. Regulation needs to fulfil the 
requirement of effectiveness in order to be considered as legitimate in the first place.47 The 
criterion of effectiveness does provide a basic yardstick for the assessment of regulatory 
quality focusing on the achievement of regulatory goals. However, besides this principal 
criterion, additional and closely connected criteria of regulatory quality can be identified. 
While effectiveness represents the final goal of regulation, some comprehensive criteria 
related to the regulatory process can be thought of as supporting the achievement of 
effectiveness.48  
 
4.2.1 General principles of good regulation 
Based on public and scientific acceptance and their significance for the European regulatory 
debate, the criteria developed by the European Commission in its white paper (2001), 
principles developed by the OECD (1995) as well as those advanced by the Better Regulation 
Task Force (2003) can be singled out.49 As the table shows, the criteria developed by the 
Commission and the Better regulation task force are largely congruent. Therefore, a detailed 
discussion of the principles developed by the better regulation task force can be limited to the 
criteria consistency, targeting and proportionality. Before the chapter turns to the discussion 
of these principles, it must be made clear, that the principles were initially developed in the 
context of regulatory policy and policy design. However, as the present study understands 
regulation as a twofold concept, the principles can mainly be understood as principles of 
policy-formulation but some of them can help to improve institutional design of the 
regulatory regime as well. 
 
 
                                                 
47
  If regulation satisfies the criterion of effectiveness, efficiency needs to be considered to fully assess the 
regulatory quality. While the efficiency of European pharmaceutical regulation is beyond the scope of this 
study, it is argued that the introduction of a European regime necessarily translates into more efficient 
regulation (Majone, 1994a, 1996b; Pelkmans, 2007).    
48
 Moreover the adherence of regulatory processes to certain commonly accepted criteria can increase the social 
legitimacy and trust in regulatory regimes (Grimes, 2006).    
49
 The Better Regulation Task Force has been included, since it represents a key actor both in the British and 
European discourse on regulatory quality. 
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Table 5: Criteria of good governance and regulation 
EU Commission 
White paper on governance 
 (2001) 
Better regulation 
task force (2003) 
OECD 
(1995) 
1. openness  
2. participation 
3. accountability 
4. effectiveness  
5. coherence 
1. proportionality  
2. accountability  
3. consistency  
4. transparency  
5. targeting  
1. Is the problem correctly defined?  
2. Is government action justified? 
3. Is regulation the best form of 
government action? 
4. Is there a legal basis for regulation?  
5. What is the appropriate level (or levels) 
of government for this action? 
6. Do the benefits of regulation justify the 
costs? 
7. Is the distribution of effects across 
society transparent? 
8. Is the regulation clear, consistent, 
comprehensible, and accessible to 
users? 
9. Have all interested parties had the 
opportunity to present their views? 
10. How will compliance be achieved? 
Source: adapted from EU Commission (2001), OECD (1995), UK Better regulation task force (2003). 
 
4.2.1.1 The white paper on governance  
Starting off with the criteria entailed in the white paper on European governance, five general 
principles of European governance are offered: openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence. To clarify the contribution of these principles to the effectiveness 
of regulation, a closer look at the remaining four principles as defined in the white paper is 
necessary. The principles are defined as follows:  
"-  Openness. The Institutions should work in a more open manner. Together with the Member States, 
they should actively communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes. They should use 
language that is accessible and understandable for the general public. This is of particular importance 
in order to improve the confidence in complex institutions.  
-  Participation. The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide 
participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved 
participation is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the institutions which deliver 
policies. Participation crucially depends on central governments following an inclusive approach 
when developing and implementing EU policies.  
- Accountability. Roles in the legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of the EU 
Institutions must explain and take responsibility for what it does in Europe. But there is also a need for 
greater clarity and responsibility from Member States and all those involved in developing and 
implementing EU policy at whatever level.  
- Coherence. Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. […] Coherence requires 
political leadership and a strong responsibility on the part of the Institutions to ensure a consistent 
approach within a complex system. [original emphasis]" (European Commission, 2001:10). 
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While the paper explicitly aims at the formulation of governance principles, the underlying 
definition of regulation as a mode of governance renders them applicable to regulation as 
well. Based on the previous discussion, effectiveness should not be treated as on the same 
logical level as the other four principles. In fact, the four principles support the realisation of 
effective regulation. The first principle openness represents a reference to transparency.50 To 
be effective, regulation has to be understood. Besides making the relevant regulation available 
to those concerned, the specific policy needs to be written in a comprehensive manner and 
entail further information on the reasons for regulation. Turning to its meaning for the 
regulatory regime, openness has to be ensured by clear roles and responsibilities and the 
access to information used within the regulatory governance structure.51 While the second 
principle, participation, mainly aims at the input dimension of regulatory policy, it can be 
applied to the implementation phase as well. Effective regulation depends on the ability of a 
regulatory system to mediate between different interests and tie in stakeholders. While this 
will depend on the balanced inclusion of respective preferences during the process of policy-
making, participation remains relevant as well during the implementation stage to increase 
compliance and trust in regulatory capacities (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994) Moreover, its 
effectiveness will depend on how regulatees perceive regulatory conduct and the governance 
structures (Nielsen & Parker, 2005). The third principle, accountability, is closely connected 
to the principle of openness. The basis of accountability is the clear identification of actors 
taking decisions. It thus raises the level of organisational transparency. Accountability is 
closely connected to the idea of legitimacy (Papadopoulos, 2007; Riekmann, 2007), as those 
actors affected by regulation want to know who is responsible for regulatory decisions.52 The 
principle can be applied to the policy-making process. However, the resulting policies should 
include clear definitions of responsibilities as well. Regarding the design of governance 
structures, defining roles and responsibilities has some important implications for the 
implementation of regulation. As it was outlined regarding the inclusion of relevant 
stakeholders, it should be made clear who is responsible for which task in the regulatory 
process. 
 
                                                 
50
 Accordingly, the study will use the terms of openness and transparency synonymously.    
51
 The establishment of transparency has to be understood as relative rather than total (Lodge, 2004). There are 
good reasons to limit transparency regarding certain information within the regulatory process. 
52
 The connection between accountability and legitimacy is especially striking in multilevel governance 
structures as mechanisms of input legitimacy are insufficient to legitimate increasingly complex and 
seemingly detached systems (Papadopoulos, 2010).   
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Finally, the principle of coherence calls for the alignment of different but intertwining 
regulatory policies and all relevant actors in the regulatory system. Additionally, the principle 
can be applied to the specific regulatory task: regulation is coherent if it manages to integrate 
all aspects of the underlying problem in need of regulation and thus addresses the problem 
adequately (internal coherence). Coherence can be defined in an external sense as well. 
Regulation is neither developed nor carried out in a political vacuum. New regulation can 
impact on different areas and has to take into account previously drafted regulation. Fitting 
new regulation into these complex existing structures will impact on its effectiveness as well. 
 
4.2.1.2 Better regulation task force 
Beyond the four relevant principles developed in the white paper the Better Regulation Task 
Force identifies three additional principles: 
 “Proportionality: Regulators should only intervene when necessary. Remedies should be appropriate to 
the risk posed, and costs identified and minimised. […] Consistency: Government rules and standards 
must be joined up and implemented fairly. […] Targeting: Regulation should be focused on the problem, 
and minimise side effects.[original emphasis]” (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003: 4-6). 
The principle of proportionality both addresses the need for the well-founded justification of 
regulatory intervention and the appropriateness of actions taken. In addition, it links 
regulatory intervention to the concept of efficiency: regulation has to be limited to the 
minimal intervention in order to reach a specific regulatory goal. The principle of consistency, 
calls for the consideration of other rules in applying regulation, basically sharing the idea 
expressed by the European Commission within the principle of coherence. Therefore, it does 
not have to be considered separately. Finally, targeting, while sharing some features of 
proportionality, represents a unique criterion of regulatory quality. It contributes to 
effectiveness by asking for the focused intervention regarding a specific regulatory problem. 
Regulation thus needs to be designed in a way that avoids collateral damage and unintended 
effects on other areas not within the regulatory scope.  
 
4.2.1.3 OECD criteria of good governance 
In contrast to the previously discussed contributions, the criteria developed by the OECD 
represent a checklist for regulatory activity and regulatory policy making rather than 
normative criteria. The review of the ten questions proposed by the OECD, reveal at least 
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partial coherence with the previously discussed criteria. However, the first four questions 
addressing the formulation of a regulatory goal (1), the justification of government 
intervention (2), the use of regulation (3) and finally the legal base of regulatory intervention 
(4) do not represent criteria of good regulation itself but preconditions of regulatory 
intervention. Accordingly, they should be included in a discussion of regulatory quality, and 
assessed upfront.53 The fifth question addresses an issue of regulatory system design, 
extremely important in the European regulatory context. It touches upon the principle of 
subsidiarity, which will be discussed in further detail below. The sixth question addresses the 
issue of regulatory costs, which is represented within the principle of proportionality. The 
seventh question deals with the impact of regulation on the different stakeholders. While the 
equal distribution of regulatory costs and benefits is not connected to regulatory effectiveness 
itself, it represents a unique value of good regulation and should therefore be included in the 
assessment under the concept of fair distribution of regulatory burden. The following two 
questions represent aspects covered within the identified criteria. The last question addressing 
the issue of compliance reflects the principal concept underlying both the criterion of 
proportionality and coherence.  
Following from the review of regulatory principles, seven specific criteria of good regulation 
can be deducted: openness, participation, accountability, coherence, proportionality, 
targeting and fair distribution of regulatory burden. These criteria serve as additional 
benchmarks in assessing regulatory quality and will be integrated into the still to be developed 
assessment framework. Linked to the primary criterion of effectiveness, the seven principles 
can be understood as enforcing and supporting its realisation. However, as the study focuses 
on the regulatory quality in the European context, a specific criterion of regulatory quality, 
subsidiarity needs to be integrated.54 
 
4.2.1.4 The principle of subsidiarity and regulatory quality  
As the focus of this study in on European regulation, the analysis of regulatory quality has to 
account for its specific characteristics. The European regulatory system is essentially a federal 
one (Kelemen, 2004, 2005). Therefore, an additional criterion for the quality of regulation in 
the European context has to be seen in the justification to regulate on the European level. The 
                                                 
53
 The four questions complement the pre-assessment beyond the criteria of justification introduced by Francis 
(1993). 
54
 The need to consider the principle of subsidiarity is highlighted in the white paper on European governance 
(CEC, 2001: 10).  
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quality of regulation in the European context will thus depend on the satisfaction of the 
subsidiarity principle. The principle is of high importance considering the issuance of 
European regulation as it represents the basis for the coordination of European regulatory 
activity. The principle was introduced in Article 3b of the Maastricht treaty in the year 1992.55 
The article states:  
“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by 
the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”  
European regulatory activity can be justified, if the scope of the problem necessitates 
supranational activity. The principle can be interpreted as twofold. First, it serves as 
precondition broadening the principal requirement of justification for regulatory action. 
Beyond justifying the respective regulatory intervention, the necessity of European regulatory 
intervention has to be established. Second, subsidiarity represents a design principle for 
regulatory systems. Action has to be taken on the appropriate level, which might lead to the 
division of regulatory activity e.g. the setting of standards and their implementation. In 
addition, the said activity should be as limited as possible in achieving the desired regulatory 
outcome.  
 
4.2.2 Intermediate results: effectiveness and principles of good regulation 
Summing up the previous discussion, eight principles of good regulation can be defined in the 
European context: openness, participation, accountability, coherence, proportionality, 
targeting, fair distribution of regulatory burden and subsidiarity. These principles should be 
traceable within the respective regulatory policies and, depending on their applicability, 
within governance structures. In addition to these principles, the discussion revealed several 
preconditions for regulatory quality. Initially, a clear goal advancing the public interest must 
be defined. Subsequently, a public (and legal) mandate to regulate on the European level has 
to be established. If these preconditions are met, the actual assessment of regulatory quality 
based on the eight principles can be conducted. While the principles have their own normative 
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 Now article 5 (TEC). 
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foundation and advance the good conduct of regulation they first and foremost serve the 
achievement of effectiveness.  
 
4.3 Achieving effective regulation 
Based on the underlying twofold definition of regulation as a type of policy and form of 
governance the implementation of the outlined principles and the realisation of regulatory 
effectiveness is achieved on at least three levels. Defining regulation as policy, the outlined 
principles can be applied both to the policy making process (1) and to the resulting policy (2). 
Yet, an analysis of the realisation of the identified principles in the policy-making process 
does not seem to be of key importance for the assessment of regulatory quality. In fact, 
analyzing the policy-making process would allow for an assessment of law-making quality 
rather than the quality of the law. Following from this, such an assessment will not be 
conducted in this study. If the policy-making process is not considered, regulatory quality has 
to be achieved via policies. Limiting the discussion to regulatory policy however would be 
too narrow: while the inclusion of principles within the policies underlying regulation ensures 
good regulation de jure, this does not ensure the realisation of these principles de facto.56 Only 
if the regulatory practice during the implementation stage reflects the underlying principles, 
real effectiveness can be achieved (Croley, 1998: 6). This shifts the focus to the realisation of 
regulatory principles through regulatory governance (3).  
From the governance perspective, good regulation has to be achieved by institutional (and 
process) design supporting the implementation of the policy itself.57 The outlined principles 
can thus be understood as design principles, which should be reflected in the resulting 
institutional set up governing a specific regulatory field. However, not all of the principles 
seem to be applicable to regulatory system design. Therefore, the discussion of principles in 
the context of governance can be limited to openness, participation, accountability and 
subsidiarity.58 Beyond assessing the existence of principles within institutions, the analysis of 
regulatory quality must focus on the analysis of regulatory institutions and the performance of 
these systems contributing to the effectiveness of regulatory institutions themselves. In fact, 
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 The issue of de jure and de facto realisation has been discussed extensively regarding the measurement of 
democracy (Lauth, 2004, 2000).  
57
 This conceptualization accounts for the significance of institutional arrangements on regulatory outcomes, 
presupposing that (conscious) institutional design is possible and that the design of institutions will have a 
significant impact on the behaviour of actors and outcomes. 
58
 The other principles have been excluded since they do not seem to be applicable to governance structures. 
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the implementation stage is viewed as more critical in achieving regulatory effectiveness, 
highlighting the importance of effective institutions for regulatory effectiveness. 
 
4.3.1 Regulatory effectiveness and institutional effectiveness 
Adopting a functional perspective, the effectiveness of an institution depends on the 
realisation of the underlying regulatory goal. If the developed principles of good regulation 
are perceived as important in achieving the regulatory goal, they have to be traceable in the 
resulting institution. While this provides a first idea of an effective institution, there are 
additional factors, which ought to be considered in the design of effective regulatory 
institutions. Institutions do not exist in a vacuum but in a given political and social context 
(Radaelli, 2004: 4). Only if regulatory institutions consider the requirements flowing from this 
context, they will be able to deliver fitting regulatory answers. In contrast, the ignorance of 
these requirements might lead to common and often criticised problems of regulation. 
 
4.3.1.1 Evaluating the common critique of regulation 
Using a classification developed by John G. Francis (1993), four different strands of criticism 
can be distinguished: ineffectively delivered or inability of state regulation (1), the potential 
of regulatory capture (2), the negative impact of regulation on economic performance (3) and 
overregulation (4).59  
The first strand of criticism addresses the structural inability of (state) regulation to realize its 
goals. Regulation is drafted as a response to a specific problem at a specific point in time. As 
time goes by, the regulatory response to a problem might simply go out of date with changes 
in economic and social conditions. Obviously, this critique is not confined to regulation but to 
all legal-based forms of governance. What is criticized is the heavy reliance on inflexible 
regulatory tools. This perception is traceable within the European better regulation debate, as 
it highlights the need for smart regulation and alternatives to legal regulation (Héritier & 
Eckert, 2008; Radaelli, 2004).  
The second strand addresses the much discussed  problem of regulatory capture and has first 
been described by George Stigler (1971) and Richard A. Posner (1974), even though Sam 
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 While the categories introduced by Francis are used to structure the next section, they are supplemented by 
addressing respective solutions for the criticism.  
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Peltzman (1976) popularized the concept.60 As stated previously the final goal of regulation is 
the protection of public interest. However, as Stigler proposes such an altruistic view of 
regulation is not capturing reality adequately. In fact, the creation of regulation is the product 
of private rather than public interests: “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” (Stigler, 1971: 4). Such benefit could be seen 
for example in the regulation of market entry, effectively protecting those in the market from 
those who want in. Capture becomes possible because the political mechanism enables 
companies to exert pressure on officials by offering votes and financial support. Politicians in 
turn either exert influence on the respective regulatory agency to produce regulatee-friendly 
regulation or do so themselves. Even though Stigler developed the concept of capture 
focusing on economic regulation and more specifically the regulation of monopolies, the idea 
of capture is applicable to all forms of regulation and often works in a more direct way than 
Stigler proposes. It is the close relationship between regulatory bureaucracies and regulated 
companies that breeds capture: as regulators lack their own basis of information for judgment 
they gradually become the allies of the industry (Francis, 1993: 27). This is even more the 
case, where regulatory activity depends heavily on industry support, for example on the  
provision of certain information or industry funding (Owen & Braeutigam, 1978). Often, 
regulators will face a situation of asymmetric information, making them dependent on 
information provided by regulatees (Baron & Besanko, 1984a). The idea of private interests 
capturing the regulators’ behavior should not be viewed as limited to companies. While it is 
true that businesses have a competitive advantage in influencing regulators through 
information dependencies, other interest groups e.g. environmental or health activists can 
capture them as well (Banks & Weingast, 1992; Calvert et al., 1989; Greer, 2008; Sabatier, 
1975). It will depend on the general political climate, towards which private interest a 
regulator is more open.61 From a theoretical point of view, one could argue that public 
regulatory capture can be perceived as less problematic, since regulators are captured by the 
constituency (Sabatier, 1975: 325-326). While regulation in such a situation could be labeled 
as highly responsive, it should not be confused with effective regulation. Using the example 
of risk regulation, citizens might prefer excessive levels of protection from a certain threat 
inevitably leading to overregulation. Public capture should thus be viewed with the same 
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 Bernstein (1961, 1972) and Sabatier (1975) both contributed to the political science perspective on capture 
theory. For a more detailed economic discussion of the capture argument see Ernesto Dal Bo (2006). 
61
 At the same time, the research on the impact of business interest on regulation seems to justify the perception 
of a stronger position of businesses in the regulatory arena as advanced by Stigler especially in the European 
case (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Broscheid & Coen, 2003; Coen, 1998, 2002; Eising, 2007). 
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skepticism as industrial capture. Furthermore, public capture might take an indirect route as 
politicians try to influence the work of regulators. Given the fact, that in most European 
member states (risk) regulatory tasks are pre-dominantly carried out by special regulatory 
agencies (Elgie, 2006; Thatcher, 2002a), governments or concerned ministries will try to 
influence these agencies in ways conducive to their interests and priorities, for example the 
maximization of vote shares (Calvert et al., 1989: 589).62 Finally, regulation can be distorted 
by capture from within. It is unrealistic to assume that regulators do not have interests. As 
companies try to preserve their competitive advantage and citizens publicly demand stricter 
regulation, bureaucracies seek to keep and expand their regulatory mandate. As Gordon 
Tullock (1976) stressed, regulators are utility maximizers. Regulation therefore will be 
influenced by bureaucratic preferences as well (James, 2000; McKenzie & Macaulay, 1980).  
A third strand of critique addresses the connection between (extensive) regulation and 
economic decline. In comparison to the issue of regulatory capture this critique stems from 
empirical observation rather than theoretical claims. Again, this critique is not directed at 
regulation in general but addresses the possible inefficiency that certain forms of regulation 
promote. While such critique has led to the emergences of massive deregulation programs in 
most OECD and European countries (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2003; Crafts, 2006), Dieter 
Helm, suggests that “the link between regulation and economic performance is tenuous and 
complex and there is no a priori reason to expect a tight negative causal relationship between 
them” (Helm, 2006: 177). A second problem not addressed by Francis could be seen in the 
negative effect on innovation (Bassanini & Ernst, 2002; Fai & Morgan, 2007). As in the case 
of economic performance, a general negative correlation between regulation and innovation is 
hard to prove. Nevertheless, possible negative effects of regulation have to be considered in 
respective regulatory decisions in order to avoid such effects. 
The fourth strand of critique can be characterized as a combination of the capture critique and 
those commentators questioning the general efficiency of government or public regulation in 
contrast to private self-regulation. First, regulators might be simply overburdened with 
regulatory tasks, therefore lacking the ability to regulate in an efficient way. A second 
problem could be seen in over-regulation. Either regulatory objectives are expanded beyond 
the initial goal of public interest and the regulatory mandate (Wiener, 2006), or the level of 
regulation is raised based on the perceptions and preferences of the regulator, beyond the 
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 On the other hand, the delegation argument developed in the previous chapter suggests, that in risk regulation 
this influence will only be traceable in the policy-making process, while regulatory governance understood as 
the daily regulatory operations will be left to the regulators.  
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social optimum (G. Banks, 2006; Littlechild, 2008). One central problem in claiming over-
regulation and the gathering of supportive evidence is the fact that it is extremely hard to 
trace.63 While a low level of regulation might result in insufficient problem solving, 
overregulation can be expected to ensure that the problem is solved, however at costs exciding 
the benefit of regulation. While the reason for too much regulation can mainly be seen in 
regulator’s interests and the public demand, it might result as well from the over- or 
underestimation of a specific thread to the public interest. The wrong valuation of a regulatory 
problem undermines reliable cost-benefit analysis, enabling the right level of regulatory 
intervention (Francis, 1993: 31). 
 
4.3.1.2 Ensuring effectiveness by addressing common problems of regulation 
As the synopsis of regulatory critique illustrated, several problems can affect regulation. 
Consecutively, the effectiveness of regulatory institutions will be negatively influenced if the 
identified challenges occur. Reassessing the identified strands of criticism, two more 
fundamental underlying issues can be identified. The first issue underlying the regulatory 
critique is a misfit of regulatory problems and regulatory answers. While this problem is not 
connected to the capture argument, the three remaining strands of regulatory critique are 
based on the perception that regulation fails to address the respective problem in an adequate 
way. This might either be the result of wrong problem perception or the wrong choice of 
regulatory answers. Accordingly, avoiding such problems depends on adequate analysis and 
even more important the choice of adequate regulatory strategies. The second underlying 
issue can be seen in the conflict between regulatory goals and affected preferences of 
stakeholders. As stakeholders try to alter the regulatory structures to maximize their utilities, 
regulatory effectiveness will be influenced. While this issue is clearly traceable in the case of 
regulatory capture, preferences play a (subordinate) role regarding the other issues as well. 
Rather than solving the issue by choosing appropriate regulatory strategies, the solution has to 
be based on institutional design. Accordingly, the next two sections will address how the two 
identified sets of problems can be solved focusing on the contribution of regulatory 
institutions. 
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4.3.1.3 Regulatory needs and regulatory strategies 
With regulation criticized as an inflexible and ineffective form of intervention, the deliberate 
choice of regulatory strategies and mechanisms represents the appropriate lever to ensure 
institutional and therefore regulatory effectiveness. This can imply the shift from the state as 
the main conductor of regulation or a change of regulatory mechanisms. These two options 
are not isolated from one another. In most cases the change of mechanisms will have an 
impact on the role of the state as well: legally based regulation, for example, was used to 
replace state ownership as the most drastic (and inflexible) form of state regulation (Baldwin 
& Cave, 1999; Egan, 1998). Opposed to this model of regulation, one could think of self-
regulation organized by the regulatees: regulation is left to the market, while the state retains a 
very limited role (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Haufler, 2001). Between these two poles, 
several arrangements based on a varying mixture of private and state influence over regulation 
are possible (Sinclair, 1997). The second lever of improvement is closely connected to the 
right choice of actors within a regulatory regime. In achieving regulatory goals regulatory 
regimes might resort to different regulatory strategies. Based on the typology introduced by 
Baldwin and Cave (1999), two sets of strategies can be distinguished. The first and more 
intrusive set of strategies can be clustered under the heading of command and control 
regulation.64 This strategy is essentially based on legal regulation and is characterized by “the 
exercise of influence by imposing standards backed by criminal sanctions” (Baldwin & Cave, 
1999: 35). The state retains a strong position in this regulatory set up by granting rulemaking 
power to a specialized agency and delegating enforcement to the judicial branch. Due to the 
heavy reliance on law, this approach is characterized by less flexibility and might take 
different forms. For example regulation might be realized through market-harnessing controls: 
competitive law, the use of franchising (granting licenses and product approval), specific 
contract agreements with companies instead of state provision of services and the issuance of 
tradable permits (1999: 44-47). A less intrusive option can be seen in the usage of incentives 
instead of punishment. Furthermore, the disclosure of information – naming and shaming – 
can be used as a regulatory strategy to influence market participant’s actions. The second set 
of strategies is the employment of rights and liabilities. Rather than being involved directly, 
the state resorts to a basic market mechanism: the allocation of rights. The enforcement of 
specific market rules is effectively delegated to the courts: In addition, public compensation 
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and social insurance schemes can be used to deal with unwanted externalities (1999: 51-54). 
In contrast to the conceptualization of Cave and Baldwin (1999), the outlined strategies 
should be thought of as sub strategies of command and control regulation, rather than an 
alternative regulatory approach since law remains the basis of the different strategies. While it 
is theoretically possible that these strategies could be set up and run by private actors, the state 
will remain involved (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). Even if it is not directly involved as in the 
case of the allocation of rights, the court will remain the enforcer of last resort. Opposed to 
command and control strategies, self-regulation can be identified as a distinct second 
regulatory strategy. The respective regulatory regime is either operated and enforced by the 
regulatees, or the state decides to retain a structuring and supervisory role (Baldwin & Cave, 
1999: 39). Instead of being based on law, regulatory regimes will be built upon soft law and 
voluntary commitment. From a theoretical perspective, self-regulation can represent an 
optimal regulatory strategy, resulting in a higher flexibility of the regulatory regime able to 
adapt quickly to new requirements (Black, 2002a). On the other hand, self-regulation depends 
largely on the trust that the public and the political actors have in its abilities (Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997; Ogus, 1995). Regulators will have to choose based on the underlying issue for 
regulation, which role the state should resume in the resulting regulatory regime. Effective 
regulatory institutions depend on the appropriate choice of strategies and the appropriate 
distribution of tasks between private and public actors in order to realize regulatory goals.  
Given that regulation in any event will be based on some sort of rules, another important 
decision is the selection of an appropriate level of precision (Diver, 1983). Regulators might 
decide to create highly precise rules to reduce discretion and uncertainty in rule application 
but at the same time this implies decreased flexibility. In contrast, they could decide to issue a 
very general rule granting some leeway but at the same time leaving regulatees with little 
guidance how to comply with regulation (Ogus, 2002: 640).65 A second issue is the right 
method to assess the regulatory problem. Only if regulators are able to assess the regulatory 
problem appropriately, they will be able to choose the fitting regulatory tools and take 
(informed) regulatory decisions. This is especially important in the area of risk regulation as 
the (right) assessment of the risk represents the foundation for effective risk regulation (Noll, 
1996: 167; Renn, 2008). Before this issue is discussed in further detail, the next section 
discusses the conflict between regulatory effectiveness and private interests. 
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4.3.2 Conflict of interests: regulatory goals and stakeholder preferences  
After highlighting the connection between regulatory strategies and (institutional) 
effectiveness, the discussion now turns to the second source of institutional ineffectiveness: 
conflicts of interests. As regulatory effectiveness is based on the achievement of regulatory 
goals, conflicting interests can affect its realisation. Internal and external stakeholders will try 
to alter regulation (or the respective agency) in ways conducive to their own preferences. In 
order to protect regulation and regulatory institutions from capture, political, institutional self 
and private interests have to be controlled. A key concept for safeguarding institutions from 
political interests and self-capture can be found in P-A theory (Kassim & Menon, 2003; 
Pollack, 2002; Ross, 1973). After delegation, agents may fall prey to certain forms of 
unintended behavior. Martin Lodge identifies three forms of drift, which can affect the agent 
and the regulatory regime as a whole:  
“These involve agency drift by the regulated actor(s) through the evasion of control in the pursuit of self-
interested action […] bureaucratic drift by regulatory and bureaucratic authorities enforcing regulation 
through selective or biased attention, budget- and turf-maximization strategies, and finally coalitional 
drift where the governing coalition seeks to move beyond the policy preferences established by the 
enacting coalition.[original emphasis]” (2004: 126) 
Regulatory effectiveness can be negatively affected by delegation in several ways. First, the 
regulated industry might refuse to comply with regulation. A second possibility beyond the 
problem Lodge identifies can be seen in the attempt to alter regulation and regulators’ 
behavior in ways more conducive to a private agenda. Second, the regulator might pursue his 
(own) agenda. Third, the (political) principal might want to relinquish long-term goals of 
regulation in order to pursue short-term interests to claim credit (e.g. react to a regulatory 
scandal by enacting stricter regulation). To prevent these problems, the agent has to be 
subjected to certain measures of control. The principal can clearly define the agent’s scope, 
task and procedures to adhere to (ex ante) and use oversight mechanisms (ex post) monitoring 
the behavior of the agent (Geradin & Petit, 2004: 50-55). Besides including control 
mechanisms within the rules establishing the agent, external review will ensure his 
compliance, for example by employing judicial review (Ogus, 2002: 644). While principal-
agent theory stresses the importance of avoiding self-inflicted capture – describing a regulator 
pursuing his (own) agenda – the presented measures can be thought of as limiting undue 
influence of the principal and private interests over the regulator. If the agent’s scope is 
clearly defined, it will be harder for the principal to push for regulation more conducive to 
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short-term political interest. Accordingly, delegation can serve as a form of credible 
commitment. Furthermore, the risk of subjective assessment of regulatory problems e.g. based 
on political considerations is reduced. As clear rules guide the assessment of regulation, the 
risk of a subjective bias in regulators’ assessment is minimized (Gehring et al., 2005). While 
the creation of an independent and controlled regulator will help to remedy the negative 
influence of political and self-inflicted capture, the risk of private capture is reduced as well. 
If regulators are subjected to clear rules and procedures governing regulatory decision-
making, their remains little leeway to rule in favor of certain private interests (Elgie, 2006). 
Without undue simplification, the safeguarding of regulatory effectiveness necessitates the 
creation of a regulator, respecting the principle of transparency and accountability. Anthony 
Ogus (2002: 643-644) provides a detailed concept of accountability in regulation. First, 
regulators (or agents) should respect their respective regulatory budgets. Using budgetary 
constraints could thus serve as an incentive to ensure financial accountability. Second, 
regulators have to ensure procedural accountability by including principles of due process and 
publicly justifying regulatory decisions. In other words, the requirement of procedural 
accountability calls for the realization of participation and transparency within the regulatory 
process. Finally, substantive accountability forces the regulator to justify their regulatory 
interventions based on its costs and benefits. Following from this, the transparency of the 
regulatory system serves as a precondition for accountable regulation. It is tempting to believe 
that by maximizing accountability and transparency, regulatory effectiveness is maximized as 
well. However, the relationship between regulatory effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency should not be perceived as linear. As Martin Lodge notes, a more reflected 
understanding is necessary accounting for the fact that: “accountability and transparency are 
not ‘good things’ in their own right of which we should simply have ‘more’, but that 
particular choices […] invite particular tradeoffs [original emphasis]” (2004: 128). While a 
high level of accountability and transparency are obviously necessary to safeguard the loyalty 
of an independent regulator to regulatory goals, there is a downside to it. With greater spans 
of control, the agent’s effectiveness might decrease while costs on the principal’s side 
increase (Huber & Shipan, 2000; Pollack, 1998). Institutional design of a regulatory system 
has to strike a balance between the need for control and avoidance of drift and the need for 
flexibility in order to regulate effectively. While accountability and transparency are 
detrimental to ensure such control they might negatively impact on the latter.  First, a (too) 
high level of transparency might lead to regulatory behavior overemphasizing compliance and 
regulation by the book. If regulators are subjected to rigorous control and transparency, this 
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might lead to a heightened awareness of public perception on the regulators’ side. Rather than 
focusing on his regulatory task, the regulator might thus become preoccupied with the 
external perception.66 This will prevent the regulatory system from developing more fitting 
regulatory strategies and can cause institutional gridlock, leading to rigid and thus suboptimal 
regulatory outcomes (Lodge, 2004: 140). 
Second, opening up the regulatory black box can result in the publicization of regulatory 
decision-making (M. Flinders & Buller, 2006). Regulation in most cases will involve the 
assessment of experts (Brint, 1990; Pollak, 1996). Due to the complex nature of most 
regulatory problems and the resulting uncertainty, experts will have to engage in scientific 
reasoning about the best advice to inform regulatory decision-making. Making these 
discussions transparent can have some unintended consequences. The unfiltered presentation 
of arguments and different view points might be misinterpreted by the lay public, leading to 
further erosion of trust in scientific assessment, increase public uncertainty, and the re-
politicization of a regulatory field. Again, this could lead to regulatory answers influenced by 
public perception rather than effective problem-solving as well as a prolonged decision-
making process (Lodge, 2004). While the issue of public influence is even more pressing 
regarding the participation of lay people in regulatory decision-making in order to advance its 
accountability (Joss, 1999), it has to be discussed in the case of transparency as well. Beyond 
these rather theoretically founded reasons, there might be a third legitimate reason to limit 
transparency to a certain level: to protect legitimate private interests of citizens and 
companies. A recent report by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) reviewing 
common failures of risk regulatory regimes argues:  
“Likewise, the protection of business secrets in competitive markets, where innovations can be the subject 
of piracy, is also seen as necessary for a well-functioning, innovative economy. […] a desire to avoid 
public panic may justify a prioritisation of confidentiality over transparency”(2009: 48).  
Referring to the discussion on the critique of regulation, the limitation of transparency can be 
viewed as necessary in order to reduce the distorting effects of regulation on economic 
growth. However, while a certain level of confidentiality is necessary to safeguard regulatory 
effectiveness, it calls for deliberate consideration.  
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As in the case of too much transparency a secretive mode of regulation:  
“may reduce trust in risk management and in decision-makers by raising suspicion that the shield of 
confidentiality is being used as a power lever (e.g. by government and/or industry) to advance or protect 
particular interests without adequate justification” (IRGC, 2009: 48). 
Companies and regulators might overemphasize the need for confidentiality in order to 
protect their position rather than enabling effective regulation.67 Summing up the previous 
discussion, the design of regulatory institutions obviously faces a crucial trade-off. To ensure 
effectiveness an institution (agent) shielded from external influence and kept from pursuance 
of his own goals while at the same time granting the agent enough discretion and leeway to 
pursue the regulatory goals must be created.  
 
4.3.2.1 Regulatory institutions and equilibrium theory 
While the avoidance of drift and capture by a carefully designed zone of discretion and the 
safeguarding of accountability and transparency form major building blocks of effective 
regulatory activity, the need to keep regulatees and other affected stakeholders out of 
regulation seems to be overemphasized and impractical. Such conceptualization ignores the 
broader meaning of a regulatory institution in a functional sense: social coordination (Knight, 
1992). Institutions have a structuring function, as they can be “thought of as part of what 
embeds people in social situations” (Shepsle, 1989: 134). This assumption is valid in the case 
of regulation as well. A regulatory institution brings together stakeholders affected by 
regulation. Since these groups have their own goals and preferences, they can be expected to 
have altering views about the institution itself. This will affect their perspective on the 
respective institution and the respective institutional outcomes. In some (rare and ideal) 
instances, preferences and goals of affected parties might eventually coincide, rendering the 
emergence of conflict as improbable. However, such constellation seems to be detached from 
reality. What will emerge most likely is a conflict of interest regarding the institution and its 
workings. Given the fact that institutions can be altered, actors will try to do so in order to 
create an institution meeting individual preferences. This clash of interests will obviously 
impact on effectiveness since regulatory institutions need credibility and mutual trust to carry 
out their task effectively (Nielsen & Parker, 2005; Shimshack & Ward, 2005). While 
regulatees often depend on the regulator, as for example in obtaining market approval, a 
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higher level of trust in the abilities of the regulator will lead to increased performance of the 
regulatory system.68 What has to be achieved in order to reach a certain level of effectiveness 
is a state of balance, between the regulator and stakeholders. Put differently an (institutional) 
equilibrium has to be created. The concept of equilibrium has been initially developed within 
economics based on the workings of Léon Walras (1954) and developed further by Kenneth 
Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954) focusing on the institution of markets.69 In context of 
regulatory governance the idea of an equilibrium can be understood as institutional stability. 
Without undue simplification, stability primarily relies on the rules that enable change of 
institutions (Shepsle, 1989). Even if competing interests exist regarding the individually 
preferred regulatory outcome, institutions will depend on its acceptance by affected 
stakeholders and how easy the institution can be changed. The higher the barriers and 
transaction costs for change, the higher the robustness of an institution will be. In line with P-
A theory, regulatory capture is minimized by shielded institutions.  
While this ensures that affected stakeholders will not be able to alter the regulator in the 
future, it does not tackle the root cause of capture. An institution needs to be robust vis-à-vis 
the goals and regulatory interests of the concerned actors in order to fulfil the regulatory goal, 
but at the same time able to change if such changes would be necessary to realize the 
regulatory goal more effectively.70 Accordingly, a (limited) congruence between regulatory 
goals and private interests has to be achieved, expanding the initial meaning of equilibrium. 
Regulatees need to perceive the regulatory situation as an equilibrium of interests, fulfilling 
their preferences at least partially. First, minimal consensus regarding what should be 
achieved by regulation must be achieved (Gilliland & Manning, 2002). If the parties involved 
share a common understanding of the regulatory problem despite their respective preferences, 
an institution can be effective. Second, the institution itself has to have some degree of 
acceptance, depending mainly on its performance. If the regulatory institution manages to 
analyze the regulatory problem appropriately and will develop fitting regulatory answers, 
regulatees can be expected to accept the institution. Furthermore, the acceptance will depend 
on the building of mutual trust in regulatory relations. 
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4.3.2.2 The building of institutional trust versus regulatory capture 
While (institutional) governance structures play a crucial part in achieving regulatory goals, 
this perspective neglects the importance of relationships and interaction in achieving 
regulatory effectiveness. As research on regulatory compliance has shown, forms of informal 
control like sharing of information and interaction enhance compliance of regulatees 
supporting the conceptualization of trust as crucial for regulatory effectiveness (Axelrod, 
1984; Gilliland & Manning, 2002). Unsurprisingly, trust is of vital importance regarding the 
(lay) public acceptance of regulators as well (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Before the 
discussion turns to the implications of trust for the relationship between regulators and the 
public, the relation between regulators and regulatees has to be explored further. While there 
are some regulatory areas, where no direct regulatees exist, industry or businesses will 
constitute the target audience of regulation in most cases. As previously discussed simple 
control and command strategies and an adversarial regulatory style in pursuing regulatory 
goals might be ineffective. Most regulatory relationships are characterized by some sort of 
asymmetric distribution of information in favour of the regulated industry (Baron & Besanko, 
1984b) and a more cooperative approach towards industry might ensure the disclosure of 
information necessary to enable effective regulatory decision-making. While this does not 
imply that regulators should resign from control as a vital component in achieving regulatory 
compliance, it highlights the importance of reputation and goodwill in the relationship 
between business and regulators (Black, 2002b; Coen, 2005a). While regulators should be 
expected to be primarily interested in compliance, the regulated industry will be mainly 
interested in clear communication of expectations, guidance regarding compliance and 
predictability of regulatory decision-making. The establishment of resilient regulatory 
relations will be based on long-term experience and repetitive interaction between the firm 
and the regulator (Willman et al., 2003). Good relations between the regulator and the 
regulated will be necessary to ensure effective regulation, but there is an obvious downside to 
it. As indicated in the life-cycle model of regulation developed by Marver Bernstein (1955), 
regulators will progressively subordinate the public interest to the interests of the regulated 
interest and fall pray to industry capture. The repetitive interaction between regulators and 
regulatees does not only breed trust but might result in too close relations.71 While a 
distinction between legitimate ties and undue closeness has to be drawn, even the former 
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could be seen as a problem as the growing literature on regulatory relations specifically in the 
pharmaceutical sector indicates (Abraham et al., 2002; Abraham & Lewis, 2000). Beyond the 
scientific discussion, the (necessarily) closer relationship between regulators and regulated 
industry, could lead to a decline in public trust in the regulator’s integrity. In a broader sense, 
the acceptance of the regulatory institution will depend, on how opposing interests are 
absorbed and incorporated in institutional change. There might not only be a conflict between 
personal interests and the regulatory goal, but between competing private interests as well. If 
the regulatory institution will establish a too close link to one of the stakeholders, this will 
lead to the demise of acceptance of other stakeholders. If regulators would favour public 
perceptions over industry interests, this can  lead to lower levels of compliance and imperfect 
disclosure of information on behalf of the regulated firm.72 If regulators constantly favoured 
the industry, this could lead to severe political repercussions and the decrease of public trust 
in regulatory competencies. Unfortunately, this problem can never be fully excluded as 
regulation can never be made fully egalitarian (Lodge, 2004). Regulation as a distinct type of 
policy necessitates a close(r) relationship between the regulator and the regulated. At the same 
time this necessity should not be misunderstood as a justification for the exclusion of other 
stakeholders. Drawing the line between legitimate close ties and favouritism of stakeholders is 
contingent upon the situation and must be assessed individually. However, such analysis can 
be based on the assessment of regulatory principles in the regulatory work: the inclusion of 
the different groups as well as the general level of transparency and accountability 
characterizing the regulatory regime. The closer the conduct of regulation resembles a black 
box, the higher the chances that regulation favours industrial interests (Abraham & Davis, 
2007).  
 
4.3.3 Intermediate result: regulatory institutions and effectiveness 
Summing up the discussion to this point, the effectiveness of an regulatory institution will not 
only depend on its ability to realize the regulatory goal and incorporate principles of good 
regulation, but its ability to adequately define regulatory problems, the right level of 
cooperation between private and public actors, the right regulatory strategy and finally the 
implementation of fitting regulatory answers. In addition, regulatory institutions will have to 
avoid any form of capture by retaining a certain degree of independence. By establishing clear 
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rules for the regulatory decision-making process the problem of self-inflicted and private 
capture is reduced, as the discretion of regulators to pursue other instead of the public interest 
is limited (Lodge, 2004). The effectiveness of regulation will mainly depend on the pursuance 
of the public interest, but total isolation of the regulator from external influence has to be 
avoided. In order to realize regulatory goals, acceptance of the regulator and mutual trust 
between the regulator and the regulatees is vital as well. While a certain level of congruence 
between regulatory goals and private interests serves as a precondition for such relations, 
experience and repetitive interaction between the parties serves as a key lever to establish 
trust. Good relations between regulators and stakeholders will support the realization of 
effective regulation, but they have to stay within the limits of cooperation, Furthermore, 
regulatory systems need to engage in balanced stakeholder management, minimizing the 
negative effects that the focus on singular interests in regulation might have. While the 
developed requirements represent generally applicable criteria to assess regulatory quality, the 
chapter now turns to the specification of the framework, accounting for the specific 
challenges connected to risk regulation and the European context.  
 
4.3.4 Risk regulation and regulatory effectiveness 
The previously developed criteria for the assessment of regulatory effectiveness can be 
applied to risk regulation as well, but the distinct features of risk regulation have to be 
accounted for in regulatory analysis. A specific feature of risk regulation is the complex 
process of defining the underlying regulatory problem. Compared to other forms of 
regulation, the regulation of risk is fundamentally characterized by uncertainty about the 
form, nature and severity of risks (Renn, 2008). The regulation of monopolies, for example, 
could be understood as minimizing the emergence of monopolies and this regulatory task 
rests upon (relatively) sound evidence and knowledge regarding monopolies and their market-
distorting effects (Sherman, 1989). In contrast, risk regulation in most cases lacks a sound 
basis and therefore qualifies as regulation under uncertainty. While the degree of uncertainty 
might differ between types of risk, uncertainty can never be fully excluded. This has 
implications for the choice of regulatory strategies and institutions and the concept of risk 
regulation has therefore been increasingly substituted by the concept of risk governance 
(Hutter, 2006; Renn, 2008) and (risk) regulatory regimes (Eberlein & Grande, 2005; Hood et 
al., 2001; Vogel, 2001). The concept of risk governance accounts for the general tendency of 
de-centred regulation and a “move to state reliance on new forms of fragmented regulation” 
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(Hutter, 2006: 215). Instead of focusing exclusively on the regulatory aim, the state 
increasingly engages in regulation of the stakeholders and in meta-regulation by monitoring 
performance and increasingly shifting implementation to regulatees (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 
2004: 6-7; Morgan, 2003: 490). The tendency towards risk governance should not be viewed 
as a simple account of the erosion of state centred regulation. It also stresses the increased 
importance of regulatory structures in delivering fitting regulatory policies. This perspective 
is closely connected to the notion of regulation as a form of governance. Since risk regulation 
represents regulation under uncertainty, a heightened meaning has to be attributed to the 
institutional setting in which regulation takes place (Renn, 2008: 9). As valid information 
forms a precondition of effective regulation, the assessment of risk becomes a focal point of 
risk regulation and its effectiveness. While the production of information on which regulation 
is based is relatively uncontested in many regulatory fields, the situation in risk regulation is 
different. First, certain risks can never be pinpointed, since they can only be estimated but 
never measured exactly (Gould, 1988). Second, these assessments will be subjective to some 
degree as they have to be made by experts. Different experts might come to different 
conclusions as humans in general might err in deciding on the severity of risks (Kletz, 2001). 
While the risk to err affects all forms of delegated decision-making, the potential negative 
implications connected to risk regulatory failures amplify these concerns leading to distinct 
models of risk regulation.  
 
4.3.4.1 Models of (risk) regulatory decision-making  
Even though the options for the design of regulatory systems are numerous, consensus 
regarding a basic process of risk regulation seems to exist. The process of risk analysis should 
include risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (CEC, 2000; Fischer, 
2009; Renn, 2006).73 Linking the discussion of these process steps to the more general 
discussion of regulatory effectiveness, several requirements regarding the evaluation of risk 
regulation can be derived.   
 
Risk assessment: the role of expertise in regulatory decision-making 
Risk regulation necessitates decisions about the nature, severity and impact of a certain risk. 
The model of science-based risk assessment can be thought of as the general approach in the 
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European context: scientific experts assess risks in order to subsequently inform political 
decision makers, who take appropriate political action to manage the risk (Gehring et al., 
2005; Löfstedt & Fairman, 2006). The reason for delegation to experts is comprehensible as 
“elected political officials,[…] face the same information imperfections as do the citizens 
exposed to the risk” (Noll, 1996: 168), reflecting the argument of uncertainty avoidance. The 
science-based approach has been exposed to heavy criticism (Abels, 2002; Boswell, 2008; 
Liberatore & Funtowicz, 2003; Shrader-Frechette, 1995). What has been criticized is the 
heavy reliance on experts in the process: scientific considerations potentially dominate 
resulting political decisions, as decision makers have to rely on the evidence that science 
produced. This would constitute a minor problem, if the scientists providing scientific input 
could be expected to do so in an objective and unbiased way. The objectivity of science and 
the need for independence of experts from political and private influence, has been 
highlighted and used as a legitimization of science based regulation (Majone, 2000). While 
the isolation of experts reduces the potential of external influence it does not address the 
inherent problem of subjectivity in regulatory science. Experts are humans and therefore their 
decisions will always be influenced by subjective assessment to a certain degree. A more 
decisive problem regarding the science based model, stems from the underlying uncertainty of 
risk regulation. Considering that some risks and their effects are more uncertain than others 
(Fischer, 2009), the superiority of experts is called into question in the latter case.74 If experts 
are not sure how to assess a complex risk, they no longer could claim a more important role 
than anyone else. More specifically, science-based risk regulation is challenged on four 
grounds (Shrader-Frechette, 1995: 117). First, the scientific character of risk assessment is 
challenged. As in risk management, value judgements are influencing the risk assessment 
process. If there is no certainty about how to assess the risk, science can no longer claim an 
exclusive position in decision-making, as authors advocating the “social robustness” 
(Nowotny, 2003) of science stress. Instead of limiting assessment to scientific facts, it is 
proposed that some claims about the nature of risk could be made on democratic grounds. No 
longer does the meeting of scientific standards suffice, but assessment has to meet social (or 
better yet societal) criteria as well to be perceived as legitimate (Nowotny, 2003: 155). 
Second, the model is challenged on ethical grounds. Since risk regulatory decisions have an 
impact on individual welfare and in some cases the individual property, there is a need to 
involve the affected parties in risk assessment. The third objection is of ontological nature. 
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Since risk regulation has an impact on many areas of human live and in some cases even an 
impact on future generations, the involvement of the public (interest) is advocated. Finally, 
the fourth reason challenges the role of experts on democratic grounds. As it has been 
discussed in a previous chapter regulation will be based on certain goals. These goals ought to 
be based on democratic consent: if regulation has an impact on the constituency, the 
constituency should be allowed to have a say in it. While the reasons forwarded by Kristin S. 
Shrader-Frechette might have high face validity, even though not entirely distinguishable 
from one another, the need of public participation in risk assessment does not seem to be 
mandatory in all cases. Going back to the initial idea of separating risk assessment and risk 
management, a concept that Shrader-Frechette challenges as well, risk assessment ought to 
provide a mere assessment of a risk. Including lay perception would be reasonable in case of a 
respective risk characterized by a high level of uncertainty. In this case, the superiority of 
expert knowledge as well as the superiority of scientific assessment and scientific methods 
can be challenged to a certain degree. The assessment phase of risk regulation is resolved. It 
would be justifiable to open up the assessment of risk to all participants affected by the 
regulation. However, if the risk under scrutiny is a known risk, the benefit of opening up the 
assessment process is questionable. In fact, the raised criticism misinterprets risk assessment 
as a sub-phase of risk management. Risk assessment is about the assessment of a risk in order 
to inform political decision-making through evaluation of scientific facts. Often, the 
information that will result from the assessment will chart the path of political decision and in 
some cases will take the form of a policy proposition. However, the actual regulatory decision 
remains a political (and value based) one, possibly dissenting from the results of risk 
assessment. If the objectivity and superiority of experts is challenged, solving the problem by 
opening up the risk assessment and the inclusion of value judgements, will hardly improve the 
overall objectivity of the assessment. Instead, scientific reasoning is replaced by value-laden 
discussions, slowing down the process reducing the regulatory effectiveness and efficiency 
alike (Lodge, 2004). The critique raised by Kirstin S. Shrader-Frechette (1995) has to be 
accounted for in the risk management phase: Surely, there is a need for the inclusion of 
peoples’ perceptions in the management of risk, but this is not challenged by science-based 
models of regulation. If the underlying risk can be framed as a known risk, the science-based 
model can be seen as a practicable solution and the role of experts seems to be at least 
tolerable. Nevertheless, the problem of objectivity and the need for accountable experts in risk 
assessment remains. Objectivity has to be shielded against undue external influence and the 
scientific experts have to be controlled in order to minimize subjectivity. The solution to this 
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problem must be seen in institutional design: subjective or privately biased assessment can be 
reduced by introducing clear criteria for assessment, while external influence has to be 
minimized further by isolating those conducting the assessment. While this argumentation 
supports the claim that risk assessment of known risks should be delegated to experts, 
additional qualifications have to be introduced. If experts conduct risk assessments, there is a 
heightened need for transparency, accountability and clear rules guiding the decision-making 
process. This is necessary in order to avoid subjective scientific assessment. In addition, the 
provision of information on how a decision was derived supports the “informedness of 
citizenry” (Noll, 1996: 174), educating the public to understand and evaluate risk in a more 
rational way.  
 
Risk management: weighing the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention 
The second step in risk analysis, risk management, focuses on the “design and 
implementation of actions and remedies necessary to cope with the specific risk” (Renn, 
2006: 16). It focuses on the political management of risks by developing a regulatory answer, 
considering the broader societal implications as well as its costs and benefits. Risk 
management should not be understood as simply transforming the scientific assessment into a 
political decision within a given bureaucratic structure, resulting in a regulatory black box. 
While such an approach to risk management can be found in many risk regulatory regimes, it 
represents a suboptimal risk management strategy. First, it ignores the fact that “science can 
provide crucial information, but cannot determine correct policies”(De Marchi & Ravetz, 
1999: 755). Second, taking political decisions in secrecy runs the risk of ignoring public 
perceptions on risk and how to react to it. It can result in insufficient cost benefit analysis, 
inadequate consideration of different options and a lack of anticipation of regulatory effects 
and impacts (IRGC, 2009). While risk assessment has to be isolated from public reasoning, 
the opposite seems to be true for the second phase of risk analysis. Affected stakeholders must 
have the possibility to state their case and provide information to enable better regulatory 
answers (Renn, 2006). Despite creating the opportunity to involve stakeholders in (political) 
decision-making, the principle of transparency and the establishment of clear rules guiding the 
process play an important part during risk management. As in the case of risk assessment, the 
decision has to be based on a clear process to create understanding for the decision itself and 
allow for independent external scrutiny.  
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Risk communication: ensuring the transfer of risk knowledge 
Communication obviously represents a prerequisite for the effective regulation of risk and 
interaction during the risk management phase. According to Ortwin Renn, the aim of risk 
communication is twofold:  
“Not only should risk communication enable stakeholders and civil society to understand the rationale 
of the results and decisions from the risk appraisal and risk management phases when they are not 
formally part of the process, but it should also help them to make informed choices about risk, 
balancing factual knowledge about risk with personal interests, concerns beliefs and resources, when 
they are themselves involved in risk-related decision-making” (Renn, 2006: 15). 
The aims of risk communication can be rendered even more precisely. First, risk 
communication is about the announcement of the regulatory decision, including the facts and 
reasons leading to the decision. Second, risk communication should be understood as a tool to 
advance the general public understanding of specific risks. Third, risk communication can and 
should be understood as a mechanism to establish trust in the regulatory system as whole 
(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). While risk communication for a long time was reduced to the 
first aim, its meaning and importance for the effectiveness of risk regulation as a whole grew 
significantly over time, leading to a more holistic approach considering all three aims of risk 
communication in a more focused way (Leiss, 1996). In realising these aims, regulators face 
some key challenges. First of all, there is a disparity “between risks assessed by experts on the 
one hand and as understood by the general public, on the other” (Leiss, 1996: 86). Regulators 
have to understand what causes these differences in perception as “the experience of risk 
therefore is not only an experience of physical harm but the result of processes by which 
groups and individuals learn to acquire or create interpretations of risk” (Kasperson et al., 
2003: 15). Risk communication has to be sensitive to these dynamics in order to enable 
effective knowledge translation. Some practical implications for risk communication have 
been synthesized by John Maule (2004). Risk communicators have to be aware that the lay 
public might interpret risk estimates differently (Dake, 1991; Sjöberg, 2000), especially 
concerning statistical information. Three implications can be derived regarding effective risk 
communication: the uncertainty of any formulation of risk has to be recognized (1), methods 
to determine how different audiences will react to the use of estimates have to be applied (2) 
and risk communication has to be organized as a two-way process (3). Especially the last 
point is of high importance. Rather than just passing out information, doing so in the form of 
a dialogue with the stakeholders will help to establish a common understanding of the risk at 
hand, reducing the risk of misinterpretation. In order to establish better communication, 
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understanding the target audience and what influences their perceptions plays an important 
role as well. Maule identifies individual factors shaping the perception of individuals 
regarding risk. In order to account for the individual factors, he suggests that regulators 
should focus on the usage of words instead of numbers in risk communication, present 
statistical info in more understandable ways and finally train risk communicators to be more 
sensitive to the meaning of individual perception. Besides individual factors, perceptions of 
risk are shaped by societal factors. Maule distinguishes cultural differences as well as 
stakeholder specific perceptions as the two main differences. The implications for better risk 
communication are obvious: Risk communicators need to be aware of their target audience. 
Finally, Maule identifies trust as a key concept for effective knowledge transfer in risk 
communication. As it was discussed with regard to the effectiveness of regulatory institutions, 
trust and reputation is important for effective regulation. However, trust itself depends on 
perception of the regulatory structure. Based on the work of Levine and Renn (1991), Maule 
identifies five facets associated with the perception of a communicator as trustworthy 75:  
“the communicator is competent (has the appropriate expertise), objective (messages are free from 
bias), fair (all points of views are acknowledged), consistent (in terms of behaviours and statements 
made over time) and acting in good faith (a perception of good will).” (Maule, 2004: 25) 
Compared to the aforementioned concepts, trust cannot be achieved by simply applying 
different risk communication techniques. Rather, trust has to be developed over a long period 
of time, depending on past experience with the respective institution. Given a perceived 
decline of trust in regulatory agencies and governments, establishing trust in risk 
communication is becoming even more complicated. Acknowledging the complexity of the 
task, Maule (2004) recommends two basic strategies for communication. Risk communication 
should draw on concepts of two-way communication, to establish repetitive interaction 
between the regulator and stakeholders. As interaction deepens over time, regulatory 
reputation, mutual understanding and eventually trust can be built. A second and more short-
term oriented tool can be seen in using trusted communicators. Regulators might, for 
example, use physicians in order to communicate the risks involved in using novel drugs, as 
they are considered more trustworthy.76 
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 Their importance is amplified in a situation of high uncertainty and time constraints (Siegrist et al., 2000). 
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 This assumption is valid in the European case, as the public perceives doctors and health associations as the 
most trustworthy sources regarding health information (DG Sanco, 2003a). 
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4.3.5 The impact of Europe on effective regulation  
Since regulation is carried out in a system of multilevel governance in the European context 
(Coen & Thatcher, 2008) the peculiar characteristics and the impact on regulatory 
effectiveness must be considered. Starting with a general assumption, the Europeanization of 
regulation can be framed as amplifying most of the problems addressed in former sections. 
The amplification of regulatory problems in the European context stems mainly from the 
specific regulatory architecture. Regulation in Europe is exercised in a multilevel governance 
system spanning different regulatory levels and even more important different regulatory 
phases. As the European level engages in regulatory rule-making, the implementation of 
regulation is carried out by the national level or even below (Haverland & Romeijn, 2007; 
Versluis, 2007). The introduction of different regulatory levels expands the number of 
stakeholders in regulation. In the simple (national) model of regulatory institutions the group 
of stakeholders consist of regulatees, (other) private groups and the public. In the case of 
European involvement, the set of stakeholders is expanded to national regulators and the 
interests of member states as well as additional European level political stakeholders. As a 
consequence, regulatory institutions on the European level face an expanded set of 
(public/political and private) stakeholders. And as the number of stakeholders expands, the 
number of conflicting preferences expands as well. Realizing effective regulation in the 
European context is thus complicated by the fact that national regulators, assuming a pivotal 
role in implementation and in most cases having a large zone of discretion in applying 
European regulation, will have a fundamental interest in keeping up their respective 
regulatory approach.77 In light of national regulatory styles, the creation of alignment of 
national regulators with the overarching European regulatory goals is of crucial importance. 
As the regulatory system or network in most cases will depend on the regulatory resources on 
the national level (Geradin & Petit, 2004; Kelemen & Menon, 2007a), circumventing national 
regulators and their interests is simply impossible. Following from that, European regulatory 
structures have to ensure alignment, compliance and support of national regulators beyond 
legal commitments. As in the case of regular stakeholders, this necessitates the creation of 
opportunity structures convincing national regulators that compliance and cooperation will 
pay off. Furthermore, the safeguarding of regulatory independence becomes an even greater 
challenge in the European context. While the principle mechanisms developed in this chapter 
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 National regulators will try to maintain their regulatory approach, since an alternation would clash with 
ingrained regulatory styles (Howlett, 2002; Meidinger, 1987) and imply adaptation costs. 
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are applicable in the European context as well, the multiplicity of interests involved will 
translate into higher pressure on regulators and European regulatory agencies more 
specifically. In addition, the two-level character of the regulatory system has implications for 
the implementation of regulation. Even though this notion seems to be trivial, the timely and 
homogenous implementation of European rules has emerged as a real and prevailing problem 
in reality and sparked an intense scientific debate on the compliance of European member 
states (Börzel, 2001; Falkner et al., 2007; Falkner et al., 2005; Toshkov, 2007). While 
compliance with European regulatory policy is essential for the according implementation on 
the national level, this again would only ensure the de jure effectiveness of European 
regulation.  
What is even more important considering the implementation phase seems to be the fit 
between national regulatory structures and the European requirements. What is needed to 
ensure a well functioning regulatory system is an institutional fit between the different 
regulatory levels (Bailey, 2002). The fit and internal coherence of the overall regulatory 
system can be expected to have a considerable impact on the implementation of regulation. 
While good transposition of European regulation (in the sense of policy) will depend heavily 
on political will to comply, the institutional fit represents a measure of compliance costs or 
adaptation costs in an institutional sense. The mere similarity of regulatory structures on both 
levels will however not suffice to ensure effectiveness. Beyond institutional fit the personal fit 
of national bureaucrats and their willingness to accept European rules has to be considered. In 
more general terms, national regulatory cultures will impact on the effectiveness in the 
implementation stage. In the case of risk regulation, for example, national regulators might 
have a different risk perception or general risk awareness concerning a certain issue, 
reflecting specific national cultures of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Viscusi & Hamilton, 
1999).78 Besides national regulatory culture, the organisational culture of the respective 
regulatory agency can impact on perceptions and behaviour of agencies and individual 
regulators (Deily & Gray, 2007). The implications for the regulatory system are obvious. If 
national regulatory cultures are very distinct and hard to align, national regulators will almost 
certainly oppose deeper integration to protect their own (national) regulatory beliefs and 
culture. Their opposition could refer to the general framework developed on the European 
level, as well as to the opinions and techniques of other national regulators. The latter will be 
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especially problematic if the new approach based on mutual recognition is considered in 
regulatory integration (Higgs, 2000; Schmidt, 2002a, 2007). If regulatory competition 
between national regulatory agencies is stimulated to derive the best regulatory strategy, 
reservations towards concurring frameworks are likely to create a gridlock. As a consequence, 
a regulatory system in the European context will have to deal with the diversity of cultures 
and find a way to isolate the distorting effects of cultural disharmony. This is achieved by 
offering certain incentives for national regulators to cooperate and probably more important 
by setting up procedures to effectively tie in national regulators. Mutual trust in regulatory 
competencies is crucial in this regard, but at the same time very hard to achieve. Regulatory 
cultures are build around deeply held believes. The acceptance of concurring concepts, 
especially when it comes to the perception of risk, could be seen as a major challenge in this 
regard (Schein, 2004). The alignment of national regulators can be seen as the key lever to 
ensure effective regulation in the European context. Again, the development of a fitting 
regulatory structure respecting the principles of participation, transparency, accountability and 
subsidiarity proves to be crucial in this regard.  
 
4.4 Conclusion: Assessing the regulatory quality of European risk regulation 
The main objective of this chapter was to develop a general framework for the assessment of 
regulatory quality in the European context and the regulation of risks more specifically.  The 
concept of regulatory effectiveness rather than the prevailing concept of more efficient 
regulation has been singled out as a yardstick against which regulatory quality can be 
assessed. Beyond the core concept of regulatory effectiveness, eight principles of good 
regulation have been deducted. In addition to effectiveness, defined as the realisation of 
regulatory goals, these eight principles provide further criteria to assess regulatory quality in a 
general sense. Turning to the realisation of regulatory quality, four main levers based on the 
twofold conceptualization of regulation as a type of policy and mode of governance can be 
identified. First of all, regulatory quality will depend on the proper (legal) mandate and the 
legitimate reason for regulation, forming a set of preconditions. Regulatory policies represent 
the second lever to ensure regulatory quality. As policies represent the foundation on which 
the regulatory framework, understood as the sum of all policies governing the respective 
sector, rests, several requirements can be drawn. First of all, the regulatory goal must be 
specified properly and the framework should cover all its relevant aspects. Second, the 
identified regulatory principles should be realized within the framework. Third, in light of the 
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specific structure of the European regulatory context, the transposition of European regulation 
must be considered. The third lever consists of the governance structures and the regulatory 
regime set up to implement the regulatory policies. The implementation stage could be seen as 
critical in ensuring de facto regulatory effectiveness. Drawing on the previous discussion of 
effective institutions, risk regulation and the European context, a set of requirements can be 
synthesized. First, the design of governance structures must ensure that fitting regulatory 
strategies, covering the regulatory problem as a whole, can be developed and that the 
probability of regulatory capture is effectively reduced. Therefore the principles of 
participation, transparency and accountability should be traceable in the regulatory design and 
conduct. Moreover, the application of the principle of subsidiarity should result in a balanced 
distribution of tasks between the European and national level. Second, the regulatory regime 
should reflect an equilibrium of interests, accounting for the different stakeholders. Third, the 
regulatory regime must ensure the creation of a regulatory network, tying in national 
regulators and isolating the distorting effects of national regulatory preferences and culture. 
Fourth, the regulatory regime must reflect the different stages of risk regulation including risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication. The fourth lever in assessing 
regulatory quality and effectiveness relates to regulatory outcomes. Since the achievement of 
regulatory goals represents the conceptual core of regulatory effectiveness, considering the 
impact of regulatory governance on these goals represents a vital component of analysis. 
Graph 9: Integrated framework assessment of regulatory quality 
 
Source: author’s own 
The proposed framework based on the four different levers is used to structure the following 
empirical part of the study focusing on the regulation of pharmaceuticals in Europe. 
Depending on the realisation of the developed requirements, the degree of regulatory quality 
and effectiveness can be approximated. Moreover, such qualitative assessment will allow for 
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the identification of possible weak points of the regulatory framework. Before the study turns 
to the analysis of European pharmaceutical policy, the next chapter will introduce the specific 
characteristics regarding the pharmaceutical sector and its regulation. As certain unique 
features characterize the pharmaceutical policy field and needless to say the market itself, 
such digression is necessary as it provides the basis for the analysis of pharmaceutical 
regulation in the subsequent three chapters.  
5.1 Pharmaceuticals: a special product 
 
 
 
93 
 
5.  The pharmaceutical sector: characteristics and regulatory aspects 
The pharmaceutical sector is frequently described as an exceptional case (Schweitzer, 2007). 
The reasons for such an assertion must be seen in a combination of different factors. First, 
pharmaceutical products as well as the unique development and production process contribute 
to this perception. Second, the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market and the peculiar 
constellation of supply and demand forces represent a distinct feature of this sector. Third, the 
high level of regulation clearly distinguishes the sector from others. Since any attempt to 
analyse pharmaceutical regulation requires an understanding of these distinct features, this 
chapter provide a comprehensive overview of the pharmaceutical sector covering the product 
and its production process, the dynamics of the pharmaceutical market and the resulting need 
for regulation.  
 
5.1 Pharmaceuticals: a special product 
Pharmaceuticals can be distinguished from most other goods based on their peculiar 
characteristics. Despite their intended effect, pharmaceuticals can have additional yet 
unintended (side) effects leading to so-called adverse drug reactions (ADR), with possible 
lethal consequences. This qualifies the consumption of pharmaceuticals as a risk and 
mandates a general risk-benefit assessment prior to their consumption. The evaluation of risk 
in the case of pharmaceuticals presupposes medical and pharmaceutical knowledge and the 
majority of consumers cannot be expected to conduct such assessment themselves. 
Considering the severity of consequences treating this issue as a normal risk of consumption, 
regulating it through consumer protection law and the possibility to claim personal damages 
does not seem to be a feasible regulatory approach. Moreover, applying a private regulatory 
approach by delegating the said assessment to the industry is not considered as sufficient 
(Bührlen et al., 2003).79 Given these reservations, the state traditionally engages in the 
regulation of pharmaceuticals. While the control of pharmaceuticals initially was limited to 
the registration of new products in most European countries, the regulatory approach was 
changed radically after the Thalidomide crisis in the nineteen sixties, marking the beginning 
of modern pharmaceutical regulation in Europe. In the aftermath of the tragic event, the 
requirements for the marketing of pharmaceutical products were expanded to protect 
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consumers from unsafe medicines. Instead of simply registering a pharmaceutical product, 
producers were now expected to demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of their products 
prior to market approval (Breitenbach, 2010; Maynard, 2005). The quality of pharmaceuticals 
mainly relates to manufacturing and the adherence to specific standards (Hefendehl & 
Muazzam, 1999). Safety mainly refers to the risk of adverse drug reactions: producers are 
obliged to assess the risk of occurrence of such events, conducting a risk-benefit analysis 
(Aigner, 2010: 88). Finally, the efficacy of pharmaceuticals relates to the performance of the 
pharmaceutical in improving the treated condition (Röhmel et al., 2005). Beyond defining 
approval criteria, (modern) pharmaceutical regulation covers (almost) the entire development 
process of new pharmaceuticals.  
 
5.2 The pharmaceutical development process  
The product development process is commonly divided into four mayor process steps: the 
search for new active pharmaceutical ingredients (1), pre-clinical development (2), clinical 
development (3) and registration (4) (Breitenbach, 2010: 36). While the first stage of 
pharmaceutical development remains unregulated, the remaining three phases follow strict 
procedural requirements.80 The aim of the first stage is the identification of a so-called drug 
development candidate (DDC), an active ingredient (AI) intended for a specific indication 
(Breitenbach, 2010: 39). Based on the DDC, the second stage of preclinical development 
begins. The main aim of this stage is the identification of a fitting and stable formulation 
depicting the composition of ingredients for the pharmaceutical product, the analysis of 
interactions between the different ingredients comprising the pharmaceutical and the scale-up 
of a small development sample to mass production. During this stage, the manufacturer 
collects data on the intended manufacturing process and the supply chain of the specific 
pharmaceutical product. The second stage is critical in realising the quality criteria. In 
addition to these tasks, producers will need to analyse the toxicology and the 
pharmacokinetics of the respective product. While the toxicology of a pharmaceutical refers 
to the occurrence of unintended effects distinct from ADRs, pharmacokinetics pertains to the 
concentration of an active ingredient within the organism and its degradation over time 
(Boroujerdi, 2002; Lemmer & Brune, 2007). These assessments are carried out in animal 
experiments. The completion of the second stage marks a focal point in the drug development 
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process, as the clinical studies in the subsequent stage are conducted by using human test 
subjects. Therefore, it is quite common to treat the beginning of the third stage as the starting 
point for the pharmaceutical development in a more narrow sense. Within the third stage, 
three different phases of clinical trials are distinguished in general.81 Phase I trials try to 
establish the safety and tolerability of a given pharmaceutical product in humans. The general 
method to gather the needed data is to conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trial with healthy test persons. While such design is not suitable to establish the 
proof of concept demonstrating the (intended) therapeutic effect, it is necessary for the 
subsequent application of the pharmaceutical product to (affected) test persons in later phases. 
As the safety and tolerability in healthy test persons has been established, the process moves 
on to phase II studies. The main objective of the second phase in clinical development is the 
proof of concept demonstrating the (intended) therapeutic effect of a pharmaceutical product 
within the respective indication for which an approval should be attained. In addition, the 
dosage and final form of application (used formulation e.g. pill) has to be identified. These 
aims have some implications for the design of phase II studies. First of all, higher ethical 
standards have to be met in the selection of test persons. Second, the size of the sample needs 
to be increased compared to phase I trials, normally conducted in smaller groups. Third, the 
test persons need to be affected by the respective disease in order to prove the therapeutic 
effect.  Upon completion of the phase II study, the collected data has to deliver preliminary 
evidence on the safety and effectiveness of the pharmaceutical to justify the scale up to phase 
III studies. The general aim of the third phase is the confirmation of the preliminary results of 
phase II under more realistic conditions, most importantly the proof of effectiveness. Clinical 
studies in phase III consist of several multi-centre studies based on several hundred to 
thousand test persons using different control groups as well as placebo or alternative 
treatments to establish the therapeutic effectiveness (Schumacher & Schulgen, 2008). Upon 
completion of phase III, the collected data of all three phases is used for the application for 
product registration in the third stage of the development process providing enough 
information to allow for the assessment of quality, efficacy and safety of the given 
pharmaceutical product. In addition, the application will need to include additional 
information about the marketed product for example labelling, packaging and prescribing 
information. 
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 Pharmaceutical development increasingly employs a Phase 0, based on few subjects, very limited exposure 
and no therapeutic intent. The main reason for this new phase can be seen in the need to control development 
costs, as it can help to specify success rates of the new drug candidate (Hill, 2007; Marchetti & Schellens, 
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5.3 Market approval and the regulatory risk-benefit dilemma  
The actual risk-benefit assessment is conducted by a (public) regulatory authority. While it 
formerly evaluates the application, the respective agency relies heavily on the data provided 
by the pharmaceutical companies.82 If the pharmaceutical product satisfies the criteria, market 
approval is granted. However, a positive assessment by the regulatory agency can merely 
represent a preliminary decision on safety. First, the data underlying the decision do not 
represent the actual risk that the consumption of a given pharmaceutical might pose. Clinical 
trials do not represent real life conditions and cannot simulate all additional influences 
affecting the safety and efficacy of a drug, for example drug-drug interactions (Bertz & 
Granneman, 1997). Moreover, many ADRs occur very rarely, e.g. affecting only one in 
thousand persons, making them incredibly hard to detect before the drug has been approved 
(Eichler et al., 2008: 821). Every regulatory assessment has to be interpreted in context of 
these limitations (Garber, 2008). Second, the standards used to assess the risk of consumption 
might be specified wrong. Instead of testing new pharmaceuticals against established 
comparable pharmaceuticals, the general approach is based on standards, against which the 
new product is tested.83 Third, the general problem of any (human) decision under imperfect 
information applies in the case of market approval for pharmaceuticals as well: The expert(s) 
carrying out the assessment might be wrong (Carpenter & Ting, 2005). These reservations 
illustrate the limited effectiveness of pre-market assessment as the exclusive regulatory 
mechanism to ensure the safety of medicines. Regulators thus face a dilemma: either they 
delay access to a new innovative drug and mandate more testing, or they take the risk of 
approving a drug to the market, which could potentially cause serious ADRs (Eichler et al., 
2009; Eichler et al., 2008; Maynard & Bloor, 2003). Following from this dilemma, the 
efficacy and safety of pharmaceutical products cannot be assessed upfront by a single 
evaluation, but rather calls for a procedural long-term perspective and continuous monitoring. 
Put differently, the safety of a pharmaceutical product remains relative and it has to prove its 
safety in the long run. The concept of safety therefore has to be expanded: it does not only 
depend on sound manufacturing and the quality of the pre-market assessment. Beyond the 
product itself, safety is influenced by activities after market approval: during the distribution 
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be submitted (Abraham & Sheppard, 1997). On the other hand, data is collected based on regulatory 
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 A second problem of non-comparative assessment is the impact on the development strategy of companies. If 
pharmaceuticals have to compete against previously released products, this would reduce the current risk-
averse drug development strategies leading to more and more me-too drugs (Wood, 2006). 
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of pharmaceuticals, for example by the entering of counterfeit drugs into the distributional 
chain (ten Ham, 2003), and even more important during consumption. In fact, the biggest 
risks might result from wrong consumption of pharmaceuticals, either caused by inappropriate 
prescribing or consumption deviating from the recommendations (Ellickson et al., 1999; 
McGavock, 2004a; Vermeire et al., 2001).84 The regulation of safety therefore has to be 
thought of as a life-cycle: “Life-cycle management of drug safety issues requires vigilant 
post-market monitoring. Increasingly, however, this concept also includes direct management 
of how drugs are used, to minimize risks and maximize benefits” (Gottlieb, 2007: 664). 
Market approval can and should be thought of as a preliminary risk-benefit assessment, which 
needs to be supplemented by additional regulatory mechanisms ensuring the continuous 
monitoring of the risk-benefit ratio. Even though this cannot prevent ADRs from happening, 
it will allow for the prevention of additional cases in the broader population. The regulatory 
measures related to such monitoring activities are subsumed under pharmacovigilance or in 
more general terms post-authorization regulation.85 In most cases, producers will be required 
to gather further information on the pharmaceutical product as used under normal therapeutic 
conditions, by conducting mandatory phase IV studies (Glasser et al., 2007). This might be 
necessary, if regulators approve a new pharmaceutical because of public health needs, even if 
the (preliminary) risk-benefit ratio seems to be unfavourable or inconclusive. These post-
market approval studies try to identify the long-term effects of new pharmaceuticals, 
especially regarding the occurrence of adverse drug reactions. The increased importance of 
Phase IV studies reflect a procedural perspective on safety: even though the assessment 
justifies the marketing of a given drug, this approval is only valid, as long as the safety of the 
product remains unchallenged. If this is no longer the case, the preliminary market 
authorization can be withdrawn. Post-marketing will however not only be based on phase IV 
studies. Systems for the reporting of ADR in general will have to be established. These might 
take the form of regular mandatory reporting by producers and the (spontaneous) reporting by 
physicians and the wider public (Castel et al., 2003). Regarding the safety and quality issues 
connected to the production of pharmaceuticals, regulatory agencies will conduct inspections 
of production sites (Koster & Oetelaar, 2005; WHO, 2002). As this short overview suggests, 
the development of pharmaceutical products is a highly complex and regulated process. The 
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 According to WHO estimates, 60 percent of ADRs are caused by non-compliance and are therefore 
preventable (WHO, 2010b). Another study estimates the percentage of preventable ADRs between 22-80 % 
(Madeira et al., 2007: 392). 
85
 Pharmacovigilance can be defined as “the science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, 
understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other possible drug-related problems”(WHO, 2002: 
7). 
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need for regulation stems from the peculiar characteristics of the product itself. However, it is 
not only the complexity of the development process that distinguishes the pharmaceutical 
sector from others and prompts the need for further regulation. 
 
5.4 The market for pharmaceuticals 
Beyond the product characteristics and the specific development process, the pharmaceutical 
market characterized by a peculiar structure both in terms of supply and demand, as well as 
specific market imperfections and failures contributes to the distinctness of the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
 
5.4.1 Supply side characteristics of pharmaceutical markets 
Starting with the supply side of the pharmaceutical market, a frequently highlighted (and 
criticized) feature has been the comparatively low level of competition (Backhaus, 1983; 
Comanor, 1986; DG Competition, 2009; Schweitzer, 2007). At first glance, this objection 
seems to be lacking empirical support. The pharmaceutical industry ranks upon the most 
internationalized ones, consisting of several thousand companies. Despite the high number of 
market participants, however, several big players dominate the industry. The high public 
exposure of big pharma companies has led to the perception, that the supply side of the 
pharmaceutical market resembles an oligopoly, resulting in low levels of competition 
(Greider, 2003). This assertion is supported by a more detailed and specific analysis of the 
pharmaceutical market, accounting for its specific structure. The (global) pharmaceutical 
market consists of several thousand products for a comparable number of indications. It seems 
to be impractical for a pharmaceutical company to cover all these fields. Given financial 
restrictions to conduct research and development (R&D), companies will concentrate on 
certain therapeutic areas, effectively reducing the overall number of potential competitors. 
The result is a comparatively low level of competition within therapeutic areas even though 
the market as a whole may appear much more dynamic (Schweitzer, 2007: 24-27). The low 
level of competition is sustained by the fact that based on the high R&D costs market entry in 
the pharmaceutical industry is highly restrictive. In addition, the granting of patents, for new 
medicines serves as a barrier for new competitors (Foray, 2004). Even though the supply side 
of the pharmaceutical market might not be as competitive as other industries, it should not be 
thought of as non-competitive at all. First, promising therapeutic areas will attract competition 
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and therefore the development of pharmaceuticals with the same therapeutic effect directly 
competing with established brands. Viagra, for example, was the only pharmaceutical product 
targeting erectile dysfunction, effectively comprising a monopoly within a single therapeutic 
area. With the introduction of Cialis and Levitra this situation changed dramatically 
(Rosenfeld & Faircloth, 2006). While so-called me-too drugs – intended for the same 
treatment with only minor advantages – might not constitute an innovation, they nevertheless 
exert pressure on existing products and stimulate competition in the pharmaceutical market.86 
A second driver of increased competition could be seen in so-called generics. Research-based 
companies will engage in the development (or at least in-licensing) of new pharmaceuticals. 
As soon as the patent protection of a given pharmaceutical runs out, the second group – 
producers of generics – is allowed to imitate the former protected original product without 
engaging into extensive R&D (Schweitzer, 2007; Simoens & De Coster, 2006). As a result, 
the out of pocket costs for these producers will be significantly lower, allowing for lower 
price levels. As generic products enter the respective therapeutic area, competition will be 
almost automatically stimulated. 
 
5.4.2 Distribution in the pharmaceutical market 
Under normal market conditions, the interaction between the supply and demand sides, that is 
manufacturers and consumers, would organize itself. In the case of the pharmaceutical 
market, an intermediary level exists. Manufacturers in most cases sell their products to 
wholesalers, which distribute the pharmaceutical products to pharmacists, dispensing doctors 
(or nurses) and alternative outlets.87 These services are subject to regulation as well: 
“the activities covered include trading in medicines, their labeling and the maintenance of records, which, 
in part, serve to facilitate product recalls when necessary.[…] The primary objective of regulating 
pharmaceutical distribution is conventionally taken to be to protect the public’s interests in safety and 
access to medicines” (Taylor et al., 2004: 198). 
From a procedural perspective, the regulation of distribution ought to ensure that only quality 
products will reach the different outlets. A comparatively new regulatory challenge at least in 
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 Me-too drugs can constitute an alternative treatment, expanding therapeutic options and possibly reducing 
unwanted side effects in specific patient groups (DiMasi & Paquette, 2004). For a more critical perspective 
on me-too pharmaceuticals see Angell (2004).  
87
 Another related issue regarding the distribution of pharmaceuticals, specifically relevant for the European 
Union, is the phenomenon of parallel trade and importation. In case of parallel trade, wholesalers use the 
different pricing levels in countries to buy in low price markets and re-sell in high price markets (Darbá  & 
Rovira, 1998).  
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industrialized countries in this regard has been the problem of counterfeit drugs entering the 
distributional chain (Cockburn et al., 2005; deKieffer, 2006; Newton et al., 2002). This 
development has been amplified by the expansion of e-commerce, creating a hard to control 
gateway for counterfeit medicine entering the market bypassing traditional (and controlled) 
distribution channels (Jackson et al., 2010).88 
 
5.4.3 Demand side characteristics in the pharmaceutical market 
Turning to the actual demand side, a distinct structure can be identified, at least for 
prescription medicine.89 Govin Permanand summarizes the characteristics as follows: “The 
consumer does not usually choose to be sick. Demand comes from the prescribing doctor (so-
called proxy demand), and there is a third party – generally the state via some form of medical 
scheme or insurance – which pays.” (2006: 21). This unique constellation reinforces the 
market imperfection caused by asymmetric distribution of information between producers and 
consumers. In most instances, end-consumers lack the knowledge and training to decide 
which pharmaceutical will be suitable for therapeutic intervention. Furthermore there is little 
awareness of the costs of pharmaceuticals in the first place, as consumers do not pay (directly) 
for the good in most cases. At the same time, the general expectation of consumer will be to 
receive the best possible treatment. At first glance, the price-inelastic demand might be 
considered as conducive to business interests as it facilitates the recovery of R&D costs and 
the generation of profits through the realisation of higher prices. However, this is not the case. 
While pharmaceutical demand in general is not affected by prices as much as demand in other 
industries (Brekke et al., 2007; Tellis, 1988), there are severe restrictions on the pricing 
strategies of pharmaceutical companies in most industrialized countries, especially within the 
European Union. While granting general access to healthcare is one of the main health policy 
objectives, its realisation including the access to and availability of pharmaceuticals is 
restricted. The first restrictions to universal access are pre-market regulatory mechanisms. 
New pharmaceuticals might not make it to the market, if the respective risk-benefit ratio turns 
out to be unfavourable. And even if market approval is finally granted, access is delayed. 
First, the regulatory requirements prolong the development process itself. Companies have to 
bare high upfront investments, before they could realize profits. Second, the actual risk-
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 Connected to this problem are the safety issues discussed with regard to official internet pharmacies and their 
regulation (Montoya & Jano, 2007).  
89
 From a demand perspective, two groups of pharmaceuticals can be distinguished. So-called over the counter 
drugs (OTC) bought without prior prescription by a physician, and prescription medicine (Beitz et al., 2004).  
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benefit evaluation by regulatory agencies can take months (Keyhani et al., 2006). The second 
and more severe restriction to general access to pharmaceuticals and the refinancing of 
pharmaceutical companies must be seen in existing budgetary constraints (Domino & 
Salkever, 2003). Given an increased pressure to consolidate health budgets, governments in 
their role as the main (indirect) purchaser of pharmaceuticals will need to balance the policy 
goals of access and financing. Governments exert considerable pressure on pharmaceutical 
price levels.90 In the European Union this is mainly achieved by introducing price controls 
(Mossialos et al., 2006).91 While price controls restrict pricing strategies of pharmaceutical 
companies they might have a temporary or even permanent negative effect on access. 
Negotiations can postpone access. Moreover, companies might decide to refrain from 
bringing a new drug to the market, if it fails to realize the required price during 
reimbursement negotiations. At the same time, the regulation of pricing can have a positive 
effect on access, as pharmaceuticals (can) become more affordable (OECD, 2008b). A second 
strategy to reduce expenditure would be the reduction of pharmaceutical consumption. 
However, governments might use such measures more cautious, because of the political 
repercussions such (paternalistic) intervention might have. Despite these political 
considerations, governments use a wide array of more subtle methods to regulate demand for 
pharmaceuticals for example budgeting for prescription, co-payments and switching 
pharmaceuticals to over the counter status (OTC), effectively shifting costs to the end user, 
usage of positive and negative lists (determining which drugs are eligible for reimbursement) 
and generic substitution (Chapman et al., 2004; McGuire et al., 2004; Thomson & Mossialos, 
2004). Based on the previous discussion of risks stemming from wrong consumption, such 
interventions should not only be understood as regulation from a budgetary perspective. 
Regulating demand can have a positive effect on the consumption, not only from a 
quantitative but a qualitative point of view, for example the risk stemming from possible 
over-consumption (Mbongue et al., 2005; Moynihan & Smith, 2002). Another important yet 
underestimated safety issue in this regard is the increasing trend of switching of 
pharmaceuticals to OTC status. While it might be tempting from the perspective of increased 
access and cost reduction to switch pharmaceuticals to OTC status, a stronger trend to self-
medication carries a greater risk of unsafe consumption (Bond & Hannaford, 2003; Ferner & 
Beard, 2008; McGavock, 2004b).  
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 In addition, pressure on both prices and total consumption can result from competition in the insurance 
market, as insurers try to reduce premiums by reducing costs (Schweitzer, 2007: 177). 
91
 For an overview of techniques and methods used by the European member states see (Ess et al., 2003). 
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5.4.4  Regulation of pharmaceutical marketing 
Besides regulating the production, distribution and demand for pharmaceuticals the marketing 
of drugs is regulated as well. While advertising for OTC is allowed in most industrialized 
countries, direct to consumer advertising (DTC) of prescribed drugs is only allowed in the 
United States and New Zealand (Magrini & Font, 2007: 526). The rationale for such 
limitations relates to the informational asymmetry within the pharmaceutical sector: end users 
lack the medical knowledge to evaluate the information entailed in such promotional 
activities. Proponents of deregulation, view DTC as an option to reduce the informational 
asymmetry and create informed patients, able to participate in health-care decisions and in the 
long run as a contribution to more efficient allocation of resources within healthcare systems 
(Finlayson & Mullner, 2005; Kaphingst & DeJong, 2004; Schweitzer, 2007; Shin & Moon, 
2005). Supporters of stricter regulation of pharmaceutical marketing argue that the main 
purpose of DTC is promotion of products instead of information, something that is possible 
under the given regulatory framework at least in the European case. This sceptical perspective 
is supported by several studies from the US market: The advertising itself focuses on 
emotional messages rather than the dissemination of information and (unsurprisingly) does 
influence the prescription behaviour possibly leading to higher pharmaceutical expenditure 
with little additional health benefit (Bell et al., 1999; Donohue et al., 2007; Gottlieb, 2005; 
Mansfield et al., 2005). DTC does only represent one possibility of marketing in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Even if pharmaceutical companies have limited access to end-users, 
they successfully try to influence prescription patterns by targeting physicians (Lexchin, 
2002). These promotional activities can take the form of detailing of the new products, 
information sharing, provision of free samples, medical journal advertising and sponsored 
continuing medical education programs (Schweitzer, 2007: 86-93).  
 
5.4.5 The economy of the pharmaceutical industry  
The realization of the outlined health policy goals has to be achieved within certain limits and 
obviously without jeopardizing the industry: It must be possible for companies to generate 
profits, while at the same ensuring access to affordable, safe and effective pharmaceuticals. 
However, companies face very distinct challenges, which have to be taken into consideration 
in designing such a balanced regulatory approach. Pharmaceutical companies, as all for-profit 
organisations, need to generate profits. While this goal might primarily be achieved to satisfy 
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the respective shareholders, they are necessary for the realisation of the highlighted health 
policy goals. Without profits, companies cannot invest in the development of new and 
innovative drugs. However, the realisation of profits is complicated by several interrelated 
factors. First a high level of uncertainty characterizes the product development. The chances 
of success for a pharmaceutical product to pass the different stages of drug development are, 
at best, minimal. According to an estimation by Jörg Breitenbach, out of 10.000 potential 
active pharmaceutical ingredients in the first stage of development, only one pharmaceutical 
product will finally pass all four stages and receive market approval (2010: 36). In line with 
this finding and based on his research of the US pharmaceutical market Joseph DiMasi (2001: 
298; 1995) estimates that roughly 21 percent of the pharmaceuticals entering the clinical trials 
phase will be granted market approval.92 Even if the product reaches the market, unfavourable 
phase IV study results or ADR incidence might lead to product withdrawal.93 Secondly, the 
drug development process is very time consuming. Modern methods of screening might have 
reduced the time needed for the identification of DDCs, but the potential for rationalisation 
has been much more limited regarding the other stages.94 Clinical trials represent a major 
component and the regulated selection of test persons serves as a prolonging factor. At the 
same time, the aforementioned regulatory expectations have to be met, leaving little 
opportunity to reduce the time of development. Regarding the development process as a 
whole, Breitenbach estimates an average time of ten years for a pharmaceutical to complete 
the four stages (Breitenbach, 2010: 36). For the US market between 1992 and 2002, Kehayni 
and her colleagues calculate an average of 5.1 years for clinical trials and 1.2 years for the 
regulatory review phase (Keyhani et al., 2006: 461). Unsurprisingly, the rather time-
consuming process leads to exponential R&D costs. While some authors estimate the costs for 
the development of a new drug to be as high as 1.7 billion US $ based on data from the period 
between 2000 and 2002 (Gilbert et al., 2003: 1), the majority of recent studies estimate the 
costs to be around 800 million US dollars (DiMasi et al., 2003; Grabowski, 2002).95 The costs 
have risen sharply over time, mainly caused by the exponential growth of clinical trial costs as 
research by Henry Grabowski shows:  
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 Despite these trends, DiMasi (2001: 304) argues that long-term trends indicate an increase in successfully 
completed approvals. 
93
 No reliable estimates on the extent of withdrawal based on safety concerns in Europe exist. A US study 
estimates a US withdrawal rate of 2,9 percent for the period of 1975-1999 (Lasser et al., 2002).  
94
 While regulation prohibits effective time reduction regarding these stages, this would have a very positive 
effect on the overall costs/efficiency of drug development (DiMasi, 2002). 
95
 Such exact numbers should be interpreted cautiously as the estimates may vary extremely based on the type 
of therapy and firm. A replication study of the cited DiMasi et al. study (2003) by Christopher Adams and 
Van Brantner (2006) produced a range of costs between 500 million and 2 billion US dollars.  
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 “The average R&D costs of a new drug introduction for 1990s approvals is $ US 802 million, compared 
with $ US 316 million for the 1980s and $ US 138 million for the 1970s [....] the biggest changes have 
been in terms of clinical expenditures, which experienced a 3-fold increase for 1990s approvals, relative 
to the 1980s approvals.” (2004: 16). 
The costs are distributed unequally within the pharmaceutical industry compared to other 
industries “because of the heavy fixed costs that have to be initially incurred for the 
development and dissemination of knowledge” (Vogel, 2007: 86).  
Graph 10: The drug development process 
 
Source: adapted from Breitenbach (2010) 
Judging on these factors and more specifically the financial risk of such investment, the 
development of drugs might be perceived as a very unattractive business (2007: 133-134) and 
this perception is amplified by a highly skewed distribution of returns on investment (Miller, 
2005: 4). According to older calculations, the present value net revenue for most marketed 
drugs is less than the average development costs in the 1990s (Grabowski, 1997). A more 
recent analysis by Grabowski, Vernon & DiMasi suggests that “only one third of the new 
drug introductions had present values in excess of average R&D costs” (2002: 27). Realizing 
profits is not only complicated by the outlined characteristics of product development, 
resulting (partially) from regulatory requirements, and the regulation of demand, but the wider 
public perception of the industry as well.  
 
5.4.6  The public perception of the pharmaceutical industry 
The public perception of health-related industries can be described as ambivalent. Most 
consumers would probably agree on the common dictum that health is priceless, yet “many 
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people believe that profit should not be earned as the consequence of caring for persons who 
suffer from somewhat random incidence of illness” (Vogel, 2007: 165). While moral 
reservations cannot keep companies in the healthcare sector from seeking profits, it creates an 
(possible) unfavourable climate, since “on one hand, we look to new drugs to deliver us from 
illness and disease. On the other, we view the companies who deliver them with suspicion or 
disdain” (Delamothe, 2008). The critical stance towards the pharmaceutical industry – despite 
its undeniable contribution to the safeguarding of public health – has been amplified by 
general and in instances very specific criticism. The industry has been criticized for investing 
more money into advertising than new product development (Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008). It 
has been argued that its research focus is on lifestyle drugs (Harth et al., 2008) and profitable 
diseases for which treatments are already available instead of developing treatments for 
serious but financially less promising illnesses, creating an abundance of me-too products 
(Lexchin, 2001; Wolinsky, 2005). Furthermore, it is suspected to create and exaggerate new 
ailments, for example female sexual dysfunction (Moynihan, 2003) and contribute the 
increasing medication of all aspects of life (Mbongue et al., 2005). One of the most persistent 
accusations has been the alleged excessive profit of pharmaceutical companies compared to 
other industries (Angell, 2004; Offerhaus, 2005; Pattison et al., 2003). While the general 
observation that the pharmaceutical industry has been profitable is true, the claim that these 
profits are excessive is not supported by detailed analysis and ignores the fact that these 
profits are subject to a high (financial) risk of failure (Grabowski, 2002; Grabowski & 
Vernon, 1982; Vogel, 2007). Comparatively higher profits can thus be understood as a 
premium for the higher risk of making no profits at all. 96  
 
5.4.7 Balancing safety, access and industrial interests  
In light of the previous discussion, the conditions under which pharmaceutical companies 
operate seem to be quite unfavourable. Since pharmaceuticals represent an important product 
both from the perspective of health and economic policy, governments will have an interest in 
supporting the well-being of the industry. In trying to create an environment conducive to 
health and industrial policy interests, governments can adopt different strategies.  
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 In addition, Ronald Vogel (2007: 176) points out that the methods used to calculate profits are ill equipped to 
account for the capital intensity and reliance on intangible assets characterizing investment in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
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Authorities can try to create more favourable conditions for pharmaceutical companies. This 
can be done, by fostering strong systems of innovation and collaboration between industry 
and public (university-based) research (Borrás, 2004; Siegel et al., 2003). An additional lever 
to foster the industry can be seen in a comparatively low level of interference with the market 
structures and pricing. Most governments might limit the potential for excessive pricing, but 
nevertheless allow the pharmaceutical industry to set prices in the first place (OECD, 2008b; 
Paris & Docteur, 2008). And while the industry as a whole is indeed heavily regulated, 
comparatively little is done to break the oligopolistic structures characterising the supply side, 
especially within therapeutic areas (DG Competition, 2009; Lacetera & Orsenigo, 2001).  
An alternative strategy can be seen in the lowering of regulatory requirements, partially 
responsible for high R&D costs (Ruffolo, 2006). However, this is commonly perceived as no 
feasible option. Above all, the safety of medicines has (some) political salience, preventing 
governments from reducing these requirements. Moreover, there is consensus in the sector 
that safety is a legitimate reason for regulation and there are strong reasons, why the 
pharmaceutical industry even tends to embrace such regulation. While these requirements 
represent costs for the industry in the first place, they represent a general entry barrier to the 
pharmaceutical market (Schweitzer, 2007: 105). Because of the high costs involved in the 
development of pharmaceuticals, companies already in the market do not have to fear the 
entry of potential new competitors. The upfront investment is simply too high, compared to 
other sectors.97 Even though there is little evidence that the general level of regulation is 
decreasing a common trend in the field of (pharmaceutical) regulation has been the regional 
and global harmonization of differing national regulatory standards (Abraham & Reed, 2002; 
Juillet, 2007).98 In the case of the European Union, the Commission itself advocated 
harmonization in order to complete the single market. On the global level, harmonization has 
mainly been promoted by a series of meetings of the International Conference on 
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use (ICH).99 The ICH is comprised of regulatory and industry representatives from Europe, 
the United States and Japan. The task of the ICH is subsumed by the organisation as follows: 
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 While these costs are reduced significantly after patent expiry regarding the development process, new 
producers still have to get market approval. For an inexperienced company this represents a very effective 
entry barrier.  
98
 This trend has been accelerated by continuous lobbying of the pharmaceutical industry on the national and 
European level (Abraham & Lewis, 1999; Abraham & Reed, 2002; Permanand, 2006; Permanand & 
Mossialos, 2005). 
99
 Another institution active in the harmonization of standards is the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS). For a description of its activities, see Macrae (2007)  
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“The purpose is to make recommendations on ways to achieve greater harmonisation in the 
interpretation and application of technical guidelines and requirements for product registration in order 
to reduce or obviate the need to duplicate the testing carried out during the research and development of 
new medicines.” (ICH, 2010). 
The main focus of this organisation is the streamlining of requirements and formats used for 
the application procedure, even though its scope is increasingly expanding towards standards 
in pharmacovigilance (Bahri & Tsintis, 2005). As it was mentioned previously, European 
harmonization led to the emergence of European level based procedures resulting in market 
approval in all member states. While there have been some major harmonization advances in 
the last decades, there is still considerable room for improvement (Eakin, 1999). The effect of 
regulatory harmonization from a business perspective is obvious: instead of preparing 
individual data for several distinct national applications, companies can use the same basic 
data for these applications. The creation of more favourable conditions and harmonization of 
regulation per se does not stimulate the development of innovative medicine. As previously 
mentioned there are two (general) types of manufacturers: originator companies engaging in 
research and development and generic companies copying original medicine. While it will 
depend on the respective national industrial composition, governments can be expected to 
have a vital interest in ongoing research and development to realize health policy 
objectives.100 They must therefore ensure that there are sufficient incentives for these 
companies to invest in R&D. Governments try to stimulate the innovative process by 
providing effective protection of intellectual property (IP) mostly via patents. As a form of 
intellectual property rights, patents “are generally speaking national rights that give the 
proprietor a measure of exclusivity in the subject-matter of protection and in so doing protect 
the owner of the right from the effects of competition” (Isaac, 2001: 27). 
By granting a patent for a product, the respective producer is allowed to act as a monopolist 
for a limited amount of time in order to recoup the R&D expenses. The regulation of IP 
therefore does not only serve as recognition of property but can be understood as a reward for 
the risk taken in developing the product. After patent expiry, other companies and especially 
producers of generics will enter the market. Even though patents will prevent other producers 
from curtailing the profits of the original producer, other companies might develop products 
not covered by the respective patents intended for the same therapeutic area before the patent 
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 Considering the European pharmaceutical market, the relevance of the generic industry from the perspective 
of industrial policy varies significantly. While the generic industry is strong in some member states, for 
example, in Germany (Accenture, 2005), it plays a much more limited role in other ones judging from the 
respective market shares (Perry, 2006).    
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expires.101 An additional reservation concerning the use of patents as an incentive for 
innovative medicine can be formulated at this point. Strictly speaking, patents can only 
stimulate the development of new drugs, but not necessarily innovative ones. In reality, most 
patented drugs are me-too pharmaceuticals representing only minor advances (Light & 
Walley, 2004; Wood, 2006).  
 
5.5 Conclusion: balancing safety, access and industrial interests 
The (risk) regulation of pharmaceutical products has to cover several interrelated aspects 
while at the same time striking a balance between underlying conflicting policy objectives. 
Even if the safety of pharmaceuticals is conceptualized as the prime public concern, it has to 
be balanced against at least two different policy goals. Most importantly, safety 
considerations might conflict with the provision of access to pharmaceuticals. The possible 
conflict between these two goals is most obvious in the regulatory decision about market 
approval. Regulators will have to weigh the risk a new drug might have against the potential 
benefits based on limited and preliminary information. Depending on their preferences, 
regulators might emphasize safety by delaying the drug approval and ask for more 
information establishing the safety, quality and efficacy of the reviewed drug. If the regulator 
believes that access to an innovative treatment is more important, he will grant approval 
having to accept the possible negative consequences of this decision. A precautionary 
approach to the approval decision, even though politically recommended, might be the less 
favourable option. The safety of pharmaceuticals cannot be determined solely upfront, but 
rather calls for a procedural perspective on safety. While a certain level of safety is mandatory 
for approval, the real risk and benefit of a drug is revealed as soon as it is tested in the field. In 
addition, the safety of pharmaceuticals is not only connected to product characteristics but 
correct consumption. A precautionary regulatory approach might therefore have only limited 
benefits. Besides the possible trade-offs between safety and access, policy conflicts almost 
certainly arise between safety and access on the one hand and industrial policy on the other 
hand. The realisation of safety and access can result in severe restrictions of industrial 
activities, for example, the regulation of the production process, distribution and marketing or 
the regulation of pricing in favour of health budget consolidation. While these regulatory 
interventions are justifiable and necessary, they must not become excessive: an innovative and 
                                                 
101
 Even if there seems to be some progress in this matter (Brizmohun, 2009), patents in Europe are still granted 
on the national level, resulting in continuing variations (DG Competition, 2009). 
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dynamic pharmaceutical industry is the prerequisite for the effective new medicine. In 
drawing a conclusion on the discussion of the underlying reasons for and requirements of 
regulation, the main regulatory challenges in the pharmaceutical sector could be formulated in 
the following way: Regulation needs to acknowledge the characteristics of regulated risk by 
adopting a regulatory approach considering the product cycle as a whole while at the same 
time increasing the understanding of consumers for the underlying risk characteristics. In 
other words, regulation needs to consider the whole regulatory lifecycle to regulate the 
underlying public health risk effectively. Starting off with the regulation of the development 
process and the approval process, regulation will need to cover the post-authorization aspects 
of production, distribution and information of patients as well as the continuous monitoring of 
pharmaceutical products in the market. Moreover, legislators (and regulators) must consider 
the possible policy trade-offs involved in the field. To be effective, regulation has to strike the 
right balance between access and safety, while at the same time accounting for the possible 
conflicts between public health, the provision of health care and industrial policy 
considerations. 
Graph 11: The regulatory lifecycle of pharmaceutical risk 
 
Source: author’s own 
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6.  The regulatory framework: establishing de jure effectiveness 
Drawing on the framework developed in the fourth chapter, the evaluation of regulatory 
quality commences with the discussion of preconditions. The second section will provide an 
overview on the development and current state of the legal framework. Considering the large 
body of European pharmaceutical regulation that has been established since 1965, such 
description can merely provide an overview of legal developments.102 Such an overview 
should suffice to inform the following discussion on the effectiveness of the legal framework. 
Moreover, units of comparison will be identified, structuring the analysis carried out in the 
subsequent section. The analysis of the regulatory framework will focus on the regulatory 
lifecycle, the coverage of the regulatory problem and the realisation of regulatory principles 
within the framework. In the final section, the transposition of regulatory policy in the 
pharmaceutical sector is evaluated briefly.   
    
6.1 Preconditions of effective regulation  
Regulation as a form of market intervention has to be justified. In the European regulatory 
context, the need for justification can be conceptualized as a twofold concept: first, an 
argument for the specific intervention must be developed and second, the case for European 
level activity has to be established. After establishing the case for intervention, it has to be 
assessed, if regulation – more specifically state-based as opposed to private regulation – is the 
appropriate form of intervention. Third it must be asked, in how far a regulatory mandate can 
be (legally) founded, within the existing European treaties.     
 
6.1.1 Justifying intervention in the pharmaceutical sector 
One of the commonly held beliefs in (liberal) market societies is that markets will operate 
best, if left alone (Biersteker, 1990; Olson, 1996; Shleifer, 1998). External intervention will 
only be deemed as legitimate, if compelling reasons can be presented. Intervention in the 
pharmaceutical sector can be legitimized on at least two grounds. First, intervention is 
necessary in order to reduce negative externalities. While the consumption of pharmaceutical 
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products clearly contributes to the maintenance of public health it can potentially harm 
consumers. However, this does not represent a normal risk of consumption which can be 
passed on to the consumer by the pharmaceutical industry. Possible side-effects of drug 
consumption can have severe and even lethal outcomes. Second, and probably even more 
decisive with respect to the justification of intervention, the pharmaceutical market is 
characterized by strong information inadequacies and asymmetries (Cassel et al., 2007; 
Viscusi et al., 2005). Consumers have limited access to information. Even more important, 
they cannot be expected to process the information regarding the risk-benefit ratio of 
pharmaceuticals, since they lack the medical knowledge to do so (Bongard et al., 2002). Even 
though the specific demand structure in the pharmaceutical market might reduce the severity 
of the problem, the capacities of physicians and pharmacists to assess the inherent risk of a 
specific pharmaceutical product are limited as well and will depend on their respective level 
of experience and information (Hasford et al., 2002). Consequently, intervention can be 
justified on the grounds of the reduction of negative externalities and the reduction of 
informational asymmetries.103 The justification to intervene does not preclude the need for 
European intervention, which form of intervention is appropriate and who should be 
responsible.  
 
6.1.1.1 Justifying European intervention 
The need to discuss the legitimacy of European intervention goes beyond the assessment of 
regulatory quality, since “ what, how and at what level of government to regulate – is the core 
of the compromise between the European Community and its member states that made the 
Internal Market Programme possible” (Majone, 1994b: 77). This core of compromise has 
been enshrined in the principle of subsidiarity, mandating that the European level should only 
perform those tasks that could not be performed effectively at the level of member states or 
were member state activity is insufficient. In establishing an argument, the principle of 
subsidiarity entailed in article 5.3 (TEC) can serve as a point of departure. The said article 
states that:  
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.” 
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While the article defines how the principle should be interpreted, further guidance in 
establishing a case for European intervention is provided by article 5, protocol 30, annexed to 
the treaty: 
“the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by 
action by Member States; actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict 
with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid 
disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise 
significantly damage Member States' interests; action at Community level would produce clear benefits 
by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States.” 
Applying these requirements to the pharmaceutical sector, the transnational dimension of the 
underlying regulatory problem could be established on several grounds. First, the target of 
intervention, the pharmaceutical industry represents a globalized and therefore European 
industry (Busfield, 2003; Gambardella et al., 2000; Schweitzer, 2007). The transnational 
character is not limited to the regulated industry, but is traceable regarding the product and 
possible negative effects as well. Pharmaceuticals represent a (tradeable) good and will 
therefore potentially affect all consumers within the European Union. Given the relatively 
high genetic similarity of the European peoples (Daar & Singer, 2005; Novembre et al., 
2008), unwanted side effects represent a comparable risk for all citizens. It can be argued, that 
national regulators could take measures to act on the risk of pharmaceuticals and regulate 
satisfactorily in this matter. Taking the additional guidelines into account, the rationale for a 
levelling up of intervention can be strengthened further.  A strong, yet predominantly 
economic argument for European intervention can be developed based on the second 
guideline, since national regulation will most probably conflict with the requirements of the 
treaty and the creation of the internal market more specifically. Another argument in support 
of European intervention can be deducted from the third guideline. While in principle, the risk 
stemming from pharmaceuticals could be sufficiently regulated at the national level, a unified 
approach will produce benefits. For example, by standardizing and integrating national post-
authorization controls, the likeliness of detecting unwanted side-effects at an early stage is 
increasing, providing those responsible with more time to react appropriately. From a 
business perspective, the benefit of scale results from reduced compliance costs, given unified 
standards. European intervention is therefore justified in achieving the underlying regulatory 
goal. 
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6.1.1.2 Determining the right form of intervention       
While European intervention is necessary and justified to remedy the shortcomings of the 
pharmaceutical sector, the appropriate form of intervention remains to be determined. In line 
with the discussion of regulatory effectiveness in the fourth chapter, the least intrusive mode 
of intervention can serve as a point of departure. The least intrusive form would be to choose 
the regulatory option of doing nothing (OECD, 2008a). For obvious reasons, this strategy is 
ill-equipped to cope with the regulatory problem at hand. Subsequently, the viability of soft 
modes of regulation and private regulation has to be considered.104 Considering asymmetrical 
information regarding product risks between the patient (principal) and the manufacturer 
(agent) as the main regulatory problem, several market-based mechanisms could be employed 
to reduce this problem. Patients could use screening mechanisms to improve their knowledge, 
for example, by using other agents (physicians, insurance companies), while producers could 
employ signalling mechanisms by building a good reputation in the market. By granting the 
possibility to claim damages via liability law, agents are incentivized to provide quality 
information (Cassel et al., 2007: 292-293). While such a regulatory approach might be viable 
and desirable from a theoretical perspective, it is seriously flawed. The problem of 
pharmaceutical risks is reduced to a mere issue of information inadequacies, overestimating 
the capacities of patients while at the same time underestimating the underlying risk. While 
the quality and quantity of information available to patients represents an important aspect, it 
does not account for the lack of ability to process this information. It remains at least 
questionable, if the screening mechanisms and the support of agents are sufficient to 
compensate the lack of knowledge. In addition, the problem of information selection is raised. 
Another problem of such an approach is the underlying assumption, that producers are well 
informed about the risks of their own product. In essence, the product risks are severe enough 
to render the proposed level of regulation as too low. A regulatory approach based on the 
disclosure of information and naming and shaming mechanisms based on the willingness of 
producers to gain a certain reputation in the market and the possibility to claim damages is 
thus insufficient. Since the regulatory problem relates to the product, the introduction of 
product based regulatory mechanisms represent a promising extension of the regulatory 
approach. Drawing on different regulatory approaches and strategies identified by Baldwin 
and Cave (1999), this could take the form of franchising or licensing: a competent authority 
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grants market access to the respective product after evaluating product characteristics. By 
introducing such pre-authorization controls, the emergence of informational asymmetries is 
effectively reduced. The regulatory authority would serve as an agent providing information 
to the patient and his respective physician regarding the risk-benefit of the product. As the 
discussion in the last chapter clarified, pre-authorization controls and the approval of products 
might be too limited in the pharmaceutical sector. Since the risk-benefit ratio leading to 
market approval could only be based on limited information and the possibility that some 
severe side effects might occur very rarely, continuous monitoring mechanism are necessary 
and justifiable in achieving optimal regulatory results, even though representing a more 
intrusive regulatory strategy.  
 
6.1.1.3 Identification of the right regulatory set up   
After clarifying how to regulate, it must be decided who should carry out this task. Given 
underlying preferences for less intrusive methods, the task could be carried out by the 
pharmaceutical sector as a form of self-regulation (Cassel et al., 2007; Sauer & Sauer, 2007). 
Leaving the evaluation of products regarding their respective risk-benefit ratio to their 
producers, however, seems not to be supported from a societal perspective. It is true that 
reputation represents a strong incentive to establish strict standards necessary for effective 
protection from unsafe products. Nevertheless, a private regulatory regime especially in the 
pharmaceutical sector will be heavily contested, as the relationship between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the public is characterized by a prevailing level of distrust 
(Offerhaus, 2005; Sharma, 2007). Two additional arguments in support of state based 
regulation can be developed. First, the introduction of private regulatory regimes might imply 
high (political) costs of introduction. Since the public expects that the regulatory task is 
carried out by a public agency – which is at least indirectly legitimized – establishing a 
private regulatory regime can face strong public resistance (Abraham et al., 2002). Second, it 
could be argued that the industry itself would not prefer such self-regulatory mechanisms. As 
Daniel Carpenter (2003: 255) notes, “the inherent uncertainty that firms themselves have 
about the quality and safety of their products”, leads to a higher acceptance of public 
regulation. In certifying the quality of a given product, the respective public authority reduces 
the uncertainty of the pharmaceutical producer regarding the quality of its own product.           
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6.1.1.4 Establishing a legal basis for regulation 
The next logical step is the identification of a legal foundation for regulatory intervention. 
Based on the underlying rationale for intervention, the protection of public health, a respective 
(constitutional) foundation has to be identified within the European treaties. Such foundation 
can be found in article 152 TEC stating that “A high level of human health protection shall be 
ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities.” As it 
was discussed in the first chapter, this rather general mandate does not provide the European 
Union with extensive competencies in health matters (Hervey, 2002). Subsection 5 of the said 
article restricts the rather general meaning by asking for the respect for national competencies 
in the field of health policies. Accordingly, article 152 does not qualify as an appropriate legal 
basis for regulatory intervention. Alternatively, article 153 on consumer protection could be 
invoked. The first indent states: 
“In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the 
Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as 
well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to 
safeguard their interests.”  
The article is formulated in a very general manner, calling for the contribution of the 
European level in matters of consumer protection and thus (only) legitimizes complementing 
measures to national regulatory activities. Therefore, Article 153 does not represent a legal 
basis for European regulation to ensure consumer protection. The Treaty, as Christopher 
Hodges rightfully notes, “falls far short of offering a general constitutional mandate to select 
whatever style of consumer protection policy it regards as appropriate for its aspirations” 
(2005: 33). Accordingly, an alternative legal foundation has to be found. As it was argued 
regarding the principle of subsidiarity, European intervention could be justified based on the 
advancement of the single market. This does however represent a different underlying 
rationale for regulation: the protection of public health no longer serves as the main aim. In 
fact, most consumer protection measures introduced by the Community were based on article 
95 (Hodges, 2005: 28), stating that:  
“The Council shall,[…] adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.”   
Despite implicit (constitutional) tensions that might arise by founding regulation in order to 
strengthen public health on provisions mandating harmonization of national standards, article 
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95 does provide a legal basis for regulation. Two preconditions have to be met in order to 
invoke article 95 as a basis for regulatory activity. Differing national provisions must exist (1) 
and the approximation of these standards must advance the creation and functioning of the 
internal market (2). Both conditions are satisfied in the case of the pharmaceutical sector. 
Even though comparatively weak, national regulatory provisions existed prior to the 
emergence of European legislative activity (Collatz, 1996) and the harmonization of these 
measures contributes significantly to the functioning of the internal market.105  
 
6.1.2 Intermediate result: preconditions of effective regulation 
The previous section tried to clarify, in how far the identified preconditions of effective 
regulation could be established regarding the European regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
Starting off with the justification of intervention, the protection of public health has been 
identified as a sufficiently legitimized justification and regulatory goal. The need to improve 
the functioning of the internal market and the expected positive regulatory scale effects, 
resulting from federal level regulation, have been identified as a justification for European 
involvement in the pharmaceutical sector. As less intrusive modes and reliance on self-
regulatory mechanisms were deemed insufficient in order to cope with the underlying 
regulatory problem, public-based regulation based on market approval and monitoring 
mechanisms were identified as an appropriate regulatory answer. Finally, a legal basis for 
regulation protecting public health was identified in form of article 95 (TEC). While the said 
provision represents a legal basis for regulatory intervention, the discussion of possible 
constitutional foundations revealed that no direct mandate for the protection of public health 
and consumer protection can be found in the treaties. Accordingly, intervention in order to 
maintain public health is disguised as a measure to reduce obstacles to internal trade. The 
justification of risk regulation via the completion of the single market raises additional 
concerns regarding the European regulatory logic from the citizens’ perspective. If risk 
regulation is merely created to reduce market distortion, disregarding the inherent necessity of 
regulation as an intervention to protect consumers from harmful products, it seems 
questionable if the social optimum of regulation is realized.  
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6.2 The development of European pharmaceutical policy  
European pharmaceutical policy can be traced back to the 1960 emerging in the aftermath of 
the Thalidomide disaster (Feick, 2002; Krapohl, 2008; Permanand, 2006). While the 
Commission had engaged in consultations with various stakeholders on the issue of 
prospective harmonization prior to this tragic event, the public health threat created an 
window of opportunity and kick started the process (Permanand, 2006; Vogel, 1998). 
National regulators reacted to the crisis by strengthening domestic regulatory systems, but the 
severity of the events helped to create awareness for the transnational dimension and a shared 
European responsibility.  
 
6.2.1 Initial harmonization after Thalidomide  
Consequently, the six initial member states agreed on the harmonization of existing standards. 
The introduction of directive No. 65/65/EEC marked the beginning of a common European 
approach to regulation in the pharmaceutical sector.106 Laying the foundation for the legal 
framework still governing the sector today, three aspects of the directive must be highlighted.  
First, the directive established the general and still valid goal of regulatory intervention. The 
first and second recitals of the said directive state that:  
“the primary purpose of any rules concerning the production and distribution of proprietary medicinal 
products must be to safeguard public health; Whereas, however, this objective must be attained by 
means which will not hinder the development of the pharmaceutical industry or trade in medicinal 
products within the Community;”  
Referring to article 100 (EEC), and therefore the advancement of the internal market, the clear 
commitment to public health as the main goal of intervention, character, may serve to reduce 
the potential tensions between the underlying regulatory task and the respective constitutional 
foundation. Second, the directive introduced a set of clear definitions and standards regarding 
the control of pharmaceuticals, for example, the types of products covered by the regulation 
and the concept of a proprietary medicinal product. Article 3 entailed the requirement of 
mandatory authorisation of these products. While most national systems were based on 
mandatory registration of pharmaceutical products, this provision marked an important step 
from a public health perspective (Daemmrich, 2004; Daemmrich & Krücken, 2000). 
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Subsequent articles lined out the approval requirements, procedural and time requirements of 
market authorisation, the duration of validity, quality controls of manufacturing, labelling 
requirements for pharmaceutical products and the necessity to engage in continuous post-
market controls (pharmacovigilance).  
Third, article 5 established the substantial criteria on which market approval as well as refusal 
and withdrawal of an authorized product ought to be based within the EEC by introducing the 
concepts of safety, quality and efficacy. While directive No. 65/65/EEC has to be seen as an 
important step towards safer pharmaceuticals, its focus was rather narrow: it achieved the 
harmonization of standards and introduced mandatory authorization, but did not contribute to 
the advancement of the single market. Considering the prevalent reservations on the national 
level regarding delegation in this sensitive policy field at that time, the directive must be 
understood as a significant progress. It took the Commission almost a decade to follow up on 
the first regulatory advancement in the pharmaceutical sector. In 1975, three directives 
affecting the regulatory framework were released. Directive No. 75/318/EEC established 
uniform rules regarding the necessary tests and trials informing regulatory decisions.107 The 
second directive, No. 75/319/EEC, did not aim at the harmonization of standards, but an 
approximation of national authorization procedures. It introduced the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP), comprised of national regulatory experts and 
representatives of the Commission. The said committee was established to examine questions 
connected to approval referred to it by the member states. Beyond its function within the 
emerging regulatory regime, however, the Commission expected it to be a device to 
harmonize national regulatory approaches through exchange and dialogue (Lorenz, 2006: 48-
51). Another procedural change introduced by the directive was the creation of the so-called 
CPMP procedure. An applicant – after successfully submitting his approval dossier based on 
the requirements of directive No. 65/65/EEC to one national regulatory authority – who 
decided to market the approved product in five more member states, could now ask the 
regulatory authority which granted approval to forward the dossier and the authorization to 
the CPMP. The CPMP would then distribute the dossiers to the concerned member states. The 
forwarding of these documents substituted the single application in each of the member states, 
representing the normal procedure before the introduction of the CPMP procedure. After 
receiving the application through the CPMP, national regulators could either tacitly accept the 
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approval documents, or raise objections by forwarding a reasoned objection to the CPMP 
within a given period. The Committee could then come up with a reasoned opinion reacting 
on the reservations expressed by the dissenting member state, granting the member states 
another 30 days to reach a decision on national authorization. However, the reasoned opinion 
was not binding on the member states. The decision to approve the product remained at the 
national level. A comparable procedure was established for dissenting opinions of national 
regulators on the same product, not submitted via the CPMP procedure, regarding the 
authorization, suspension or withdrawal.108 In addition, member states were permitted to call 
on the Committee if interests of the Community were involved. In essence, the introduction of 
the CPMP procedure reflected the political conviction of the Commission, that integration in 
the pharmaceutical sector ought to be achieve based on the principle of mutual recognition 
(Gehring et al., 2005: 85). Beyond procedural innovations, directive No. 75/318/EEC 
introduced several additional changes. It established rules on the manufacturing and 
importation of medicine from third countries and introduced the requirement of a qualified 
person (QP) exclusively responsible for certain aspects regarding the approval process.109 The 
fifth chapter introduced requirements regarding the supervision of the manufacturing process 
and specified the requirements regarding continuous monitoring of pharmaceuticals after 
approval. The third directive No. 75/320/EEC released in the same year, created the 
Pharmaeutical Committee acting as an advisory panel to the Commission when preparing 
proposals for directives regarding the pharmaceutical sector. On first sight, the changes 
introduced to the regulatory system in 1975 were considerable and marked a shift from the 
harmonization of standards to the establishment of a mutual recognition procedure. The 
introduction of the CPMP and the according procedure represented an attempt to introduce a 
facilitated mutual recognition approach, rationalising market approval within the EEC by 
making individual assessments by national regulators of the same product obsolete. However, 
the CPMP procedure did not succeed. Since the opinions of the Committee were non-binding, 
“the member states could, and generally did ignore them” (Permanand, 2006: 49). The 
political and public sensitivity regarding pharmaceutical products, the strong national 
regulatory traditions and the prevailing distrust between the national regulators hampered the 
success of the newly established procedure (Abraham & Lewis, 2000; Lorenz, 2006). 
Legislative activity in the pharmaceutical sector decreased in the following years with few 
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notable exceptions.110 The next notable attempt by the Commission to harmonize procedures 
was included in directive No. 83/570/EEC, introducing the multi-state procedure modifying 
the existing, yet disappointing CPMP procedure. Under the multi-state procedure, access to 
the procedure was improved by lowering the number of countries to which the initial 
authorization should be extended from five to two. In addition, member states were now 
strongly advised to take former authorizations into due consideration.111 However, these 
modifications did not solve the underlying problem of the procedure: Still, the CPMP opinion 
was non-binding and member states regularly choose to ignore it (Lorenz, 2006).112 By the 
mid 1980s, harmonization in the pharmaceutical sector fell short on the Commission’s 
expectations. Sparked by the disappointing performance of the existing regulatory framework, 
the Commission explicitly highlighted the need for additional efforts in its white paper on the 
completion of the internal market (European Commission, 1985). This new found enthusiasm 
has not only been caused by the suboptimal level of harmonization. With the signing of the 
Single European Act in 1986 and the goal of completing the internal market until 1992 
looming in the distance, pressure on the Commission to take action increased.113 The first 
result of these efforts – directive No. 87/22/EEC – sought to achieve two goals.114 First, the 
underlying policy goal was to create more favourable conditions for research in high-
technology pharmaceuticals. Second, the Commission believed that in order to incentivize the 
industry and strengthen regulatory capacities regarding high-technology products, the 
introduction of a new procedure was inevitable. The directive introduced the concertation 
procedure mandatory for products derived from biotechnology. If a pharmaceutical company 
applied for market authorisation for such a pharmaceutical product the respective regulatory 
agency had to refer the application to the CPMP, acting as a so-called rapporteur. The CPMP 
would then issue an opinion regarding the respective pharmaceutical product. However, the 
CPMP opinion was (still) non-binding and the decision on market approval remained within 
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the discretion of member state authorities.115 The main benefit of the concertation procedure 
should therefore be seen in the facilitation of dialogue between national regulators before a 
national approval decision was taken (Lorenz, 2006: 55). Another measure in this regard has 
been the creation of so-called notice to applicants (NTA), developed by the Commission in 
close cooperation with national regulators and published for the first time in 1986, 
summarizing and harmonizing the requirements regarding the application dossiers. 
Obviously, neither the issuance of NTAs nor the procedural changes resulting from directive 
No. 87/22/EEC did suffice to remedy the shortcomings of the regulatory framework at this 
point of time.  
 
6.2.2 The first revision of the regulatory system (1989/90): a new start 
Twenty-five years after the initial directive founded European pharmaceutical policy, policy 
developments had reached a cul-de-sac: While standards were continuously harmonized, 
attempts to harmonize the regulatory process and reduce existing duplication of evaluation 
efforts were undermined by the prevalent level of mutual distrust between national regulators 
and the reservations of member states to let go responsibilities within a field closely related to 
healthcare (Collatz, 1996; Currie, 1990; Feick, 2000; Krapohl, 2008). Despite these 
drawbacks, and with the 1992 single market deadline approaching, the Commission was 
forced to push things forward. Starting in 1988, the Commission engaged in an extensive two 
year consultation process with various stakeholders, including the member states, the 
pharmaceutical industry, consumer groups and professional associations (European 
Commission, 1990: 5). Several possible new approval systems were discussed in the course of 
the consultation process, but preferences of the affected stakeholders and the Commission 
converged around a blended approach (Abraham & Lewis, 2000; Hancher, 1990; Lorenz, 
2006). The results of the two year process culminated in the release of a communication by 
the Commission titled Future system for the free movement of medicinal products in the 
European Community (European Commission, 1990). While the proposals envisaged several 
important changes to the existing regulatory framework, three aspects deserve special 
attention. First, the Commission proposed a structural change by creating a European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMA). The new European Agency was based on 
the existing governance structures, namely the CPMP and the Committee for Veterinary 
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Medicinal Products (CVMP) expanded by additional substantial administrative resources. 
Instead of substituting national regulators, the EMA was intended to take over a coordinating 
function between national regulatory resources and act as supervisory and organisational body 
in the so called centralized procedure. Second, a mutual recognition procedure (MRP/DP) 
based on the former multi-state procedure was proposed.116 An applicant looking for market 
approval in several additional member states, could ask the authority granting market 
authorization for the first time (reference member state) to forward the assessment report and 
additional data, as lined out by the former directives, to the respective authorities in the target 
countries (concerned member states)117. The concerned member states (CMS) were expected 
to recognize the first authorization. As under the former procedure, a CMS could refuse 
approval. However, acceptance could only be denied on risk to public health grounds. 
Subsequently, the dissenting national authorities were expected to forward their assessment 
reports to the other member states and engage in a bi- (or multi-)lateral arbitration phase. If no 
mutual agreement was reached, the matter was referred to the CPMP. As opposed to the 
former procedure, the CPMP under the decentralized procedure could now take a binding 
decision, applicable to all concerned member states. The third change envisaged by the 
Commission, was the introduction of the centralized procedure (CP). The CP resembled the 
concertation procedure, since it was compulsory for pharmaceutical products derived from 
bio-technology. If a producer wanted to apply for market authorization, the application now 
was directed to the agency, which asked the CPMP to start the procedure. The CPMP then 
selects a rapporteur responsible for the evaluation of the product and a co-rapporteur. The 
rapporteur was expected to prepare an assessment report and a draft, subsequently asking the 
CPMP for its scientific opinion. The CPMP then prepares a scientific opinion, if the 
respective product should be approved. Given the fact, that the agency does not have the 
power to take a binding decision, the final (political) decision was ought to be taken by the 
Commission.118 The proposed changes resulted in a new regulatory system, offering three 
different routes to market access. If an applicant wanted to market a product only in one 
country he could do so by applying to the competent national authority, which would evaluate 
the application based on the European harmonized criteria (national procedure). However, if 
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he chose to market the product in more than one member state, one of the two envisaged 
European procedures would apply. If the product satisfied the criteria, the applicant could 
apply for Community-wide authorization via the CP. If the product did not satisfy the 
requirements, he could chose the MRP/DP, which – under the normal condition of acceptance 
by all concerned member states – would result in market authorization in all concerned 
member states. The Commission – aware of the political sensitivity of the policy field and the 
circumstances – chose to build on existing structures instead of radically breaking with the 
former modest achievements. The resulting approach could best be explained by the positions 
and preferences of the stakeholders involved. As Martin Lorenz (2006: 58-59) notes, a single 
centralized approach with the EMA taking all regulatory decisions was unacceptable¸ but 
national regulators and member state governments were at least willing to accept procedural 
differentiation. And as the proposed CP only covered a relatively small and specific group of 
pharmaceuticals, “member states agreed to this new procedure for fields where the 
distributional consequences for existing national procedures was, so far, not very important” 
(Feick, 2008: 44). In addition, national regulators could not claim a high level of expertise, as 
the regulatory capacities in this new field were not as advanced.119 While industry officials 
probably would have preferred a centralized procedure open for all products (Abraham & 
Lewis, 2000; Krapohl, 2008), the newly established and differentiated system offered them a 
certain degree of selection regarding market approval. Furthermore, the abolition of national 
regulators within the single market would have resulted in the deprivation of established 
regulatory ties with national regulators as well as regulatory reputation of regulatees. 
Following up on the proposals of the Commission, two central pieces of legislation were 
introduced in 1993. Regulation EEC No. 2309/93 introduced the CP and the EMA.120 Starting 
of with the provisions concerning the newly established agency, the regulation specified the 
role of the EMA as a provider of scientific advice and as a coordinator of regulatory 
resources, as well as defining the agency organisational structures beyond the CPMP and 
CVMP, operating procedures and agency funding. As envisaged by the Commission, the 
second change was the introduction of the CP under title two of the regulation. As outlined in 
the Commission proposal in 1990, the applicant now submits the required documents to the 
EMA, which then refers the application to the CPMP. The CPMP selects a rapporteur and co-
rapporteur, taking into consideration the preference of the applicant, conducting the scientific 
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 This refers back to the recitals of directive No. 87/22/EEC, claiming that the national regulatory experience 
regarding certain products was insufficient, mandating the pooling of expertise.   
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 The new agency was to take up its responsibilities effectively from January, 1 1995. 
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assessment. Based on the scientific advice of the CPMP, the Commission subsequently drafts 
a decision and in case of no further objection from the member states a market authorization 
valid throughout all member states is granted.121 In addition to the procedural and institutional 
changes, the regulation improved the European system of pharmacovigilance by strengthening 
reporting requirements of applicants and granting the EMA a supervising and coordinating 
role regarding national pharmacovigilance systems. The second piece of legislation taking up 
the proposals of the Commission was directive No. 93/39/EEC. Under the new MRP/DP 
procedure, an applicant planning to market a product in more than one country could send the 
required documents to the authorities of the concerned member states and the agency.122 In 
addition, he would ask the reference member state to draft an assessment report as the basis 
for the mutual recognition procedure. As outlined in the proposal, the concerned member 
states were expected to recognize the first authorization, but had the opportunity to refuse 
market approval if they could provide evidence that the authorization constitutes a serious risk 
to health.123 If no settlement could be reached in bilateral discussion, binding arbitration 
within the CPMP would start, leading to a binding decision by the Commission affecting the 
concerned member states. Besides the responsibilities under the DP, the CPMP had to be 
involved in case of dissent regarding the suspension or withdrawal of a certain product. 
However, if no agreement between national regulators was reached, as in the case of market 
approval, a binding decision by the Commission was issued.124 While the introduction of the 
new procedures and the EMA in the early nineties marked a critical juncture in the 
development of European pharmaceutical regulation, additional legislative acts altering the 
legal framework governing the sector were released in the aftermath of the first revision. In 
December 1988, the so-called transparency directive – No. 89/105/EEC – was released, 
asking member states to provide information on employed price regulation methods 
(Abraham & Lewis, 2000; Mossialos et al., 2006; Permanand, 2006). In 1989, directive No. 
89/341/EEC amended existing rules by introducing the concept of medicinal product 
substituting the category of proprietary pharmaceutical product and made package inserts 
mandatory. Three additional directives, No. 89/342/EEC, No. 89/343/EEC and No. 
89/381/EEC expanded the applicability of existing rules to additional product groups. Most 
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 An illustrative overview of the centralized procedure is provided in the appendix (A.6).  
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 The procedure could be started either if a product was still under review in one member state or a first market 
authorization was already granted.  
123
 After the revision of the procedure in 2004, discretion of member states has been reduced. Refusing 
authorities are now asked to provide suggestions how the objections regarding the product could be remedied 
according to article 10 of the said directive.  
124
 For an illustration of the process see the appendix (A.7).  
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notably, generic pharmaceuticals not covered by the framework before, were brought under 
the European rules (Lorenz, 2006: 56). In 1991, a first directive No. 91/356/EEC introduced 
more specific rules on good manufacturing practice and the second directive worth 
mentioning, No. 91/507/EEC amended existing testing requirements to cover the previously 
expanded scope of products. In April 1992, four directives were released. Directive No. 
92/25/EEC regulated the wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals, by making authorization 
of distributors mandatory. Directive No. 92/26/EEC introduced guidelines for the 
classification of pharmaceuticals, according to their prescription status. Directives No. 
92/27/EEC strengthened already existing rules on the design and content of leaflets 
accompanying pharmaceutical products, with a special focus on the readability of such 
documents. Finally, directive No. 92/28/EEC specified existing rules regarding the 
advertising for pharmaceutical products. In addition to the new rules pertaining to proprietary 
pharmaceutical products, the European framework became more inclusive by releasing 
directive No. 92/73/EEC governing homeopathic medicinal products.125 In 1995 three 
additional regulations were released. Regulation EC No. 540/95 specified the requirements 
regarding the development of a better pharmacovigilance system while regulation EC No. 
541/95 and regulation EC No. 542/95 established rules regarding the examination of 
variations to an existing approved product.126 Resulting from the changes developed during 
the early 1990s, the new European regulatory regime was implemented in 1995 and its 
fundamental components remained untouched in the following years. However, article 71 of 
regulation EEC No. 2309/93 envisaged a mandatory evaluation of the regulatory system, 
leading to the second revision starting in late 1999.  
 
6.2.3 The second revision of European medicines authorization (2000-2004) 
In 1999, the Commission awarded a contract to CMS Cameron McKenna and Andersen 
Consulting asking for the evaluation of the previously introduced authorization system. The 
consulting companies presented their report in October 2000. Based on the report, the 
Commission engaged in an extensive consultation exercise before drafting new legislative 
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 Even though, this study does not consider homeopathic products, the directive is noteworthy. It closed a 
regulatory gap from the public health perspective, since homeopathic products are widely used within the 
European Union and can have unwanted side effects as well (Calapai, 2008; Lewith et al., 2003; Menniti-
Ippolito et al., 2008).    
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 Regulating the variation of an existing authorization was necessary to prevent the complete reassessment in 
case of minor changes. The regulations were amended three years later, by regulation EC No. 1146/98 and 
regulation EC No. 1069/98 and have been revised subsequently.   
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proposals. After intense discussions within EP communities and the involvement of the 
Council of ministers, two new legislative acts were passed in 2004: directive No. 2004/27/EC 
and regulation EC No. 726/2004.127 Preceding the two central pieces of legislation, several 
additional legal acts worth mentioning were introduced. Between 1999 and 2000 two 
regulations aiming at the improvement of the regulatory regime regarding the development of 
orphan drugs were passed. Regulation EC No. 2000/141 entailed a definition of an orphan 
drug and established the Committee for Orphan medicinal products within the EMA, 
responsible for granting orphan status to submitted pharmaceuticals, based on the criteria 
specified further in regulation EC No. 2000/847 (Watson, 2000). In the following year 
directive No. 2001/20/EC specified the rules on good clinical practice, strengthening the 
requirements in the pre-authorization phase. Since the regulatory framework during this stage 
was based on a large number of single documents and became increasingly complex, it was 
integrated by the introduction of directive No. 2001/83/EC, representing the new fundamental 
piece of European pharmaceutical legislation. Based on directive No. 2003/63/EC, the 
requirements for application dossiers were harmonized further. The directive implemented the 
Common Technical Document (CTD) developed within the ICH. The second directive No. 
2003/94/EC released in that year, specified the rules regarding good manufacturing practice 
with a special focus on investigational medicinal products. Regulation EC No. 1084/2003 and 
EC No. 1085/2003 amended existing provisions on the examination of variations regarding 
authorized products.  
 
6.2.3.1 General modifications based on the revision process    
Turning to the changes resulting directly from the revision process, it should be noted that 
they were rather moderate compared to the first revision of the regulatory framework in the 
early 1990s. Nevertheless, the revision altered the framework in several ways. Starting off 
with symbolic changes, several institutional features were renamed. The agency was 
rebranded European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the CPMP was renamed to Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP). Mainly due to the Community enlargement in 
2004, the composition of the CMHP was changed. Besides one member from each of the 
(now) 25 national agencies, five additional members could be chosen in order to bring in 
specific expertise. In addition, the CMHP was empowered to establish standing and 
temporary working parties. Another change affected the board of the EMA which now 
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 For a detailed analysis of the policy-making process see Andreas Broscheid & Jürgen Feick (2005).   
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included one representative from each Member State, two representatives of the European 
Commission, two representatives of the European Parliament, two representatives of patients’ 
organisations, one representative of doctors’ organisations and one representative of 
veterinarians’ organisations.128 An important harmonization was reached regarding the data 
exclusivity and protection, leading to the so-called 8+2+1 formula or bolar provision (Roox, 
2006). The data needed to submit an application dossier was protected for eight years. After 
this period, generic producers were allowed to draw on the scientific data and prepare their 
application even though they were not allowed to market their product until the ten-year mark 
had passed. In effect, this meant 8 years of data protection and 10 years of market exclusivity. 
If the respective producer could demonstrate an additional therapeutic benefit of his product, 
he could even prolong this period by one additional year (Lorenz, 2006: 216). The 
transparency of the regulatory process was improved by making the publishing of assessment 
reports mandatory under both procedures.129 While the previous framework mandated a new 
assessment of a market authorization every five years, the new provision envisaged one 
mandatory evaluation of the respective product. After re-examination, however, the market 
authorization – given a consistent risk/benefit ratio – will be valid without limitation. Another 
change affecting market authorization was the requirement to market a medicinal product 
within three years from approval. If an applicant failed to do so, the obtained market 
authorization will be invalid.    
 
6.2.3.2 Changes affecting the centralized procedure 
While the CP had been evaluated positively by most stakeholders (CMS Cameron McKenna 
& Andersen Consulting, 2000), the Commission proposed several improvements. First, the 
scope of the procedure was widened, by including medicinal products based on a new active 
substance or intended for certain therapeutic indications and orphan drugs.130 Opposed to 
earlier regulation, it was now possible for a generic medicinal product to receive market 
approval through the centralized procedure. In principle, the procedure was opened up for 
other medicinal products offering therapeutic benefit or a special benefit to patients as well. 
The timelines during the political phase of decision making were tightened and an accelerated 
assessment procedure was set up, reserved for medicinal products of major therapeutic 
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 During the legislation process, industry representatives tried to lobby for participation in the management 
board but eventually failed (Broscheid & Feick, 2005: 25). 
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 For the centralized procedure, the European public assessment report (EPAR) was introduced. 
130
 As defined in the annex of the said regulation the scope was expanded again in May, 2008. 
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interest and making specific post-authorization controls necessary. Furthermore, the reduction 
of fees payable for authorization through the CP for small and medium enterprises was 
introduced.  
 
6.2.3.3 Changes affecting the decentralized and mutual recognition procedure 
Compared to the CP, the MRP/DP was exposed to extensive criticism during the review 
process (CMS Cameron McKenna & Andersen Consulting, 2000).131 Accordingly, more far-
reaching changes compared to the CP were entailed in directive No. 2004/27/EC. To 
strengthen the voluntary elements of the process, the previously existing informal mutual 
recognition facilitation group (MRFG) was transformed into the coordination group 
(CMD(h)) and was granted administrative support by the EMA. An important change from a 
procedural perspective was the modification of the binding arbitration procedure. Under the 
new rules, withdrawal of the product from one of the dissenting concerned member states did 
no longer prevent binding arbitration. In addition, concerned member states willing to accept 
the first assessment were now allowed to grant a provisional market approval. Another change 
to strengthen mutual recognition within the MRP/DP, was the altered sequence. The RMS 
was expected to share his draft assessment with the CMS’s before taking a decision, 
providing for additional bi-lateral and multilateral discussion.  
  
6.2.4 Recent developments in the regulatory framework 
After the second revision, policy developments in the pharmaceutical sector did not lose its 
dynamic, even though the focus of new legislative acts shifted from the institutionalisation of 
the regulatory system to its modification. In 2005, directive No. 2005/28/EC integrated 
former provisions on clinical practice by establishing new guidelines and developing control 
mechanisms. The same year, regulation EC No. 2049/2005 was introduced, regulating 
additional support for small and medium enterprises regarding the approval process. 2006 saw 
the issuance of several legal acts, beginning with Regulation EC No. 507/2006 introducing a 
conditional market authorization.132 In December, two additional regulations, EC No. 
1901/2006 and No. 1902/2006, concerning medicinal products for paediatric use were 
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 A mutual recognition procedure (MRP) applies, if the product already has received a market authorization in 
one member state, opposed to the decentralized procedure (DP) where no market authorization has been 
received prior to the application. 
132
 A conditional authorization is granted, even if not all the data necessary for an application can be provided.   
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released. The most significant changes resulting from the two regulations were the creation of 
a new paediatric committee (PDCO) within the EMA and the introduction of the so-called 
paediatric investigation plan (PIP). Since children were not covered in most clinical studies, 
even though representing a significant subset of the consuming group, the new regulation 
made the consideration of aspects related to paediatric use in clinical trials mandatory (Auby, 
2008).133 In 2007, two regulations were passed. Regulation EC No. 658/2007 provided the 
agency with additional powers for sanctioning non-compliance of market authorization 
holders and levy fines at least indirectly.134 The second one, regulation EC No. 1394/2007 
broadened the scope of the centralized procedure by including advanced therapy medicinal 
products. Directive No. 2008/29/EC released in March, 2008 clarified the competencies of the 
Commission regarding changes of the pharmaceutical regulatory framework. Directive No. 
2009/53/EC amended directive No. 2001/83/EC regarding the terms of variations to an 
authorized product and in September 2009, directive No. 2009/120/EC was released, adapting 
the annex of directive No. 2001/83/EC to account for the increasing importance of advanced 
therapy medicinal products.  
 
Graph 12: Overview of key European regulatory legal acts (1965-2010) 
 
Source: author’s own 
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 A waiver can be granted releasing companies from the obligations. However, the EMA has been restrictive in 
granting waivers and even engaged in litigation in the case of Nycomed (Brizmohun, 2009).  
134
 The general possibility to sanction regulatees had already been introduced by regulation EC No. 726/2004, 
but had to be specified further. Formally, sanctions are implemented by the Commission on request of the 
agency (Killick, 2007).  
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At the time of writing, the Commission has engaged in a new review initiative of the 
regulatory framework to promote its regulatory goals in the pharmaceutical sector. Since these 
measures are still in the legislative process the potential impact of anticipated changes will be 
discussed briefly in the ninth chapter.        
 
6.2.5 Development paths of European pharmaceutical policy  
The main aim of the previous section was to provide a descriptive overview of the policy 
developments in the pharmaceutical sector. At first sight, the process seemed to be marked by 
a steady flow of legislation but at same time shaped by coincidences and partial congruence of 
stakeholders’ preferences instead of a clear and distinct strategy.135 At second glance, 
however, a development path emerges: summarizing the policy developments it can be 
argued, that the process started with the harmonization of standards (1), subsequently shifted 
towards institutionalisation (2) – flanking the still ongoing harmonization of standards – and 
finally lead to the consolidation and differentiation of the regulatory regime (3). This 
development path can be projected on the actual timeline. The first policy phase – focusing on 
the harmonization of standards – started with the release of directive 65/65/EC and ended 
with the first revision of the pharmaceutical regulatory framework in the 1990s and the 
instalment of regulatory structures in 1995. As it has been shown, the discussion of the future 
system started with the consultation process under the hospice of the Commission. 
Furthermore, the increased legislative activity during the early 1990s could be attributed to 
the policy dynamics leading to the creation of the new system, rather than being the result of 
the developments in the first phase. The second phase of institutionalisation, started with the 
first revision process in 1990, the subsequent instalment of the European agency and the 
foundation of the still existing (yet adapted) authorization system consisting of a national, a 
decentralized and a centralized procedure entering into force in 1995. The year clearly marked 
a critical juncture in the policy process: Besides the creation of an European agency, the 
successful establishment of European regulatory/authorization structures – mainly through 
changes in the competencies of existing institution – fundamentally changed the regulatory 
landscape (Collatz, 1996; Jefferys & Jones, 1995). While the starting point of the second 
phase can be defined based on previous consideration, at least two endpoints seem to be 
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 This assertion is supported by Govin Permanand claiming that “the history of European pharmaceutical 
regulation is an inconsistent one” (2006: 53). However, from a theoretical perspective this inconsistency 
seems to be rather comprehensible as different interests had to be accommodated (Krapohl, 2008).   
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possible. Using the general perspective applied in the specification of the first phase, no 
specific cut-off point could be determined and the second phase would be still ongoing. Using 
such an inclusive definition could be justified, since the basic regulatory system has remained 
largely untouched despite undergoing several changes. Opposed to this inclusive view, the 
changes resulting from the second revision and the corresponding legal acts published in 2004 
can be used as an alternative cut-off point.136 While leaving the fundamentals of the 
regulatory system untouched, the revision nevertheless impacted on the effectiveness of the 
regulatory system as a whole. An additional practical argument for distinguishing a third 
phase could be invoked. Since the majority of the changes resulting from the revision process 
came into force at the time of writing it is too early to discuss their impact on the underlying 
effectiveness of the system with certainty and in greater detail. In line with the argumentation 
used to justify the starting point of the second phase, the third phase starting in 2000 until the 
present day will be used in this study. 
Graph 13: Development path of the European regulatory framework 
 
Source: author’s own 
 
6.3 Evaluating the effectiveness of the regulatory framework 
Using the three policy phases as a structuring device, the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework can be assessed. The evaluation is conducted in three consecutive steps. First, it 
must be assessed in how far a clear regulatory goal has been formulated. In a second step, the 
coverage of the regulatory lifecycle within the regulatory framework will be considered. In a 
third step, the framework will be discussed from a good governance perspective using the 
principles of regulatory quality developed in the fourth chapter.     
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 An additional argument for the distinction of a second and third phase is, that many studies treat the ‘2001-
2004’ revision as such a cut-off point (Broscheid & Feick, 2005; Feick, 2008; Lorenz, 2006; Nettesheim, 
2008).  
6.  The regulatory framework: establishing de jure effectiveness 
 
 
132 
6.3.1 Regulatory goals: public health, a single market and a competitive industry 
The general aim of European pharmaceutical regulation was established by the first directive 
No. 65/65/EEC and has remained constant throughout the process. The first two recitals of the 
said directive state that:  
“the primary purpose of any rules concerning the production and distribution of proprietary medicinal 
products must be to safeguard public health; Whereas, however, this objective must be attained by 
means which will not hinder the development of the pharmaceutical industry or trade in medicinal 
products within the Community” 
Flowing from this definition, the primary policy aim of European pharmaceutical regulation is 
the safeguarding of public health. However, based on the formulation used in the directive, 
this goal should be achieved in accordance with the policy goal of industrial development and 
the goal of market creation (Collatz, 1996; Lorenz, 2006). Instead of providing one clear 
policy goal, European regulation is thus based on three and potentially conflicting policy 
goals. While it could be argued that this tension is mediated by granting safety considerations 
priority over industrial and economic considerations, some doubts from a consumer 
perspective remain (Collatz, 1996).137  
 
6.3.2 The regulatory framework and the regulatory lifecycle 
Based on the policy goals lined out in directive No. 65/65/EEC, it must be asked in how far 
the resulting framework is designed to adequately fulfil them. An effective regulatory 
framework needs to cover all regulatory aspects with a potential impact on the achievement of 
the regulatory goal. Based on the discussion of regulatory challenges in the pharmaceutical 
sector in the previous chapter, this implies that the whole regulatory lifecycle, including pre- 
and post-authorization aspects, is covered.   
 
6.3.2.1 The first phase: Harmonization of standards (1965-1990) 
The release of the first European directive in 1965 did not only mark the start of the first 
phase but structured the regulatory framework in several important respects, mainly by 
defining its boundaries. It established the scope of the framework by defining, which products 
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 The ECJ has repeatedly struck down national legal acts aiming to safeguard public health, as obstacles to free 
trade (Kanavos, 2000). On the other side, the Commission increasingly came to understand that the 
protection of consumer interests has to be considered in the (general) integration process (Pollack, 1997b).   
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should be covered by regulation. While the focus was on proprietary pharmaceutical products, 
the directive established an important rule from the perspective of consumer protection. 
Aware of the problems connected to the delineation of pharmaceuticals and other product 
groups especially cosmetics, the directive established that borderline cases and products 
belonging to both categories would be treated as a pharmaceutical and therefore subjected to 
stricter controls (Collatz, 1996: 35). During the following years the definition of products 
covered by the regulatory regime was updated regularly, leading to a more targeted and 
differentiated application. In addition, the directive mandated pre-authorization approval of all 
products falling under the definition of a pharmaceutical product and established approval 
criteria on which the assessment should be based.   
Starting with the regulation of development, the introduction of mandatory approval based on 
directive No. 65/65/EEC and the criteria of safety, quality and efficacy contributed 
significantly to the establishment of pre-authorization controls of pharmaceutical product 
risks. Producers were now obliged to produce data on their products in the course of the 
development process. These requirements remained rather general until the release of 
directive No. 318/75/EEC, concretizing the testing requirements underlying the application. In 
addition to the said measures, directive No. 83/570/EEC specified the testing requirements. 
While not representing a legal measure in the strict sense, the issuance of NTAs starting in 
1986 could be seen as an additional improvement regarding the safety aspects connected to 
the development process. With the instalment of the Committee on the Adaptation to 
Technical Progress of the Directives on the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade in the 
Proprietary Medicinal Products Sector in late 1986, the Commission created additional 
supranational expertise to continuously update testing requirements. In this regard the 
issuance of directive No. 87/19/EEC should be mentioned, as it introduced the concept of 
good laboratory practice (Collatz, 1996: 40).  
Turning to the second aspect of the pre-authorization stage, the actual approval process, the 
first phase saw the instalment of mandatory market authorization, the definition of underlying 
decision criteria and the general requirements for the approval process as laid down in 
directive No. 65/65/EEC. A notable advancement in rationalizing the process was the 
introduction of Standard Product Characteristics (SPC) as a uniform format for application by 
directive No. 83/570/EEC. From a public health perspective, the establishing of the CPMP 
has to be highlighted as well. Supranational expertise drawing on member states’ regulatory 
resources was created in order to support national regulators in decisions on market approval. 
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While the role of CPMP was of specific relevance in the case of the multi-state and the 
concertation procedure, its instalment was of general importance for the effectiveness of the 
system as a whole.   
Considering the regulation of the production process, directive 75/319/EEC introduced 
mandatory authorization for pharmaceutical manufactures and required manufacturers to 
employ a qualified person responsible for the manufacturing process. These rules were 
complemented by calling on national competent authorities to carry out inspections of 
manufacturing sites to continuously monitor, if the requirements of the manufacturing 
authorization were still met. In addition, manufacturers were obliged to adhere to the 
guidelines on good manufacturing practice (GMP).138  
While manufacturing was already subjected to considerable regulatory activity during the first 
phase, this has not been the case in the field of distribution. Trade was regulated, since 
importers of pharmaceutical products needed an authorization as well based on the 
requirements of directive 75/314/EEC.139 In contrast, the distribution to end consumers in 
more general terms remained unregulated at the European level at this point in time.  
Regarding information requirements, directive No. 65/65/EEC created rules for the 
appropriate (external) labelling of proprietary pharmaceutical products including specific 
information, for example, the mode of administration. However, it must be stressed that at this 
point in time no additional information for customers were mandatory. While the 
specifications for such additional information in the form of a leaflet were introduced in 1975, 
they became mandatory in 1989. In addition, the introduction of directive No. 89/552/EEC 
banning TV advertising for pharmaceuticals strengthened the regulatory framework regarding 
the availability of right information.  
It could be argued, that directive No. 65/65/EEC already envisaged responsibilities of post-
authorization monitoring and pharmacovigilance, since withdrawal and suspension of market 
authorization were ought to be based on the failure to fulfil the approval criteria. However, 
these responsibilities were obviously rather general and did not mandate the establishment of 
a systematic pharmacovigilance approach. This situation only changed partially during the 
first phase. Directive No. 75/319/EEC did entail more specific requirements for supervision of 
manufacturing and products on the market, but did not specify how data should be gathered in 
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 Adherence to these guidelines was envisaged in directive No. 75/319/EEC and No. 75/318/EEC and the 
requirement was specified further in directive No. 89/341/EEC.  
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 In 1976, the ECJ established the legality of such economic activity with its ruling in De Peijer (Case 104/75) 
in context of parallel trade, as long as licensing requirements were met (Darbá  & Rovira, 1998: 133).   
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a systematic way. However, the CPMP was now ought to be notified in case of market 
withdrawal. Finally, directive No. 89/341/EEC introduced reporting requirements for the 
pharmaceutical producers in case of product withdrawal.  
 
6.3.2.2 The second phase: Institutionalization (1990-2000) 
The policy developments between 1990 and 2000 strongly focused on procedural and 
approval aspects of the regulatory system. However, several changes affected the other 
aspects of the regulatory lifecycle.  
While no new legislative acts were passed affecting the stage of development during the 
second phase, the density of regulation was increased by employing a soft law approach and 
the issuance of further guidelines.  
Considering the approval process, the establishment of the new approval procedures was an 
important improvement both from the perspective of European regulatory capacities and the 
safeguarding of public health. By expanding the competencies of the CPMP in both 
procedures, cooperation between national regulators was strengthened further. In addition, the 
introduction of different procedures for market approval incentivized pharmaceutical 
companies to develop innovative pharmaceuticals, as the market authorization for the whole 
community implied a reduction of regulatory costs. Moreover, the introduction of new rules 
regarding the approval of variations to authorized products should be seen as an important 
step from a point of rationalization. Even though released lately in the second phase, the 
introduction of the orphan regulation in December 1999 was an important step regarding the 
improvement of access to medicine at this point as well. It created specific incentives for 
producers willing to engage in research on ailments for rare diseases. No specific application 
procedure for these drugs was created, but additional support and specific requirements for 
the approval process were introduced (Hoppu, 2008; Watson, 2000).     
The safety requirements regarding the production process were mainly altered by the 
introduction of directive No. 91/356/EEC introducing new manufacturing guidelines. As in 
the case of development standards, the regulation of manufacturing evolved steadily on the 
basis of soft law instruments, most importantly through the issuance of guidelines 
(Sarantopoulos et al., 1995). In addition, the creation of the EMA responsible for supervision 
of manufacturing strengthened the existing regulatory framework. 
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No fundamental changes to the rules governing (parallel) imports and trade in more general 
terms were introduced during the second phase. However, in 1992 directive No. 92/25/EEC 
closed a prevalent regulatory deficit of the first phase – the distribution of pharmaceutical 
products – by making an authorization for distribution mandatory. Furthermore, the 
Commission in collaboration with the CPMP was requested to develop guidelines on good 
distributional practice (GDP). Another change affecting the distribution in a wider sense was 
introduced by directive No. 92/26/EEC, harmonizing national rules regarding the 
classification of products. 
The most significant changes to the framework from a public health perspective were enacted 
regarding information requirements. Directive No. 92/27/EEC strengthened existing 
provisions on the information, accompanying a pharmaceutical product. From now on, 
producers were obliged to insert package leaflets in accordance with the information entailed 
in the SPCs.140 Directive No. 92/28/EEC amended existing regulation on advertising, 
effectively reducing the potential of possible misleading information on (prescription) 
pharmaceuticals.141 With regard to the overall transparency of the decision process, little 
progress was made in the second phase. Even though assessment reports for products 
authorized in the decentralized procedure were not intended to be published, transparency was 
at least improved regarding the centralized procedure through the introduction of European 
Public Assessment Reports (Abraham & Lewis, 1999).  
The previously existing European legal framework provided only insufficient regulation of 
monitoring and pharmacovigilance. This changed with the instalment of the EMA and the 
pharmacovigilance requirements laid down in directive No. 93/39/EEC and regulation EC No. 
2309/93. Most notably, producers were now mandated to have a qualified person for 
pharmacovigilance at their service responsible for regularly updating safety information on 
marketed products and sharing of this information with the competent authorities (Brown, 
2005). National authorities were requested to install pharmacovigilance systems and asked to 
exchange these information with the agency and within the network of national regulatory 
agencies.142 
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 Another important requirement in this regard was that pharmaceutical leaflets must be written in a 
comprehensible manner (Anon, 1995a; Kenny et al., 1998).  
141
 However, the directive did not only cover promotion to the public, but entailed regulations regarding the 
provision of information to the dispensing doctors.  
142
 It should be noted, that the pharmacovigilance requirements at this point were formulated in a rather general 
way, prompting the need of further guidance.   
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6.3.2.3 The third phase: Differentiation (2000-present) 
The third development phase in pharmaceutical regulation led to the consolidation and 
differentiation of the existing regulatory framework. This is demonstrated for example, by the 
introduction of directive 2001/83/EEC integrating most of the existing rules developed in the 
course of nearly four decades. In addition, the framework was consolidated further by the 
continuous revision of EudraLex, including all rules and regulations comprising the legal 
regulatory framework. As in the previous phases some specific changes regarding the distinct 
regulatory aspects must be mentioned to illustrate the dynamic of developments in this phase.   
Despite releasing several guidelines on the conduct of clinical requirements, the most 
important change in the regulation of the development process must be seen in the release of 
the clinical directive, No. 2001/20/EC, and the additional rules laid down in directive No. 
2005/28/EC, streamlining clinical trials throughout Europe.143 Additional changes were 
introduced by the new paediatric regulation in 2007 improving safety especially for the 
patient group of children (Jong et al., 2002; Kölch et al., 2007; Seyberth et al., 2005).   
While the approval process regarding the centralized and decentralized procedure was altered 
during the second revision, these modifications had only minor impacts on the overall 
effectiveness of the legal framework. Tthe scope of products to be assessed under the 
centralized procedure was widened, but no changes were introduced regarding the assessment 
itself. A change with a possible impact on public health protection was the restriction of 
reasons for refusal of an initial assessment within the MRP/DP. In contrast it can be argued 
that instead of taking the possibility from member states to react to health risks, the possibility 
to block market access based on unqualified reasons was reduced. Four additional important 
aspects from the perspective of public health must be mentioned in this regard. First, the 
creation of an accelerated approval procedure and the general tightening of timelines under 
the CP improved the access to new and innovative drugs by speeding the regulatory decision. 
Second, in 2004, compassionate use was increasingly legalized improving access to medicine 
(Suñé-Arbussá, 2009). Third, the new approval regime foresaw the possibility of conditional 
approval contingent upon additional requirements (Carroll et al., 2008). Fourth, an increased 
pre-application discussion between the applicant and the respective agency was 
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 Comments from academia and industry suggest that the directive did neither improve patients’ (and test 
subjects’) safety nor strengthened the competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry (Houlton, 
2004; Woods, 2004).  
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encouraged.144 Some authors believe that these changes negatively affect public health, as 
they represent a relaxation of approval requirements (Abraham & Davis, 2007). However, this 
view could be challenged, as approval still is based on the same criteria, mandates essentially 
the same pre-authorization assessments and in those cases were a conditional approval is 
granted, the producers is obliged to fulfil strict reporting requirements.145 
Regulations concerning production were included in directive No. 2001/83/EC as well and the 
release of directive No. 2003/94/EC amended previous rules on manufacturing which were 
subsequently advanced by the release of additional guidelines in Volume 4 of EudraLex. 
However, the level of regulation concerning this aspect remained constant.  
The same assertion holds true regarding the distribution of pharmaceuticals. Existing rules 
were included in the newly established directive No. 2001/83/EC, without changing the 
underlying rules and therefore the regulatory impact. 
While no changes were made regarding the labelling and leaflet requirements, the revision 
process affected the regulation of information as public availability of data was increased. 
New regulation mandated the publication of assessment reports – after clearing commercially 
sensitive information – under the DP and greater openness regarding the previously 
introduced European Public Assessment Reports (EPAR) under the CP (Pimpinella & Bertini 
Malgarini, 2007). Furthermore, the EMA was mandated to make publicly available 
pharmacovigilance information.146   
Turning to the regulation of monitoring and pharmacovigilance, new legislation strengthened 
the role of the EMA regarding the coordination of pharmacovigilance activities, most notably 
the creation of an electronic system, and the introduction of measures for increased 
collaboration between national regulators. In addition, the signalling of ADRs by patients 
channelled through the respective physician was encouraged. Extensive obligations of 
pharmaceutical producers were introduced and the mandate of the responsible person was 
widened (Lorenz, 2006).147  
                                                 
144
 Pre-application consultation has been a task of the EMA since its foundation (Dejas-Eckertz & Schäffner, 
2005).  
145
 Discussions before the application procedure can be understood as a rationalization of the process and 
therefore can be expected to have a positive effect on approval success and public health (Regnstrom et al., 
2009; Toivonen, 2005). 
146
 This provision led to the creation of the electronic pharmacovigilance network which can be accessed under 
www.eudravigilance.org. Public access to the side is still restricted.  
147
 Another important change has been the introduction of the so-called EU risk management plan (EU-RMP) 
for products based on new chemical entities, mandating detailed additional post-market studies on possible 
ADRs  (Giezen et al., 2009).  
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And as in other fields, the increased use of guidelines could be seen as measure to strengthen 
the self-regulatory aspect of the regulatory framework.148    
 
6.3.3 Regulatory principles within the regulatory framework  
Assessing the realisation of policy principles, the regulatory framework in its current is 
considered, referencing to previous periods and evolutionary steps throughout time.    
Beginning with openness, the framework did only partially cover the principle during the first 
two policy phases. The European framework largely adapted the national regulatory approach 
based on regulatory secrecy, which has been criticized repetitively in the national and 
European context (Abraham & Lewis, 1998; Boissel & Chiquette, 1999; Kopp, 2000). The 
informational requirements were rather limited and the framework provided regulators with 
the opportunity to invoke confidentiality as a reason to withhold information to the wider 
public (Kesselheim & Mello, 2007). Even though room for improvement remains, the 
changes enacted in the third phase support the assertion that the legal framework moved 
towards greater respect for the principle: The introduction of transparency measures and the 
publication of assessment reports as a result of the second revision may serve as a proof in 
this regard.  
At first glance, the realisation of participation in the European framework is skewed: While 
consumers are only mentioned in an indirect manner, the framework largely focuses on the 
participation of the pharmaceutical industry (Collier et al., 1997). However, based on the 
previous analysis of the regulatory acts – and in opposition to the findings of former studies 
(Abraham, 2002a) – the current framework does not seem to reflect an overwhelming industry 
bias, which would indicate a lack of participation or acknowledgement of other interests. 
While the policy process itself surely has been driven by the pharmaceutical industry 
(Permanand, 2006) this does not preclude, that the resulting policies automatically reflect a  
business position. In fact, it did not prevent the European Commission from recommending 
increasingly stricter regulation, for example the clinical trials directive and the paediatric 
regulation primarily serving consumer safety interest, while at the same time leading to 
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 While an increase in guidelines might represent a positive aspect, concretizing the at times rather general 
requirements laid down in the legal acts, they might cause an overburdening of regulatees signifying the 
emergence of overregulation (Tor & Brian, 2008).  
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increased regulatory compliance costs (Ladds, 2004; Watson, 2003).149 Again, the third policy 
phase had been decisive in the advancement of public interest, probably leading to a more 
balanced consideration of interests at least at the level of regulation. Even though consumers 
are still excluded from regulatory assessment, the most recent changes to the EMA structure 
providing permanent representation for consumer groups point into the same direction.150   
Turning to the principle of accountability, the policy framework did clearly address the 
responsibilities of the actors within the regulatory field – except for those fields where no 
regulation was put in place at that time – from the beginning. An example for the assignment 
of responsibilities and an increase of accountability could be seen in the gradual introduction 
of responsible persons in the different subfields, for example production and monitoring. 
However, while these examples support the notion, that the framework realises accountability, 
it should be noted that the legal framework has been perceived as providing only relatively 
general requirements leading to subsequent problems in compliance (Tor & Brian, 2008).  
 The principle of coherence, both in its internal and external meaning, is traceable throughout 
the regulatory framework. While coherence in the first policy phase was lacking because the 
regulatory lifecycle was only covered partially, this changed during the second and third 
phase. The external coherence became visible for example in the case of advertising 
regulation, incorporating and specifying existing rules entailed in other directives.  
As the discussion of preconditions at the beginning of this chapter revealed, the current 
regulatory approach based on market approval and additional regulatory mechanisms in the 
post approval stage represents a justifiable intervention in the market. Accordingly, the 
requirement of proportionality is fulfilled within the regulatory system. Since less intrusive 
regulatory approaches were deemed insufficient, the current approach can be considered a 
proportional regulatory answer.  
 Closely connected to the principle of proportionality, the adequate targeting of the regulatory 
problem within the framework has been achieved. While directive No. 65/65/EEC clearly 
defined the scope of the regulatory framework, problems of delineation between 
pharmaceuticals and other product groups, for example cosmetics, can be seen as a derogation 
                                                 
149
 This argument can be generalized in the context of European pharmaceutical regulation. Stricter rules 
resulting in considerable compliance costs have been introduced in many areas, explaining increased 
discussions on the need to streamline pharmaceutical regulation on the European level (European 
Commission, 2007).   
150
 However, recent studies on the funding of consumer and patient groups may raise concerns on the positive 
effect on balanced representation. Most groups working with the EMA are funded by the pharmaceutical 
industry (Lambert, 2009; Mintzes, 2007)  
6.3 Evaluating the effectiveness of the regulatory framework 
 
 
 
141 
 
from the principle of targeting. However, based on the rulings of the ECJ and the resulting 
non-cumulation rule (Gagliardi & Dorato, 2007: 6) it seems that the still existing ambiguity in 
this field is tolerable.151   
The sharing of regulatory burden within the regulatory framework seems to represent an 
imbalanced situation, as the regulatory costs are borne almost exclusively by the 
pharmaceutical industry. However, two arguments can be made to correct this perspective. 
First, the framework does not only burden the pharmaceutical companies but national 
regulators as well. National regulators had to adapt to the rules implying compliance costs for 
these agencies. Second, pharmaceutical companies do not only carry the burden of regulation 
but realize profits from approved products, legitimizing the prior imposition or regulatory 
burdens.  
Finally, the current framework influenced by prevailing considerations of political necessity 
puts a strong emphasis on the respect for the principle of subsidiarity (Gehring et al., 2005).  
Member states’ competencies are clearly delineated within the policy framework and while 
supranational competencies were increasingly expanded throughout the policy phases, the 
general design principle underlying the regulatory framework was not abandoned. The 
framework still builds on national activities, expertise and regulatory resources, increasingly 
coordinated throughout the policy phases (Dehousse, 1997). Judging from the regulatory 
framework and considering the distribution of regulatory work, the network approach to 
regulation is dominated by the national regulators, rather than by the European level. While 
the EMA has increased European level steering capacities, it largely depends on the resources 
of the national agencies.         
 
6.3.4 The transposition of European rules 
While the (de jure) effectiveness of European regulation depends on the regulatory 
framework, the peculiar characteristics of the European regulatory system represent a 
potentially intervening variable since “effective regulation not only depends on legislative 
decisions, but also on the extent to which these decisions are actually implemented and 
complied with.”(Knill & Lenschow, 2003: 7).  
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 Non-cumulation means that a product can either be a pharmaceutical or a different product but not both.  
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As the analysis of the legal framework has shown, regulation of pharmaceuticals is mainly 
based on directives raising possible issues of right transposition. Transposition problems can 
be of mere temporal nature, if member states chose to ignore the deadlines for 
transposition.152 Qualitative compliance issues however turn out to be more critical. Member 
States could for example choose to engage in gold plating, raising national standards beyond 
the intentions of the European regulator, or choose the opposite and implement national 
measures not adequately transposing the content of the European directive.153 Given the 
potential existence – and distorting effects on regulatory effectiveness – of such transposition 
problems, compliance issues regarding European pharmaceutical regulation must be assessed.  
There are two possible approaches in measuring (correct) transposition. Either, transposition 
is measured directly by focusing on the national, or the lack of transposition from a European 
level perspective is measured. Studies based on the first approach, measure transposition 
based on national data and notification obligations regarding the implementation of European 
directives (Kaeding, 2006; König et al., 2005; Mastenbroek, 2003). The alternative approach 
applies a proxy-measure in assessing compliance by measuring the degree of non-compliance 
from the European perspective. Usually, this is done by relying on the monitoring activities of 
the Commission and infringement procedures more specifically (Börzel, 2001; Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2007). In deciding which approach should be employed, the complementary 
character of the two perspectives must be emphasized. Transposition is either achieved or not 
achieved. Considering the higher complexity of data generation and the possible differences 
in the conceptualization of compliance, assessing non-compliance from the European 
perspective has the principle advantage that data availability and data gathering constitutes at 
least a smaller problem. The Commission has been publishing annual reports on the 
application (and transposition) of Community law at least since 1984.154 Furthermore the Eur-
Lex database enables – even though limited – research on the infringement procedures 
considering the last two steps. Moreover, the focus on non-compliance reduces the underlying 
ambiguity regarding the correctness of transposition: The Commission will most likely start 
an infringement procedure if it has a reason to believe that member states failed to comply.  
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 For a discussion of the national differences in timeliness and problems of measurement see (Falkner et al., 
2005; Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009; R. Thomson, 2009) 
153
 Compliance research differentiates between problems of timeliness and problems of correctness in 
transposition (Falkner et al., 2005; Kaeding, 2006; König et al., 2005).   
154
 The reports are available on the internet. Unfortunately, it was not possible to retrieve the reports for the 
phases from 1984-1989 and 1991-1992.  
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Despite these advantages, the analysis of transposition using infringement data is flawed as 
well. Infringement data represents an incomplete picture of the real extent of transposition, as 
they merely represented a subset of the transposition process or put differently the “‘tip of the 
iceberg’ of non-compliance [original emphasis]” (2009: 292).155 Monitoring activities and the 
general approach to monitoring can be described as inconsistent over time and influenced by 
strategic considerations of the Commission, leading to differing levels of scrutiny (Hartlapp, 
2008; Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009; Mbaye, 2001). The Commission and more precisely the 
responsible units will thus have to make a choice in which areas they will make an effort to 
investigate cases of non-compliance and were to pursue infringement proceedings.156 Another 
limitation for analysis based on infringement data could be seen in data availability: 
transposition was not monitored in a comprehensible form before 1984, limiting the usability 
of infringement data for the assessment of transposition in the specific case of pharmaceutical 
regulation.157 Weighing benefits and drawbacks of the two possibilities, the advantages of a 
non-compliance approach seem to justify its usage at least as a rough estimate of 
transposition.158  
Looking at previous studies of pharmaceutical regulation, it is rather surprising that 
transposition into national law has not been assessed in a systematic way, neither on the 
aggregated nor on the single case level. One notable exception is the analysis by Matthias 
Wismar and his colleagues (Wismar et al., 2002) discussing transposition patterns regarding 
health related directives focusing on Germany compared to the UK, Spain and Sweden.159 In 
addition, several studies partially consider the transposition of European measures within the 
reform process of legislation on the national level (Hohgräwe, 1992; Murswieck, 1983; 
Smith, 1991; Winter, 2004). However, these studies focus on the qualitative impact of 
European law as a contextual variable, rather than tracking the general national transposition 
records over a longer period of time.  
 
                                                 
155
 While it is necessary to highlight the relativity of results based on European data, Kaeding (2008) is right in 
noting that despite issues of data quality, the results confirm the existent of a general implementation deficit.    
156
 This will depend on a variety of factors, for example the position and capacities of the respective units 
(Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009).    
157
 While Eur-Lex covers the whole period, serious data problems especially regarding the completeness of data 
prevail (Börzel, 2001).   
158
 An optimal approach would combine European non-compliance and national compliance data and has been 
employed in few studies, focusing on a small number of countries (Haverland & Romeijn, 2007; 
Mastenbroek, 2003). Since the main focus of this study is not on transposition and the gathering of national 
data for the pharmaceutical sector for all 27 member states is not possible from a pragmatic perspective, the 
following discussion will be limited to the European data.     
159
 However, Matthias Wismar and his colleagues (2002) do not discuss pharmaceuticals in greater detail. 
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The next two sections will assess in how far key directives in the pharmaceutical sector have 
been transposed, based on the notifications by the member states entailed in Eur-Lex and the 
annual reports. Unfortunately, the data availability in the first policy phase (1965-1990) is 
seriously limited. While the annual reports have been published since 1984, it was not 
possible to retrieve the documents for the period of 1984-1989. Eur-Lex covers the entire 
phase allowing at least for the tracking of National Execution Measures (NME). 
Acknowledging the fact, that the assessment of NMEs can only provide an overview of 
general transposition dynamics rather than a measure of correct transposition, it will be 
assessed, if infringement procedures are commonly used in the pharmaceutical sector based 
on the data in the annual reports. To assess the transposition dynamics in the pharmaceutical 
sector, data on NMEs from all member states were gathered for five key directives in each of 
the three policy phases.160 In addition, the year of the most recent measure and the timespan 
between the official transposition deadline set up by the EU and the most recent measure, 
calculated in years, were included to estimate the respective transposition time lag.161 While 
the reliability and explanatory value of these two variables should not be overstated, it 
provides at least rough measures on the general transposition dynamic of member states.162 
An interesting observation drawn from the data in the first policy phase but not included in 
the tables should be highlighted. The data show a strong variation regarding the number of 
measures to transpose single European measures, with the strongest variance for directive No. 
89/105/EEC. Some member states (Greece, Hungary) transposed the directive with one single 
national measure, others needed as much as 57 (Netherlands) and 58 (Poland) measures for 
the same directive. While these differences could be partially explained by national contextual 
factors, for example, differences in legislative instruments, they point to the existence of 
different transposition strategies highlighted in previous studies.       
                                                 
160
 Key directives were identified drawing on the previously conducted analysis of the regulatory framework.  
They were selected either because they represent central pieces of legislation, amended by other directives in 
the subsequent process, or there importance has been proven by the frequent mentioning in previous research 
on pharmaceutical policy.  
161
 While it would be more precise to calculate the months between deadline and NME, this strategy is 
complicated by the fact that Eur-Lex provides only insufficient data for this task. Accordingly, if a deadline 
was set, for example, on November, 31 1994, 1995 is used as the year of deadline.   
162
 The NMEs do not tell anything about the correctness of transposition, but represent the perspective of the 
member states. However it could be argued, that an increased phase between the deadline and the last 
measure points to a certain lack of sufficient transposition beforehand. For those countries that joined the EU 
after the deadline of a directive, the accession year was used as the transposition deadline. 
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Turning to member states performance based on the data gathered for the first policy phase, 
member states showed a high level of transposition. Out of the five directives, four were 
transposed by all member states.  
Table 6: Transposition of key directives during first phase (1965-1990) 
 
Directive No. 
65/65/EEC 
Directive No. 
75/318/EEC 
Directive No. 
75/319/EEC 
Directive No. 
87/22/EEC 
Directive No. 
89/105/EEC 
Country Last NME 
Time 
span 
Last 
NME 
Time 
Span 
Last 
NME 
Time 
span 
Last 
NME 
Time 
span 
Last 
NME 
Time 
span 
Austria 1994 -1 1994 -1 1994 -1 1994 -1 2004 9 
Belgium 1983 17 1983 17 1983 17 1987 -1 1990 0 
Denmark  1995 22 1995 18 1997* 20 1982 -6 1990 0 
Finland 1995 0 1995 0 1995 0 NRA n.a 2006 11 
France  1972 6 1975 -2 1998 21 1988 1 2007 17 
Germany 1976 10 1994 17 1976 -1 1993 5 2002 12 
Greece 1992 11 1992 11 1992 11 1987 -1 1990 0 
Ireland 1976 3 1976 -1 1975 -2 NRA n.a 1984 -5 
Italy 1977 10 1977 0 1977 0 1988 0 2007 17 
Luxembourg 1983 17 1976 -1 1983 6 1987 -1 1989 1 
Netherlands 1977 10 1977 0 1977 0 1988 0 2009 19 
Portugal 1993 8 1990 4 1993 7 1993 5 1993 3 
Spain 1995 9 1995 9 1997 11 1993 5 2006 16 
Sweden 1994 -1 1992 -3 1993 -2 1992 -3 2002 12 
UK 1977 4 1977 0 1977 0 1968 -20 n.a. n.a. 
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 
Czech republic 2008 4 
Cyprus 2001 -3 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 2004 0 
Latvia 1998 -6 
Lithuania 2002 -2 
Malta 2009 5 
Poland 2008 4 
Romania 2008 1 
Slovenia  2005 3 
Slovakia 
 
2009 5 
Source: Eur-Lex; Note: NRA: no reported actvities; n.a.: not applicable 
Two member states (Finland and Ireland) did not reference transposition measures for 
directive 87/22/EEC. This does not imply that the directive was not transposed, but could 
simply mean that the NME was not communicated. Turning to the timing of transposition, the 
first phase shows the strongest variance regarding the time distance between the official 
deadline and the last recorded NMEs. While in several cases member states were able to 
transpose the directive even before the deadline – because existing national measures already 
covered the requirements entailed in the directive – others needed as much as 22 years to 
transpose a directive. Again, this does not mean that member states did not take action before, 
but that existing measures were subsequently supplemented by new measures.163 
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 In the specific case, Denmark released three NMEs before the last one published in Eur-Lex. 
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In trying to explain the rather long transposition times, three possible reasons can be singled 
out: previous measures were not sufficient (1), changes were necessary to account for 
amendments of directives (2) or the Commission demanded additional measures (3). The first 
two reasons can be expected to explain the largest part of additional NMEs and longer 
transposition phases.    
The second policy phase – based on the NMEs – saw a slight decrease in transposition 
compliance. Out of the five selected directives, only two were transposed by all member 
states.164  
Table 7: Transposition of key directives during the second phase (1990-2000) 
 Directive No. 
92/25/EEC 
Directive No. 
92/26/EEC 
Directive No. 
92/27/EEC 
Directive No. 
92/28/EEC 
Directive No. 
93/39/EEC 
Country Last NME 
Time 
span 
last 
NME 
Time 
Span 
Last 
NME 
Time 
span 
last 
NME 
Time 
span 
last 
NME 
Time 
Span 
Austria 1994 1 1994 1 1995 2 1994 1 1996 -2 
Belgium 1993 0 1993 0 1993 0 1995 2 NRA n.a 
Denmark  1997 4 1993 0 1993 0 1993 0 1995 -3 
Finland 1993 0 1995 2 1993 0 1993 0 1996 -2 
France  1998 5 1994 1 1994 1 1996 3 1995 -3 
Germany NRA n.a 1994 1 1995 2 NRA n.a NRA n.a 
Greece 1995 2 1993 0 1993 0 1993 0 1995 -3 
Ireland 1993 0 1993 0 1993 0 1993 0 1996 -2 
Italy 1992 -1 1992 -1 1992 -1 1992 -1 1997 -1 
Luxembourg 1995 2 1992 -1 1992 -1 1992 -1 1996 -2 
Netherlands NRA n.a 1996 3 1996 3 1997 4 1995 -3 
Portugal 1995 2 1994 1 1994 1 1994 1 1995 -3 
Spain 1994 1 1993 1 1993 0 1994 1 1995 -3 
Sweden 1997 4 1992 -1 1995 2 1995 2 1996 -2 
UK 1993 0 1992 -1 1992 -1 1994 1 NRA n.a 
Source: Eur-Lex; Note: NRA: no reported activities; n.a.: not applicable 
Germany did not communicate national measures for directive 92/25/EEC, directive 
92/28/EEC – along with Italy – and directive 93/39/EEC. These developments could be seen 
as an indication of Germany’s reluctance towards the integration of European law which has 
been highlighted by previous studies (Collatz, 1996; Winter, 2004). In addition, the 
Netherlands did fail to communicate transposition for 92/25/EEC as well, while the UK and 
Belgium did not communicate measures regarding directive 93/39/EEC. Despite this negative 
development, transposition time lags decreased dramatically during this period with a 
maximum transposition phase of five years.165  
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 The new 12 member states were excluded from the computation, since the respective directives were repelled 
before 2004 and 2007 respectively.    
165
 Unsurprisingly, the number of NMEs did decrease as well during the second phase. 
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During the third policy phase, transposition compliance increased, with communicated 
measures for four out of five directives. Seven member states claimed that no measures for 
implementation were necessary regarding directive 2001/83/EC.166 Transposition times 
remained on a rather low level, while the number of transposition measures grew. 
Table 8: Transposition of key directives during third phase (2000-2008) 
 Directive No. 
2001/20/EC 
Directive No. 
2001/83/EC 
Directive No. 
2001/83/EC 
Directive No. 
2003/94/EC 
Directive No. 
2004/27/EC 
 Last  
NME 
Time 
span 
Last  
NME 
Time 
Span 
Last  
NME 
Time 
Span 
Last  
NME 
Time 
span 
Last  
NME 
Time 
Span 
Austria 2006 2 2006 4 2003 -1 2005 0 2006 0 
Belgium 2004 0 MPN n.a 2004 0 1960 -45 2006 0 
Denmark  2003 -1 2005 3 2003 -1 1997 -8 2008 2 
Finland 2002 -2 MPN n.a 2003 -1 2005 0 2006 0 
France  2006 2 MPN n.a 2004 0 2006 1 2008 2 
Germany 2004 0 2004 2 2004 0 2004 -1 2005 -1 
Greece 2003 -1 MPN n.a 2003 -1 2003 -2 2004 -2 
Hungary 2002 -2 2004 2 2004 0 2000 -5 2009 3 
Ireland 2007 5 2007 5 2007 3 2004 -1 2007 2 
Italy 2003 -1 2006 4 2003 -1 2003 -2 2003 -3 
Luxembourg 2005 1 MPN n.a 2003 -1 2004 -1 2006 0 
Netherlands 2006 -2 MPN n.a 2003 -1 2006 1 2007 1 
Portugal 2004 0 2006 4 2006 2 2003 -2 2006 0 
Spain 2004 0 MPN n.a 2003 -1 2004 -1 2007 1 
Sweden 2003 -1 2006 4 2003 -1 2004 -1 2009 3 
UK 2004 0 2006 4 2003 -1 n.a. n.a 2005 -1 
Bulgaria 2000 -7 2008 1 2007 3 2009 2 2007 0 
Czech 
republic 2008 4 2008 4 2008 4 2008 3 2008 2 
Cyprus 2004 0 2007 3 2004 0 2004 -1 2007 1 
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 2005 1 n.a n.a 2005 -1 
Latvia n.a. n.a. 2003 -1 2001 -3 2001 -4 2006 0 
Lithuania 2007 3 2002 0 2001 -3 2002 -3 2004 -2 
Malta 2004 0 2006 2 2003 -1 2004 -1 2008 2 
Poland 2008 4 2008 4 2009 5 2009 4 2009 3 
Romania 2006 -1 2006 -1 2003 -1 2003 -2 2006 -1 
Slovenia  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a 2003 -2 n.a. n.a 
Slovakia 2006 2 2009 5 2004 0 2004 -1 2008 2 
Source: Eur-Lex; Note: MPN: no measure  necessary;  NRA: no reported actvities;  n.a.: not applicable 
However, this could be seen as a possible catch up effect of the new member states, 
necessitating more measures to fully comply with the directives. Drawing on the transposition 
data, a decreasing transposition gap is traceable in the pharmaceutical sector. While in the 
majority of reviewed directives transposition was achieved, not all member states did comply. 
However, these results have to be interpreted cautiously. A lack of notification should not be 
equated with incorrect transposition. At the same time, notification of measures does not 
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 Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain claimed that no NME were 
necessary (“MNE pas necessaire”). This is especially problematic since directive 2001/83 represents such a 
crucial directive. However, since it integrated former directives the claim of member states is possibly 
supported by previous transposition activities. 
6.  The regulatory framework: establishing de jure effectiveness 
 
 
148 
necessarily imply full transposition of a directive. Accordingly, reports on infringement have 
to be consulted in order to specify the transposition problem in the pharmaceutical sector.  
The investigation of infringement proceedings is complicated by the lack of continuous 
monitoring of member states’ transposition compliance before 1984. While the Eur-Lex 
database provides information on infringement judgements affecting a specific directive, only 
one case has been registered during the first phase. An infringement procedure was 
successfully launched against Italy for the failure to comply with directive 65/65, directive 
75/318 and directive 75/319.167 In light of data restrictions it must be assumed, that no 
additional severe transposition violations justifying referral to the Court were recorded before 
1984 and during the first phase respectively. This perception is supported by the eighth annual 
report on the application of Community law stating that: “The situation regarding 
pharmaceuticals is positively encouraging.”  (European Commission, 1991a: 15). This does 
not imply that the compliance record during the first phase was flawless. Even though there 
was only one reasoned opinion concerning the labelling of pharmaceutical products issued in 
1989 affecting Germany, several member states received letters from the Commission in the 
early nineties for a lack of transposition of directives No. 89/341/EEC, No. 89/342/EEC, No. 
89/343/EEC and No. 89/381/EEC. In addition, directive No. 89/105/EEC – despite being 
transposed in all member states according to the NMEs – was mentioned in nearly all 
following annual reports and lead to a considerable number of infringements by the 
Commission.168       
During the second policy phase, transposition problems in the pharmaceutical – due to more 
vigorous monitoring – became more visible.169 The introduction of the new mutual 
recognition system and the respect of national authorities for procedural timelines were 
perceived as the most pressing general compliance issues by the Commission (European 
Commission, 1997: 34-35). Focusing on the transposition efforts and besides starting 
proceedings for the already cited measures the Commission saw the need regarding several 
additional measures. Obviously, the positive transposition record in the pharmaceutical sector 
was supported by the vigorous monitoring activities of the Commission. However, it must be 
noted that most of the proceedings were terminated the following year, after member states 
                                                 
167
 This points to the limited reliability of transposition data, as Italy officially transposed all three directives. 
168
 Unfortunately, the available reports do not list all infringements but simply highlight the relevance of certain 
transposition problems. Data on infringement is only available on an aggregated level listing the total number 
of infringements for each member state.   
169
 While the area of homeopathic products is not covered in this study, the Commission specifically highlighted 
compliance problems in this sector (European Commission, 1995: 28).     
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took additional measures to transpose directives. This suggests that member states during this 
phase did not oppose transposition in general, but had to be reminded of their duties. 
Accordingly, national transposition efforts in the pharmaceutical sector were encouraging, 
showing a high rate of transposition during the 1990s, with France having transposed “only ” 
81,3 % of all directives as the laggard within the EU 15 (European Commission, 1997: 35). In 
1998, the Commission – despite highlighting the positive developments in the sector – 
identified the management of the re-authorisation of old medicinal products, initially brought 
to the market before the European framework applied, as a key concern of compliance for the 
years to come.170 In its seventeenth report released in 2000, the Commission stated that except 
France all member states transposed the pharmaceutical directives (European Commission, 
2000: 15).  
While the second phase saw an increase in infringement procedures in the sector, this trend 
continued in the third policy phase. In 2002, several proceedings regarding the transposition 
of directive No. 2000/38/EC were issued, resulting in two reasoned opinions (Italy) and a 
referral to the ECJ (Germany). The introduction of the clinical trials directive No. 2001/20/EC 
led to an increase of infringement proceedings in 2003 (European Commission, 2003: 12). 
The same year, the European Court of Justice decided that Germany failed to transpose 
directive No. 2000/37/EC and No. 2000/38/EC (European Commission, 2003: 12). Reacting 
to the judgment, Germany proposed specific measures to be introduced in 2005. In 2005, the 
Commission sent 18 letters of formal notice for failure to notify measures to transpose 
Directive No. 2004/27/EC amending Directive No. 2001/83/EC (European Commission, 
2005b: 37). Additional (notable) transposition problems were encountered regarding No. 
2004/24/EEC covering herbal products and directive No. 2005/28/EC. While information on 
the termination of these proceedings could not be retrieved, it seems rather likely, that the 
infringement dynamics between the Commission and the member states traceable in the 
second policy phase prevailed during the third phase and is most likely to prevail in the 
future: While the Commission regularly notifies member states to transpose measures, 
escalation of infringement remains the exception and is mainly confined to a small group of 
member states.171  
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 The problem of re-authorisation (Nachzulassung) has been and still is an issue in many member states 
especially Germany (Kurth, 2008; Murswieck, 1983).  
171
 An exception from this general dynamic seems to be the transparency directive No. 89/105/EEC, resulting in 
several escalations over the years. However, this deviation is less surprising given that the said directive is 
the only way for the Commission to exert (limited) influence on national pharmaceutical pricing strategies.     
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In light of the fundamental transposition problems encountered in other fields, for example 
environment (Jordan, 1999) and based on the limited evidence available, transposition in the 
pharmaceutical field proves to be less problematic. While the Commission increasingly 
employed measures to stimulate transposition throughout time, the comparatively low levels 
of escalation indicate, that most member states were willing to comply rather than actively 
opposing further harmonization. As the analysis suggests, the willingness seems to vary 
between member states – with Germany and France as the most deviant cases – in the 
pharmaceutical sector, falling in line with previous research on different cultures of 
compliance (Falkner et al., 2005; Treib et al., 2007). While it is suggested that the 
reservations of France to transpose certain directives could be attributed to a “posture of 
arrogance” (Falkner & Treib, 2007: 4) the lack of transposition in Germany can be attributed 
to the comparatively complex national bargaining environment and the different stakeholders 
and interests (Collatz, 1996; Lorenz, 2006).  
 
6.4 Conclusion: the de jure effectiveness of the European regulatory framework 
Based on the framework developed in the fourth chapter, the quality and de jure effectiveness 
of regulatory policy has been conceptualized as the result of three interrelated aspects: the 
satisfaction of specific preconditions, the coverage of the regulatory lifecycle as well as the 
realisation of regulatory principles and finally the effective transposition of European rules 
into national law.       
Starting off with the preconditions of regulatory quality, it has been found that the 
requirements are met in the case of European pharmaceutical policy. Specific market failures 
necessitate public intervention and justify regulatory activity. Since less intrusive forms of 
intervention were deemed insufficient, market regulation based on licensing mechanisms and 
post-authorization controls were identified as the appropriate form of intervention. 
Considering scale effects as well as the transnational character of pharmaceutical risks, 
European involvement is justified in the sector. Turning to the legal mandate and 
constitutional foundations of European pharmaceutical regulation, it was shown that no clear 
consumer protection and public health mandate could be established within the European 
treaties. However, based on the characteristics of pharmaceuticals as marketable goods, the 
establishment of a single market and the reduction of obstacles to free trade were identified as 
constitutional basis for regulatory intervention. Considering the coverage of the regulatory 
lifecycle and the realisation of regulatory principles, the conducted analysis revealed a mixed 
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result. While the current regulatory framework seems to cover all regulatory principles in a 
sufficient way, supporting the notion of effective regulation and regulatory quality, the 
regulatory framework revealed some flaws. On the positive side, the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework clearly increased throughout time. Three different policy phases were 
identified. While the regulatory framework during the first phase mainly focused on the 
harmonization of pre-authorization aspects, the second phase – starting in 1990 – saw an 
expansion of the framework to post-authorization aspects and a strengthening of European 
regulatory structures leading to a more inclusive and dense regulatory framework. While this 
positive development path is can be considered as a natural result of policy learning 
mechanisms (Feick, 2008), it does not represent an automatism. Furthermore, the 
comparatively long phases of inactivity might serve as an indication that regulatory changes 
emerged after complex negotiation rather than representing a self-sustaining process.  
 
Table 9: Coverage of the regulatory lifecycle (illustration) 
 Phase I (1965-1990) Phase II (1990-2000) Phase III (2000-present) 
Development ++ +++ +++ 
Approval ++ +++ +++ 
Production + ++ +++ 
Distribution 0 + + 
Information + ++ ++ 
Pharmacovigilance + ++ +++ 
Source: author’s own; Note: (0) no regulation; (+) general requirements; (++) specific requirements; (+++) detailed requirements  
In contrast to these positive developments and even though the current regulatory framework 
manages to cover all aspects of the regulatory lifecycle, a certain imbalance considering 
different degrees of regulation in the pre- and post-authorization stages has been identified. 
While pre-authorization aspects are regulated rather extensively and some authors consider 
that the system moves towards a state of over-regulation (Baeyens, 2002; Ruffolo, 2006; 
Schofield, 2008; Tor & Brian, 2008), regulation in the area of distribution and information 
can be considered under-regulated. This finding is especially striking given the predominately 
economic and market-based justification of European pharmaceutical risk regulation. The 
creation of the single market serves as the constitutional basis, yet trade aspects and most 
importantly the stage of distribution and information remain comparatively unregulated.  
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Beyond the realisation of regulatory principles and the coverage of the different regulatory 
aspects, the discussion of the framework and its development provided some general insight 
characterising the European regulatory approach and its alternation. First, the regulatory 
approach in the first policy phase was clearly built on the paradigm, that product safety could 
be achieved solely based on regulation of development and market approval. Starting in the 
second policy phase and the first revision, the regulatory approach shifted subsequently to a 
more reflected approach increasingly incorporating post-authorization regulatory aspects. 
Second, the increased acknowledgement of the regulatory lifecycle led to a more inclusive but 
at the same time more complex regulatory framework. Instead of substituting existing pre-
authorization mechanisms by introducing stricter post-authorization measures, requirements 
were raised in both segments. This development might be interpreted as an evidence for the 
explanatory value of the uncertainty avoidance argument in the sector and a manifestation of 
the precautionary principle underlying the general European risk regulatory approach 
(Callréus, 2005). While such an approach could be seen as preferable from the public health 
perspective, there might be reason to believe, that legal framework increasingly drifts towards 
over-regulation as regulation is becoming more complex, but not necessarily more effective. 
This remark is closely connected to another notion of the shift in the regulatory approach. 
Especially during the last policy phase, the regulatory approach seems to increasingly 
incorporate soft regulatory tools and emphasizes cooperation and guidance. An indicator for 
this cooperative turn could be seen in the increase of guidelines, guidance documents and the 
encouragement of interaction between regulators and regulatees, for example the pre-
authorization consultation (Dejas-Eckertz & Schäffner, 2005). On first sight, this could be 
interpreted as a shift towards private regulation and a stronger reliance on discussion, instead 
of sanctioning mechanisms in regulation. At the same time, this shift could be interpreted as 
an indication, that the current regulatory framework has reached a stage of complexity and 
hyper-fragmentation (Tor & Brian, 2008). More specifically, regulation might suffer from 
complexity and vagueness at the same time. While the situation might have improved 
throughout the policy phases, the regulatory requirements regarding most aspects of the 
regulatory lifecycle remain relatively general.172 The current framework seems to foster a 
certain level of uncertainty regarding requirements leading to an increased need of guidance 
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 In addition, regulation is mainly based on directives, leaving member states with a certain level of discretion 
in transposing them. 
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on the side of the regulatees.173 Finally, the analysis of transposition in the pharmaceutical 
sector showed that member states in general managed to integrate the European regulation 
into the national body of legislation. As in the case of the European regulatory framework, a 
positive development is traceable throughout the different policy phases. Despite relatively 
long transposition periods during the first stage, member states started to adopt measures 
more quickly in the subsequent phases. While increased compliance of member states can be 
partially ascribed to increased monitoring and sanctioning activities by the Commission, a 
learning effect might have influenced the improvement of compliance as well.   
Drawing a conclusion on the evaluation of the European regulatory framework, the evidence 
suggests that despite some remaining flaws, effectiveness de jure of pharmaceutical 
regulation is achieved. Unfortunately, de jure effectiveness and the transposition into national 
legislation do not necessarily translate into effective governance. Moreover, the identified 
characteristics of the European regulatory approach serve as additional source of unsettlement 
in this regard. If the framework potentially amplifies uncertainty instead of reducing it, de 
facto effectiveness will most certainly be challenged. Therefore the following chapter will 
assess the governance in the pharmaceutical sector. 
                                                 
173
 This can be considered as a structural deficit of the current regulatory framework and is probably not limited 
to the risk regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
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7.  Regulatory governance in the pharmaceutical sector 
While the regulatory framework serves as the basis for effective regulation, the 
implementation stage must be viewed as critical in achieving regulatory goals, since: “policies 
are not just applied mechanically but they have to be made applicable in the implementation 
process which makes that polices are somehow completed by operationalisation and 
implementation” (Feick, 2004: 4). Based on the neo-institutional claim that institutions do 
matter (Bulmer, 1993, 1998; Mayntz, 2009; Peters, 2000) for the realisation of regulatory 
outcomes, an assessment of the regulatory regime is necessary to develop a more inclusive 
understanding of regulatory quality and de facto effectiveness.  
Drawing on the discussion in the fourth chapter, the following section will assess regulatory 
interests of the involved stakeholders.174 In contrast, possible conflict between regulatory 
interests can result in a distortion of the regulatory regime and its performance. Considering 
the large number of actors in the pharmaceutical sector, the discussion will start with the 
identification of relevant actors. Subsequently, their underlying regulatory interests will be 
identified. Based on the assumption that (general) regulatory interests do not vary over time, it 
is argued that they can be distinguished from (case-specific) regulatory policy preferences. 
While the policy preferences of actors will depend on the specific content of the policy, an 
underlying set of perceptions and interests exists, how the risks stemming from 
pharmaceuticals should be regulated (Feick, 2005a: 30).  In a second step, the effectiveness of 
the governance system and its development through time will be assessed. The regulatory 
lifecycle concept as well as the policy phases deducted in the previous chapter will be used to 
structure the assessment. In assessing the European regulatory regime in the pharmaceutical 
sector, several aspects need to be considered in greater detail.  
First, the discussion should consider the complete regulatory lifecycle. Due to the central 
importance for the protection of public health, the analysis will have to consider the European 
approval regime and the changes that have been introduced in greater detail. Second, the 
institutional changes affecting the approval regime as well as the regulatory network, 
consisting of national authorities and the EMA, necessitate a more detailed discussion. The 
EMA represents a specific type of institution, an international regulatory agency (IRA). 
Therefore, the impact of institutional choice on the overall effectiveness of the regulatory 
                                                 
174
 Aligned interests serve as a precondition for effective sectoral governance, strengthening compliance and 
overall stability of the regulatory regime (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Langbein & Kerwin, 1985; Oliver, 2000; 
Parker, 2000) 
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system and more specifically its legitimacy must be determined.175 Third, the realization of 
openness, participation and accountability within the regulatory network and the EMA in 
particular must be discussed. Fourth, the governance structure will be evaluated briefly from 
the perspective of effective risk governance.    
 
7.1 Regulatory interests in the pharmaceutical sector 
Conceptualizing the policy field from the perspective of regulatory governance, the  
regulatory arena (Lowi, 1964a) in the pharmaceutical sector consists of a wide variety of 
actors and stakeholders. Based on the different notions of regulation, different subsets can be 
identified. If regulatory policy-making is considered, the number of relevant actors increases. 
If the discussion focuses on regulatory decision-making and the implementation phase, the 
number of relevant actors is effectively reduced.176 Recurring to the metaphor of the 
regulatory arena, the implementation phase represents the inner circle within the wider arena 
of regulatory policy-making. While many stakeholders and interest groups try to influence 
regulatory policy, these groups do not participate directly in the actual implementation of 
regulatory policy and governance of the sector. However, these interests can be expected to 
cast a shadow (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008) on regulatory decision-making and interaction 
between the main stakeholders, in this case regulators and regulatees. Clearly, this 
conceptualization simplifies matters: the distinction between regulatory policy-making and 
regulatory decision-making is not as clear-cut as suggested. Several actors, most notably the 
Commission, are involved in the decision-making process as well.177 Nevertheless, these 
interests impact on the regulatory decision-making process indirectly and intermediated.  
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  While European IRAs have been the subject of several studies, the issue of legitimacy has only begun to 
stimulate scientific discussion (Majone et al., 1999; Thatcher, 2002b; Vibert, 2007). 
176
 It is important to note, that this classification focuses on the actors actively involved in the respective domain 
rather than including stakeholders affected by it.  
177
 The Commission is involved in several committees accounting for the soft mode of governance and is 
involved in the political decision in the centralized procedure and, in case of arbitration, in the MRP/DCP as 
well. In addition, the ECJ influences regulatory decision-making by limiting the zone of discretion of the 
regulators (Krapohl, 2004a; Krapohl & Gehring, 2007). 
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Graph 14: Main actors in the pharmaceutical regulatory arena  
 
Source: author’s own  
While the public interest is excluded from the model up to this point, it is accounted for at 
least indirectly. The public interest is represented by three of the relevant actors: national 
governments, user groups and professional associations. Even though these intermediaries 
will pursue their own interests, the public interest will influence their position. Based on this 
conceptualization, the discussion of interests can be narrowed down to the public interest, the 
interests of regulatees and the regulators.  
 
7.1.1 Regulatory interests of the public  
While the public does not participate directly in the respective regulatory decision-making 
process, their interests potentially influence the regulatory process. It is assumed that a public 
interest in effective regulation translates into a general and predominant interest in safe drugs. 
While this claim has a high face validity, it omits the fact that people do not only want save 
drugs but access to quality treatment as well, giving rise to the classic regulators’ dilemma of 
safety versus access (Eichler et al., 2008: 818). Obviously, the public interest can not be 
pinpointed exactly on this continuum. While no systematic research on public interests in 
pharmaceutical regulation exist, recent contributions on the impact of private groups on US 
pharmaceutical regulation and the FDA highlight the fact that different patient groups do 
show different regulatory interests (Daemmrich, 2004). Patients suffering from a severe 
illness, for example, can be expected to be more willing to accept a greater risk in light of 
potential benefits (Johnson et al., 2007: 776-778). Numerous additional factors – both on the 
individual and the group level – can be expected to alter individual regulatory interests and 
the respective valuation of safety and access, for example the personal awareness of 
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pharmaceutical risks.178 To add an additional layer of complexity, interests might vary 
regarding different product groups and between specific products as well (Aronson, 2006: 
136). Based on previous research on risk perception, individual perceptions will be influenced 
by the respective group of references, the social background, personal encounter of risks and 
gender (Chauvin et al., 2007; Greenberg & Schneider, 1995; Sjöberg, 2000; Sjöberg et al., 
2004). Considering the complex interaction of factors on the individual level, it seems to be 
more promising to move beyond the individual level to derive a public regulatory interest. 
Recent studies of risk perception point to the impact of (national) cultural differences 
influence the personal acceptance of risks and their regulation, specifically in the European 
context (O'Riordan et al. 1998; Sjöberg, 2000; Ferrari, 2008).179 Accordingly, different risk 
cultures should be identifiable within Europe, impacting on the acceptance of risk and their 
governance. Regulators depend on the public support and will therefore try to regulate in the 
public interest at least to some degree (Levine & Forrence, 1990; Thompson et al., 1982). 
National regulatory preferences, conceptualized as a function of the national public interest, 
can clash and undermine the effectiveness of joint regulatory decision-making. It can be 
argued that the existence of different risk cultures will have an impact on the (input) 
legitimacy of the respective regulatory regime, since:  
“ignoring public anxieties, or dismissing them without due attention is a violation of the basic tenet of 
consumer sovereignty. It also ignores that certain areas of safety are perceived by the public as the sole 
domain and responsibility of government (as opposed to other domains where individual safety 
behaviour is perceived to be indicated)” (Vertinsky & Wehrung, 1990: 14). 
To specify the issue in the European context, social legitimacy can be expected to diminish if 
the general precautionary regulatory approach is not supported by according national risk 
cultures. The cultural theory of risk has its main roots in the works of anthropologist Mary 
Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, 1983). While the claim that culture matters has been accepted lately by the mainstream 
psychometric approach on risk perception (Peters & Slovic, 1996), cultural theory in general 
has been exposed to substantial criticism. First, several conceptual and methodological 
problems have been identified (Boholm, 1996, 2003; Oltedal et al., 2004). Second, the 
suggested link between culture and risk perception is only supported by “a not very 
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 Even though no systematic research exists on this topic, public awareness for pharmaceutical risks and side 
effects is best described as low. Lay people expect medicines to work and reflect to a lesser degree about the 
possible problems associated with consumption (Bissell et al., 2001).  
179
 These effects have been discussed for risk perception in broader terms and specific risks. It can be assumed 
that perceptions of pharmaceutical risks are subject to the same general influences. For a general argument, 
why risk perceptions should play a role in drug assessment see Vertinsky and Wehrung (1990).  
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impressive set of correlations” (Sjöberg et al., 2004: 22). Yet even critics acknowledged that 
“the basics of the theory is easily comprehendible and might seem intuitively reasonable, 
which of course will make it easier to gain acceptance.” (Oltedal et al., 2004: 33). Even 
though the initial concept of cultural biases on risk perception is not fully supported it thus 
seems to be a valid assumption that cultural aspects do influence the way risks are perceived 
(Boholm, 2003: 174). A cultural concept, partially drawing on the previous work of Mary 
Douglas, has been developed by the Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede. Hofstede 
defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 1998: 17) traceable in differing 
values, attitudes and beliefs. This definition allows for the inclusion of the national level as a 
unit of comparison since for some of these values “the nationality component is relatively 
strong” (Hofstede, 1998: 20).180 Based on individual survey data collected at the multinational 
corporation IBM, Hofstede constructed four cultural (value) dimensions: Power Distance, 
Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance.181 The original dataset has been used 
and replicated in numerous studies, supporting the validity of the underlying cultural 
dimensions (see, for example Litvin et al., 2004; Merritt, 2000). Despite the overwhelmingly 
positive reception of the concept in many social science disciplines, it has been criticized on 
conceptual and methodological grounds (Baskerville, 2003; McSweeney, 2002a, 2002b; 
Williamson, 2002).182 While this calls for a cautious interpretation of Hofstede’s dimensions, 
it  does not justify to abandon the concept altogether, since that would mean “to throw away 
valuable insight.” (Williamson, 2002: 1391).  
Drawing on Hofstede’s concept, the next section will try to verify the claim that different risk 
cultures exist within the European Union. In developing a concept of risk cultures, two of 
Hofstede’s dimensions are relevant. First, the dimension of uncertainty avoidance (UA) can 
be related to the concept of risk perception and risk assessment. Hofstede defines uncertainty 
avoidance as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
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 It is important to note, that values – opposed to attitudes and beliefs – proved to be very stable over time, 
since such cultural programming is acquired early in life. Following from this, it can be expected that values 
will impact on behaviour and perceptions of group members.   
181
 A fifth dimension long-term orientation was added later to the concept (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).   
182
 Three main arguments can be highlighted in this regard. First, Hofstede’s sample does not seem to fulfil the 
criteria of representativeness, as it is solely based on data from a multinational corporation. Critics argue that 
the survey measured differences in corporate rather than national culture. Second, Hofstede treats national 
cultures as homogenous ignoring the fact that cultures can show differing patterns on the regional and 
individual level. Accordingly, the uniform impact of culture on behaviour and perceptions is challenged. 
Third, the assumption of time-invariance of national cultures and the possibility that national culture can be 
measured by using questionnaires is challenged. For a response see Hofstede (1998). 
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unknown situations. The basic dilemma in this case is dealing with the unknown” (1998: 26). 
It is assumed that the tolerance for uncertainty will have an impact on risk acceptance. Lower 
UA scores will most probably be associated with higher risk acceptance. The second 
dimension that proves valuable in assessing risk culture is power-distance (PD) defined as 
“the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a 
country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally; from relatively equal (that is, 
small power distance) to extremely unequal [original emphasis]” (Hofstede, 1998: 25). The 
level of PD is expected to impact on risk management preferences. Nations with higher power 
distance will, according to the underlying construct, accept the delegation of risk regulation 
and more closed forms of risk governance. Based on the two dimensions, national profiles for 
the risk perception and preferred governance approach for the EU 15 member states and the 
EU 27 can be constructed using the most recent dimension scores (Hofstede et al., 2010).183 
Based on Hofstede’s data, differences in perceptions of risk and risk governance are traceable 
within the EU 15 and EU 27 group. Starting with the interests regarding the management of 
risk, it can be deducted that the public in the majority of the EU 15 Member states does not 
generally prefer delegation of risk regulation, since most states show lower power distance. 
Even though the (data) range between member states increased with the enlargement of the 
Union, delegation of risk regulation as a general mode of governance does not necessarily 
enjoy the public support to the same extent that the current European regulatory approach 
based on delegation does. 
Table 10: Risk perception and risk governance preferences (EU 15 & EU 27*) 
 
Dimension Mean Median St. Deviation Spread Min. Value Max. Value 
UA  66,4 70 27,64 89 23 112 EU 
15 PD 42,12 38 17,55 57 11 68 
UA  70,35 70 23,51 89 23 112 EU 
27 PD 50,77 48 21,17 93 11 104 
Source: Based on data from Hofstede *, 2010 #3703'; Note: * no data for Cyprus was available 
Turning to the general risk acceptance, the EU 15 shows a weak tendency towards lower risk 
aversion. When the enlarged European Union is considered, risk aversion seems to increase 
gradually. This finding could be interpreted as an indirect legitimization for the precautionary 
approach in European risk regulation: if the European demos is less willing to accept risks, 
being more cautious represents a responsive form of risk governance. The identified national 
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 The scores are available at Hofstede’s homepage (http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--vsm.aspx). 
Unfortunately, Hofstede remains unclear about the scales used to calculate the scores. Results are not 
rescaled on a comprehensive scale. Instead, single scores are added.  
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differences in risk perceptions and risk governance can be expected to affect individual 
perceptions of pharmaceutical risks, forming distinct national pharmaceutical risk cultures. 
However, considering the specific character of pharmaceuticals and their consumption, it is 
necessary to establish a relationship between general and specific risk cultures. In a first step, 
the theoretical relationship between underlying risk dimensions and field-specific indicators 
must be established. Starting with the UA dimension, it most likely will impact on the 
perception of risks associated with pharmaceutical consumption and on actual consumption. It 
is assumed, that people with a higher tolerance for uncertainty will accept pharmaceutical 
risks more willingly compared to persons with higher uncertainty scores and thus a lower risk 
tolerance. The impact on consumption represents the inverse relationship: People with higher 
UA scores will consume more pharmaceuticals, while people with lower scores will wait 
before they consume pharmaceuticals. While the PD dimension can impact on the acceptance 
of risk as well, for example, as a tendency to delegate the responsibility for the right treatment 
to the respective physician, it will mainly impact on the interest regarding the risk governance 
of the sector. A higher PD score can be expected to result in a higher acceptance of delegation 
and depoliticisation of the regulatory sector. In trying to identify proxy measures, 
Eurobarometer surveys, covering aspects of health and risks, were evaluated.184 The last two 
indicators were selected based on the increasing role of biotechnology regarding 
pharmaceutical products. In addition, data on pharmaceutical consumption has been collected. 
However, rather than using existing measures based on per capita expenditure, consumption 
measured in packs is used.185 While per capita expenditure serves only as a crude measure of 
consumption, depending on the respective national pricing level, the number of packs 
consumed can be linked more directly to the notion of risk acceptance.  
Given that individuals show a higher level of uncertainty, they can be expected to consume 
more pharmaceuticals as they want to reduce the uncertainty stemming from illness. In turn it 
could be argued, that the state of illness is perceived more negatively than the possible risks of 
pharmaceutical consumption (Deschepper, 2008: 87). What should be noted is the fact, that 
the number of consumed packages – due to the respective price inelasticity in demand – is 
                                                 
184
 For a general discussion of the Eurobarometer survey and their use in research see (Karmasin & Pitters, 
2008; Schmitt, 2003). 
185
 Standardized data on national consumption – measured in standardized packaging sizes – has been retrieved 
from a study conducted by Evelyn Walter and her colleagues (2008).  
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only partially influenced by the price: the correlation between the pricing level in the EU 15 
in 2005 and consumption in 2008 was -0.49, however, the result was not significant.186 
Table 11: Indicators of pharmaceutical risk cultures 
Variable Question Source Used  category 
Likeliness of 
serious medical 
error 
All in all, how worried are you to suffer a 
serious medical error? 
Q 7 SEB 241: 
“medical errors” 
(2006)  
Worried (%) 
Likeliness of 
Medication error 
Thinking of the following types of adverse 
events in your view, how likely, if at all, is it 
that each of them might happen to you if you 
were to receive healthcare in (our country): 
Medication related errors (wrong 
prescription, wrong dose, dispensing error in 
pharmacy, wrong administration route) 
Q 5.4 SEB 327: 
“Patient Safety” 
(2009) 
Very unlikely 
(%) 
Effect of 
medicine 
I am going to read out a list of areas in which 
new technologies are currently developing. 
For each of these, do you think it will have a 
positive, a negative or no effect on our way 
of life in the next 20 years? Medicines and 
new medical technologies 
Q 13.13 SEB 225: 
“Social values, 
Science and 
Technology” (2005) 
Positive effect 
(%) 
Confidence in 
regulation 
Public confidence in the ‘biotechnology 
system’ 
Report on EB 64.3 
Figure 22: “Public 
confidence in the 
‘biotechnology 
system’” (2006) 
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Accordingly, the number of consumed packs relates to other factors than pricing. To validate 
the connection between general risk perceptions and specific pharmaceutical risk cultures 
correlations between the six selected indicators and risk culture dimensions were calculated. 
Even though most of the results are not statistically significant, the assumed relation between 
national risk cultures and individual perceptions of pharmaceutical risks is supported by the 
results. The existence of distinct national pharmaceutical risk cultures has several implications 
for the governance of the pharmaceutical sector. First, the divergence of pharmaceutical risk 
perceptions can clash with a standardized European regulatory approach. If national risk 
cultures are rather diverse, and likely to persist over time, a common European regulatory 
approach is harder to achieve. 
                                                 
186
 Pearson coefficient was used to calculate the correlation and a two-tailed test was employed (Wagschal, 
1999-203).   
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Table 12: Correlations for general and pharmaceutical risk cultures (EU 15) 
Variable Uncertainty Avoidance Power Distance 
Likeliness of serious medical error ,682** ,627* 
Likeliness of Medication error - ,086 -,523* 
Effect of medicine -,359 -,176 
Confidence in regulation -,350 -,090 
Principles of Governance ,151 ,586* 
Consumption 564* ,632* 
Note: (Pearsons, two-tailed test), ** significant on 0,05, * significant on 0,1.  
Second, the input legitimacy of a regulatory regime based on such an approach will 
necessarily be reduced. Third, such cultural differences are most likely to translate into 
regulatory differences as the discussion of regulatory interests will show. The general public 
interest in safe medicines remains a viable assumption, yet the notion of safety and acceptable 
risks may vary throughout the European Union.  
 
7.1.2 Regulatory interests of the pharmaceutical industry 
The European pharmaceutical industry consists of a wider variety of companies, which based 
on structural differences can be expected to have differing regulatory interests. Moreover, 
these differences are complemented by variance on the national level (Ruane, 2007; DG 
Competition, 2009). Two main categories can be used to classify the industry: company size 
and product type. Starting with the first category, located on the one end of the continuum are 
the big multinational pharmaceutical companies acting on a pan-European and even global 
scale. On the other end of the continuum are the smaller regionally-focused and generally less 
innovative companies. The second dimension differentiates companies based on their product. 
While less innovative and less research intensive products, with the notable exception of 
highly innovative therapeutics and biotechnological products, are mainly produced by smaller 
companies, bigger multinational companies engage in the development and marketing of 
innovative and research intensive products. Generic producers form a middle-category.187 
While their product is by definition not innovative, some of these companies have a 
considerable size and engage in multi-national activities. Turning to the regulatory interests of 
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 While there are some companies focusing exclusively on generic manufacturing, for example Ratiopharm, 
many originator companies, most prominently Novartis, engage in generic activities (Sohal, 2008). Despite 
their significance, the distinct position of generic producers and their interests has not been sufficiently 
recognized by most previous studies, except for the contributions by Feick (2005a).  
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these groups, divergent and convergent aspects are traceable.188 Divergence can be mainly 
attributed to the regulatory processes. Small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), given 
their limited capacities to penetrate the whole European market, can be expected to have a 
stronger interest in a national regulatory approach. Bigger companies, given the international 
character of their operations, will prefer a more rationalized and Europeanized approach, 
possibly serving as an additional entry barrier for competitors. Considering the consolidation 
in the sector, starting in the early nineties (Chaudhry et al., 1994; Karrer-Rueedi, 1997) and 
continuing unitl today (Sheridan, 2006), it can be argued that the interests of the big 
pharmaceutical companies – despite their internal heterogeneity – tend to overshadow the 
interests of smaller and less innovative producers. Moreover, they possess greater leverage 
and political influence on the European level (Greer et al., 2008: 428). Turning to the mutual 
interests of pharmaceutical companies, the most basic one can be seen in the reduction of 
regulatory costs (Abraham, 2002a; Rawson, 2000). A second and closely connected interest 
can be seen in fast regulatory decisions. The development of pharmaceuticals is a time-
consuming process and pharmaceutical companies will therefore have a vital interest in 
speedy approval (Pieterson, 1992; Thomas et al., 1998).189 Generally speaking, the main 
regulatory interest of pharmaceutical companies will thus be on quick and cost-efficient 
market access.190 Based on this general interest, previous studies on European pharmaceutical 
regulation are quick to conclude that safety – as opposed to access – must play a subordinate 
or minor role from the industrial perspective (Abraham, 2002a; Abraham & Lewis, 1999, 
2002). While access and safety can be treated as different ends of a continuum, the valuation 
of one aspect does not preclude that the other aspect is automatically irrelevant (Lexchin, 
2007: 36). The pharmaceutical industry needs to generate profits, which is contingent on fast 
approvals, but this does not imply that safety is not considered sufficiently. Pharmaceutical 
companies and the respective developers are aware of pharmaceutical risks. In addition, the 
possible negative impact a defective medicinal product represents a strong economic 
                                                 
188
 The divergence is apparent in the policy-making arena with the different groups represented by different 
associations. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) represents 
the big and innovative companies, the European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) represents the 
producers of generics and the European Confederation of Pharmaceutical Entrepreneurs (EUCOPE) 
represents small and medium-sized companies. In addition, there are several other interest associations on the 
European level most notably the Association of the European Self-Medication Industry (AESGP) for the 
OTC and self-medication industry and the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies 
(EAEPC) representing the interests of the parallel traders.    
189
 More specifically, generic producers will be interested in fast approval of their own products and in fast 
approval of those products they want to imitate as soon as their patent protection expires. 
190
 While access in this study mainly relates to the market authorization process, the pharmaceutical industry 
perceives the reimbursement phase as a second major component (McGuire et al., 2004; Miller, 2005). 
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argument against the negligence of safety considerations on behalf of the industry. If a 
product has to be withdrawn after market authorization because of unwanted side effects, this 
will obviously negatively affect the products turnover. In case of blockbuster pharmaceuticals 
generating billions in turnover each year, the negative impact can be considerable. Additional 
indirect effects of such an event will serve as a strong incentive for the pharmaceutical 
industry to value safety accordingly. Victims may claim damages and sue the pharmaceutical 
producers. While law suits will be settled eventually and most likely represent manageable 
costs, the loss of reputation in the stock market can have a detrimental effect on 
pharmaceutical companies. The most recent and well publicized example for such a 
development has been the market withdrawal of Vioxx, produced by the US company Merck 
& Co Inc., after several severe side effects. The withdrawal and the following litigations 
resulted in a  
“a litigation bill […] put at between US$10 and $15 billion. The company has seen its revenues and 
market capitalisation slashed. It has been financially disabled and its reputation lies in ruins. It is not at 
all clear that Merck will survive this growing scandal.” (Horton, 2004: 1995) 
Another example involving a European-based company has been the withdrawal of Lipobay. 
In 2001, Bayer recalled the product from the European and US market and shortly afterwards 
from the Japanese market, after reports on serious side effects. After a series of public 
accusations and numerous litigations, Bayer’s pharmaceutical division was on the verge of 
collapse (Angelmar, 2007). The two examples illustrate the possible and severe consequences 
of unsafe products for the respective manufacturer.191 The potential financial and reputational 
losses connected to drug failure serve as an incentive for a more balanced regulatory interest 
of the pharmaceutical industry. It can be argued, that more intense pre-authorization testing 
might not prevent such events from happening. On the contrary, this could lead to more 
frequent denial of market authorization. However, drug companies accept the underlying risk 
of non-approval and most likely believe that a stricter test of their product at least helps to 
reduce the uncertainty about the risk benefit ratio and therefore the likelihood of known side 
effects (Carpenter, 2003: 254). Given that market approval serves as mechanism to reduce 
uncertainty, the industry will have an interest in the predictability of the regulatory process 
and outcome.192 Moreover, reputation-building and the establishment of regulatory ties with 
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 Incidents like the Halcion controversy (Abraham & Sheppard, 1998; Berger, 1999) or the more recent 
incidents in relation to Avandia (rosiglitazone) (Bloomgarden, 2007; Cohen, 2010) support the assumption.  
192
 Regulatory uncertainty has been discussed in relation to reimbursement decisions (Claxton, 1999; Sculpher & 
Claxton, 2005). However, the importance of limited predictability from the regulatees’ perspective is evident 
in the case of market approval. 
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regulators is in the interest of regulatees. While approval mainly depends on convincing data 
it would be naïve to assume, that such a decision is not influenced by interaction between the 
two parties. The European regulatory approach increasingly emphasizes the need for dialogue 
in regulation and producers will have an interest in establishing a sound working basis and 
predictable regulatory decisions (Coen, 2005b; Parker, 2000). While small and medium sized 
companies focusing on one market will need to establish such basis with the respective 
national regulator, European companies will need to establish these ties with the EMA and – 
due to the regulatory structure – with the national regulators as well. Summarizing the 
previous arguments, it is assumed that the interests of the industry will be on fast access (1), 
but without completely sacrificing the safety of pharmaceuticals and the building of 
sustainable regulatory relations (2). 
 
7.1.3 Regulatory interests of regulators 
Regulators have self-interests, but their interests will be partially determined by external 
factors as well. Regulators have a (social) coordinating and mediating function and will 
therefore engage in interaction with their two main stakeholders: the regulated industry and 
the public. A possible third influence on their interest results from the specific institutional set 
up chosen for the regulation of pharmaceutical risks. Nearly all European member states 
chose to delegate the regulatory field to a (independent) national regulatory authority, 
resulting in a principal-agent relationship between national governments and national 
regulators.193 Principals can be expected to shape the agents interests to a certain degree. Yet 
this influence should be mainly traceable in the policy-making process, establishing the 
regulatory playing field. If the theoretical claim of uncertainty avoidance as a motivation for 
delegation holds true, national governments consciously delegate in the field of risk regulation 
to avoid participation in the regulatory decision-making arena. The same could be said 
regarding the possible impact of the European Commission and the ECJ. The European 
Commission can effectively influence policy-making by structuring the behaviour of the 
regulatory agencies, but it can be expected to have little interest in intervening in regulatory 
operations. While the ECJ can cast a shadow on regulatory behaviour (Alemanno, 2008b) it 
does not shape the regulators interests. Regulatory interests can thus be conceptualized as a 
                                                 
193
 Even before the agencification on the national level, member states used relatively isolated institutions for the 
national regulation of pharmaceutical risks (Hart & Reich, 1990: 51-61). This finding supports the idea of 
uncertainty and depoliticisation as driving factors in national risk regulation and the public acceptance of 
secrecy as a mode of governance.   
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function of self, public and industrial interests, shaping the regulators “bureaucratic agenda” 
(Carpenter & Ting, 2007: 835). Drawing on the research of bureaucratic behaviour and P-A 
theory, the most general interest of a regulatory agency is organisational stability and 
organisational survival (Faure-Grimaud & Martimort, 2003: 414; Spiller, 1990).194 Based on 
the assumption, that governments delegate the regulatory task in order to get out of the firing 
line, the drug regulatory agency will still need to adhere to the will of its political principal 
and accommodate interests in the regulatory arena.  More specifically, the agency will need to 
build an institutional and regulatory reputation towards the public and the industry in order to 
survive and this is where public and private interests come into play (Carpenter & Ting, 2005: 
1; Maor, 2009: 1).  
In building a reputation towards the public, regulators will need to satisfy the general public 
expectation by only granting approval to safe products. While the perception of safe enough 
products will vary according to the national pharmaceutical risk cultures identified above, the 
general assumption of the public – given the public unawareness for the perpetual character of 
pharmaceutical risks – will be that if a product is approved it is safe.195 The emergence of 
controversy surrounding a harmful product and potential market withdrawal will necessarily 
impact negatively on the public reputation of the regulator (Carpenter & Ting, 2007).196 This 
general assumption holds true, even if the reason for the withdrawal must not necessarily be 
based on initial regulatory error. As Carpenter and Ting note regarding the FDA:  
“The logic of reputation protection suggests that regulators will see the decision to approve a new 
product as irreversible.[…] Yet if the FDA secures the withdrawal of a product it previously approved, 
                                                 
194
 For the sake of clarity it should be noted that most theories focus on the individual behaviour of bureaucrats 
and regulators, which can be motivated by a variety of interests, ranging from personal career development 
and the maximization of regulatory budget to the advancement of a specific public good (Levine & Forrence, 
1990).  
195
 This assumption is supported by studies providing evidence that lay people tend to adopt a perspective 
focusing on the benefits rather than risks of drugs as long as no regulatory crisis involving the specific 
product emerges (Bissell et al., 2001; Moldrup et al., 2002). For a more critical account of lay perceptions on 
pharmaceutical risks see (Abraham & Sheppard, 1997; Britten et al., 2004).   
196
 According to Moshe Maor (2009: 6-14) a withdrawal can have a positive or a negative effect on the 
reputation of a regulator, depending on the basis of reputation. If regulatory reputation is based on expertise, 
withdrawal will have a negative effect since the agency must revoke its own decision. If reputation is based 
on guaranteeing public safety in the media, withdrawal will have a positive effect. The concept is based on 
the idea that non-expert agencies could blame expert agencies, as they based their decision on the previous 
decision of the expert agency. This conceptualization seems to be flawed. It is true that the level of expertise 
between national agencies varies and obviously many agencies are influenced by the decisions of the US 
agency (FDA), representing the gold standard (Coombes, 2007) of global drug regulation. Yet, a withdrawal 
will always have a negative effect on reputation and it is hard to believe that an agency would admit that the 
decision of market approval was completely based on a previous assessment – with the DP/MRP procedure 
as a notable exception. In addition, Maor seems to assume that the regulatory agency can simply determine 
how it is perceived by the public – an assumption that can be challenged as well.         
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or attaches important new information to the product which was not detected at earlier review stages, it 
will only publicize its own ‘error’.[original emphasis]” (2005: 1)            
The safeguarding of reputation towards the public will push regulators towards a more risk-
averse regulatory approach. Moreover, it will impact on the interests during the post-
authorization phase and the general mode of governance. In contrast to Moshe Maor (2009: 
6), arguing that some regulators will have an interest in public exposure, encouraging media-
effective drug withdrawals to generate reputation as a public guardian, previous studies on 
regulatory behaviour indicate that most European (national) regulators pursue a low public 
profile (Abraham & Davis, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2003). While the viability of such a strategy 
will depend on the public exposure of the regulator as well as the public interest in the subject 
of drug safety and the media, this study assumes that regulatory agencies will try to omit 
public exposure and media attention to maintain a positive public reputation.197   
While the need to build a public reputation is obvious, the need to build a reputation towards 
the industry flows from the specific mode of funding of (public) pharmaceutical regulators. In 
light of financial dependence on regulatory fees and the depoliticized character of 
pharmaceutical regulation, regulators might even lean towards regulatees, overemphasizing 
their interest in the formation of their own regulatory interest. The main influence on the 
interests of the regulators can be seen in the previously discussed interest in low public 
exposure of the regulatory process. The regulator’s preferred secretive mode of governance 
advances the reputation towards the industry as well. The industry has no specific interest in a 
highly transparent and participative regulatory process, mainly because of confidentiality 
reasons (Abraham, 2005; Garattini & Bertele, 2001). Given that the industry prefers an 
efficient and predictable regulatory process, regulators can be expected to develop stringent 
regulatory processes and guidelines to facilitate the regulatory process for the regulatees and 
reduce procedural uncertainties. Turning to the valuation of safety and access regulators and 
regulatees, as well as the public, share a common position. In order to advance the reputation 
towards the industry, the regulatory assessment should be conducted in a timely fashion, but 
without compromising the safety of the product. 
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 Compared to the high public exposure of the FDA, most European national regulators and the EMA are 
arguably left alone by the public, even though the EMA – intentionally or unintentionally – becomes 
increasingly exposed.  
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7.1.4 Intermediate result: Interests and conflicts in the regulatory arena 
The functioning of a regulatory system and the realization of regulatory goals, presupposes 
the alignment of the key stakeholder interests. In the case of the pharmaceutical sector an 
overlap of interests can be identified. Considering the regulatory dilemma of safety versus 
access a consensus between the three considered stakeholders exists. The provision of safety 
is a shared goal, even though individual reasons for this consensus vary. While interests 
diverge regarding the valuation of access, the differences can be described as gradual rather 
than fundamental. The second dimension of alignment considers the organisation of the 
regulatory decision-making process. Since the public interest does not necessarily prefer a 
specific regulatory set-up but focuses on regulatory outcomes, alignment of interests concerns 
regulators and regulatees. Again, no conflict of interest is traceable. Both regulators and 
regulatees can be expected to prefer a science-based and secretive mode of regulation. While 
an equilibrium of interests exists within the regulatory arena, there are several factors 
potentially preventing it from translating into a functioning regulatory regime in the European 
pharmaceutical sector. First, the assumption of time inconsistency regarding regulatory 
interests can not be upheld, if the whole regulatory lifecycle is considered. While all three 
parties consider safety as an important issue in the pre-authorization stage, the constellation of 
interests moves towards access considerations in the post-authorization stage. The industry 
wants to keep the product on the market for commercial reasons. The public considers the 
drug as safe enough – at least as long as no regulatory crisis emerges – and will not accept 
that a drug is withdrawn from the market. The regulator, in light of reputational 
considerations, has little interest to withdraw a drug that he had previously considered as safe 
enough. Paradoxically, this situation still represents an equilibrium of interest, but has certain 
negative implications for regulatory effectiveness. In general terms, compliance of regulators 
and regulatees can be expected to be lower in the post-authorization stage. Regulators 
reputation is mainly based on the pre-authorization process. While pre-authorization 
regulatory science has evolved throughout time and the accumulation of regulatory experience 
provides at least partial certainty, the right decision in the post-authorization stage is marked 
by an even higher level of uncertainty (Anon, 1995b; Hughes et al., 2007). 
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Graph 15: Regulatory interests pre- and post-authorization (illustration) 
 
Source: author’s own 
More importantly, the decision to withdraw the drug will negatively impact on the public 
perception, at least if the withdrawal causes public and media attention, and on the reputation 
towards industry. Beyond the regulator’s lack of interest in vigorous post-market control the 
effectiveness of post-market controls is hampered by the possible lack of regulatee’s 
compliance.  
Graph 16: Compliance in the pre- and post-authorization stage (illustration) 
 
Source: author’s own 
In the pre- authorization stage, the will to comply is high and increases as the review process 
moves closer to the regulatory decision. As soon as the product has passed the regulatory 
hurdle, it can be assumed, that the willingness of industry to comply with additional 
regulatory burdens decreases. Furthermore, the interest to detect safety signals and follow up 
on them is arguably low, since the more safety signals are detected, the higher the risk of label 
warnings, additional studies and eventual withdrawal. Companies do not want to risk a 
regulatory crisis, but driven by commercial consideration they might tend to increasingly 
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ignore the signals. Beyond theoretical arguments, evidence from the US market supports the 
idea of time-inconsistency in compliance. Based on analysis of FDA data, a study by Jerry 
Avorn shows that 71 percent of requested post-marketing studies were not started, even 
though producers were obliged to deliver additional safety data (2007: 1698). Second, the 
equilibrium of interest does not prevent conflicts resulting from national regulatory 
differences. As pharmaceutical regulation is conducted in a European regulatory network, 
national authorities are pitted against each other in the European level regulatory procedures, 
driven by the collection of industrial fees. This competition may lead to more cooperative 
regulatory interaction, but it remains unlikely given the identified interests that regulators will 
dramatically reduce testing requirements. The more decisive element of conflict results from 
the reputation considerations of national regulators. Drawing on the previously introduced 
concept of national pharmaceutical risk cultures, differences will affect regulators in their 
behaviour because of two reasons. First, the need to build a reputation towards the public will 
make regulators consider public risk perceptions. Second, regulators themselves are affected 
directly by the underlying national pharmaceutical risk cultures. National regulators can be 
expected to oppose assessments of other national regulators representing a possible thread to 
their own reputation. While learning and repetitive interaction between national regulators can 
help to increase trust in the regulatory capacities of other regulators, the underlying reason for 
these conflicts are rooted in different risk cultures and therefore will be eradicated only 
gradually. Two main conclusions can be drawn at this point. First, the regulatory system will 
work more effectively during the pre- authorization phase, while the post- authorization phase 
might suffer from a general lower level of compliance based on the time-inconsistency of 
regulatory interests. Second, national pharmaceutical risk cultures will translate into differing 
regulatory cultures, resulting in different risk perceptions in drug assessment and a lower level 
of acceptance of external assessments serving as the basis of authorization in the mutual 
recognition system characterising the European regulatory approach.  
 
7.2 Evaluation of the regulatory regime 
The development of the European regulatory regime is closely connected to the general policy 
developments in the sector. Regarding the evolution of the regulatory regime the critical 
juncture must be seen in the establishment of the EMA and the according European level 
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procedures. The next section will focus on the sectoral governance considering the regulatory 
lifecycle before 1995.198 In the following section, the phase after 1995 will be considered. 
 
7.2.1 The effectiveness of  regulatory regime until 1995 
The regulatory regime initially consisted of the six competent national authorities connected 
by the introduced harmonized authorization criteria entailed in directive No. 65/65/EEC. 
Adherence to these standards was however not fostered by the creation of supranational 
structures. Despite this lack of institutionalization, the harmonization of assessment criteria 
must be understood as improving the effectiveness of national approval procedures and the 
regulation of development process.  
 
7.2.1.1 Governance of development 
With the introduction of the testing directive in 1975 and the increasing density of the 
regulatory framework, discretion of applicants regarding the development process was 
reduced. However, the governance of the development process remained largely within the 
responsibility of the respective applicants. The lack of regulatory involvement is exemplified 
in the diverse practice regarding the supervision of clinical trials. While some states 
demanded notification of trials, some made authorisation of clinical trials mandatory but a 
common approach especially considering the requirements of trial design was clearly missing 
(Jefferys & Jones, 1995; Lemmens, 2004). This did not only result in concerns regarding the 
quality of results, but led to possible problems for the mutual recognition of trial data. Above 
all, it compromised the idea of a high level of patient protection throughout the European 
Community (Hart, 1989). Furthermore, the lack of a central register of clinical trials in Europe 
made the suppression of unfavourable results more likely (Lauritsen et al., 1987).   
  
7.2.1.2 Governance of approval  
As the thalidomide scandal proved, no adequate approval controls existed in most member 
states. From the perspective of European sectoral governance, the CPMP represented a first 
step towards establishing a “hub in a network of national experts” (Burkard & Abraham, 
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 The following assessment deviates from the previously identified policy phases, using 1995 as the cut-off 
point. However, this is justified by the fact, that the EMA as well as the new approval regime were 
introduced at that time.   
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2008: 28). This intention was reflected as well in the CPMP procedure aiming at the 
rationalisation of decision-making by reducing duplication efforts inherent in the purely 
national regulatory approach. However, the procedure did fail to realize this goal, given the 
refusal of national authorities to accept the CPMP assessments.199 During the eight years of its 
existence (1976 to 1985), 41 applications were made of which 28 received a favourable 
opinion (Cartwright, 1991: 222).  
On first sight, the multi-state procedure improved the situation considering the higher number 
of applications. In the first four years of its existence applications nearly quadrupled from 41 
to 142.200 Despite this arguable success, the procedure did not lead to a reduction of 
assessment efforts. Instead it resulted in additional work, as every single application led to a 
CPMP opinion. With the exception of Luxembourg, all member states raised reasoned 
opinions with Italy using this option in 93 percent of all applications (European Commission, 
1991b: 17-18). While national authorities were expected to communicate regulatory measures 
after CPMP decision within 60 days, several national authorities still failed to comply with 
this task after 46 months. In 1990, out of the 142 applications only 45 were completed 
(European Commission, 1991b: 13-19). In 1993, more than 300 products had entered the 
Multi-State Procedure, with only one product authorized without reasoned objections, and the 
request of an opinion by the CPMP remained the standard procedure (Jefferys & Jones, 1995: 
473).  
The Concertation procedure established in 1987 – limited to innovative products derived 
from biotechnology – saw a comparative decline in the total number of applications. Between 
1987 and 1994, 51 products used this authorization route (Earl-Slater, 1996). The procedure 
foresaw specific timelines to which national agencies were expected to adhere to. 
Unsurprisingly, compliance remained low: national regulators needed as long as 27 months to 
comply with notification requirements (European Commission, 1991b: 28). As it was argued 
previously, none of the three procedures did manage to life up to the expectations (Earl-Slater, 
1996; Lorenz, 2006). The reasons for the malfunction of the system can not solely be ascribed 
to the procedures itself.  
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 This assertion is based on two facts. First the number of applications was relatively low compared to the 
number of national procedures. Second, the products that were licensed through the procedure were mostly 
old products (second applications and generics) (Cartwright, 1991-26).  
200
 To put this trend into perspective, it must be noted that the applications using this procedure represented less 
than 4 per cent of the products licensed by national authorities in the EU (Earl-Slater, 1996: 18).  
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Table 13: Performance of European application procedures (1965-1995) 
 
CPMP procedure 
(1976-85) 
Multi-State procedure 
(1986-1993) 
Concertation procedure 
(1987-1994) 
Number of 
applications 41 > 300 51 
Positive 28 n.r. n.r. 
Source:  adapted from (Earl-Slater, 1996; European Commission, 1991b); n.r.= no information was recorded  
In light of the previous discussion of regulatory interests and the inherent uncertainty in risk 
regulation, the explanation for the weak compliance can be seen in the interplay of two 
factors. First, national regulatory authorities – despite differences in the range of 
competencies, administrative traditions and structures – enjoyed considerable discretion from 
the outset of Europeanization of the pharmaceutical sector. Formally, in all member states – 
except the Netherlands – the final decision on approval “was granted in the name of Ministers 
who form the final authority and hence are answerable to the national parliaments and through 
them to the people” (Jefferys & Jones, 1995: 472). Yet these decisions were predetermined by 
the national regulators. On first sight, it would have been highly probable that the regulatory 
crisis surrounding the Thalidomide incident led to a stronger political supervision and more 
rigid political control. Instead, national governments raised the level of regulation, but did not 
increase political control over regulatory bodies (Hart & Reich, 1990; Jefferys & Jones, 
1995). Applying the uncertainty avoidance argument, this counter-inductive development in 
the sector can be explained: regulators were isolated, because of governmental political 
benefit/risk assessments, providing them with comparatively high regulatory discretion. 
Political isolation hence amplified the impact of regulatory cultures on risk perceptions and 
assessments underlying regulatory decision-making. National regulators had little interest to 
trust other national regulators since the building of reputation was limited to the contacts 
within the CPMP, representing an immature institution at this point in time. The second factor 
allowing for the impact of national differences was a lack of control within the regulatory 
regime. Essentially, all procedures enacted before 1995 were non-binding and required the 
national willingness for mutual recognition. By granting the CPMP only a coordinating 
function, the constellation of national interests was not outbalanced by the regime. While the 
established procedures clearly failed to fulfil their purpose, this did not necessarily impact 
negatively on the regulatory effectiveness concerning the pre-authorization stage: based on 
the directives enacted during the 1960s and 1970s, all pharmaceuticals were subjected to 
approval based on the same criteria. While harmonized standards could not ensure a uniform 
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understanding and interpretation, their application represented a clear improvement to the 
previous situation from a public health perspective.  
Even though the CPMP did not contribute to the effectiveness of the initial European 
procedures as expected, its creation must still be understood as an important step for 
development of the regulatory regime. Beyond the regulatory arena, the CPMP and the PC 
served as scientific advisory panels for the Commission in the development of new policy 
proposals and the starting international harmonization within the ICH which was established 
in 1990.201 Within the regulatory arena, the CPMP facilitated dialogue creating the 
preconditions for stronger collaboration in the following years. More specifically, the CPMP 
and its numerous working parties developed most of the soft law instruments that helped to 
govern the pharmaceutical sector until this very day most notably the Notice to Applicants 
document advancing the harmonization of dossiers and the Eudralex database (European 
Commission, 1991b: 6-11). These instruments are of crucial importance for the effectiveness 
of governance, since the legal framework was and is inherently characterized by rather 
general and imprecise requirements (Glaeske et al., 1988: 34). 
 
7.2.1.3 Governance of production 
The regulation of pharmaceutical production was a shared responsibility of the industry and 
national authorities. However, activity on behalf of the regulators was rather limited and must 
be seen in context of under-regulation identified in the previous chapter. While the WHO 
already published guidelines on good manufacturing practice (GMP) in 1967, European rules 
were introduced in 1975. The role of the qualified person, responsible for the assurance of 
quality in the production process and the requirements for good manufacturing, remained 
fairly general. While inspections were envisaged within the document, no systematic and 
coordinated assessment of production sites based on uniform European rules and an exchange 
of information was mandatory.202 The creation of the CPMP did not contribute significantly to 
the reduction of the governance gap, even though a working party on quality was established. 
While after the adoption of directive No. 91/356/EEC, the control of manufacturing was 
improved, the sector was still lacking a clear governance structure (Jefferys & Jones, 1995).    
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 The ICH played an important role for the development of the European pharmaceutical policy and the 
harmonization of global pharmaceutical regulation (Abraham & Reed, 2002; Eakin, 1999; Vogel, 1998).  
202
 Even though no European coordination took place, it must be acknowledged that several member states 
joined the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-operation Scheme 
(PIC/S) aiming at the mutual recognition of national inspections (Brunner, 2004).   
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7.2.1.4 Governance of distribution 
The regulation of distribution remained the blind spot of the regulatory regime until the 
wholesale directive No. 92/25/EEC was released. Even after the introduction of the directive, 
control of distribution channels remained on the national level and was mainly based on 
licensing and the adherence to certain standards. Moreover, wholesalers were expected to 
check whether their customers were licensed (Andersson, 1994: 275). Beyond the control of 
distribution, the dispensation of pharmaceuticals remained unregulated on the European level, 
since it constituted an integral part of national health systems remaining within the domain of 
exclusive national competencies (Erbsland & Mehnert, 1992).  
 
7.2.1.5 Governance of information  
While informational requirements regarding the pharmaceutical product were subjected to 
uniform rules after the introduction of several directives in 1992, no distinct governance 
structures safeguarding the distribution of information on pharmaceutical risks were 
established. Direct information to patients was limited to package leaflets and differences in 
transposition as well as dispensation practices lead to different levels of patient information in 
the member states, even after the introduction of European rules. In the UK for example, the 
repackaging of pharmaceuticals resulted in the separation of the product and the 
accompanying leaflet (Anon, 1995a: 86).203 Central and publicly available national databases 
did neither exist in most member states nor on the European level.   
 
7.2.1.6 Governance of monitoring  
The monitoring of pharmaceutical risks during the first policy phase was highly fragmented. 
National pharmacovigilance systems developed in parallel and due to a lack of European rules 
reflected no systematic approach, as the adoption of pharmacovigilance measures was 
voluntary.204 Most monitoring systems were based both on input from the medical profession 
and the pharmaceutical manufacturers subsequently gathered by regulatory authorities 
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 While the practice in the UK surely represented a distinct case, repackaging still affects the provision of 
information to the consumer, even if European rules were ought to be transposed until 1999 (Raynor & 
Knapp, 2000).   
204
 The German system of pharmacovigilance for example, was based on the collaboration of the national 
regulator (BGA), authorities of the German federal states, a special commission of the physicians association 
(Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft), the pharmacists association (Arzneimittelkommission 
der Apotheker) and the reports collected by the pharmaceutical association through their medical 
representatives (Glaeske et al., 1993: 42-44).      
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(Griffin, 1986: 84-85).205 Based on administrative traditions and political structures, member 
states chose very different regulatory systems to gather information and assess risk/benefit 
ratios of marketed medicinal products, resulting in differing levels of compliance and signal 
detection across the countries (Glaeske et al., 1988: 20-26). These differences were amplified 
by a lack of sanctioning power of regulatory agencies in case of non-compliance with 
reporting requirements (Hart & Reich, 1990: 102). In contrast to pre-authorization regulation, 
the governance of post-authorization aspects obviously diminished the regulatory 
effectiveness of the regime. National pharmacovigilance systems based on different 
definitions and methods did not produce comparable results, representing the basis for 
effective cross-national pharmacovigilance and more rapid signal detection (Lindquist, 2007). 
The low institutionalisation of post-authorization controls mainly resulted from the prevalent 
regulatory philosophy at the beginning of modern European pharmaceutical regulation, 
emphasizing pre-authorization controls. Despite the differences and isolation of national 
pharmacovigilance structures, some collaborative efforts on the supranational level were 
traceable. The CPMP established a rapid alert system for the exchange of information on 
ADRs and installed a working party on pharmacovigilance in 1989 (European Commission, 
1991b: 32-33; Wood, 1992). Moreover, the committee regularly conducted 
pharmacovigilance meetings and discussed specific actions regarding the management of 
safety signals. However, as in the case of authorization, these discussions had a non-binding 
character. Alongside the CPMP, the international drug monitoring programme by the WHO 
established in 1978 and the corresponding Uppsala Monitoring Center (UMC) completed the 
respective regulatory structures.206 Even though the decision to take regulatory measures as a 
reaction to safety signals in all national systems was based on the same criteria, concrete 
actions were negotiated with the industry rather than obstructed by regulators (Hart & Reich, 
1990: 114). This regulatory approach might have contributed to the general compliance of the 
industry, but its effectiveness must be questioned. Given that the industry was in favour of 
less intrusive instruments, regulators might have refrained from stronger forms of intervention 
based on previously negotiated consensus. This speculation has been supported to some 
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 For an overview of the different systems, see Griffin (1986), Inman (1980) and Wille & Schönhöffer (2002)  
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 The UMC (http://www.who-umc.org/) collects data from WHO countries on ADRs to facilitate the detection 
of safety signals. The European regulatory framework mandates regular communication of safety signals to 
the centre. 
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degree by the actual practice of national regulators, often favouring weaker forms of 
intervention (Hart & Reich, 1990: 115).207 
     
7.2.1.7 Regulatory principles within the regulatory regime before 1995 
Considering the realisation of regulatory principles – participation, transparency and 
accountability – the criteria were only partially met. Participation of other stakeholders and 
the public both in the pre- and post-authorization stage, in comparison to the strong 
involvement of the industry, was practically non-existent during the first phase. The public 
was largely excluded from the pre-authorization stage in national procedures and in the 
emerging European procedures as well. Regarding the post-authorization stage and the 
conduct of post-authorization controls the public participated only indirectly – with the 
notable exception of Ireland allowing direct patient reporting – while the industry assumed an 
active role. This practice can only be justified from a practical and necessarily science-based 
perspective. Letting uneducated patients report on ADRs can lead to false and more crude 
signals and runs the risk of over-reporting in more general terms (Egberts et al., 1996; van 
Grootheest et al., 2003).208    
The transparency of the regulatory process on the national and European level was very 
limited. Publication requirements only affected the internal communication between national 
regulators. The creation of a regulatory black box covering the interaction between national 
regulators, the CPMP and the applicants, was possible because of the political isolation of the 
regulatory field and the previously identified confluent interests of regulators and regulatees.  
In considering the overall accountability of the regulatory regime, no uniform assessment is 
possible. First, legal accountability of regulatory decision-making was comparatively weak as 
all decisions both in national and European procedures were made by member states. 
Therefore, the ECJ had no competence in scrutinizing regulatory decisions (Krapohl, 2008). 
Despite Germany, where regulatory decisions could be and were regularly challenged by the 
applicant, most national regulators were subjected to limited forms of judicial review (Hart & 
Reich, 1990: 58-60). Accountability was skewed as regulatory decisions could only be 
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 Since these results are based on analysis of the initial six member states, one should abstain from 
generalization. In addition, the tendency towards softer forms of intervention can be seen as an approach 
based on proportional responses and does not necessarily reflect a state of capture.     
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 Considering the prevalence of under-reporting in pharmacovigilance (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 2009; 
Wysowski & Swartz, 2005), it could be argued to the contrary that increased patient reporting and education 
seems to be necessary to improve post-market regulation.   
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challenged by applicants, while the public, based on the claim that it was not directly affected, 
had virtually no possibility to challenge decisions. Considering the financial accountability of 
the regulators control was mainly exercised through budgetary games between regulators and 
their respective political principal, in most cases the national ministry of health. Financial 
accountability vis-à-vis the applicants arguably played a minor role: since the regulatory 
competition for conducting assessments was rather limited, as the comparatively low levels of 
applications for the European procedures indicates, applicants had no means to assert pressure 
on regulators. Evaluating the procedural accountability of the regulatory regime is 
complicated by the lack of openness of the national procedures. Considering the fact that 
national regulatory procedures were revamped and codified in distinct national 
pharmaceutical law after the thalidomide scandal, procedural accountability was reflected in 
the design of regulatory structures. Especially in those countries with a high degree of 
legalization of regulatory procedures, most notably Germany, national regulators had a strong 
interest in clear procedural rules and adherence to avoid possible infringements of applicants 
(Hohgräwe, 1992: 219). In case of the European procedures, the detailed procedural 
requirements and timelines warranted the procedural accountability at least in principle. 
Substantial accountability of the regulatory regime both regarding purely national and 
European procedures was mainly based on directive No. 65/65/EEC. Given the (unavoidable) 
vagueness of the three criteria quality, safety and efficacy, room for regulatory discretion 
remained (Hart & Reich, 1990: 24). While the CPMP was created with the intention to limit 
such regulatory discretion, as decisions could be referred to the Committee in case of differing 
interpretations of the directive, this internal accountability mechanism was ineffective since 
CPMP opinions were non binding.          
 
7.2.1.8 Intermediate result: governance as patchwork   
Drawing on the brief discussion of the regulatory lifecycle, the regulatory regime in the 
pharmaceutical sector before 1995 is best described as a regulatory patchwork (Héritier, 
1996). While the regulatory framework after almost 30 years reached a considerable level of 
density, the establishment of governance structures was lagging behind. Implementation was 
largely shifted towards private actors, most notably pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
wholesalers. The CPMP was lacking the necessary competencies to effectively tie in national 
authorities. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the regulatory regime before 1995 must be 
considered as constrained. While public health was safeguarded in principle, as market 
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authorization became mandatory and based on specific criteria, a single market in the sense of 
functioning mutual recognition was clearly not established. From the perspective of industrial 
policy and innovation, the regulatory regime did not rationalize the regulatory process as 
intended. The lack of collaboration and appropriate structures was even more problematic 
regarding the post-authorization stage. While national pharmacovigilance systems existed, 
little was done to streamline and rationalize the exchange of information. Instead, the situation 
clearly represented a state of under-regulation and under-institutionalization (Hart, 1989: 350-
351). The overall dissatisfying situation was aggravated by a lack of openness, participation 
and accountability of the regulatory regime. These results are in line with the expectations 
drawn from the interests of actors in the regulatory arena and the uncertainty avoidance 
argument. Even though national regulators were not totally independent, most of them 
enjoyed considerable regulatory discretion. Based on a logic of reputation and the lack of 
power of the European institution, national regulators opposed to stronger collaboration 
regarding regulatory decisions both in the pre- and post- authorization phase.      
 
7.2.2 Institutional transformation of the regulatory regime after 1995 
The two new European regulatory procedures and more importantly the EMA, created in 
1995, marked a turning point and heralded a new governance approach. In contrast to its 
predecessor, the CPMP, the EMA did not simply represent another expert committee, but an 
independent regulatory agency (IRA). Since the instalment of an agency was not limited to 
the regulatory field under review but a European trend, the reasons for the creation of the 
EMA must be understood beyond the sectoral necessity, but within the context of a shift in the 
general European approach to sectoral governance.  
 
7.2.2.1 The European regulatory state and the rise of regulatory agencies 
While independent regulatory agencies were a common and longstanding feature of 
regulatory regimes in North America (Shapiro, 1997), the trend of agencification (Christensen 
& Laegreid, 2005) in Europe has been a comparatively recent phenomenon starting with the 
increased deregulation of industrial sectors, the diffusion of New Public Management (NPM) 
and the subsequent instalment of new independent regulatory institutions in the 1980s 
(Eberlein & Grande, 2005; Scott, 2000; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). These institutions emerged 
in several waves on the national level. While some agencies date back to the 1950s and 1980s, 
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most organisations were created in the nineties and at the start of this millennium (van Thiel, 
2009: 12). The term agency subsumes a wide array of different institutional forms since “what 
an agency is and what it does varies considerably across national and organizational cultures, 
legal systems and political systems” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005: 5).209 Research of 
agencification in European member states has developed into a vivid research field mainly 
based on comparative qualitative studies (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Gilardi, 2005; Jann, 
2007; Thatcher, 2007; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). While agencification at the European level 
through the creation of European agencies (EA) is “no new phenomenon” (J. Pollak & 
Riekmann, 2008: 775) and some authors contributed to the field (Chiti, 2000; Everson, 1995; 
Fleischer, 2005; Kreher, 1997; Majone, 1997; Shapiro, 1997), in-depth research on the 
functions and consequences of these organisations from a comparative perspective is still in 
an early stage (Barbieri & Ongaro, 2008; Geradin & Petit, 2004; Krapohl, 2004, 2008; Vos, 
2000, 2005). While two agencies were already founded in the 1970s, two main waves are 
traceable in the emergence of EAs. The first one happened in the mid 1990s including the 
creation of the EMA and the second one in the 2000s.  
European agencies represent a heterogeneous group of organisations given their distinct tasks 
and competencies and several classifications have been proposed (Chiti, 2000; European 
Commission, 2002; Geradin & Petit, 2004). As a common feature agencies share “that they 
have their own legal personality and a certain financial autonomy” (Pollak & Riekmann, 
2008: 777). In addition, all agencies – at least those created from the 1990s onwards – have 
the basic task of information gathering. Turning to the reasons for the establishment of 
European agencies, variations of general delegation arguments are invoked as theoretical 
reasons: the improvement of efficiency (1), the improvement of the capacity of the central 
government (the Commission) to focus on strategic aspects rather than administrative tasks 
(2), Creating specialist agencies concentrating policy expertise to facilitate objective, 
unbiased and better regulation (3), Enhancing policy credibility through depoliticization (4) 
and improving the overall legitimacy of a regulatory regime based on better output (5) 
(Geradin & Petit, 2004; Majone, 2002; Pollak & Riekmann, 2008). Beyond the theoretical 
claims, it is important to highlight the politics involved in their creation. While the first wave 
of agencification at the European level was a concerted approach of the political actors, their 
foundation was mainly driven by the European Commission and can be linked to the 
previously discussed better regulation debate (Chiti, 2004). While the Commission saw a 
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window of opportunity to expand its activities in the wake of the single market initiative, 
independent agencies seemed to be the only feasible option from a political perspective.210  
Graph 17: Agencification on the European level (1965-2010) 
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Source: based on EU data (http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/index_en.htm) (last accessed January 2, 2010)) 
Agencies at least partially controlled by the Commission allowed for an indirect expansion of 
governance capacities, providing the Commission with the opportunity to focus on its 
strategic task by delegating sensitive and work intense activities to expert institutions.211 
Beyond the advancement of regulatory capacities, the Commission envisaged the creation of 
agencies as a means to improve the quality of European regulation (European Commission, 
2001: 23-24).  
 
7.2.2.2 European agencies: a challenge to social legitimacy 
The positive notion of European agencies advocated most prominently by Giandomenico 
Majone (1997, 2006, 1999) and several other authors (Fleischer, 2005; Tarrant & Kelemen, 
2007), is based on the claim that agencies can play a vital role in achieving effective European 
regulation. What is largely downplayed by the proponents of European agencies, are the 
possible problems that may arise from their creation. First, it is questionable in how far the 
creation of agencies really meets public expectations. The Commission’s logic seems to be 
based on the notion that “because Europeans don’t like the technocrats in Brussels and fear 
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 In fact, some Commission officials viewed the creation of agencies as a second best option, since expanding 
resources within the Commission would have been in their interest (Kelemen, 2002).    
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 Member states demanded a strong position in the control of the agencies. Moreover, their cautious position of 
delegating competencies to these expert bodies resulted in a rather limited mandate for some of the agencies 
(Kelemen, 2002: 102-103). However, the official mandate does not necessarily imply that agencies do 
possess a low degree of de facto independence (Gilardi & Maggetti, 2009). In the case of the EMA, the 
creation was surrounded by less controversy, as interests between member states did converge around its 
creation (Kelemen, 2002: 103-104).  
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concentrating even more governance there, if we want more EU technocrats, we split them up 
and scatter them about Europe” (Shapiro, 1997: 281). Second, the creation of European 
agencies raises questions of legitimacy. European agencies are created through acts of 
delegated bodies criticized for a lack of social legitimacy and it is at least questionable if the 
chain of delegation is strong enough to legitimize these bodies (Bauschke, 2009; Vibert, 
2007). If the delegation of certain tasks to an agent is contested, delegation activities by the 
agent should be contested as well. Closely connected to the issue of social legitimacy is the 
legal discussion surrounding the creation of European agencies in light of the Meroni 
doctrine, preventing the Commission from delegating regulatory powers to bodies not 
foreseen in the treaty (Geradin & Petit, 2004; Majone et al., 1999). Consequently, none of the 
regulatory agencies involved in decision-making processes takes the final decision. Instead 
this is done by the Commission and the other institutions involved based on the respective 
decision procedure. Even though most of the agencies only carry out information gathering 
tasks and provide expertise, they can have considerable influence on the resulting policy 
decisions. As Martin Shapiro notes, “What research we do, determines what policies we 
make. What policies we wish to make, determines what research we do. In this way 
information agencies are always policy agencies.” (1997: 285). Even if agencies do not 
determine the respective decision they pre-structure decisions especially in high expertise 
regulatory fields (Barbieri & Ongaro, 2008). Majone, for once acknowledging the existence of 
the criticism raised regarding European agencies, concludes that:  
 “The growing importance of nonmajoritarian institutions in all democratic countries, in spite of 
persistent doubts about their constitutional status and democratic legitimacy, shows that for many 
purposes reliance upon qualities such as expertise, professional discretion, policy consistency, fairness, 
or independence of judgment is considered to be more important than reliance upon direct democratic 
accountability.” (2005: 37) 
From this perspective, neither the claims of lacking social legitimacy of the European Union 
as a whole, nor the concerns regarding regulatory agencies are valid, since output legitimacy 
is the main interest of all parties concerned, and the mode of governance is generally 
accepted.212 While the importance of output legitimacy for the legitimacy of European 
regulation is undeniable, Majone’s perspective is based on assumptions lacking a sound 
empirical foundation. Majone simply assumes that the European people only care for 
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the same acceptance on the European level. At the same time, he rejects the validity of applying legitimacy 
concepts developed in the context of the nation state to the European Union.  
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outcomes, while there is public indifference how these outcomes should be achieved.213 He 
seems to believe that delegation to agencies will be tacitly accepted if the right outcomes are 
produced. While another question would be, what is considered as right outcomes, a decisive 
precondition for the assumption of tacit acceptance is the public awareness of European 
agencies (Pollak & Riekmann, 2008: 783-784). No systematic research on public awareness 
for regulatory agencies exists, but it can be expected on theoretical grounds, that the 
awareness for agencies, especially in risk regulatory areas, is low. The creation of agencies 
thus is not necessarily based on permissive consensus, but represents integration activities 
largely unnoticed by the public. Following from this, the creation of an agency in the field of 
pharmaceutical regulation necessitates a thorough discussion of its legitimacy and control. 
The question of control goes beyond the external control of the agency. Even more decisive 
from the perspective of legitimacy is the internal control of experts who are responsible for 
the actual regulatory decisions as these experts inhabit a privileged position enjoying 
delegated authority without being backed by a sufficient public mandate (Jasanoff, 2003: 
158). Accordingly, the creation of a regulatory agency might represent a bigger challenge to 
legitimacy of the European regulatory state, as proponents of IRAs are willing to admit.  
 
7.2.2.3 The EMA: role and structure 
The creation of the EMA has been the result of a lengthy process and came at a time when the 
regulatory regime had more or less reached a dead end. Discussions did not only concern its 
powers and tasks but location as well. Several member states bid to site the newly created 
agency, but London was finally selected. Commentators argued that besides the strong 
position as one of the leading European industries and markets, the improved efficiency of the 
recently established UK regulator, the Medicines Control Agency (MCA) founded in 1989, 
played a decisive role (Horton, 1993: 1275). A condensed role description can be drawn from 
the mission statement at the agencies’ website. Essentially, the role of the EMA is twofold: 
coordination of the European regulatory network consisting of the EMA and the national 
agencies (1) and the provision of scientific advice (2), especially regarding the authorization 
procedures on the European level (EMA, 2010). The EMA thus represent the supranational 
hub inside the regulatory network. Based on the heavy reliance on national resources, the 
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 This assumption resembles the efficiency perspective traceable within the broader better regulation debate 
and does not necessarily reflect the public perception. While in the case of pharmaceutical regulation the 
European public might actually support a secretive mode of governance, this assumption cannot be 
generalized for all regulatory fields. 
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EMA has been labelled a virtual agency. This assertion stems from the fact, that the structure 
of the agency evolved around the existing CHMP recruited from national experts in most 
cases located within national competent authorities, supplemented by administrative 
structures. Initially, the EMA consisted of an Executive director, a (financial) controller, a 
management board, the two scientific committees CHMP and CVMP and a Secretariat 
supporting their work.214  
The EMA was initially financed exclusively through Community subsidies, but fees played an 
increasing role in agency funding. These were nevertheless not able to prevent the agency 
from experiencing budgetary deficits especially during the first years (Rogers, 1998). 
However, this situation changed with the significant increases in revenues from 1999 
onwards. With an increase in regulatory activities and workload, staffing of the EMA has 
been expanded considerably as well from 68 in 1995 to 624 in 2008.  
Graph 18: European Medicines Agency: development of funding (1995-2008) 
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To carry out its steering capacity more proactively, the European Union Drug Regulating 
Authorities Network (Eudranet) was established in 1998 and its function has been expanded in 
the following years (Rinaudo, 2001). The system is managed by the EMA but operates under 
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 During revisions of the regulatory system the structure of the EMA was differentiated further in 2004. In 
2007, two additional committees were established: the Paediatric Committee (PDCO) and the Committee for 
Advanced Therapies (CAT). 
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the overall responsibility of the Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Unit within the European 
Commission's DG Enterprise and Industry.215 It covers all aspects of the regulatory lifecycle, 
except distribution.216 On May, 1 2004 EudraCT, the European clinical trials register, has 
been introduced. The EudraTrack system is used to manage the approval phase and has been 
operational since the establishment of the EMA. EudraGMP, launched in 2007, contains 
information on manufacturing authorisations and certificates. Already in 2006, EudraPharm 
was launched containing all products authorized under the centralised procedure. EudraWatch 
covering the pharmacovigilance activities has been operational since 1998 and was replaced 
by EudraVigilance, launched in 2001. Initially, the closed network was installed to facilitate 
communication between national agencies and the EMA regarding the approval process. 
During the following years, new modules were introduced that allow for the surveillance of 
nearly all phases of the regulatory lifecycle. It is important to note, that most parts of the 
Eudranet are not open to the public. As of 2010, only the databases covering authorized 
products are publicly available.217 While the data base will be expanded it recently does not 
contain products authorized under national procedures and in the decentralized procedure. A 
separate database, the European Product Index (EPI), administered by the Heads of 
Medicines Agencies (HMA) exists for those products introduced after 2005 under this 
procedure. 
Table 14: European governance tools and databases 
Phase Development Approval Productio
n 
Distribution Information Monitoring 
Tool EudraCT EudraTrack EudraGMP n.a 
1) EudraPharm 
2) EPI 
1) EudraWatch 
2) EudraVigilance 
Founde
d (year)  2004 1995 2007 n.a. 
1) 2006 
2) 2005 
1) 1998 
2) 2001 
Source: EMA website; n.a.= no tool available 
Considering the scientific advice function of the EMA, this task is carried out by the CHMP. 
Even though its main task is the scientific assessment within the centralized procedure and 
arbitration within the decentralized procedure, the body has a monitoring function in the post-
approval stage as well (European Commission, 1991b). In addition, the committee engages in 
the development of guidelines and documents in order to increase the understanding of and 
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 At the end of 2009, the unit has been shifted to the DG for Consumers and Health.  
216
 For an overview see Meencke (2002). 
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 The public databases contain restricted data, since products authorized before the database has been launched 
are not included. At the time of writing plans to open up the GMP database were discussed by the 
Commission.    
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compliance with European pharmaceutical regulation. The CHMP has therefore been granted 
the power to form working parties (ad hoc and permanent). Most existing working parties 
were formed before 1995 for example Efficacy and Safety was created in 1977, Quality in 
1985 and Pharmacovigilance and Operations in 1989 (European Commission, 1991b: 8).  
 
7.2.3 Regulatory governance after 1995 
The changes in the pharmaceutical sector and the creation of the EMA did not only alter the 
regulatory network, but affected all aspects of the regulatory lifecycle. As the following 
analysis will show, the impact has been most pronounced in the governance of approval, but 
helped to rationalize the regulatory approach as a whole.  
 
7.2.3.1 Governance of development  
The EMA has been granted a supervisory role regarding clinical trials (Binns & Driscoll, 
2000). The current governance approach – based on the combination of licensing and 
monitoring mechanisms – has mainly been the result of the clinical trials directive in 2001. 
Clinical trials conducted within Europe now must follow a comparable procedure and start 
with an authorization of a research ethics committee (REC) (Hedgecoe et al., 2006). The 
EMA remains involved in the governance of the development stage through the EudraCT 
database. In order to assess, if clinical trials are conducted according to the standards of good 
clinical practice (GCP IWG), the EMA can mandate inspections.218 It is important to note that 
as a general rule the EMA does not conduct the inspection but asks competent national 
authority to do so. While using such policing mechanism can have an important effect on 
compliance, it seems questionable if the current regulatory practice does support this need. 
First of all, the tool – based on the limited evidence available – has been rarely used. In 2008, 
the EMA mandated 50 inspections (GCP IWG, 2009).219 Furthermore, national regulatory 
capacities in the field of clinical inspections are underdeveloped and despite involvement of 
the EMA inspections (still) remain uncoordinated (Ward, 2006: 40). The European 
cooperative regulatory approach does expand to the conduct of clinical inspections as well, as 
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 Beside the requirements entailed in the respective guidelines the requirements which have to be met are 
defined in volume 10 of the pharmaceutical code (EudraLex).  
219
 This number does only consider inspections mandated by the EMA/CHMP. National regulators still have the 
authority to conduct inspections.   
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the majority of inspections are previously announced routine inspections.220 It thus seems that 
the introduced structural measures improved the control of development, even though 
coordination problems and the potential for a more effective inspections approach must be 
acknowledged. 
  
7.2.3.2 Governance of approval 
Judging the new approval regime based on its performance, both procedures show a high level 
of activity compared to the situation before 1995.221 Within the centralized procedure, despite 
an incline in applications during 2001 and 2005, a constantly rising level of new applications 
is traceable. This increase is less surprising since the centralized procedure was gradually 
opened up to a wider range of products. At the same time the number of withdrawals under 
the CP increased. While no recent analysis on the current development is available, it can be 
argued that the reasons explaining higher withdrawal levels in the period between 1995 and 
1999 are still valid.222 Considering the number of applications, the decentralized procedure 
shows an impressive performance compared to the previous procedures based on mutual 
recognition.223 While the number of referrals (arbitration) still points to room for 
improvement regarding the willingness to accept prior assessments, the introduction of the 
CMD(h), based on the limited evidence available, can be expected to have a positive effect on 
the overall compliance. The changes in sequence and the discussions prior to the market 
authorization of an RMS under the DCP can be expected to improve the situation further.224 
 
7.2.3.2.1 Remaining challenges of the approval regime  
Going beyond the assessment of application levels, the (external) evaluation of the approval 
system conducted by CMS in 2000 sheds some more light on the qualities and perceptions of 
the new system. Drawing on the position of regulators and regulatees, the report highlighted 
                                                 
220
 This implies that the regulatee can prepare himself, potentially diminishing the continuous compliance effect 
of policing mechanisms.  
221
 The reliability of the approval data is at least restricted, especially considering the data on the decentralized 
procedure. Numbers provided on the HMA website differ from those published in the EMA annual reports. 
However, these differences may be explained by the annual data revisions.   
222
 In its analysis, the EMA concluded, that the reason for this could be seen in premature submissions and 
concerns regarding efficacy (EMEA, 2000: 1) 
223
 It is important to note that a significant part of rejections of the first assessment can be attributed to the 
product characteristics. The decentralized procedure is mainly used for the licensing of generics. Since the 
Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC) of these generics imitate the original SPCs and a lot of them have 
not been created based on harmonized rules, member states find it difficult to accept them (Janse-de Hoog, 
2007).    
224
 In light of an increasing number of CMD(h) referrals such developments seems to be likely.  
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an overall satisfaction with the CP by regulators and regulatees and to a lesser degree with the 
MRP/DP (CMS Cameron McKenna & Andersen Consulting, 2000: 71-76). While criticism 
regarding the CP mainly affected the political stage – the decision by the Commission and the 
Standing Committee – of the process, criticism regarding the MRP/DP was more fundamental 
and directly linked to the work of regulatory bodies. In effect, applicants regularly chose to 
withdraw their applications from the dissenting CMS in order to avoid binding arbitration. In 
1998, for example, withdrawal from at least one member state happened in 47 percent of all 
procedures finalized in that year. However, this trend decreased in the following years to 30.5 
percent in 2000 (Feick, 2002: 24). Considering the procedural changes after the second 
revision and the number of successful procedures, it can be argued that despite remaining 
drawbacks the current MRP/DP represents an improvement compared to the previous 
approval regimes based on mutual recognition. Accordingly the new approval regime can be 
deemed as clear improvement compared to the system in place before 1995, as cooperation in 
the sector increased. However, the reasons for these improvements cannot be attributed solely 
to the design of approval procedures, but are the result of several interrelated factors. 
 
 
  
 
Table 15: Overview centralized procedure (1995-2008) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Applications* 30 25 60 55 51 54 58 31 39 51 41 78 90 103 766 
Decisions ** 8 28 24 37 30 42 33 39 26 34 25 55 65 73 401 
Positive by 
consensus*** 
8 28 23 21 24 31 31 34 20 34 24 51 58 66 453 
Positive by 
vote*** 0 0 1 13 2 11 1 5 4 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.a. 
Negative 0 0 0 3 4 0 1 0 2 0 1 4 7 7 29 
Withdrawn 1 3 7 20 8 11 11 13 4 7 15 8 9 23 140 
Source: EMA annual reports (1995-2008); Note: *applications are considered product based; ** calculated based on positive and negative decisions; *** type of decision (consensus/vote) not 
recorded after 2003  
 
 
Table 16: Overview mutual recognition/decentralized procedure (1995-2008) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Procedures 
started 30 
171 
(since 
1995) 
190 183 275 373 484 587 620 935 857* 1046
* 
1429* 1899* 9049 
Completed 
during year 10 84 147 179 210 309 443 420 529 760 954 592 827 1174 6638 
Arbitration n.r. 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 5 9 10 127 (22) 
44(25) 
CMD(h) 
15(7) 
CHMP 
39(43) 
CMD(h) 
12(7) 
CHMP 
n.a. 
Source: EMA annual reports (1995-2008); Note: * including MRP and DCP; arbitration: number in brackets signifies DCP; n.a.: not applicable 
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7.2.3.2.2 Explaining the performance of the new approval regime 
The first important factor leading to improved performance of the approval regime must be 
seen in the institutional convergence, affecting national pharmaceutical regulators. As it has 
been argued previously, agencification has been a common phenomenon both on the national 
and European level. Considering the dynamics of agencification and interaction between the 
two levels, institutional change mainly is a horizontal phenomenon: waves of agencification 
either happened on the national or the European level. In the pharmaceutical sector, 
agencification was traceable as well and it is argued here that it was mainly triggered by the 
emergence of the EMA.225  
 
Agencification in the European pharmaceutical sector 
Until 1990, only four member states had agency-like national regulators: The College ter 
Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen in the Netherlands established in 1963, the National 
Organisation for Medicines established in 1983 in Greece, the Medicines Control Agency in 
the UK established in 1989 and the Swedish Medical Products Agency founded in 1990.226 
Starting with the first revision of the framework, following up on the Commission proposal, 
the number of agencies doubled until 1995 and tripled until 2000.227 Today, Luxembourg is 
the only EU 15 member without an agency, explained by the lack of national pharmaceutical 
market and pharmaceutical industry. Of course, Europeanization and the instalment of the 
EMA, can not solely explain the agencification, but given the rapid increase of national 
agencies surrounding the creation of the EMA they should be understood as a catalyst in the 
process (Hauray, 2009: 439; Permanand, 2004: 49). While the national regulatory agencies in 
the pharmaceutical sector represent similar organisational types and their internal 
management structure resembles the EMA, the tasks and structures of the respective agencies 
differ widely.228 
 
                                                 
225
 In fact, the institutional blueprint of the EMA was mainly based on the previously created national regulator 
in the UK, the MCA (Abraham & Lewis, 2000). 
226
 Since Sweden was no member state until 1995, it would be more precise to count only three agencies in EU 
countries before 1990. 
227
 The accessing east and central European member states established agencies as well. However, the reasons 
for agencification presumably differ compared to the situation within the EU 15. A list of the national 
regulatory bodies is provided in the appendix (A.8).   
228
 Data collection was complicated by the differing level of information provided by national agencies. If data 
could not be retrieved, agencies were contacted. In most cases, no additional information could be retrieved. 
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Graph 19: Agencification in the pharmaceutical sector EU 15 (1955-2010) 
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Source: websites of national regulatory agencies, Note: Luxembourg was excluded, since pharmaceutical regulation is 
carried out by a division of the health ministry  
All national agencies operate under the supervision of the national ministry of health.229 
Looking at the responsibilities of the national agencies, their role in Denmark and Italy as 
well as in Portugal differs from other national counterparts, since they are not only involved 
in the process of safety evaluation but in the reimbursement decision as well.230 At first 
glance, the agencification of national authorities clearly raised the level of independence, 
since national regulators now enjoyed even greater regulatory discretion.231 Accordingly, 
previously encountered problems of coordination were most likely to increase. At the same 
time, agencification did not only increase regulatory independence but external accountability 
as well. Looking at the financing of the national agencies, the new regulators became 
increasingly dependent on the fees of applicants, especially from the European procedures.232 
This financing model increases the pressure on regulators to play by the rules, while at the 
same time raising questions about the objectivity of assessment, triggering a discussion on the 
immanent competition that characterizes the new approval system (Abraham, 2000; Garattini, 
2001). 
 
                                                 
229
 This is one of the key differences to the EMA operating under the supervision of DG Competition and 
Industry raising criticism of several authors. The EMA was relocated at the end of 2009 and is now under the 
supervision of DG Health and Consumers (DG Sanco).  
230
 While in Denmark and Italy agencies have the power to decide on reimbursement, the Portuguese agency 
(INFARMED) decides on reimbursement status in cooperation with the health ministry and the ministry of 
economy (Gouveia Pinto & Teixeira, 2002).  
231
 Looking at the de facto independence of national pharmaceutical regulators compared to other regulatory 
fields, the higher level of autonomy is striking (Gilardi & Maggetti, 2009).     
232
 The dependence on fees proved to be a problem during the economic downturn and resulting decrease in 
applications and public subsidies both for the EMA and the national regulators (Anon, 2006a).  
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Table 17: National regulatory agencies in the pharmaceutical sector (EU 15) 
Country Abbreviation Authority Name Funding Staff* Responsibilities 
Austria AGES PharmMed 
Austrian Agency for 
Health and Food Safety 
Fees 
Subsidies (20%) 250 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Belgium FAMHP 
Agence Fédérale des 
Médicaments et des 
Produits de Santé 
Fees 
Subsidies (30%) 350 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V), 
Medical devices 
Denmark n.a. Lægemiddelstyrelsen Fees Subsidies 500 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Reimbursement 
Pharmacies 
Medical devices 
Finland n.a. Lääkelaitos Läkemedelsverket** 
Fees 
Subsidies (20%) 190 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
France AFSSAPS 
Agence française de 
sécurité sanitaire des 
produits de santé 
Fees 
Subsidies (10%) 990 
Pharmaceuticals (H) 
Medical devices 
Cosmetics 
Germany BFARM 
Bundesinstituts für 
Arzneimittel und 
Medizinprodukte 
Fees 
Subsidies (30%) 800 
Pharmaceuticals (H) 
Medical devices 
Greece EOF National Organization for Medicines 
Fees 
Subsidies 238 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Cosmetics 
Ireland IMB Irish medicines Board Fees Subsidies (20%) 280 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Italy AIFA Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco 
Fees 
Subsidies  
250(2008) 
459(2009) 
Pharmaceuticals (H) 
Reimbursement 
Luxembourg n.a. 
Direction de la Santé 
Villa Louvigny Division 
de la Pharmacie et des 
Medicaments 
Fees 
Subsidies n.r. 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Pharmacies 
Cosmetics 
Netherlands CBGMED 
College ter Beoordeling 
van Geneesmiddelen 
Medicines Evaluation 
Board 
Fees 
Subsidies (30 %) 194 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Novel foods 
Portugal INFARMED 
Instituto Nacional da 
Farmácia e do 
Medicamento Parque 
da Saúde de Lisboa 
Fees 
Subsidies 251 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Cosmetics 
Reimbursement studies 
Spain AEMPS 
Agencia Española de 
Medicamentos y 
Productos Sanitarios  
Fees 
Subsidies 470 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Cosmetics 
Sweden MPA Medical Products Agency 
Fees 
Subsidies (10%) 496 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Cosmetics 
Medical devices 
UK MHRA 
Medicines and 
Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency 
Fees 
Subsidies (15%) 875 
Pharmaceuticals (H+V) 
Medical devices 
Source: Websites of national agencies, annual reports; * 2007 was used as year of reference regarding the staffing levels; the 
level of subsidies has been included if data was available; n.r.: not reported; n.a.: not applicable; ** since 2009, the Finnish 
agency is called Finnish medicines agency (FIMEA) 
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Competition, beyond the lowering of standards is possible on several levels. First, there is an 
indirect conflict between the EMA and the national agencies manifested in the two available 
approval routes (inter-procedural). Given the financial dependence of agencies competition 
can arise regarding those products eligible for both procedures. Second, competition may 
arise within procedures (inter-agency). National authorities will have an interest to serve as 
rapporteur or RMS in the respective procedure. As a consequence, it is believed that the need 
to generate fees will drive regulators towards a more industry friendly position and, as it is 
feared by some commentators, to a general lowering of assessments standards to attract 
regulatory business (Abraham & Lewis, 1999).233 
 
Competition within the regulatory system   
Starting with the inter-procedural competition and drawing on the numbers of new 
applications of the two procedures, competition seems to be very limited. Growth trends in 
both procedures have been fairly stable. Furthermore, many applicants chose the mutual 
recognition procedure because of the flexibility, which is not as high in the centralized 
procedure.234 While it might be likely that competition will rise in the future given a further 
expansion of products eligible for both procedures, the current trends do not point towards 
such a development. Considering inter-agency competition, data from the centralized 
procedure indicates some competition between national regulators regarding rapporteur status, 
but rather points to a stable regulatory market with few agencies responsible for the majority 
of the conducted assessments.  
UK, Sweden, France, Germany together with the Netherlands and Denmark represented the 
lead agencies between 1995 and 2000 within the centralized procedure and the dominance of 
this group largely remained stable (MHRA, 2009: 14).235 In addition, the selection process of 
the rapporteur within the EMA renders tough competition as rather improbable since “usually 
the manufacturer and the CPMP chairman suggest one rapporteur each.”(Garratini & Bertele, 
                                                 
233
 In contrast, the discussion of the regulatory framework in the previous chapter rather suggests a levelling up 
of standards. This position is unsurprisingly shared by industrial representatives interviewed by Abraham and 
Lewis, while regulators either stated a constant or slightly decreasing level (Abraham & Lewis, 1999: 1657).   
234
 In many instances, companies want to market a product in some of the Member States and unless it is a 
product for which the CP is mandatory, the decentralized procedure might represent the more fitting approval 
procedure (Janse-de Hoog, 2007).  
235
 Since the EMA no longer publishes statistics on the RMS/CMS status, annual reports of national agencies 
were consulted. Depending on the sources, the ranking of national agencies after 2000 differs.     
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2004: 85) and it has been the official policy of the EMA to strive for a balanced representation 
of the CHMP members in taking the lead role in evaluation (EMA, 1998a: 24).236  
 
Graph 20: Involvement in centralized procedure in the EU 15 1995-2000** 
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Source: EMA annual report 2000; * total includes participation of member states as a rapporteur and co-rapporteur; ** Data was 
replicated from graph values might partially differ from original numbers. 
Considering the situation in the mutual recognition/decentralized procedure (DP/MRP) the 
picture is quite different. Some of the agencies dominating the evaluation of new application 
in the centralized procedure show a weaker performance in the decentralized procedure and 
there is a higher degree of fluctuation across time. It seems that applicants, having complete 
discretion in the selection of the regulatory agency, apply different criteria in selecting 
agencies in the different procedures. As it was highlighted above, competition is not only 
traceable in the selection of the assessing agencies but in the approval process as well. 
Compared to the centralized procedure emphasizing cooperation, the procedural set-up of the 
mutual recognition procedure, specifically before the review in 2004, stimulates conflicts. The 
agency serving as an RMS forms its position and consequently a legally binding national 
authorization, which in case of dissent is challenged by another authority. 
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 The EMA has recently proposed a new selection procedure for rapporteur status, increasingly considering the 
different national regulatory capacities (Anon, 2006b).    
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Graph 21: Inter-agency competition in the decentralized procedure (EU 27)* 
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In fact there are little incentives and substantial barriers for the two agencies to relinquish 
their position:  
“It is difficult for a dissenting CMS to retract its opinion and adopt the RMS’s position once it has 
refused automatic mutual recognition because of ‘serious concerns’ to public health in their countries. 
The other possibility of finding a compromise position would require a change in the RMS’s initial 
authorization. This is no less complicated since a legally valid national authorization already exists 
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furnishing the authorization holder with a right to market in the RMS.[original emphasis]” (Feick, 2002: 
19). 
Based on the logic of reputation agencies serving as a CMS, might even challenge the 
assessment of the leading agency to prove their own capacity (Feick, 2002: 46). While the 
arbitration procedure within the CHMP was intended to solve such conflicts 
“most applicants considered the duration of such a referral procedure too long (on average 9 months). 
Because of commercial interests to market the product as soon as possible in the Member States that 
could approve it, in most cases the application was withdrawn in member states that were negative.” 
(Janse-de Hoog, 2007: 250) 
Turning to the competition of standards it is assumed by some authors that the 
Europeanization of pharmaceutical regulation and the increased financial dependence of 
regulators has caused a watering down of approval standards in order to attract applicants 
(Abraham & Lewis, 2000; Wille & Schönhöfer, 2002). This assumption is mainly based on 
the fact that the European procedures and especially the CP introduced stricter timelines, 
significantly lower than most national approval times, forcing national regulators to 
rationalize their assessments.  
Graph 22: Assessment times within the Centralized Procedure (1995-2008) 
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Source: EMA annual reports (1995-2008) 
It seems noteworthy that approval times started to converge before the new European system 
was introduced and several agencies already conducted their national assessments based on 
very strict timeframes (Abraham & Lewis, 1999; Feick, 2002; Thomas et al., 1998). It is true 
that the European procedures intentionally rationalized national approval procedures, but a 
prevailing tendency towards shorter assessment times is not traceable considering the 
development of average review times in the CP.  Instead, the former trend of convergence 
regarding review might have reached the baseline. Accordingly, the perceived watering down 
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of standards rather corresponds to the watering down of regulatory discretion and pressure to 
adapt national regulatory cultures. 
 
The emergence of a European regulatory culture in the pharmaceutical sector 
The instalment of the European agency and the new regulatory procedures did not only 
stimulate changes in national regulatory structures, but emphasized a new regulatory approach 
that challenged existing national regulatory traditions. This is the impression one could get, 
drawing on the study on the harmonisation of drug regulatory standards in Europe of 
Abraham and Lewis (1999: 1657-1659). While interviewees argued that standards might 
erode through Europeanization mainly due to the shortage of review times, national regulators 
from Germany, UK and Sweden perceived the application of standards by other less 
experienced agencies as the real challenge to safety within the European system. From this 
perspective, the main problem was not the erosion of standards but the lack of trust in 
regulatory capabilities of other agencies. However, the new European regulatory approach 
was based on the idea of mutual trust and increased cooperation between national agencies 
and between regulators and regulatees as well. The instalment of the CHMP and its 
procedural significance especially after the creation of the new regime played a crucial role in 
the diffusion of this new European regulatory approach and the neutralization of the 
predominant national approaches. In contrast to the decentralized procedure, where regulatory 
agencies were competing against each other, the CHMP was composed of individuals and 
therefore personnel interaction helped to adapt to the new way of conducting regulation. Boris 
Hauray and Philippe Urfalino in their qualitative study on the work of the CHMP concluded:  
“European committees progressively became the very places in Europe where top medicines specialists 
(regulators and industrialists) could engage in exchanges about pharmaceutical knowledge and rules. 
[…] First of all, delegates developed deliberative norms and mutual trust. […] National delegates’ 
support for positions that went against the opinions of their national committee, or against the interests 
of ‘their’ national firms, was of course critical in this process. But the development of direct personal 
ties and even friendship were also of great importance […] A European regulatory network was 
structured around the members of the 1970s working parties and, in 1995, most of the leaders of the 
‘new’ European system had been working together for many years.[original emphasis]” (2009: 441-
442)  
An important change and possible conflict with national regulatory cultures must be seen in 
the emphasis of cooperation with the regulated industry within the European context. Within 
the centralized procedure, the traditional relations between regulators and regulatees shifted. 
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While the traditional understanding of the regulatory role in most countries was that of a 
gatekeeper, the new regulatory approach intentionally fostered a much more collaborative 
approach emphasizing the mutual goal of regulators and regulatees to achieve market access 
of safe products. The new regulatory culture was reflected in several respects. A manifestation 
of this new European regulatory style can be seen in the ever growing role of scientific advice 
preceding new applications (Dejas-Eckertz & Schäffner, 2005), increasing from only 7 in 
1995 to 263 in 2008. Applicants can ask the EMA and more specifically the CPMP for advice 
before an application procedure is started and optimize their applications dossiers.237 A 
second characteristic can be seen in the increased use of soft law instruments and most 
notably the importance of guidance provided to applicants. As it has been argued in the 
previous chapter, the European regulatory framework is marked by a considerable degree of 
vagueness, resulting in uncertainty how to best comply with regulation. To reduce this 
uncertainty, the issuance of guidance documents initialized by the CPMP has been 
continuously expanded,  
Table 18: EMA guidance documents (1995-2008) 
  1995-
1996 
1997-
1998 
1999-
2000 
2001-
2002 
2003-
2004 
2005-
2006 
2007-
2008 
Quality Chemical 2 7 2 10 11 11 8 
Biologicals 8 8 5 13 21 9 6 
Non-Clinical 5 5 3 5 6 8 8 
Clinical Efficacy & Safety 6 5 9 19 20 36 27 
Multidisciplinary 1 1 1 6 6 14 16 
Total  22 26 20 43 64 58 65 
Source: http://www.EMEA.europa.eu/htms/human/humanguidelines/background.htm (25.3.2009); Note: Only adopted 
guidelines not under revision were counted, using the effective date (guidelines to become effective). 
While collaborative relationships were common in some member states, most prominently in 
the UK where regulatory relations were marked by an “informal negotiation-based 
interdependency alongside a formal licensing structure” (Smith, 1991: 7), others like the 
German authority had developed a more cautious approach towards the pharmaceutical 
industry (Hohgräwe, 1992: 196-198). In order to succeed within the European system, 
national regulators facing the need to generate fees had to adapt to these new requirements. 
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 The practice of scientific advice has been criticized by Silvio Garratini and Vittorio Bertele arguing that: “it 
is uncommon for an organization, and in effect the same group of people […] to be responsible for giving 
advice to industry about the best way to proceed with the development of a drug, and also be responsible for 
approving drug authorization” (2004: 88-89). This perspective can be challenged considering the perspective 
of regulatory efficiency and increased access, since compliance with scientific advice has been found to 
increase the chances of approval (Regnstrom et al., 2009).     
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This adaption has led to the progressive adoption of a more professionalized and NPM 
inspired approach on behalf of the regulatory agencies: most European agencies began to 
publish annual activity reports roughly since the year 2000, highlighting their achievements 
and regulatory performance. A contributing factor to the professionalization of the regulatory 
network must be seen in the strong external scrutiny of the regulatory network both by the 
Commission and the industry.238 While the European Commission used the regulatory 
revision to analyse regulatory performance and has recently commissioned an external auditor 
to assess the work of the EMA (Ernst&Young, 2010), the industry and the EFPIA more 
specifically conducts various studies and surveys on the regulatory network, for example, 
regarding the performance in providing scientific advice (Mayer-Nicolai et al., 2008).  
 
7.2.3.2.3 Potential for regulatory capture: EMA & Approval regime   
While the emergence of a common regulatory culture on the European level and the adaption 
of national agencies contributed significantly to the functioning of the approval regime, 
considering the centralized procedure and to a lesser degree the decentralized procedure, the 
resulting efficiency regime (Abraham & Lewis, 2000) has raised serious concerns about close 
relationships of the EMA and regulatees (Abraham, 2002; Garattini & Bertele, 2001, 2007; Li 
Bassi et al., 2003). In light of this criticism, an assessment of regulatory principles and control 
mechanisms regarding the European agency and the approval process is necessary at this 
point.239   
 
The realisation of participation within the approval regime and the EMA 
Considering the participation in the approval regime, the privileged role of industry compared 
to the public is obvious and less surprising, given the underlying regulatory interest of 
regulators and regulatees regarding the mode of governance.240 As it has been argued before, 
the participation of the public within the actual regulatory decision-making processes can 
have a distorting rather than beneficial effect. It is hard to imagine, how personal participation 
in the decision process and in the discussions of the CHMP would contribute to the 
                                                 
238
 The external review is complemented by internal benchmarking and evaluation activities, for example by the 
HMA (2005).  
239
 A separate assessment of the subsidiarity principle seems unnecessary, since the regulatory network in the 
pharmaceutical sector clearly reflects a sufficient realisation of this principle.       
240
 The lack of public participation is not confined to the approval regime, but is traceable in the post-
authorization stage as well. Public participation however constitutes a general problem in health care and its 
governance (Hart, 2004). 
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effectiveness and efficiency of the regime.241 Nevertheless, it might be beneficial to increase 
public input on general risk perceptions from the perspective of (input-) legitimacy (Löfstedt 
et al., 2009).242 Judging on the general involvement of the public beyond the participation in 
the scientific body (CHMP), it must be acknowledged that while the situation during the 
founding years has been disappointing (Collier et al., 1997), it improved significantly 
especially after the second revision of the framework. Patient groups are now represented 
with two seats on the management board supervising the executive director and the overall 
strategy of the agency and participate in the Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products 
(Georges, 2006). In addition, the EMA developed a strategy to improve and identify new 
aspects for patient and public involvement and started several activities in this respect. Even 
though participation remains selective, as the EMA only considers patient organisations 
which were identified based on a framework, the external perception of this initiative has been 
overwhelmingly positive (EMA, 2007b: 3-9).  
 
The realisation of transparency within the approval regime and the EMA 
Given the dominant regulatory interest of regulators and regulatees, transparency does not 
necessarily rank high on the national regulatory agenda. While the Commission emphasized 
the need for greater transparency and openness and the EMA compared to most national 
regulators seemed to be more open to the idea of transparency (Anon, 1994: 90), the first 
years of the European approval regime were marked by a highly secretive regulatory approach 
(Abraham & Lewis, 1998; Anon, 1996). Despite legally binding transparency obligations, 
greater openness regarding the workings of the agency and the actual assessment process was 
rejected based on the obligation to protect commercially sensitive information. Interestingly 
enough, this claimwas used to shield the regulatory work of the EMA from public scrutiny in 
general (Abbasi & Herxheimer, 1998). The first notable attempt to change this was the 
publishing of European public assessment reports (EPAR) for all products approved under the 
CP after January 1, 1995. Unfortunately, the EPARs proved to be a promise unfulfilled. 
Availability of the first generation of assessment reports was severely limited and the entailed 
information was of limited use. A study by the International Society of Drug Bulletins (ISDB) 
covering 9 EPARs found that the reports were lacking a clear and uniform structure, dealt 
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 For a concurring view see Abraham & Davis (2005), Abraham & Sheppard (1997) and Liberatore & 
Funtowicz (2003). 
242
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with important details in a superficial manner and were generally hard to understand even for 
health professionals. Above all, the commitment to withhold sensitive commercial 
information resulted in the blackening of considerable parts of the reports (ISDB, 1998). 
Reacting on the accusations of the ISDB, the EMA promised to improve EPARs (EMA, 
1998b), but a follow up study of the ISDB in the year 2000 showed little signs of 
improvement (Kopp, 2000). The situation was even worse considering the transparency of the 
decentralized procedure, as the field experience of Abraham and Lewis suggests:  
“We found it impossible to get basic information from the EMEA about mutual recognition 
applications, such as names of products, RMSs and CMSs. The EMEA referred us to the Mutual 
Recognition Facilitation Group of the national regulatory authorities; the chairman of that group, Dr D 
Lyons, told us in a letter dated Sept 5, 1996, that only ‘the applicant, the RMS and the CMSs need to 
know’ such details.[original emphasis]”  (1998: 480).   
The situation did only start to improve with the advent of the second legislative revision in 
2000, leading to more stringent and detailed EPARs and for the first time introduced similar 
requirements regarding assessments under the decentralized procedure, contributing 
significantly to the overall transparency of the approval process (Pimpinella et al., 2007).  
Considering transparency from today’s perspective it must be acknowledged that the EMA 
has significantly improved its own transparency policy. Access to documentation is much 
easier than it was at the beginning of this decade especially compared to the transparency 
policy of national regulatory authorities within the field (Slijkerman, 2009) and most notably 
other European agencies (Vos, 2005: 131). In fact, the EMA publishes an abundance of 
documents in order to make its own work transparent. Despite this positive account, problems 
regarding transparency remain. First, officials working at the agency are still subjected to 
outmost secrecy even after leaving their position. Second, despite increased access to 
documents and information, large parts of the data and dossiers used in approval decisions are 
excluded from public access for confidentiality reasons. This creates a paradox situation as 
the decision to disclose information is not taken by the regulator but “the decision with 
respect to what information should be regarded confidential hence lies with the industry” 
(Garattini, 2003: 1078). Third, transparency is limited to the administrative work of the EMA 
and the approval procedures, but is lacking regarding clinical trials and post-authorization 
controls (Garattini, 2003; Kenny, 2004). While the situation regarding clinical trials has 
improved with the introduction of EudraCT, the lack of transparency regarding post-
authorization monitoring has resulted in a recent complaint by the EU Ombudsman 
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(Pharmaletter, 2010). Fourth, the new found transparency of the EMA does not expand to the 
times before 2005. 
 
The realisation of accountability and control within the approval regime and the EMA 
Since the EMA represents a regulatory agency and therefore has a certain level of 
independence, the need for external control mechanisms arises. External control after 
delegation is achieved mainly by two mechanisms. First, ex-ante controls shape the agency’s 
mandate and the more general zone of discretion defined in the course of delegation. Second, 
the behaviour of the agency is regulated by ex-post mechanisms and the power (and ability) to 
hold the agency to account. Given the interdependence of the two mechanisms it must first be 
discussed how strongly the agency is controlled (Busuioc, 2009: 10-14).  
 
Ex-ante and ex-post control of the EMA 
Considering the provisions establishing the EMA, several ex-ante mechanisms can be 
identified.243 First, the Commission has the right to recommend a new executive director 
serving a five year mandate, who has to be accepted by the respective management board. 
Under the new regulation (after 2004), the candidate can be asked to give a presentation 
before the European Parliament (EP) and answer questions. However, the EP has no power to 
influence the selection of the new executive director. Another change introduced by the 
second revision provides the Commission with the right to propose the suspension of the 
executive director. The actual decision has to be taken by the management board, deciding 
with a qualified majority. An additional constraint can be seen in the competence of the 
Council, to set the fees that the EMA collects (Winter, 2004: 138).  
Turning to the ex-post mechanisms, several instruments were developed to hold the EMA 
accountable. The EMA has adopted a code of conduct, and the management board has 
published rules of procedures to ensure the adherence to procedural standards – advancing 
procedural accountability – in decision-making (EMA, 2005, 2009). Board members have to 
provide a declaration on possible conflict of interest on an annual basis (EMA, 2006). 
Considering its political accountability, the Commission has significant powers in holding the 
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EMA and regulatory agencies in general to account.244 It can ask for periodic evaluations of 
the regulatory performance, as it has recently done in case of the EMA (Ernst&Young, 2010). 
The composition of the management board ensured a continuous involvement of the member 
states and the Commission. Under the new legislation, external control and accountability is 
expanded by the inclusion of EP representatives. The management board approves the annual 
reports and the working plans for the following years. Annual reports are forwarded to the 
Commission, the Council, the European Social and Economic Committee, the Court of 
Auditors and the Member States. Working plans are forwarded to the Commission the 
Council and the Member States. The financial accountability (and control) of the EMA is 
ensured by the internal budget control mechanisms, carried out by the respective accounting 
officer and the external review of the European Court of Auditors. Furthermore, the 
Parliament and the Council in their role as the budgetary authority can re-examine the 
Community contributions to the agencies budget and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
serves as a mechanism to prevent the agency from drift. Judicial accountability of the EMA 
plays a vital role in securing agencies compliance. It has been argued by the Commission, that 
the agencies are responsible before the Court of Justice of the European Communities for the 
decisions they take (European Commission, 2005a). The provisions founding the EMA, 
however, remain silent on the issue of judicial review (Winter, 2004: 147). In a strict sense, 
the decisions of the EMA and more precisely the scientific assessments by the CHMP cannot 
be challenged. However, since the formal approval decision is (regularly) taken by the 
Commission and the Standing Committee – on a regular basis within the CP and in case of 
binding arbitration within the DP as well – the agency at least indirectly can be held 
accountable and the resulting Commission decisions can be challenged before the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) and subsequently the ECJ (Collatz, 1996; Winter, 2004).245 In fact, the 
ECJ as in other European risk regulatory fields (Alemanno, 2008b), has had a significant 
influence on the regulatory work of the EMA, as the Court has proven at several instances that 
he is willing to “scrutinise the substantive reasons for authorisation decisions in detail” 
(Krapohl, 2008: 98). The possibility to hold the EMA accountable judicially however is 
confined to those actors directly affected by the Commissions decision, reducing the number 
of eligible plaintiffs. This has been recently demonstrated in the Olivieri decision. The Court 
of First Instance dismissed an individual complaint of a doctor involved in the clinical trials 
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of an authorized drug, arguing that she was not individually concerned by the Commission 
decision (Best, 2004). Apparently, the lack of direct involvement renders most claims against 
authorization decisions – except those of applicants – void. This surely constitutes a problem 
form the perspective of accountability, despite the fact that every member state, the 
Commission or the EP can bring nullity claims before the Court (Krapohl, 2008: 99).   
 
The effectiveness of control mechanisms 
While it can be argued that except the apparent asymmetric access to judicial accountability, 
the control and accountability of the agency is ensured based on the cited mechanisms, there 
is reason to believe that their effect is limited. Starting with the control of personnel, even 
though the Commission could threaten the agency to use its suspension right regarding the 
executive director, it seems questionable that it has an interest in doing so. Since its creation, 
the EMA has been marked by a remarkable continuity regarding its personnel. Ferdinand 
Sauer became Head of the Pharmaceutical Products Unit within the Commission in 1984. 
After serving 10 years in that position, he was appointed the first executive director of the 
EMA in 1994. In 2001, Sauer left to join the DG for Health and Consumers as a director. 
While his successor and recently reappointed executive director Thomas Lönngren, did not 
serve within the Commission’s service, he worked for the Swedish MPA since 1990 and, 
given the importance of the agency within the European network, can be expected to have a 
strong standing within the management board.        
Turning to the financial control of the agency, the usefulness of the existing controls can be 
challenged. Judging from its financial basis, the EMA has become increasingly independent 
from Community subsidies, even though a reverse trend has been traceable, with the 
contribution of the Community nearly doubling in 2007. This development could either be 
interpreted as an increased commitment to patient safety, an acknowledgement of the 
increased workload on behalf of the agency, or the attempt of the principals to regain some 
control over the workings of the agency. Considering the controlling function of the 
Management Board, the recent changes in composition might have somewhat improved the 
situation, since oversight by the European Parliament and public stakeholders has been 
strengthened. Still, the current composition of the management board exemplifies a potential 
lack of control. The board is dominated by representatives of national agencies. While this 
will ensure, that the agency is prevented from adopting a strategy that collides with national 
regulatory interests, it must be asked, if the current composition and size really allows for an 
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independent supervisory role. In light of the previous discussion, the differences in formal 
independence and de facto independence (Gilardi & Maggetti, 2009; Maggetti, 2007) in case 
of the EMA become apparent. While the formal control mechanisms would suggest a 
moderate level of formal independence and thus a high degree of compliance and 
accountability, the de facto control over the agency can be expected to be less strong than the 
formal mechanisms would suggest.246 This situation is aggravated by the lack of de facto 
independence from the industry exemplified in the high degree of financial and informational 
dependence, supporting the raised assumption that the political independence of the EMA 
might translate into a situation of private capture. However, as it has been suggested by 
Martino Maggetti in the context of national independent regulatory agencies, a lack of 
political control and accountability does not necessarily translate into regulatory capture 
(Maggetti, 2007: 282). In addition, it must be noted that capture in case of the EMA does not 
necessarily relate to the agency as a whole but the approval procedures and the respective 
scientific committees. In assessing the potential capture of the regulatory regime, it is the 
control of the approval process that is decisive.  
 
Control of the centralized procedure and the CHMP 
While the EMA represents the central actor within the regulatory regime as a whole, the 
CHMP represents the key institution in the approval regime. Considering the ex-ante controls 
of the scientific committee, the initial directive on which the CHMP is based, does not specify 
measures of control.247 The committee was expected to draw up rules of procedures governing 
its activities, in accordance with the legal provisions. However, this document does not entail 
additional control measures despite the selection of members (CHMP, 2007). Each member 
state appoints a member after consultation with the management board, serving for three 
years. Under the new legislation, five additional co-opted members are part of the Committee, 
proposed based on their expertise either by the agency or the member states. Since the 
majority of the CHMP are representatives of national regulatory agencies, it might be 
tempting to believe, that national agencies can exert control over the centralized procedure. 
However, national agencies are obliged to refrain from giving instructions to their 
representatives, which highlights the independent character of the scientific committee. 
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Because of the personalized character of the CHMP, members are obliged to give annual 
conflict of interest declarations, available through the EMA homepage.248 A possible lever for 
external control of the committee is the possibility to invite applicants and establish contacts 
with interested parties. However, such contacts remain within the discretion of the CHMP. 
Even if no clear external control mechanisms exist, the procedural requirements serve as an 
additional control lever. The regulatory framework clearly structures the assessment process 
and sets out the criteria on which the scientific assessment is ought to be based. Given the 
higher degree of formalisation, the significant regulatory discretion existing in previous 
(national and European) regulatory procedures is effectively reduced. This reduction does not 
imply that discretion and thus the possibility for deviating or captured decisions is fully 
excluded (Gehring et al., 2005: 133). Since the decision criteria remain vague to a certain 
degree, different interpretations remain possible at least in principle. Given the underlying 
preferences of the regulators, most importantly those charged with the regulatory decision, the 
authorization might be skewed, as long as the regulator can convince the scientific committee 
that his decision is in line with the underlying criteria. In order to prevent the CHMP from 
drift, the development of guidance documents plays a key role. While these soft law 
instruments issued by the CHMP were previously considered as a mechanism to facilitate the 
authorization process, they have an important function for the control of the actual assessment 
within the committee:  
“Authorization decisions that deviate from these rules will thus require particularly convincing 
justification. This is all the more true because guidelines as the most reliable guidance documents are 
not only published by the EMEA, but also by the Commission […] Instead of exploiting its informally 
powerful status under the authorization procedure, the EMEA expert committee limits its margins of 
discrete choice through the elaboration and publication of numerous guidance documents. […] By 
committing itself to decisions that follow its own rules, the committee reduces the number of options 
that could be chosen and voluntarily cuts the room for manoeuvre for internal bargaining.” (Krapohl & 
Gehring, 2007: 221-222) 
While the voluntary limitation of discretion plays an important part in the control of the 
independent committee, it seems to be questionable at first sight why members would 
voluntarily reduce their room to manoeuvre. However, this could be explained by at least two 
factors. First, the agreement on certain interpretations creates a common understanding of 
regulators and reduces remaining scientific uncertainty regarding the right assessment of 
products (Abraham, 1994: 494). Second, the mutual understanding of interpretation is a 
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prerequisite for the efficient work of the CHMP. While the initial assessment is conducted by 
the rapporteur and co-rapporteur, the committee as a whole discusses and decides on the final 
report. Given the personalized character of the body, the individual independence from their 
own organisation in the decision-making process and the consensual orientation (Hauray & 
Urfalino, 2009; Metcalfe, 2000), individuals will try to reduce the potential for conflicting 
assessment wherever possible. As the committee is expected to decide anonymously and this 
has been the case in the majority of decisions (Krapohl & Gehring, 2007), it is necessary for 
the group to agree on how evidence is interpreted. Furthermore, the committee serves as a 
peer-review mechanism in case the rapporteur overstepped his or her boundaries.  
Beyond these internal reasons, the two step assessment process does contribute to the 
CHMP’s willingness to limit its own discretion. While the committee provides the scientific 
assessment, the final political decision to authorize the product is taken by the Commission 
and the Standing Committee, which (in principle) are allowed to deviate from the initial 
proposal. Based on reputational considerations of the CMHP vis-à-vis the Commission, 
decision-making within narrowly defined corridors reduces the potential overhaul of a 
decision, since it becomes harder for the Commission to challenge the decision on procedural 
grounds.  
 
Graph 23: Scientific and political stage of centralized procedure (illustration) 
 
Source: author’s own 
The adherence to the approval criteria and the predefined approval process is advanced by the 
credible threat of the Commission and the Standing Committee to challenge the decision. In 
case of the latter, this threat has become even more credible, since under the new regulation 
the Standing Committee can challenge a decision with a qualified majority, These political 
ex-post controls are supplemented by the European courts serving as an additional external 
control mechanism. While the ECJ effectively evaluates the political decision by the 
Commission, this will indirectly affect the CHMP, since the court would need to prove that 
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either the Commission or the Committee did wrongly apply approval criteria.  In light of these 
mechanisms, it seems that the CHMP and the centralized approval procedure, despite a lack 
of extensive ex-ante control mechanisms is sufficiently controlled (Krapohl & Gehring, 
2007). This assumption must, however, be qualified.  
While actors within the CHMP only have a limited zone of discretion and will have little 
incentive to take a decision that clearly reflects a (public or private) bias, the current structure 
can have negative implications. First, the approval process might lead to the adoption of a 
risk-averse regulatory strategy, as (new) products for which little guidance exists are more 
likely to receive a negative decision. This risk is counterbalanced by the credible threat of 
judicial review. The likeliness that a scientific assessment and the following political decision 
are challenged judicially is unequally distributed and thus represents an incomplete control 
mechanism. While negative decisions most likely will be challenged, the challenge of a 
positive decision must be seen as an exceptional case. Even if Krapohl and Gehring (2007: 
217) argue that an outvoted member of the CHMP could inform the Commission that a 
positive scientific assessment should actually be negative, this is highly unlikely. Since the 
work of the CHMP has a strongly personalized character, such behaviour would negatively 
impact on the personal reputation within the body. No alternative external public control is 
possible, since data restrictions prevent independent scientists from reviewing false positive 
assessments. Judicial review will therefore not necessarily result in effective control of the 
process, but serves as an additional mechanism to hold the committee accountable to the 
industry. This problematic aspect of the approval system could be mitigated, since the 
Commission and the Standing Committee can challenge a regulatory decision. Again, such 
corrective action is unlikely. The Commission would have to prove, that the scientific 
assessment of the CHMP was not based on the substantive criteria. Since the EMA was 
created with the intention to provide the Commission with the necessary expertise to 
effectively govern the sector, the Commission does not posses scientific capacities to 
challenge the initial expert assessments. In fact, it must be asked in how far the Commission 
and the Standing Committee are interested in challenging the CHMP assessment. This 
assumption can be drawn from the actual behaviour of the Commission in the political stage 
of approval:  
“in analysing the practice, one notes, for instance, that EMEA recommendations are systemically 
rubber-stamped by the Commission […]. This is hardly surprising. If an institution pooling the best 
expertise available at the European level warns against the dangers of a given pharmaceutical, the 
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‘political power’ could not ignore its advice without taking substantial risks.[original 
emphasis]”(Dehousse, 2008: 799).      
While data on the decision practice of the Standing Committee are lacking due to 
confidentiality, there is no reason to believe that the Committee will deviate from the initial 
decision. As in the case of the Commission, the body does not posses scientific resources and 
does not meet regularly, but decides on the Commission proposal in a written procedure. 
While the centralized procedure provides applicants with a stronger position in challenging 
negative decisions and can lead to insufficient consideration of false positive decisions this 
situation should not be confused with regulatory capture. A rapporteur is not able to bypass 
the underlying criteria, because such assessment would be challenged by his peers: the 
procedure does reduce regulatory (and unfortunately political) discretion in general and 
therefore the potential for capture irrespective of its nature.  
 
Control of the decentralized procedure and national regulators 
While the CHMP serves as the key actor in the governance of the centralized procedure, the 
decentralized procedure initially lacked a clear governance structure. The Mutual Recognition 
Facilitation Group (MRFG) was no formal body, but rather an ad-hoc group in charge of the 
arbitration process. In fact, this leaves the member states and more precisely the national 
regulatory agencies in charge of the process. The situation has been improved slightly with 
the introduction of the CMD(h). Comparing the two European procedures, CP and MRP/DP, 
the prevailing lack of governance and procedural steering becomes apparent.  
 
Control of the mutual recognition/decentralized procedure until the second revision  
Similar to the CP, the behaviour of national regulators is subjected to procedural rules and the 
underlying decision criteria. However, it lacks the self-binding instruments that the CHMP 
developed under the CP. While the MRFG developed comparable guidelines (Janse-de Hoog, 
2007: 347-348), these documents lack authority. Furthermore, these ex-ante controls are not 
supplemented by ex-post mechanisms, ensuring the same general level of compliance 
traceable in the centralised procedure. Considering the standard assessment process, national 
authorities are for the most part left by themselves. Only in case of arbitration the CHMP and 
subsequently the Commission and the Standing Committee interfere with the decision making 
process. Considering the comparatively low levels of arbitration under the MRP/DP 
procedure, this ex-post political control function is rarely activated. The element of European 
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judicial control and accountability is lacking as well. Licensing decisions under the MRP/DP 
are taken on the national level and therefore remain outside of the scope of the European 
courts, unless a decision has been made under the arbitration procedure. The lack of 
controlling mechanisms could lead to the assumption that the potential for capture increases. 
However, just because national regulators are not controlled by the ECJ and the Commission, 
this does not mean that they could sidestep the approval criteria. Heightened regulatory 
discretion under the MRP/DP procedure is still bound to the approval criteria, even though 
national regulators might find it easier to consider additional reasons in deciding on approval. 
Since the chance that a procedure reaches binding arbitration is relatively small, their 
assessments are not under ex-post scrutiny. It can be assumed, that the lack of external control 
would make it easier for an applicant to convince a Reference Member State (RMS) to license 
his product. Still he would have to convince the regulators of the Concerned Member States 
(CMS) to accept the initial assessment. While it is theoretically possible that an applicant will 
benefit from the lower level of control, regulatory discretion can easily turn against him. Not 
only the RMS, but the CMS as well can use regulatory discretion to block an application on 
other reasons that he officially claims and must not fear to be held accountable, even though 
the possibility for such behaviour has been reduced by the second revision, making arbitration 
mandatory. From this perspective, the underlying regulatory competition that hinders the 
smooth functioning and efficiency of mutual recognition, might serve as an additional lever of 
control and unintentionally contributes to the avoidance of capture.  
 
Control of the mutual recognition/decentralized procedure after the second revision  
While the changes of the decentralized procedure do not alter the underlying logic of the 
approval process when a product has already been approved in one member state (MRP), it 
strengthened the control and governance of the approval procedure. The newly created 
CMD(h) group provides a forum resembling the CHMP in the centralized procedure. 
Contributing to the overall mutual understanding of the approval process and by using the soft 
law approach it can reduce potential discretion in the decentralized procedure. Furthermore, 
the clarification of the potential serious risk claim by the European Commission (2006) 
reduces regulatory discretion of the CMS, even though it is unclear which consequences such 
crossing of boundaries will have. Another change is the fact, that ex-post control has been 
strengthened, since every potential serious risk claim will now be referred to the CHMP. 
While the creation of the CMD(h) can help to facilitate consensus between national regulators 
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it can not solve the underlying dilemma within the MRP: as soon as a CMS is convinced that 
he must claim a serious risk to health, there is (still) little incentive for him to revise his 
position after discussion in the newly founded committee. Nevertheless the revision of the 
MRP/DP has strengthened control and efficiency of the European approval regime. Control is 
strengthened, because national regulators now have the chance to develop a common position 
on applications rather than being confronted with a final decision. The new procedure is thus 
much closer to the centralized procedure. Even though the RMS will still be in charge of the 
assessment, he will not take his decision before he has engaged in dialogue with his peers 
(Broscheid & Feick, 2005: 24) and as in the case of the centralized procedure this peer-review 
mechanism will reduce the potential of agency drift. 
 
7.2.3.2.4 Intermediate result: effective approval procedures or captured regime?  
From the perspective of effectiveness, the new European approval system represents a mixed 
blessing in many respects. Starting off with the instalment of the EMA it must be 
acknowledged that it contributed significantly to the sectoral integration beyond mere legal 
harmonization. With the establishment of the EMA and the strengthening of the CHMP, the 
previously informal network of agencies has been aligned. With the instalment of the CP, for 
the first time a truly Europeanized application procedure is available. Despite remaining 
procedural problems, the MRP/DP, especially in case of a newly submitted product must be 
seen as a clear improvement to the previous procedures based on mutual recognition. 
Comparing the three possible authorization procedures regarding participation, transparency 
and accountability a clear rank order can be established. The CP represents the most advanced 
procedure, even though issues of participation remain. While the MRP/DP procedure has been 
improved during the second revision of the regulatory framework it still falls short compared 
to the CP, considering reduced transparency and accountability. 
Table 19: Regulatory principles within the approval regime (illustration) 
 Participation Transparency Accountability 
National + + + 
MRP/DP + ++ ++ 
CP + +++ +++ 
Source: author’s own, Note:  (+) low; (++) intermediate (+++): advanced 
Nevertheless, both European procedures are superior to purely national procedures given the 
(traceable) lack of transparency and accountability measures. The European approval regime 
thus represents a clear advancement to the fragmented governance approach before 1995.  
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These improvements are outweighed by several critical aspects. As it has been shown, the 
alignment of national regulators has not only been the result of the emerging European 
regulatory approach and the creation of a European peer group (Metcalfe, 2000: 136-137), but 
was forced through an increase in competition and financial dependence from the regulatees. 
Furthermore, the strong position of the CMHP within the regulatory process raises serious 
concerns regarding the legitimacy of the current regulatory regime. While regulators on the 
national level already enjoyed considerable discretion, this seems to be even more so the case 
within the centralized procedure. Given that under the current regime the only chance to stop 
a regulatory decision by the CHMP is based on scientific grounds, and this regulatory game 
has to be played against a body that has been created to concentrate pharmaceutical expertise 
on the European level, a sufficient level of political control and therefore legitimacy is called 
into question. While the new regime surely is efficient, it comes at a high price. Decisions are 
made by an isolated regulatory body based on an approval process with a potential 
authorization bias towards unsafe products, insufficiently tamed by political control 
mechanisms. 
 
7.2.3.3 The governance of manufacturing  
As in the case of clinical development, the governance of the manufacturing phase is based on 
licensing and monitoring mechanisms supervised by the EMA. The monitoring capacities of 
the European agency have been strengthened recently, with the instalment of the EudraGMP 
database, providing national agencies with the data on authorization holders administered by 
the EMA. In order to manufacture pharmaceutical products, producers must have a 
manufacturing license, granted through the EMA or the respective national agency. The 
production process is regulated through the respective legal provisions, the good 
manufacturing practice (GMP) guidelines compiled in Volume 4 of Eudralex and the 
specifications of the production process that have been submitted in order to obtain a 
manufacturing authorization. The regulatory framework clearly delineates the standards that 
manufacturers have to meet, but regulatory compliance is largely delegated to the respective 
producer. Manufacturers have to have a qualified person at their services and develop a fitting 
quality management system (QMS). While the continuous control of manufacturing is thus 
delegated to the regulatee, regulators can use the instrument of inspections, mandated by the 
EMA or the national competent agencies, to monitor compliance. In case of EMA inspections, 
inspections are mostly requested in context of a centralized authorization procedure and as a 
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general rule will be conducted by the RMS. The need for national inspections may either 
result from obligations under the decentralized procedure or represent routine or triggered 
inspections. Given the importance of GMP requirements for the quality assurance of 
pharmaceutical products inspections represent an important instrument to achieve compliance. 
Based on the comparatively elaborate regulatory framework, the monitoring function of 
regulatory authorities and the self-regulation and monitoring of manufacturers the risks 
stemming from production seem to be regulated adequately. On closer inspection, this finding 
must be corrected based on two main arguments.  
First, the effectiveness of the current monitoring approach must be questioned both on 
quantitative and qualitative grounds. Comprehensive data on the frequency of nation 
inspections is lacking and those European agencies issuing annual reports do not specify their 
inspection activities in most cases. A notable exception is the British regulatory agency 
MHRA. In 1998-99, the agency conducted 243 national inspections and 57 inspections in 
third countries (non EU/EEA) (J. Taylor et al., 2000). The general distribution of inspections 
remained stable with 214 national inspections and 42 in third countries in 2001/2002 (J. 
Taylor et al., 2003). Given that the UK is one of the member states with relatively strong 
national pharmaceutical production capacities, a strong agency and a fairly stable level of 
initiated approval procedures, it can be assumed that national GMP inspection levels will be 
lower in most of the other member states. While the focus of national authorities is on 
national inspections, inspections issued by the EMA show a reverse pattern. Between 1995 
and 2005, the EMA issued 35 inspections within the EEA and 400 in third countries (EMA, 
2007a). This amounts to an annual EMA inspection activity of 3.5 within the EU and 40 
within third countries, indicating a modest level of continuous monitoring.249 These 
inspection activities only involve products licensed under the centralized procedure, 
representing only a fraction of products currently on the European market. In addition, the 
current level of inspections of third countries can hardly be considered as sufficient given the 
increased trend of relocation of production capacities to China and India (Erdmann & Gabriel, 
2005: 41). More stringent monitoring and increased cooperation with local authorities based 
on mutual recognition agreements seem to be necessary given the higher level of critical 
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deficiencies in these countries.250 An additional drawback of the current regulatory practice 
must be seen in the fact that inspections are conducted on a regular and notified base, while 
spontaneous inspections remain the exception. The lack of supervision does not necessarily 
constitute a problem, given that pharmaceutical producers have an intrinsic interest in 
compliance in order to achieve the necessary product quality. While this (might) ensure that 
the production process is regulated sufficiently, this does not imply that a holistic regulation 
of possible quality problems is achieved.  
The second problem diminishing regulatory effectiveness regarding production must be seen 
in the lack of control of the pre-manufacturing phase and the production of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (API), representing input factors of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. Under the current regulation, the quality control of API is effectively 
delegated to the respective QP of the manufacturer. It is the manufacturer and more 
specifically the QP who must ensure that no inferior APIs are used in the production process. 
This regulatory approach is based on an outdated conceptualisation of the pharmaceutical 
sourcing process, ignoring the fact that sourcing became increasingly competitive and 
globalized. Private capacities to monitor the compliance of API producers, by inspecting 
those companies themselves, will vary tremendously, especially in case of SMEs with limited 
resources. Instead, they will rely on existing certificates of API producers, issued by the local 
agencies, the FDA or the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines & HealthCare 
(EDQM).251 As recent incidents have shown, this licensing mechanism – even in the case of 
those certificates issued by the FDA – does not prevent the entering of poor quality API into 
the manufacturing process (Kaufman, 2008).252 The quantity of FDA inspections has been 
lacking (Barnes, 2006) and the effects of national inspections in China must be questioned as 
well.253 The impact of this insufficient self-regulatory mechanism on European manufacturers 
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 The FDA might serve as a valuable example in this matter as it recently opened up a bureau in China to 
conduct GMP inspections more effectively and considered to open another one in India (Erdmann & Gabriel, 
2005: 44). A problem for mutual recognition of inspections is the different level of qualification, especially in 
China. The FDA and the EMA are currently developing a new strategy to improve the efficiency of their 
third country inspections. 
251
 While the EDQM is mainly responsible for the European pharmacopeia, it has been granted the power to 
issue certificates for APIs. Judging from the number of conducted inspections, with approximately 30 annual 
inspections worldwide in the period of 1999-2009 (Keitel, 2010), the perceived lack of effective policing 
prevails.  
252
 In the case referred to, contaminated Heparin entered the US market (Laurencin & Nair, 2008). The 
investigation revealed that the FDA confused the API producer and therefore did not inspect the right 
production site (Wechsler, 2008).  
253
 In 2007, the head of the Chinese agency was sentenced to death, after a large scale bribe scandal was 
uncovered (van den Bos, 2009; Watts, 2007)  
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has been highlighted recently by several (industrial) interest groups, pushing the EMA and the 
EDQM to engage in stronger regulatory activity in the API sector as  
“the quality of our medicines is compromised and the noncompliant operator is likely to continue 
business in the EU undetected. Many thousands of manufacturing plants for off-patent APIs in those 
non-EU countries are unlikely to have ever been inspected by an EU official. For the majority of EU 
medicines containing off-patent APIs the authorities have not confirmed (through their inspections of 
the API manufacturers or traders) that the APIs are Q7A-compliant and safe. Curiously, although most 
of the APIs come from Asia, the majority of inspections by EU inspectors are conducted in Europe” 
(Villax & Oldenhof, 2007: 46). 
Considering the identified deficiencies it must be concluded, that the regulation of production 
is only partially able to ensure the quality of pharmaceutical products. The reason for this can 
be seen in an inadequate problem framing and the lack of public regulatory involvement. 
 
7.2.3.4 The governance of distribution  
As the analysis of the European regulatory framework already indicated, the regulation of 
pharmaceutical distribution is only narrowly defined and is (still) mainly based on a directive 
released in the early 1990s. The European regulatory approach is based on a licensing 
mechanism. Wholesalers need a national license to engage in business activities. The basic 
requirements to obtain such a permit resemble the requirements set out in the area of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing. Wholesalers need to employ a QP and to ensure the 
appropriate storage and monitoring of pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, they are 
expected to comply with the requirements set out in directive No. 92/25/EEC and the 
guidelines on good distributional practice GDP. The most decisive requirement from the 
perspective of public health is that wholesalers must provide an emergency plan for the recall 
of pharmaceuticals in case of an authorization suspension or market withdrawal and keep 
detailed records of incoming and outgoing quantities. The regulatory framework thus seems to 
provide the necessary rules to ensure the quality and safety of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain.254 
Yet the achievement of compliance in the distribution sector must be questioned. In contrast 
to the other regulatory phases, the EMA only recently has been granted a very limited 
function in the regulation of distribution and does not engage in the monitoring of 
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 National regulators are authorized to put additional requirements on wholesalers (Macarthur, 2007a).  
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regulatees.255 As in the case of products authorized through national procedures, the 
monitoring of wholesalers remains mostly within the competencies of member states. 
National authorities grant wholesaling licenses and are responsible for the supervision and 
monitoring of the wholesalers and their compliance with regulatory requirements. Like 
manufacturing and clinical development, distributional activities have been increasingly 
Europeanized and transformed. Distribution can no longer be reduced to the transfer of 
products from manufacturers to dispensing units, but increasingly involves trading activities 
between wholesalers as well as parallel trade and parallel distribution (Chaudhry & Walsh, 
1995). Such trading activities lead to repackaging and relabeling of products in order to 
comply with the (un-harmonized) national marketing requirements (Armengod & 
Baudenbacher, 2009). With an increase in trade, the number of potential actors in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain increases. At the same time, the capacity to monitor the quality 
of pharmaceuticals continuously decreases (Arfwedson, 2004). Since there are currently no 
regulatory obligations to use authentication mechanism in the manufacturing of products, 
tracking products throughout the distribution system is becoming an increasingly complex 
task (Lancaster, 2007: 5). The stretching of supply chains can result in potential quality risks 
if storage requirements are not met (Bishara, 2006). As in the case of manufacturing the 
probability of quality issues is aggravated by the potential lack of monitoring of wholesalers 
by national authorities. It remains within the discretion of member states to conduct 
inspections and given the lack of involvement of the EMA, the sharing of information 
depends on bilateral coordination. Comprehensive data on national inspection level of GDP 
compliance is lacking, but the assertion that the current regulatory approach is insufficient is 
substantiated by current incidents for example counterfeit medicine found in British 
pharmacies and the detection of fake drugs manufactured in Italy (Partnership for Safe 
Medicines, 2005; WHO, 2010a). In light of these incidents, the lack of monitoring and 
cooperation between national authorities does not only lead to a potential risk for the quality 
of pharmaceuticals, but increases the chances that counterfeit pharmaceuticals enter the 
(traditional) distribution channel (Walser & Mierzewski, 2008).  
While counterfeit medicines have been considered a “third world problem” (Juillet & Vlasto, 
2005: 461) for a long time, the topic has recently risen in political salience when 
Commissioner Gunther Verheugen stated that in 2008, within only two months 34 millions of 
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7.2 Evaluation of the regulatory regime 
 
217 
fake drugs were seized by European customs (AFP, 2009).256 An alternative number is 
provided by the IMPACT task force of the WHO estimating that around one percent of 
pharmaceuticals marketed within Europe are fake (Impact, 2006: 1). The amount of 
counterfeit medicines in traditional distribution channels seems to represent a serious public 
health threat.257 Providing a more detailed perspective, the Harper report issued by the 
Council of Europe in 2006, investigated the link between counterfeit medicine and 
distribution.258 The interviewed stakeholder groups identified the insufficient control of the 
distribution chain and the increase of trading activities between wholesalers as the main 
reasons for the recent emergence of counterfeit medicine in European traditional distribution 
chains. Beyond the insufficient control of distribution channels, the lack of criminal sanctions 
and the high profit margins have been identified as a reason for the attractiveness of 
counterfeiting pharmaceuticals (Harper & Gellie, 2006: 34-35). While improvements in the 
control of traditional distribution channels are important, the real threat to public health must 
be seen in the existence of alternative distribution channels. Bypassing regulated channels, 
direct internet-based trade accounts for the majority of counterfeit medicine entering the EU 
(Schweim & Schweim, 2009: 163).  
E-commerce of pharmaceuticals has evolved slowly within Europe, but has gained speed after 
the decision in the Doc Morris case by the ECJ (C-322/01), confirming the legality of internet 
pharmacies (Orizio et al., 2009: 375). However, national provisions still differ resulting in an 
uneven diffusion of internet pharmacies in the member states. The inherent problem of 
internet trade is obvious: in contrast to regular distribution channels, “pharmaceutical flow via 
online markets is impossible to supervise effectively” (Mäkinen et al., 2005: 246) and clearly 
transcends the European dimension. Furthermore, effective regulation is complicated by the 
fact that the number of operating e-pharmacies is hard to pinpoint and subject to fluctuations. 
While there are legally operating internet pharmacies subjected to the same regulations 
applying to regular pharmacies and therefore not posing a specific risk to public health 
(Mäkinen et al., 2005: 251) the more immanent threat of counterfeit medicine does result 
from rogue pharmacies (Bostwick & Lineberry, 2007). Rogue pharmacies offer 
pharmaceuticals without prescription and knowledge of the medical history of the ordering 
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 This number does account for all counterfeit drugs and not only for those entering the distributional chain. 
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 It must be acknowledged that the occurrence of this phenomenon within the EU – based on the preliminary 
evidence available – is still limited (Macarthur, 2007a; Spielberg, 2009). The recent political discussion on 
the European level has been mainly stimulated by vested interests and must be interpreted in context of the 
latest (ongoing) revision of the pharmaceutical framework started in late 2007.  
258
 As in the case of manufacturing inspections, only few national agencies publish their inspection activities and 
in those cases where data is available no distinction between GMP and GDP inspections is made. 
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person. The distinction between lawfully operated e-pharmacies and rogue pharmacies is 
often blurred rather than clear cut and even more so from a consumers’ perspective (Schweim 
& Schweim, 2009). The problems with the majority of internet pharmacies are manifold. In 
analyzing 104 internet pharmacies out of which 67 percent delivered internationally, Tracey 
Bessell and her colleagues (2002) identified several shortcomings compiled in the following 
table. 
Table 20: Common problems of e-pharmacies (n=104) 
Issue Percentage 
Displayed addresses 61% 
Displayed any health information 60% 
Promoted the availability of pharmacist’s advice 42% 
Displayed privacy statements 40% 
Unidentified country of origin 21% 
Advertised prescription-only medicines 20% 
Sold prescription-only medicines without a prescription 19% 
Displayed quality accreditation seals 12% 
Offered online prescribing 12% 
Displayed last date of update 12% 
Source: adapted from Bessell et al. 2002 
Results from a more recent European study by a research team led by Grazia Orisio (2009) 
surveying 118 online pharmacies does amplify raised concerns: less than half of the 
pharmacies did provide a physical address, one third did not ask for medical history of the 
ordering person and health information, most importantly concerning potential side effects, 
was lacking in general. In addition, 81,4 percent of e-pharmacies were delivering prescription 
medicine without asking for prescription (2009: 375-376).  
Reconsidering the governance of pharmaceutical distribution it must be concluded, that the 
comparatively narrow requirements entailed in the regulatory framework are not mitigated by 
a strong governance approach. While the pharmaceutical supply chain is regulated based on 
national licensing mechanisms, continuous monitoring accounting for the changing nature of 
distribution is not possible under the current regulatory approach. Increased trade of 
pharmaceuticals can negatively impact on the quality of pharmaceutical products and the 
multiplicity of actors along the distribution chain increases the chances of counterfeit 
medicine entering distribution channels. The current approach suffers from a lack of 
cooperation between national regulators, the EMA, manufacturers, wholesalers and 
pharmacies. Beyond the lack of regulatory activity connected to the traditional supply chain, 
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the current regulatory regime does not address the public health threats outside traditional 
supply.259  
 
7.2.3.5 The governance of information  
In assessing the changes in the governance of information, two aspects need to be considered: 
the information on the work of the agency network (1) and the information provided to 
patients (2). 
  
7.2.3.5.1 Information on agency operations 
When the EMA was installed in 1995, the mandate of the new agency included a strong 
commitment to an active information policy. This commitment did not only cover the work of 
the European agency, but expanded to the national authorities as well. Increased involvement 
and adaptive pressure within the regulatory network led to the adoption of a more active 
national information policy: the publication of annual reports by national agencies, for 
example, today is considered a standard but this has not been the case before 1995. 
Nevertheless, different levels of information on national regulatory activities prevail. While 
some agencies take a very proactive information approach on their regulatory activity, others 
provide only minimum information. National differences are exemplified by the level of detail 
of annual reports. Some agencies do not publish annual reports but merely statistics 
(Germany), or no reports at all, as in the case of Greece. If national agencies publish reports, 
the number of pages in the document range from 5 (Luxembourg) to 120 (France).260 While 
these differences are influenced by the respective scope of the agencies and national 
information laws, they still reflect different and prevailing approaches to information and 
transparency of national agencies within the European governance structure.  
The availability of information on agency operations depends on the degree of European (and 
EMA) involvement. Under the centralized procedure and regarding the work of the CHMP, 
the availability of information is much better, compared to the activities under the 
decentralized procedure.261 Despite improvements, it must be acknowledged that the 
governance approach is still reactive. Much information remains disclosed and is only 
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 Moreover, the lack of cooperation between regulatory agencies and European customs authorities represents 
an additional challenge (Cockburn et al., 2005).   
260
 These numbers are based on the annual reports published in 2007 and 2008. 
261
 The Heads of Medicines Agencies group at least provides additional information on the functioning of the 
procedures based on mutual recognition on its website (http://www.hma.eu/).  
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revealed on a need to know basis, with the EMA acting under considerable discretion (Anon, 
2010a). This deficiency is reconfirmed by the recent investigation of the European 
Ombudsman into the information policy of the agency. Based on a complaint by an Irish 
citizen, whose request for reports on the adverse reactions of an authorized drug was refused 
by the EMA, European Ombudsman Nikiforos Diamandouros asked the agency to revise its 
current approach and adopt a more proactive information policy (Anon, 2010a: 1753). 
Considering the reluctant position in the past, however, it remains to be seen in how far the 
EMA will adopt such a proactive approach in face of increased public pressure (Sukkar, 
2010).  
  
7.2.3.5.2 Provision of product-related information 
The consumption of pharmaceuticals involves the risk of unwanted side effects. A second risk 
from the perspective of public health is wrong consumption. Advice by dispensing physicians 
and pharmacists plays a decisive role in reducing these risks. While the doctor-patient and 
patient-pharmacist relationship is still vital, the traditionally hierarchical constellation seems 
to erode gradually, with more demanding and critical patients increasingly searching for 
alternative sources of health information (Ball & Lillis, 2001; Deccache & Aujoulat, 2001; 
Visser et al., 2001). Reliable information beyond the advice of doctors and pharmacists 
regarding pharmaceutical products is important because pharmaceuticals are normally not 
consumed under supervision. Accordingly, written medical information accompanying the 
product serves as an important additional lever to inform patients and achieve compliance.262 
European regulation has been instrumental in their introduction and the improvement of 
information entailed in these leaflets. Notably, the most recent revision of the pharmaceutical 
code has made prior testing of package leaflets mandatory in order to achieve a higher 
usability of such information (Fuchs et al., 2007). Beyond the provisions entailed in the 
framework, the EMA and the respective ad hoc group support the continuous improvement of 
patient information by developing guidelines for package information. The expansion of 
European activities and the involvement of the EMA improved the availability of product 
information, but problems with written information remain. Current European standards result 
in lengthy and complex leaflets, hard to understand for the lay public and overemphasizing 
negative information resulting in potentially reduced patient compliance instead of safer 
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 Another important aspect of product related information has been the reduction of potential confusion of drug 
names, and the EMA has played a crucial role in this matter as well (Hoffman & Proulx, 2003).     
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consumption (Fuchs et al., 2007; Pander Maat & Lentz, 2010; Verdú & Castellá, 2004).263 
Additionally, leaflets only reflect the information available at the time of writing. In light of 
these findings, the reliance on package leaflets as the main mechanism to inform patients 
seems to be insufficient and does not necessarily satisfy patient’s informational needs 
(Dickinson et al., 2003: 861). In this context, the internet plays an increasingly important role, 
representing an invaluable source of information for patients (Benigeri & Pluye, 2003; Närhi, 
2007; Trotter & Morgan, 2008).  
 
7.2.3.5.3 Providing pharmaceutical information through the internet 
As in the case of rogue pharmacies, it is virtually impossible to control product related 
information available on the internet (Valverde, 2001). Hence, it is necessary to provide 
reliable and unbiased information to the public and ensure that people can distinguish between 
reliable and misleading sources of information. This task goes well beyond the provision of 
information on pharmaceutical products but is relevant regarding e-health in more general 
terms as patients are “both too much and too poorly informed” (Deccache & Aujoulat, 2001: 
13). Focusing on pharmaceutical product information, national regulatory agencies and the 
EMA play a crucial role. While product information by producers – considering the fact that 
advertising for prescription medicine is not allowed under the current regime – always is 
potentially biased, regulatory agencies can assume the position of a neutral arbiter of 
information: beyond the provision of updated product information, regulatory agencies could 
advance the understanding of pharmaceutical risks in more general terms and provide 
contextual information on the risks and benefits of certain products. The current European 
regulatory approach and most national regulatory philosophies pose an obstacle to the 
fulfilment of this role. Regulators only reluctantly involve the public, affecting the potential to 
proactively communicate with the public (Schofield, 2009; Slijkerman, 2009; Vitry et al., 
2009). Given this long standing practice and the shortage of regulatory capacities, especially 
outside the field of application management, the majority of agencies do not have the 
organisational capacities to communicate proactively. While the introduction of the 
EudraPharm database and the equivalent database for products authorized under the 
decentralized procedure provides the public with basic and updated product information, the 
provision of information in more general terms depends on national capabilities and an 
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according regulatory culture. The role of communication functions seems to focus on the 
processing of standard informational request rather than providing the public at large with 
information. This reflects the lack of public orientation of pharmaceutical regulators, not 
necessarily viewing the provision of information to patients as one of their core tasks. This 
assertion is supported by the current practice of national regulators regarding the provision of 
information through their websites considering both data availability and accessibility.   
 
7.2.3.5.4 Provision of information on national regulatory agency websites  
The following table provides an overview on basic data available on national agencies 
websites.264 Five indicators were used to assess the level of information. The first two 
indicators assess the accessibility of the homepages from the perspective of the lay public: the 
availability of a specific patient portal (1) and the certification of the website as a source of 
trusted information (2).265 The following three indicators assess the availability of standard 
information on pharmaceutical products: a register of marketed drugs (3), the Summary of 
Product Characteristics SPC (4) and the Package Information Leaflet (PIL) (5).266 Most 
notably, the majority of national agencies and the EMA do not employ certificates which 
would make it easier for the public to identify the homepages as a source of trusted 
information. In addition, specific sites for the public are no common feature of regulatory 
websites. From the perspective of information availability, the majority of national agencies 
provide basic information to the public. Comparing these findings to previously conducted 
studies, the situation did improve, at least regarding the availability of information (Närhi, 
2006; Vitry et al., 2008). Despite these improvements, the comparatively low level of 
accessibility of the regulatory agency websites reduces patients’ ability to find necessary 
information.      
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 Data was compiled based on the regular and the English sections of agency websites. No data was available 
for Cyprus.     
265
 The Health on Net Code (HON) was used, representing an established standard in health care (Boyer et al., 
1998). 
266
 To determine the availability of PIL and SPC, the search function of databases was used. Paracetamol, a 
pharmaceutical commonly used to treat headache, was used as a search term. Results thus do not indicate that 
the same level of information on PILs and SPCs is available in all member states.   
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Table 21:  Provision of information on national authorities' websites 
 
Accessibility Availability 
 
HON Code Consumer site Product Register SPC PIL 
Austria No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Belgium No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Denmark  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finland No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
France  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Germany Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Greece No No No No No 
Ireland No No Yes Yes No 
Italy No Yes Yes No No 
Luxembourg No No No No No 
Netherlands No No Yes Yes Yes 
Portugal No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spain No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UK No Yes No No No 
Bulgaria No Yes Yes No No 
Czech republic No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estonia No No Yes Yes Yes 
Hungary No No Yes Yes Yes 
Latvia No No Yes Yes Yes 
Lithuania No No Yes No Yes 
Malta No No Yes Yes Yes 
Poland No No Yes Yes Yes 
Romania No No Yes Yes Yes 
Slovenia  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Slovakia No No Yes Yes Yes 
EMA No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ratio Yes/Total 3/27 13/27 24/27 21/27 21/27 
Source: national agency websites (accessed 23 December, 2009); Note: SPC: Summary of Product Characteristics; PIL: 
Package Information Leaflet 
 
7.2.3.6 The monitoring of pharmaceutical risks  
While national monitoring systems existed prior to 1995, no stringent governance of 
pharmacovigilance was traceable throughout the European Union. In light of insufficient 
alignment, one of the reasons for the creation of the European agency has been the 
strengthening of the European pharmacovigilance system, resulting in a comparatively strong 
formal role in the monitoring of pharmaceutical risks.267 The EMA is responsible for the 
pharmacovigilance of pharmaceuticals authorized under the centralized procedure and has a 
comparatively strong supervising function regarding products authorized under the 
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decentralized procedures. Three different governance aspects of pharmacovigilance can be 
separated: the collection of pharmacovigilance data (1), the evaluation and decision (2) and 
the regulatory actions (3). Building on the national pharmacovigilance systems, the new 
European governance approach is based on shared responsibilities between the competent 
national authorities, the EMA and market authorization holders. The monitoring of 
pharmaceutical risks is achieved by relying on organisational requirements as well as 
monitoring and reporting obligations. In addition, private and public stakeholders are 
involved in the collection of pharmacovigilance data.  
 
7.2.3.6.1 Detection of safety issues and regulatory action 
The gathering of pharmacovigilance data is based on several different mechanisms. The most 
important one is spontaneous reporting of adverse events. Reports are generated by patients or 
doctors, encountering adverse events related to pharmaceutical consumption. The reporting of 
such signals is organized differently in the member states.268 Market authorization holders 
(MAH) are obliged to collect ADR signals as well. While the EMA does not operate an 
additional reporting scheme, it collects the reports gathered by national authorities within the 
EudraVigilance system, allowing for the rapid exchange of signals between MAH and 
national authorities. This system is supplemented by the rapid alert system (RAS) based on 
the Eudranet system. The RAS is used by national authorities to share their perspective 
concerning a specific product and developments altering its risk-benefit profile, making a 
subsequent decision necessary. The partial delegation of monitoring tasks to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers is based on the same concept employed in the other governance fields. 
Companies are required to employ a qualified person (QP) responsible for the development of 
a system to track and process pharmacovigilance data and the implementation of reporting 
requirements. Moreover, producers are obliged to compile Periodic Safety Update Reports 
(PSURS) in defined intervals, perform literature researches and conduct voluntary or 
mandated safety studies (Härmark & van Grootheest, 2008). These requirements are 
supplemented by the competence of national agencies and the EMA, for centralized products, 
to conduct pharmacovigilance inspections. In case of non-compliance, agencies are authorized 
to penalize regulatees. With the adoption of the new risk management strategy, the stringency 
of the different mechanisms and requirements has been strengthened further. Authorization 
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 While some member states, as Ireland, allow for direct reporting of patients, the majority of member states 
restrict the generation of signals to doctors (Blenkinsopp et al., 2007). In addition, some countries authorize 
pharmacists to report events (van Grootheest et al., 2004).   
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holders now have to provide detailed plans how to ensure, that the risks and benefits 
associated to a newly authorized product is constantly evaluated and which additional steps 
they will take to safeguard public health (Andrew et al., 2008; Hagemann, 2009).  
 
7.2.3.6.2 Evaluation of signals and decision on regulatory measures 
Based on the available information, national agencies, the EMA and market authorization 
holders engage in activities to detect safety signals, necessitating a re-evaluation of the 
previously established risk-benefit ratio of a pharmaceutical product.269 Based on detected 
safety signals, assessments must be conducted. For products authorized under the centralized 
procedure, the (original) rapporteur is responsible for the assessment of safety signals. Under 
the decentralized procedure, the reference member state will conduct this assessment. Under 
both procedures, the CHMP’s Pharmacovigilance Working Party (PhVWP) can be asked for 
additional (non-binding) scientific advice. The CHMP forms an opinion, which is 
subsequently referred to the Commission for a decision. This decision has to be implemented 
by the member states. Under the centralized procedure, the rapporteur based on his 
assessment asks the CHMP for an opinion, leading to a Commission decision. While 
regulatory authorities can initiate such an assessment, the current regulatory approach 
provides the market authorization holder with the possibility to take voluntary measures.  
 
7.2.3.6.3 Regulatory actions, implementation and communication 
If a signal is detected and regulatory action is necessary, different instruments can be applied. 
The market authorization holder can be asked to apply for a variation of the market 
authorization, modifying the existing authorization. If this does not suffice, the market 
authorization can be suspended, revoked or withdrawn. During the decision process, 
competent authorities are authorized to take urgent safety measures in order to protect the 
public health, for example by conducting pharmacovigilance inspections or restricting 
prescription status. If the market holder forestalls regulatory intervention, he can either apply 
for a variation of the market authorization or withdraw the product voluntarily. While a swift 
decision on safety matters is important, the clear communication of the decision is vital in 
order to prevent more patients from exposure to a dangerous drug. Again this is a shared 
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 Different methods and tools are used to detect safety signals employing for example data mining techniques 
and additional studies. For an overview see (Hauben et al., 2007; Lindquist et al., 2000; Meyboom et al., 
2002; Segal et al., 2005)  
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responsibility between the EMA, competent national authorities and the market authorization 
holder. The MAH is obliged to publish a dear doctor letter informing health professionals 
while regulators can provide information on their homepages or in specific publications (drug 
bulletins).  
 
7.2.3.6.4 Effectiveness of post-authorization safety monitoring 
The new European governance approach to post-authorization monitoring built around the 
EMA represents a remarkable shift from the predominantly national and voluntary system. 
While the new regulatory regime builds on existing national spontaneous reporting systems, 
harmonized and more stringent reporting requirements as well as the improved exchange of 
information within the regulatory network improved the monitoring capacities. 
Notwithstanding these important changes, the predominantly positive assessment of post-
market monitoring of pharmaceutical risk within the European Union must be corrected. 
Regulatory developments have mainly resulted in improvements in the collection of new 
ADRs, while the following aspects of post-market monitoring remained outside the scope (de 
Abajo, 2005). Judging from the trends in ADR reporting, the introduction of more stringent 
reporting requirements has led to an increase of reported incidence over time. The reasons for 
this trend and the conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness of post-market 
surveillance are, however, unclear. Moreover quantity does not necessarily translate into 
quality. The more information is collected, the more the analysis of the data is complicated, 
reducing the value of ADR reporting (Waller & Evans, 2003: 19-20). Even though the 
limitations of ADR reporting have been recognized by regulatory authorities, it remains the 
corner stone of the current monitoring approach. It has been increasingly supplemented with 
alternative methods to detect adverse reactions, including literature research, prescription 
event monitoring and (mandatory) post-marketing studies (Rupalla & Jarrett, 2003). The 
usage of such tools has been strengthened with the introduction of risk management plans in 
Europe (Kermani, 2009), requiring pharmaceutical producers to propose activities to establish 
a sound risk-benefit ratio after market approval. Yet the responsibility to perform such 
investigations rests mainly with the producer (Ladds, 2007).  
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Graph 24: Reported adverse drug reactions 1998-2008 
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Source: EMA annual reports  
 
7.2.3.6.5 Delegation of post-market surveillance and the regulatee’s dilemma 
Even though the delegation of signal detection to the pharmaceutical industry represents a 
flexible regulatory approach, the current practice must be viewed as problematic. It puts 
considerable regulatory costs on pharmaceutical producers, adding to the already substantial 
expenditures in order to comply with regulatory requirements. Evidently, it is the 
pharmaceutical industry that should pay for the monitoring of pharmaceutical risks, yet it 
must be asked if the current approach is efficient and specific enough. This problem is 
exemplified in the employment of PSURs. The current approach does mandate the regular 
compilation, irrespective of the already established risk-benefit ratio of a given product 
(Klepper, 2004). In addition, it is based on the assumption that pharmaceutical manufacturers 
will voluntarily comply with regulation and reporting requirements. The regulatee is however 
confronted with a potential dilemma: prolonging the timeframe of continuous safety 
monitoring increases the time of unrestricted marketing of the product. If it turns out that the 
producer was aware of a risk and harm could have been prevented, this will lead to a 
reputation loss. Current changes in the European pharmaceutical framework and the 
introduction of risk management plans surely contribute to the minimization of such 
behaviour, but there is still reason to believe, that compliance regarding post-market 
commitments is lacking. Evidence from the US market shows, that compliance with post-
market commitments is at least suboptimal (Avorn, 2007; Okie, 2005; Sharma, 2009). While 
no comparable assessment of compliance for the European market and products under the 
centralized procedure exists, data from 2005 compiled by the UK regulator showed 
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comparable results as “of 115 studies in the MHRA registry, one-third have been completed, 
one-third are incomplete and one-third have not been started” (Breckenridge et al., 2005: 3). 
Despite the introduction of the risk management concept during the second revision of the 
framework, making post-authorization requirements more stringent, the compliance issue is 
still prevalent (Breckenridge, 2008). The potential problems cannot be solely attributed to a 
perceived lack of willingness of regulatees. Two contributing factors stemming from the 
governance approach must be acknowledged as well: a lack of active surveillance and limited 
enforcement capacities on behalf of the regulators.  
 
7.2.3.6.6 Delegation of responsibility without monitoring compliance 
National regulators are expected to monitor the reporting requirements of pharmaceutical 
companies and ensure that manufacturers comply with the organisation requirements. Despite 
these legal obligations, national regulators did not pursue proactive monitoring, especially in 
the first years of the new European regime:  
“In general time frames for reporting are relatively loosely handled […] Although Competent 
Authorities are concerned about time frames we are not aware of any company that has received a 
formal warning or has been questioned for untimely reporting by European Competent Authorities 
unless reporting time frames were consistently and significantly exceeded months from first notice.” 
(Koster et al., 2000: 476) 
Similar problems were experienced regarding pharmacovigilance inspections. In a survey of 
sixteen European countries, Gysele Bleumink and her colleagues found that the majority of 
member states did not conduct inspections. Countries employing pharmacovigilance 
inspections focused mainly on organisational aspects and conducted such inspections 
irregularly (2001: 339-340). A follow-up study in 2005 by Maria Koster and Anita van den 
Oetelaar showed little improvement, with only half of the fifteen surveyed European countries 
conducting specific pharmacovigilance inspections (Koster & Oetelaar, 2005). Assessing the 
effectiveness of pharmacovigilance activities after the legislative review in 2005 is 
complicated by the fact that data and research on the conduct of pharmacovigilance in Europe 
is scarce. The MHRA represents a notable exception, making pharmacovigilance metrics 
since 2006 publicly available on their website. Two conclusions can be drawn from the data. 
Pharmacovigilance monitoring in the UK has increased significantly from 75 inspections 
conducted in 2006 to 121 in 2009. During the same period the average number of findings per 
inspection decreased (MHRA, 2009: 8). Judging from this (very) limited evidence, increased 
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inspection activities seems to contribute to regulatory compliance. Unfortunately, the UK 
experience might not reflect the European regulatory reality. The MHRA clearly represents a 
precursor in pharmacovigilance, both from a ‘philosophical’ and practical perspective. 
Members of the agency, most notably Alisdair Breckenridge, have continuously contributed 
to the scientific discussion of pharmacovigilance and compliance (Breckenridge, 2004, 2008; 
Breckenridge & Woods, 2005). More decisively, the agency dedicated considerable resources 
to pharmacovigilance activities. While the reluctance to adopt a more proactive approach to 
post-market monitoring can be partially attributed to the differences in regulatory culture, 
difference in resources must be considered as well.  
Traditionally, national regulators dedicated their resources almost exclusively to the pre-
market aspects and approval, while post-authorization activities including monitoring, 
pharmacovigilance and the issuance of variations have been largely treated as an 
administrative process. While more recent data on the distribution of resources within 
agencies is not available, a report of the Fraunhofer institute, assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the European pharmacovigilance system, provides data for 2005. Drawing on 
interviews with national agencies, the report identified considerable variation regarding the 
pharmacovigilance resource.  
Table 22: National pharmacovigilance resources (2005) 
 Pharmacovigilance staff in national regulatory 
authorities (FTE per million capita) 
Minimum  0,2 
Median 0,772 
Maximum 4,6 
 Source: adapted from Bührlen et al. (2006)  
The numbers correspond with the findings of a survey conducted by the HMA group in 2004 
highlighting the imbalanced staff situation ”with less than 10% monitoring industry 
compliance and very few engaged in audit of pharmacovigilance action.” (HMA, 2005: 2). 
Both the relatively low level and the national differences of regulatory resources do point to 
the fact that the increased importance of pharmacovigilance within the lifecycle approach to 
drug safety is not reflected in staffing levels.270 Moreover, the lack of pharmacovigilance 
resources points to a general understaffing of national agencies negatively affecting the 
conduct of post-authorization monitoring and the regulation of the sectors as a whole (Anon, 
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 The improvement of pharmacovigilance does not only depend on staffing but better trained experts and the 
increased employment of statisticians in regulatory agencies more specifically (Eichler et al., 2010; Jones, 
1992; Skovlund, 2009).  
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2006c).271 The lack of effective sanctioning mechanisms, or a reluctance to use these 
mechanisms on the national level reduced effectiveness (Wiktorowicz et al., 2008: 18). It 
remains to be seen, if the recent changes in the regulatory framework granting the EMA with 
sanctioning powers in case of non-compliance with regulatory obligations will fulfil its 
purpose or ”may prove to be a big stick that is rarely used” (Killick, 2007). While the lack of 
regulatory resources aggravates the compliance problems in post-authorization monitoring, it 
also decreases regulatory capacities to engage in analysis of potential safety signals, 
supplementing industrial activities. As in the case of pharmacovigilance inspections, the 
capacities to carry out post-authorization research, for example, data mining, prescription 
event monitoring and meta-analysis, are unevenly distributed throughout the Union. Many 
agencies do not have sufficient pharmacoepidemiologic resources to conduct independent 
research and signal assessment.272 Furthermore, the conduct of meaningful post- authorization 
research is contingent upon the respective infrastructure and databases. Independent academic 
research can play an important role in supplementing information for risk benefit assessment, 
but limited resources and data shortages due to confidentiality prevail. Furthermore, study 
results are often criticized on theoretical grounds by the respective market authorization 
holder. On the other hand, safety studies conducted by independent experts and sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies, have been found to produce positive results downplaying safety 
concerns (Blumsohn, 2007). Problems of data generation result in a problematic decision 
basis for regulatory agencies, drawing largely on evidence from spontaneous reporting 
systems (Clarke et al., 2006). Since this data represents a lower level in the hierarchy of 
evidence, the quality of resulting decisions, is potentially biased and subjected to a larger 
margin of interpretation rather then scientific evidence.   
 
7.2.3.6.7 Problems of post-market decision-making 
While the quality of decision-making is hampered by the limitations of data underpinning 
regulatory decisions in the post-market, additional problems from a procedural and 
institutional perspective exist. The regulatory decision process is confronted with a 
problematic constellation of interests, resembling the regulatee’s dilemma regarding the 
identification of signals. Regulators are confronted with the public perception that authorized 
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 The problem of understaffing has been raised by industrial officials highlighting the increased complexity of 
the regulatory task and the possible negative effects on the efficiency and speed of the regulatory process 
(Anon, 2008b).  
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 This problem has been recognized lately and triggered the creation of a new European Network of Centres 
for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance (ENCEPP).  
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drugs are (absolutely) safe. Notwithstanding the fact that this is an unrealistic perception, 
regulators will try to support the safety claim. If a regulator is confronted with a safety signal, 
he has the ethical and moral obligation to react. At the same time, the withdrawal of a product 
can potentially undermine his public reputation, especially if he is exposed to media attention. 
Obviously, a lack of action can potentially lead to more severe consequences in the long run 
and even higher levels of public criticism, if a regulatory failure is detected. As a result, a 
rational regulator might adapt a specific regulatory strategy in the governance of post-
authorization surveillance: he will try to accumulate as much evidence as possible before far 
reaching regulatory measures (withdrawal) will be invoked and rather employ softer measures 
to regulate post-market safety (variations). The possibility to pursue such a strategy is 
supported by the institutional set-up of the process and the prevalent low level of 
transparency. In contrast to the centralized authorization procedure, accountability measures 
as well as clear decision criteria are largely absent from the post-authorization decision 
process (Hughes et al., 2007; Meyboom et al., 2002). Considering the fact that the decisions 
will be largely based on spontaneous reporting, providing the regulator with even more room 
for interpretation, regulatory discretion in the assessment of risk-benefit ratios is increased. 
Since information on potential risks as well as information on the decision process is, based 
on confidentiality arguments, either not publicly available or only available in highly 
aggregated form, external control is reduced even further.273 Drawing on the available data on 
regulatory action in the post-authorization stage, supportive evidence for the assumption of an 
expectant approach to post-authorization decision-making can be found. While the number of 
safety related referrals to the CHMP in the post-authorization stage has remained fairly 
constant, the regulatory network increasingly employs the instrument of safety reviews to 
establish a more sound understanding of product risks.      
Table 23: Post-market regulatory activities 
 
1995-
1996 
1997- 
1998 
1999-
2000 
2001- 
2002 
2003-
2004 
2005- 
2006 
2007- 
2008 
Referal 
CHMP* 4 11 10 15 10 15 12 
Finalized safety 
reviews n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 10 19 
Source: EMA annual reports; Note:* Started referrals based on articles 107, 31 and 36 of directive 2001/83/EC as amended 
Turning to the product withdrawal data available at the EMA website, covering only products 
authorized through the centralized procedure suggests, that withdrawal is regularly used. Out 
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 Lately, the situation has improved but only gradually. Considering the availability of risk-benefit data, the 
recent activities by the European Ombundsman have called for more transparency. For the centralized 
procedure, actions after authorization for any specific product are now published on the EMA website.   
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of the 551 products included in the EPAR database, 70 products were withdrawn after 
authorization.274 Yet, the majority of these withdrawals were voluntary and because of 
commercial reasons.  
Table 24: Drug safety incidence and regulatory action since (1995-2008) 
Name Type of Approval Regulatory action 
Trovofloxacin Centralized Withdrawal 
Tolcapone Centralized Suspended 
Cisapride National Restrictions 
Bupropion Decentralized Restrictions 
Cerivastatin (Lipobay) Decentralized Withdrawal 
Atomoxetine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Citalopram* Decentralized Restrictions 
Duloxetine* Centralized Restrictions 
Escitalopram* Decentralized Restrictions 
Fluoxetine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Fluvoxamine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Mianserine* Centralized Restrictions 
Milnacepram* Centralized Restrictions 
Mirtazapine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Paroxetine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Reboxetine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Sertraline* Decentralized Restrictions 
Venlafaxine* Decentralized Restrictions 
Celecoxib** Decentralized Restrictions 
Etoricoxib** Decentralized Restrictions 
Lumiracoxib** Decentralized Restrictions 
Valdecoxib** Centralized Restrictions 
Parecoxib** Centralized Restrictions 
Macrolide Centralized Restrictions 
Rosiglitazone Centralized Restrictions/review in progress 
Source: adopted from *Härmark, 2008 #2289'; *: SSRis (Class review); **:Cox II (Class review)  
 
In fact, only 10 of the 70 withdrawals were enacted because of safety reasons, based on the 
fact that the products were suspended prior to the withdrawal. While no comparable data for 
products authorized under the decentralized procedure is available, recent studies suggest that 
withdrawal is reluctantly used for those products as well. Based on a list of recent drug safety 
incidence within Europe, identified by Härmark and van Grootheest (2008), the respective 
authorization procedure and regulatory measure was identified. Based on this limited sample, 
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 See the appendix (A.9) for a full list of withdrawn products. Database was accessed in June 2010.  
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the reluctance to withdraw products is reaffirmed.275 Instead, European regulators resort to a 
less intrusive approach applying restrictions to the use of the respective product. Accordingly, 
the level of type 2 variations, covering clinical and quality changes to an existing product, has 
been constantly rising.276  
Graph 25: Type II variations between 1998-2008  
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Comparing the use of the different regulatory measures the assumption of an expectant 
regulatory approach seems to be a valid and drawing on regulatory behaviour in two recent 
safety incidents, involving Lipobay (Cerivastatin) and Vioxx (Rofecoxib), is substantiated 
further. 277  
 
7.2.3.6.8 Regulatory behaviour during drug safety incidents: Lipobay and Vioxx 
Lipobay was authorized in Europe in 1997 via a decentralized procedure, with the UK as a 
reference member state. After several adverse events with lethal consequence in the US 
market, the market authorization holder, Bayer, voluntarily withdraw the product from the 
global market in August, 2001. Even though the withdrawal was voluntary, the decision 
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 Another important finding is the fact that safety concerns seem to be more common in products authorized 
under the decentralized procedure.  
276
 It is important to note that the level of type II variations does not exclusively reflect changes of the risk-
benefit ratio, but in most cases is the result of voluntary adaptation of the product to the newest available 
scientific knowledge.  
277
 The two cases were selected based on the high media attention. Other examples supporting the reluctance of 
European pharmaceutical regulators could be seen in the recent Rosiglitazone controversy (Bloomgarden, 
2007; Misbin, 2007; Moynihan, 2010) or the case of Alosetron (Moynihan, 2002).  
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resulted in substantial attention in the (lay) media. Bayer was accused of informing investors 
before regulatory officials, while at the same time withholding information to European 
regulatory agencies, specifically the German Bfarm (Zylka-Menhorn, 2001). It was claimed 
that additional risks were already known in 1998, but neither the Bayer AG and the German 
regulator nor the UK authority, saw the need for regulatory action beyond variations to the 
existing authorization. Only after the product withdrawal and the increased media attention, 
the EMA started a class review of Lipobay and similar products. The behaviour of the 
German regulator in the Lipobay case is noteworthy. Faced with increased public criticism, 
the regulator first blamed Bayer for withholding information and shortly afterwards argued 
that an investigation of adverse incidence was not possible, since the responsibility for the 
regulatory assessment rested with the UK authority. However, nothing would have prevented 
the Bfarm from referring the matter to the CHMP (Tuffs, 2001). Instead of pursuing a 
proactive pharmacovigilance approach, for example the request of Phase IV studies or 
additional literature studies, European regulators waited for more evidence to re-evaluate the 
risk-benefit profile of Lipobay. 
As in the Lipobay case, first evidence on the negative side effects of Vioxx was detected in 
the US. Vioxx sold by Merck, was withdrawn voluntarily in September 2004, after a study 
revealed that it doubled the risk of heart attacks and stroke in those who took it for longer than 
18 months. While the information on the long-term effects leading to withdrawal could not 
have been collected before authorization, the withdrawal has resulted in a massive turmoil in 
the US media. Both the producer and the FDA were exposed to massive criticism, when it 
was revealed that a study commissioned by Merck in 1999 already hinted towards the safety 
issues leading to withdrawal (only) four years later. Information to regulators was effectively 
suppressed (Mathews & Martinez, 2004). The so-called VIGOR study was published, but 
obscured cardiovascular risks, while independent research into the risk-benefit profile of the 
drug was actively prevented by the producer (Krumholz et al., 2007: 121). Questions about 
the passive role of the FDA in the Vioxx scandal resulted in an in-depth analysis of the 
American regulator. Despite mounting evidence, the regulator did not request any additional 
investigations. Moreover, internal organisational structures amplified the negative effects of 
the regulatory dilemma:  
“Once a licensing approval has been made it is naturally in CDER’s own interests to stand by its 
original decision. CDER’s reputation would be damaged if its licensing judgments were constantly 
challenged by its own staff. This understandable but dangerous tendency to discourage dissent makes 
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the Office of Drug Safety, which sits lower in the hierarchy of CDER than the Office of New Drugs, 
weak and ineffective.” (Horton, 2004: 1996) 
Unsurprisingly, the Office of Drug Safety lacked the regulatory powers to effectively govern 
the post-authorization stage (Dohrman, 2005; Waxman, 2005). Public and media attention 
surrounding the Vioxx incident in Europe have been more moderate. Vioxx had been 
authorized in 1999 through a decentralized procedure with the UK serving as a reference 
member state. In contrast to the Lipobay case, European regulators in light of the emerging 
evidence from the US and after referral by the French Agency engaged into the investigation 
of  the risk-benefit profile of Vioxx and other COX-2 inhibitors in 2002 (Arznei-Telegramm, 
2004). However, the practical conduct of the investigation remained largely secretive and 
took nearly two years, reflecting the expectant approach of European regulatory agencies. 
This impression is shared by Silvio Garratini, a longstanding member of the CHMP and the 
Italian agency:  
” 2 years to make a decision on whether a class of drugs used by millions is safe or dangerous is 
certainly too long. (…)The EMA depends on the fees paid by industry much more than the FDA does, 
and is much less transparent — of the above referral procedure, only a onepage document can be traced 
on the EMA web site.” (Garattini & Bertelé, 2005: 24). 
In light of the current governance approach and regulatory behaviour, the current surveillance 
of post-market risks must be described as both expectant and reactive. At the same time, it is 
important to note that the reluctance to withdraw products must not be equated with the wilful 
endangering of public health. The public has to understand that risk/benefit decisions are 
complex and take (some) time. Moreover, withdrawing a product can have severe 
consequences for those patients successfully treated, calling for a careful evaluation of less 
intrusive measures. In light of a functioning approval process withdrawal must remain the 
exception and not become the routine. Higher levels of product withdrawals should thus not 
be confused with a higher level of public health protection. However, it is not the rate of 
withdrawal or the number of suspensions that is problematic, but the fact that it remains 
unclear, which steps have been taken by regulators in the post-market to evaluate products in 
a proactive way.  
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7.2.3.6.9 Communication of risks in the post-authorization stage 
The reactive governance approach characterizing the monitoring of post-market risks 
unsurprisingly affects the communication of product risks as well. The task of communicating 
product risks is shared between regulators and regulatees. Companies either voluntarily or 
mandated by the regulatory authorities issue dear doctor letters. In addition, regulatory 
authorities will take supplementing measures through the distribution of drug bulletins or 
information on their websites. In case of product variations, updated product characteristics 
are published. This communication approach is problematic from at least two perspectives. 
The approach focuses mainly on health professionals. It is frequently legitimized based on the 
claim, that the public is not able to evaluate product risk information, resulting in wrong 
assessments. However, it is questionable how such an understanding should ever be 
developed, if only limited information is communicated to the public. Furthermore, 
unregulated information on the internet could have a much more detrimental effect (Tatsioni 
et al., 2003). Accordingly, a more proactive communication approach to the public is 
necessary. By educating the public about the general risks of pharmaceutical consumption and 
the role of patient compliance and a more continuous approach to risk communication, 
differences in informational needs and the risk of information overload can be reduced 
(Goldman, 2004). While the pharmaceutical industry frequently claims, that such continuous 
education would be possible if advertising was allowed, such claims should be interpreted 
with caution (Anon, 2006d; Hugman, 2006). Instead, regulatory agencies should be 
responsible. Most regulatory authorities do, however, not have the resources and, judging 
from their behaviour, not the will to assume such a role. A second argument for a more 
inclusive communication approach must be seen in the fact, that physicians despite their 
medical training do not necessarily possess the skills to interpret the information entailed in 
the product risk communication in a much more reflected way than the public. Pharmacology 
and pharmacovigilance represents only a small fraction of medical education (Cox et al., 
2004; Hauben & Reich, 2005; Orme, 2003). Additionally, the information received by health 
care professionals about changes in the risk-benefit profile of a specific product, as in the case 
of product information, is not easy to understand, lengthy and not written in a manner that 
easily translates into clinical practice (Mazor et al., 2005; Seligman, 2003).  
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7.2.4 The European regulatory regime from the perspective of effective risk governance 
Drawing on the findings of the previous analysis, the regulatory regime can be briefly re-
evaluated from the perspective of risk governance, focusing on the approval procedure and 
post-authorization monitoring process.  
 
7.2.4.1 Approval regime 
The three stages of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication are traceable in 
the European approval regime, even though differences in the centralized and mutual 
recognition/decentralized procedure exist. In general, the current regulatory approach to 
approval represents a science-based risk regulatory model. Risk assessment is based on expert 
advice and even though decision making is subjected to clear decision criteria and 
transparency as well as accountability is safeguarded under both procedures (CP and 
MRP/DP), the current process does arguably not allow for adequate and mandatory risk 
framing. Even though this might still be achieved informally, the lack of an institutionalized 
option to consider the public regulatory interests represents a shortcoming of the current 
regulatory approach.  
Turning to the risk management stage, two main issues can be identified. First, the dominant 
position of the CHMP within the assessment process blurs the clear separation between a 
scientific opinion and the actual (political) regulatory decision. The CHMP occupies an 
agenda-setting position within the CP and to some degree in the MRP/DP and the challenging 
of the initial scientific assessment is highly improbable. The political control function that risk 
assessment should normally provide is levered out by the current regulatory set-up. Second, 
the risk management stage does not allow for additional consideration of public risk 
perceptions, but is organized as a closed regulatory process.  
Considering the risk communication efforts of the pharmaceutical approval regime, the 
quantity of information compared to national approaches has increased. The introduction of 
mandatory assessment reports clearly helps to retrace regulatory decisions. Moreover, the 
communication of risks based on package leaflets has been improved under the European 
regime. From the perspective of quality, however, the current approach does not necessarily 
improve the understanding of pharmaceutical risks in general and specific terms, as the 
potential negative effect of leaflets on compliance demonstrates. The effectiveness of risk 
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communication is hampered by the formulation of leaflets amplifying concerns and serving 
the commercial interest to reduce potential liability.  
              
7.2.4.2 Risk governance during post-authorization 
Risk governance of the post-authorization stage reflects a science based approach. Risk 
assessment is conducted by experts, but in contrast to the approval regime, transparency, 
accountability and control is much more limited. While the underlying regulatory criteria 
apply in post-authorization assessment as well, the external scrutiny and transparency of the 
process seems to be much more limited. In addition, the quality issues of scientific evidence 
underlying risk assessment increases the zone of discretion of regulators. As in the case of 
approval, no institutionalized form of risk framing is traceable. Similar to the approval 
regime, risk management in the post-authorization stage hardly serves as an independent 
political assessment, since the same procedural limitations for challenging an initial 
assessment apply. A positive aspect of the current risk communication approach can be seen 
in the dissemination of information through physicians serving as a “credible source” (Maule, 
2004: 26). Yet the effectiveness of risk communication is potentially reduced by the lack of 
physicians’ education regarding the interpretation and communication of pharmaceutical risk 
information, as well as the limited information that is provided by regulatory authorities and 
manufacturers. While the approach thus avoids the perils of direct risk communication to the 
lay public, its effectiveness is reduced by insufficient consideration of context.  
 
7.3 Conclusion: The merits of European governance 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the impact of the Europeanized regulatory regime on 
regulatory effectiveness in the pharmaceutical sector. While no uniform and simple answer is 
possible several conclusions on governance and regulatory effectiveness in the European 
pharmaceutical sector can be drawn.   
 
7.3.1 Aligned regulatory interests and conflicting pharmaceutical risk cultures   
In the field of European pharmaceutical regulation, aligned interests between the three main 
actors – regulators, regulatees and the public – do exist. The equilibrium of interests 
converges around the provision of safe medicines in the pre-authorization and the 
maintenance of access in the post-authorization stage. Paradoxically, the post-authorization 
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situation is still characterized by aligned interests, but can still negatively affect public health 
as it confronts regulators and regulatees with a fundamental dilemma and far reaching 
consequences for the effective governance of post- authorization safety. Even though the 
sector is characterized by an equilibrium of interests the analysis of public interests revealed 
the existence of distinct national pharmaceutical risk cultures, impacting on the perception 
and acceptability of pharmaceutical risks and (indirectly) on the regulatory behaviour of 
national competent authorities. Linking the existence of risk cultures to the performance of 
the regulatory regime until the fundamental changes in the mid 1990s, an immanent conflict 
between the principle of voluntary mutual recognition and the underlying risk perceptions of 
national regulators was identified, serving as well-grounded explanation for the regulatory 
patchwork and under-performance of the regulatory regime. 
 
7.3.2 The EMA, new European regulatory culture and adaptive pressure 
The creation of the European agency and the shift from voluntary to facilitated mutual 
recognition has had a fundamental impact on the effectiveness of sectoral governance and the 
compliance of national regulators. The mind change within the regulatory network is 
explained by the emergence of a new European regulatory culture, emphasizing cooperation 
both within the established regulatory network and between regulators and regulatees, as well 
as increased experience and development of mutual trust within the regulatory network. 
Moreover, the agencification, economisation – understood as an increased dependence of 
regulators on industrial fees – and professionalization of the network were identified as the 
main reasons for improved governance effectiveness. The new governance approach is 
marked by an increased respect for the principles of transparency and accountability regarding 
agency operations and authorization procedures. While the EMA has been instrumental in this 
regard, its creation raises questions of accountability, control and legitimacy. The EMA and 
its scientific committee the CHMP more specifically, effectively dominates the authorization 
of innovative products, even though the Commission, together with the Standing Committee, 
is officially responsible for the issuing of authorizations. The current situation provides the 
EMA with significant regulatory powers, only partially controlled by external actors. While 
this regulatory set-up can be legitimized both from the perspective of increased effectiveness 
and efficiency, the current regulatory regime does not necessarily represent an optimal 
institution from the perspective of public participation and input legitimacy. 
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7.3.3 Regulatory governance: the pre and post-authorization divide 
Even though the emergence of a European approach and governance structures increased the 
effectiveness of governance, the discussion of the different aspects of the regulatory lifecycle 
pointed to several weaknesses.  
The authorization process has been found to be potentially biased towards early access and 
providing disproportionate representation of industrial interests.278 Furthermore, the different 
authorization procedures result in different levels of transparency and accountability. Under 
the decentralized procedures, regulatory discretion is significantly increased allowing for a 
black box approach to regulation. Turning to the post-authorization governance aspects, 
several general shortcomings of the regulatory approach were revealed. The regulatory burden 
is increasingly shifted to the pharmaceutical manufacturers, without ensuring that compliance 
with regulatory requirements is achieved.279 The insufficient guidance and reactive 
monitoring, resulting from a lack of resources and potential lack of willingness, is traceable in 
all aspects of the post-approval. Furthermore, the current approach to the governance of 
production and distribution does not account for the fundamental changes affecting the sector. 
This finding points to a remarkable and almost ironic paradox. While European regulation 
was initially created to establish the internal market, increased trading is mainly responsible 
for the counterfeiting of medicine, one of the most pressing regulatory problems in the 
pharmaceutical sector. While the quantity and quality of information on the performance of 
the regulatory network as well as product-related information has improved under the 
European regulatory framework, the availability of information still suffers from selectivity 
bias and confidentiality. Product-based information, largely confined to package leaflets, has 
been found to be too complex and at times even negatively affecting patients’ compliance. In 
addition, the current information governance approach does not seek to advance the general 
understanding of pharmaceutical risks. While the strengthening of the regulatory network 
could have been expected to improve post- authorization surveillance, the positive impact 
must be described as limited. The current approach relies heavily on information provided by 
the regulated industry and the institutional design does not account the identified dilemma in 
post-market monitoring. Regulators and regulatees seem to adopt an expectant approach, 
potentially impacting negatively on public health. 
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 Yet this situation does not represent a state of capture as sufficient checks and balances under both 
procedures, especially in the case of the centralized procedure seem to exist.   
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 The tendency to delegate could be seen as an attempt to reduce regulatory uncertainty on behalf of the 
regulator (Beck, 1992; Power, 2007).   
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8.  Regulatory outcomes: industry, the single market and public health  
Three interrelated and potentially conflicting goals have been identified in the European 
pharmaceutical sector: the protection of public health, the competitiveness of the European 
pharmaceutical industry and the completion of the single market. The present chapter will 
assess in how far regulatory goals are met and which impact regulation has had in this regard. 
The following section will start with an assessment of the current state and previous 
development of the European pharmaceutical industry, focusing on the innovation capacities 
from a European perspective. Subsequently, progress towards a single market in 
pharmaceuticals will be discussed. The third section will assess the impact of the European 
regulatory regime on public health and pharmaceutical safety more specifically.  
 
8.1 A competitive European pharmaceutical industry 
Changes in the European pharmaceutical industry since the early 1960s have been substantial. 
While national companies focusing on domestic operations dominated the industry early on, 
German, French, Swiss, British and Italian companies increasingly started cross-border 
operations exporting their products within Western Europe in the 1970s (Casper & Matraves, 
2003; Taggart, 1993). Increased demand, rising development costs and globalization trends of 
the pharmaceutical sector helped to grow and expand their businesses: in 1977, several 
European-based companies were ranked under the world’s top 30 companies, with the 
German Hoechst company leading the group. By the mid-80s, six European companies were 
under the leading 15 pharmaceutical producers (Taggart, 1993: 32-33). Beginning in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry has been dominated by even stronger 
globalization and consolidation leading to several waves of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
both on the national, European and global level affecting the position of European 
pharmaceutical companies (Busfield, 2003; Chaudhry et al., 1994).  
 
8.1.1 Consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry  
The first wave of consolidation in the sector was largely connected to changes in 
pharmaceutical development and economy of scale considerations (Jungmittag, 2000). 
Fundamental changes and improvements in the drug discovery process in the 1980s resulted 
in rising development costs. In an attempt to consolidate R&D activities and increase the 
chances to regain development costs, companies looking for external growth engaged in 
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M&A activities (P. Danzon et al., 2007). These activities were concentrated regionally during 
the first wave. European companies merged with other European-based companies and US 
competitors focused on targets based in the US (Busfield, 2003: 587). While economy of 
scale arguments are still invoked in more recent merger decisions, the filling of the product 
pipeline in light of patent expiry of blockbuster products now plays a major role as well 
(Frantz, 2005, 2006). The altered motive has lead to a change in M&A strategy in recent 
years: besides horizontal mergers between large pharmaceutical manufacturers, producers in 
attempt to increase their R&D competitiveness increasingly target biotechnology companies 
(Munos, 2009). M&A activity in the generic industry has recently gained momentum as well, 
both between generic producers and between innovative and generic manufacturers (Karwal, 
2009). While the volume of M&A decreased after 2004, a new wave of consolidation started 
in 2007 culminating in the recent mega-mergers between Pfizer and Wyeth as well as 
Merck&Co and Schering Plough (KPMG, 2009). Consolidation trends have changed the 
industry in several respects. The number and position of companies leading the industry has 
changed fundamentally in the last 15 years. Most of the top 30 companies of the 1990s did 
cease to exist as they were bought by their competitors, resulting in increased market 
concentration: In 1989, the leading 10 companies had a market share of roughly 30 percent 
(Busfield, 2003: 588).280 In 2007, the same group had a market share of 44,9 percent and the 
leading 20 companies even controlled 62,6 percent of the global market (ABPI, 2008). From 
the perspective of the European pharmaceutical industry, consolidation has strengthened the 
position of US based pharmaceutical manufacturers. US based companies expanded their 
market shares on both sides of the Atlantic and dominated recent M&A activities (KPMG, 
2009). As a result, “the ‘pharmacy to the world’, once located at the intersection of Germany, 
Switzerland, and France, today is found in the United States [original emphasis]”(Daemmrich, 
2009: 17). In light of these developments, it must be asked in how far the current regulatory 
regime impacted on the position and competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
8.1.2 Competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry both from a national and European perspective has traditionally 
represented a key industrial sector. Despite national differences within the European Union, 
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 The Herfindahl index (Wagschal, 1999: 143-146), would provide a more adequate measure of market 
concentration. Unfortunately, the relevant data for the pharmaceutical industry is not publicly accessible.     
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the pharmaceutical industry, in comparison to other manufacturing industries, has been 
characterized by high added value, productivity and continuous growth, resulting in 
considerable direct and indirect employment effects (Vekeman, 2005). Moreover, the sector is 
of strategic importance and positively contributes to the European trade balance. 
Table 25: Employment and trade balance of the European pharmaceutical 
industry  
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Employment 437,613 500,879 504,014 538,438 634,546 643,138 636,403 633,056 
Trade balance 
(in mio. €) 5,130 7,067 13,849 22,094 35,794 44,375 48,128 52,000 
Source: EFPIA annual reports 2000-2009 
While the European pharmaceutical industry has been deemed one of the most competitive 
ones in comparison to other industrial sectors, previously mentioned global trends have 
resulted in mounting concerns and a heated debate on the global competitiveness of the 
European pharmaceutical industry (Anon, 2004; Charles River Associates, 2004; Gambardella 
et al., 2000; Tsipouri, 2004).281 
 
8.1.3 The innovation gap 
Previously mentioned sectoral developments have altered the European research-based 
pharmaceutical industry. The German pharmaceutical industry, despite still representing the 
biggest market within Europe (Jim Gilbert & Rosenberg, 2004), has lost ground to French and 
UK based companies. As a result, the breadth of the European industry compared to the US 
has decreased. The competitiveness discussion, however, goes well beyond the market shift. 
While the claim was based on economic arguments and the lack of productivity (Gambardella 
et al., 2000: 20-23), the main concern has been the reduced innovation capability of the 
European pharmaceutical industry. The survival of the pharmaceutical sector – even more so 
than other industries – depends on innovation. While the European industry historically 
contributed significantly to the development of new drugs, a declining trend in comparison to 
the US industry has been highlighted both by European officials and industrial associations. 
Comparing absolute European research and development (R&D) spending to the development 
of US-based investment, an innovation gap is becoming apparent. According to the EFPIA, 
                                                 
281
 It should be noted, that the discussion of competitiveness is no recent phenomenon, but has been raised 
constantly since the late 1980s (Grabowski, 1989) and represents a fundamental and general problem for the 
whole industry (Coombs & Metcalfe, 2002; Ganuza et al., 2009).   
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“between 1990 and 2008, R&D investment in United States grew 5.6 times whilst in Europe it 
only grew 3.5 times” (2010a). Further structural challenges impeding European 
competitiveness are connected to the biotechnology revolution (Nightingale & Martin, 2004) 
in the pharmaceutical industry, the resulting changes in research and development and the 
prevailing problems to establish a competitive European innovation system (Owen-Smith et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, collaboration between academia and industry, instrumental in 
developing a strong biotechnological innovation system, is still underdeveloped in Europe 
(Jason et al., 2002; Owen-Smith et al., 2002; Riccaboni et al., 2003). As a result, the diffusion 
of biotechnology has been largely confined to the US industry (EFPIA, 2010a). Divergence in 
input factors translates into a corresponding shift in innovation output. Based on the number 
of new chemical and biological entities (NCE/NBE), the perceived loss of competitiveness on 
behalf of the European industry is substantiated (Grabowski & Wang, 2006). While the 
European industry dominated drug discovery during the 1980s and 1990s, the US has taken 
over the lead in the new millennium. Judging from the available data, the European industry 
indeed has lost competitiveness, as both the industrial capabilities and the innovative outputs 
decreased.  
Graph 26: European and US R&D investment (1990-2008) 
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Source: EFPIA (2010c) 
However, the severity of this development must be interpreted in context of a globalized 
pharmaceutical industry. First, even though it is true that the US industry has been more 
productive, the distance between European and US NCE/NBE output is closer compared to 
the situation in the 1980s.  
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Graph 27: Discovery of new chemical and biological entities by the US and 
European pharmaceutical industry (1980-2009) 
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Source: Data from 1980-1989 Permanand (2006), Data from 1990-2009 EFPIA (2010c) 
In fact, the pharmaceutical industry as a whole seems to suffer from a productivity crisis: 
R&D investment has multiplied but the relative number of innovations is decreasing. It is 
therefore uncertain, if significantly higher European R&D investment had resulted in a 
corresponding sharp incline of NCE output. Second, the validity of the widely used 
comparison of innovation outputs has been called into question since “counting which country 
discovers the most new molecular entities is irrelevant in a global market. Companies know 
that where a good drug is discovered does not matter and often a discovery comes from 
research in several countries” (Light & Lexchin, 2005: 959). Third, the extent of the 
competitiveness gap partially depends on the data used. Reconsidering the comparison of 
R&D investment, it seems striking that the figures provided by the EFPIA are not based on 
the same currency, effectively amplifying the volume of US R&D investment. Recalculating 
the estimates by the EFPIA based on annual exchange rates provided by the European Central 
Bank (2010) for the period of 1999-2008, the investment gap decreases significantly. Fourth, 
using total R&D spending as an indicator tends to obfuscate differences regarding industry 
size, market share and consumption (Keyhani et al., 2010; Donald W. Light & Lexchin, 
2005).282  
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 A recent study by Donald Light (2009) using productivity ratios even concludes that the competitiveness of 
the European industry did not decrease but increased in certain therapeutic areas.  
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Graph 28: Recalculated US and European R&D investment (1999-2008) 
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Source: EFPIA (2010c); For the calculation of exchange rates see ECB (2010) 
From this perspective, the gap mainly reflects changes in the global importance of the 
European market and the industry. Considering the US share of the global pharmaceutical 
market, its importance has risen significantly between 1995 and 2000 and despite a moderate 
convergence of European and US shares, the US continues to represent the largest national 
market.283  
Graph 29: Global market share of EU and US market (in % of sales) 
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In light of these changes, the decision to relocate R&D investment and register new chemical 
entities in the most important domestic market might be related to other factors, for example 
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 Unfortunately, no reliable estimate for 2008 was available. While graph 30 suggests, that the US share of the 
global market has been always above European level, an alternative estimate by the WHO (2006) suggests, 
that the European market in 1990 was bigger than the US.     
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increasing the chances of successful market approval and quicker return on investment. While 
these counter-arguments point to the potential dramatisation of the European competitiveness 
gap, it must be acknowledged that the European industry has lost ground vis-à-vis its US 
counterpart. At the same time, the impact of European pharmaceutical regulation in this 
regard seems to be unclear.   
 
Regulatory impact on innovation and competitiveness 
Focusing on the issue of innovation as a major component of competitiveness, research on 
pharmaceutical innovation has singled out a broad range of distorting and supporting 
factors.284 Unsurprisingly, regulatory burden has been identified as an important negative 
external influence (Reed et al., 2006).  Robert Ruffolo, former head of R&D operations of 
Wyeth, for example, identified raised regulatory requirements, a lack of harmonization and a 
tendency of regulatory conservatism, depicting an overly cautious approach to drug approval, 
as important reasons for decreased R&D productivity and output (Ruffolo, 2006: 100-101). 
The impact of changes in the European regulatory framework on the reduced competitiveness 
of the European industry might however not be as decisive as Ruffolo with regard to the 
global industry suggests. The creation of the new European approval regime was intended to 
reduce regulatory burden and stimulate innovation by providing one approval route for new 
and innovative products. Considering the rising number of applications und the centralized 
procedure, a positive impact of regulation can be constituted. Moreover, the introduction of 
orphan drug regulation as well as increased support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
supports innovation activities.  
At the same time, the evolution of the regulatory framework has increased regulatory burden 
by introducing stricter and more extensive requirements. Reaching definite conclusions on the 
impact of such changes on European competitiveness is problematic, especially in context of 
a globalized pharmaceutical industry. First, regulatory changes did not affect the European 
industry per se, but all companies applying for product approval within Europe. Only if the 
European market was dominated by European companies realizing the majority of their 
earnings within Europe, a negative impact of (safety) regulation on European competitiveness 
can be constructed. While the European industry is partially made up of SMEs, the market 
and therefore the centralized approval procedure is dominated by large companies (Regnstrom 
et al., 2009). Considering the current distribution of European market shares, US-based as 
                                                 
284
 For an overview see (Hu et al 2007).   
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well as European-based companies use the procedures. Second, the levelling-up of regulatory 
requirements has been a global rather than a European phenomenon. Only if European 
requirements did exceed US standards, providing US companies with a home advantage, this 
could have translated into higher competitiveness of the US industry. Moreover, this would 
largely affect competitiveness from the perspective of realizing profits. Moreover, regulatory 
requirements outside the European market have not remained stable but moved towards 
stricter requirements as well (Anon, 2008a). Third, considering actual regulatory behaviour, 
regulatory conservatism hampering innovation seems to be a US rather than a European 
phenomenon. Drawing on the average approval times between 2000 and 2006, the EMEA 
approved drugs faster than its US counterpart, even though differences have been marginal 
(Wilsdon et al., 2008).285 Moreover, the success rates of new drug approvals indicate that the 
European system seems to outpace the FDA in terms of access (B. Hughes, 2008a; Regnstrom 
et al., 2009).  
These arguments point to the limits of regulation in steering innovation capacities, but it must 
be remembered that regulatory requirements impact on the development strategy of 
companies. If regulatory standards are too high, companies might have fewer incentives to 
invest in specific therapeutic areas. Considering the development of the European framework, 
it could be argued that standards are probably too low and too high at the same time. 
Standards are (probably) too low when the concept of innovation under the centralized 
procedure and approval standards are considered. The centralized procedure was gradually 
opened up to new product groups. As a result, the initial idea of the centralized procedure, 
rewarding innovative products with uniform market access, has been somewhat corrupted. 
Since an increased number of product categories can now use the centralized procedure, the 
concept of innovation is watered down. This perception is supported by the analysis of 
Domenico Motola and his colleagues (2006). Evaluating products authorized during the first 
decade of the centralized procedure, the study concluded that only 32 percent of the 
authorized products constituted a real innovation. While this number must be interpreted 
carefully, it points to the fact that it is becoming easier for products to be considered as 
innovative. Moreover, current approval criteria potentially do not serve as an incentive to 
stimulate innovation. New pharmaceuticals are predominantly assessed on its own merit 
instead of comparing their efficacy to existing therapies (Eichler, Bloechl-Daum et al., 2009). 
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 This might have changed in the post Vioxx area, with approval times increasing again on a global scale 
(Ruffolo, 2006). 
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Despite the lack of relevance in approval decisions, concepts of relative efficacy are 
increasingly impacting on drug development because of the heightened relevance in the 
context of reimbursement (Hughes, 2008b; Miller, 2005; Syrett, 2003).286 While current 
regulatory standards might be considered as too low to stimulate innovation, they could at the 
same time appear too high from the perspective of regulatees. Pharmaceutical development is 
marked by uncertainty. This does not only relate to the development process but to the 
approval decision as well. Facing the trade-off between a product that carries a high risk of 
failure regarding development and approval and a product that has been developed for a 
known indication, risk-averse producers can be expected to choose the latter.287 In fact, most 
European producers have been found to employ risk-averse R&D strategies focusing on 
established product categories, providing an alternative explanation for the European 
innovation gap (Pammolli et al., 2010). The contribution of regulation in stimulating 
innovation can therefore be seen in a reduction of regulatory uncertainty through increasing 
the predictability of regulatory decisions. Furthermore, adjusting incentives for drug 
development – demonstrated in case of the orphan drug development and the introduction of 
new pricing regulations even though outside the scope of European regulation – can 
contribute to the development of new and better drugs (Hughes, 2008c; Jayadev & Stiglitz, 
2009; Light, 2009).288 While regulatory uncertainty and incentives do play a role for 
innovation, such contextual factors play a minor role in strategic considerations in the 
development of R&D strategies. Instead, shareholder value, demands for short-term profits 
and a corporate strategy focusing on the development of me-too drugs and few (lucrative) 
therapeutic areas contribute significantly to a more conservative R&D approach (Hu et al., 
2007). Judging the performance of the European regulatory framework in light of these 
findings, the impact of the European framework on industrial competitiveness is ambiguous. 
The centralized procedure has potentially stimulated innovation by providing companies with 
a streamlined access point to the European market, but this impact must be understood in 
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  Incorporating such concepts into market approval can be expected to reduce duplication of efforts, market 
delays and revitalize innovation The need to readjust approval criteria will however depend on what is 
considered as an innovation (Hughes, 2009). The current European debate is divided between the industry 
position focusing on incremental innovation (Cohen, 2005; EFPIA, 2010b) and more critical authors 
advocating stricter innovation concepts (Abraham, 2002b; Ahlqvist-Rastad et al., 2004; Light, 2009).  
287
 Economic theory would suggest that high risk development would result in greater benefits in the long-term 
most important a lower level of competition (Pammolli et al., 2010: 8). Moreover, the importance of 
reimbursement should motivate producers to develop superior products. The strong trend of producers to 
focus on me-too products, however, supports the assumption of a short-term orientation and a conservative 
approach to R&D (Angell, 2000; Markovitch et al., 2005; Pauly, 2007).  
288
 Another area of activity can be seen in the adjustment of IP protection and the expansion of market 
exclusivity for innovative products (Hughes, 2008c).  
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context of a globalized industry: Not only European but all companies using the approval 
route have profited from the rationalization of regulatory procedures. The same holds true for 
the incentives introduced under the orphan drug regulation as well as the negative impact of 
increased regulatory burden. Against this backdrop, it seems to be considered to conclude that 
the new regulatory framework increased the incentives to develop innovative products. Yet 
both the global productivity gap as well as the innovation gap of European companies must be 
viewed as influenced by regulation but determined by other (and predominately internal) 
factors.   
 
8.2 Creation of a single pharmaceutical market  
In determining the regulatory impact on the completion of the European pharmaceutical 
market, the supply and demand side of the pharmaceutical market have to be considered. 
Starting with the supply side, a functioning (pharmaceutical) market should be marked by a 
certain degree of competition (Makowski & Ostroy, 2001). While the benefits of competition 
have been discussed regarding innovation capacities of originator companies, it is expected to 
contribute to higher efficiency and more favourable market conditions for customers as well 
(Haucap & Coenen, 2010). The creation of a single market should result in as broader choice 
for customers and contribute to a convergence or even lowering of pricing levels (Armstrong 
& Bulmer, 1998; Cecchini et al., 1988). Drawing on the general benefits of market 
integration, a single pharmaceutical market should result in improved and European-wide 
access to pharmaceuticals (Bungenstock, 2010).289  
 
8.2.1 Competition in the European pharmaceutical market 
Competition in pharmaceutical markets can take two main forms: competition between 
originator companies and competition between originator and generic companies.290 In 
determining the level of inter-originator competition, general industry trends and the specific 
market structure have to be considered. As the previous section highlighted, a comparatively 
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 The convergence of prices is not considered in this study, since it represents an ambivalent indicator. While 
convergence can be interpreted as an indicator for market completion, complete convergence does not 
necessarily translate into benefits for customers, but can result in welfare loss (Towse, 1998). 
290
 Competition between generic producers and within the OTC sector is important as well. However, the impact 
on the performance of the sector as a whole is much more limited in this regard. Furthermore, the practice of 
parallel imports has been discussed in context of (supply side) competition. While the issue of parallel trade 
is beyond the scope of this study, the impact on competition has been thoroughly discussed without reaching 
definite conclusions (Anon, 2004; Panos Kanavos & Costa-Font, 2005; Kyle, 2007; Macarthur, 2007b).   
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small number of companies dominates the global pharmaceutical industry and this groups is 
strong in the European market as well. The comparison of respective market share of the 
leading three companies on the US, European and global level however suggests that the 
general dominance of big pharma has eroded and since 2005, has been less pronounced in 
Europe in comparison to the US market. Sufficient competition thus seems to exist in the 
European pharmaceutical market. Yet this aggregated perspective does not take the specific 
structure of the pharmaceutical market into account. Pharmaceutical markets are characterized 
by a specific structure, consisting of several dynamic submarkets (Amisanoy & Giorgetti, 
2009).  
While market dominance on the aggregate level might in fact be not as pronounced as 
commonly referred to, the situation within submarkets can be expected to be quite different. 
Submarkets are dominated by a small group of producers, which in most cases will partially 
consist of market (share) leaders, forming an oligopolistic core (Bottazzi et al., 2001: 1163) 
dominating the submarket for as long as IP protection is intact. The diabetic care market 
effectively shared by the two companies Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk serves as an example for 
the oligopolistic structure (HAI, 2010). Considering recent strategic shifts within the 
European pharmaceutical market from blockbuster to niche buster portfolios (Anon, 2006d), 
manufacturers pursuing a specialty strategy will be increasingly able to realize market shares 
that exceed those on the aggregate level. A recent example has been the emergence of the 
therapeutic class of oncology (McCabe et al., 2009; Pollack, 2009), with Roche gradually 
developing a dominant position on a global scale (Anon, 2009b). The general characteristics 
of limited competition in sub-markets are traceable in future markets – therapeutic classes 
where most products are still in clinical development – as well (Karlberg, 2008). While the 
relative importance of therapeutic classes is subjected to changes based on the described 
mechanism, the most important European market segments have been rather stable over time. 
Again, this supports the assumption that competition within the originator market is not as 
pronounced as it could be. While the importance of cardiovascular treatment has decreased, 
the remaining market segments remained largely stable and despite growing originator-
generic competition over time, oligopolistic structures within market segments are highly 
likely.  
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Graph 30: European sub-market shares 2001 and 2008 
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An additional factor undermining competition between originator companies within the 
European market has been identified by a recent sector inquiry conducted by the Directorate 
General Competition (DG Competition). The analysis spanning the period from 2000 to 2007 
found that originator companies use defensive patent and publication strategies to prevent 
other research-based companies from developing new drugs in the same sub-market.291 In 
addition, IP infringement claims were used to protect one’s development strategy (DG 
Competition, 2009: 379-440). However, the report as well as responses of industry during the 
consultation stressed, that the dimension of such behaviour is hard to quantify exactly (Killick 
& Dawes, 2009). Judging the degree of competition between originator companies in light of 
the available data, it is concluded that the specific market structure as well as company 
behaviour will lead to oligopolistic structures within submarkets.292 Economic theory suggests 
that such structures result in inefficiencies (Craig & Malek, 1995), but it can be argued that 
the negative impact is limited and even represents a necessary incentive to stimulate future 
innovation. In addition, the oligopolistic structure is temporary since generic pressure will 
impact as soon as the market turns off-patent (Magazzini et al., 2004). Therefore, the 
safeguarding of originator – generic competition is vital from the perspective of single market 
completion and the stimulation of competition (Perry, 2006; Simoens & De Coster, 2006). 
Aggregated data supports the assumption that originator-generic competition has grown in the 
European Union. While in 2002 generics had a value share of 7.4 percent recent figures for 
2008 estimate a European sales volume of roughly 20 percent (Datamonitor, 2003; IMS 
Health, 2009).293 Focusing on sales volume conceals the growing importance of generics in 
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 Defensive strategies are no European phenomenon, but have been discussed as a general problem negatively 
affecting R&D productivity (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).     
292
 This finding must be interpreted carefully, since the situation can vary on the national level and between 
therapeutic classes. Furthermore, previous studies emphasized strong competition in originator markets 
(Pammolli et al., 2010).  
293
 Unfortunately, reliable estimates regarding the European generic market during the 1990s are not available. 
Since the rising shares are mainly the result of large-scale expiry of blockbuster drugs, the numbers can be 
considered considerably lower (IMS Health, 2009).    
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terms of sales volume and thus the contribution to fulfil pharmaceutical demand in Europe.294 
Given the expiry of IP protection of many blockbusters in the next years (Anon, 2007) and a 
high percentage of generics currently seeking approval (EGA, 2007) this trend is sustainable, 
potentially reaching US levels were generics made up 90 percent of volume sales in the off-
patent market and 65 percent of total pharmaceutical volume sales in 2008 (IMS Health, 
2009; Larkin, 2008). Moreover, the rising importance of biosimiliars and the strong 
involvement of the European generic industry in this field can be expected to contribute 
significantly to future growth (DiCicco, 2006).295 While the present level of competition in 
off-patent submarkets resulted from the cited internal factors, the role of national policies 
must be acknowledged. Policies to stimulate generic substitution have been employed to a 
varying degree by national governments, in an attempt to consolidate health budgets 
(Andersson et al., 2007; Garattini & Tediosi, 2000). The data suggest an increase of 
competition in the European off-patent pharmaceutical market. Yet there is ample evidence 
that generic competition in the European single market is still far from a social optimum.        
Graph 31: Share of generic products in Europe 2005-2009 (volume sales %) 
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To protect submarkets from generic competition, originator companies apply similar tactics as 
to prevent me-too products from market entry. Companies use patent cluster and defensive 
patenting, which, given the much more limited resources of generic producers, can have a 
detrimental effect on generic development costs. A related strategy has been the so called 
evergreening, depicting minor variations of existing products, the creation of second 
generation or follow-up products and the patenting of processes in order to extend the patent 
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 While the EU average does suggest a homogenous distribution, market penetration of generic products within 
the European Union differs widely on the national level, ranging from six percent (Italy) to nearly eighty 
percent (Latvia) (EGA, 2007).  
295
 Biosimiliars are generic versions of biopharmaceutical products.  
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life cycle and impede generic development (Bansal et al., 2009; Whitehead et al., 2008). The 
legitimacy and extent of this practice is heavily contested and the discussion within Europe 
has become much more controversial in light of the findings of the sectoral enquiry (Becker, 
2009; Jorge, 2009; Mooney & Parker, 2007). While the inquiry found that the aforementioned 
strategies are applied regularly, several additional measures to prevent generic competition 
were identified. Originator companies have increasingly used patent litigation as a means to 
delay generic entry and the number of cases “rose nearly fourfold from 36 in 2000 to 132 in 
2007” (DG Competition, 2009: 214). Litigation is prolonged, since patents are granted on the 
national level resulting in multiple separate law suits. Given an average duration of 2.8 years, 
such action can have a decisive impact on generic competition (DG Competition, 2009: 228). 
Interim injunctions are used during litigation to prevent generic companies from realizing 
profits, while the originator company is not affected by this measure. In addition, 
manufacturers have threatened wholesalers selling generics with legal proceedings. Beyond 
legal measures, companies apply communication strategies to defame generic products by 
raising legal and quality concerns. This includes communication to authorizing agencies, 
reimbursement bodies and doctors as well as negative advertising in medical journals (DG 
Competition, 2009: 312-342). While the findings of the inquiry must be interpreted cautiously 
(Killick & Dawes, 2009), the claim of restricted competition in the European pharmaceutical 
sector is substantiated further by legal proceedings against originator companies. The 
AstraZeneca decision by the European Commission in 2005 has been a prominent example in 
this regard (Lawrance & Treacy, 2005).296 Drawing on the presented data, competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector must be considered as restricted.  
 
8.2.2 Access to pharmaceuticals 
From the perspective of consumers, a single pharmaceutical market should result in better 
access to treatments. Harmonization of regulatory criteria and processes should have impacted 
positively in this regard both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. Drawing on the 
rising application numbers, new and innovative treatments have become available to all 
citizens of the European Union. However, not only innovative treatments authorized under the 
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 In 2005, the Commission found the Swedish company AstraZeneca guilty of abusing its dominant position 
when it decided to withdraw the market authorization for the capsule form of Losec shortly after introducing 
the tablet form, to prevent generic producers from entering the market. In addition, AstraZeneca was accused 
of abusing the patent system and Supplement Protection Certificates (SPC) to extend market exclusivity 
(Manley & Wray, 2006).   
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centralized procedure contribute to the increase of access. While products authorized under 
the decentralized procedure do not represent therapeutic innovation in a strict sense, they 
represent alternative treatments with potential additional therapeutic benefits, for example less 
side effects or higher efficacy. Access to generics has been improved as well, by opening up 
the centralized procedure. In light of these developments, the creation of a single European 
pharmaceutical market has delivered on its promises. At closer inspection, this positive 
account has to be reconsidered. First, an increase of authorized products does not necessarily 
meet the specific distribution of demand for products and result in different access for 
different patient groups. Given the focus of most manufacturers on certain therapeutic areas 
and risk-averse development strategies, access will be uneven in different indications. 
Therapeutic areas promising little financial incentives attract fewer products, as the 
development of the European orphan drug market shows.297 While over 500 orphan 
designations have been defined under the European orphan regulation, only 45 products were 
authorized in 2008 (Heemstra et al., 2008). This clearly represents an improvement to the 
situation before the new regulation entered into force and orphan drug development seems to 
gain momentum (Heemstra et al., 2008), yet access to orphan drug treatment still is severely 
limited (Joppi et al., 2006, 2009). Second, general access is limited by the occurrence of 
different drug lags, depicting a delay in treatment. The first type of drug lag relates to the 
availability of new treatments in major pharmaceutical markets. Since the 1990s, the US has 
regularly been chosen for first approval and launch of new products, with subsequent launch 
in the European market (Grabowski & Wang, 2006; Tsuji & Tsutani, 2008, 2010).298 In 
addition to this Atlantic drug lag, the single market is hampered by the existence of an internal 
drug lag between member states. The timing of access and the availability of specific 
treatments differs widely. Considering the extent of the temporary drug lag within Europe for 
products authorized under the centralized procedure, Heuer, Mejer and Neuhaus (2007) 
estimated a variation between 3.5 (Germany) and 18.9 months (Belgium). A report by IMS 
health commissioned by the EFPIA, covering 20 European countries reconfirms these 
assessments (2007). Access delays do represent an impediment to the completion of the single 
market, yet the persistence of permanent differences in drug availability does constitute a 
more fundamental problem. Regarding the uniformity of access within the EU 15 a study by 
Folino-Gallo and his colleagues found that “only 7% of all the active ingredients are available 
                                                 
297
 The same argument can be applied on the global level, with companies not dedicating enough R&D 
resources on treatments for neglected disease, mainly affecting people in low-income countries (Trouiller et 
al., 2002).   
298
 Drug launch depicts the actual marketing and availability of a drug on the market.    
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in all the participating countries” (2001: 444).299 More recent data compiled by the HMA 
covering the whole European market point to continuous national disparities.  
Graph 32: Average launch delays in selected European countries (in days) 
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 Even though completion of the single market could be interpreted extensively, it must be asked if all products 
have to be available in all member states. However, if essential medicines are missing from several member 
states as in the current situation (Task Force on Availability of Human Medicinal Products, 2007) this points 
to a lack of regulatory effectiveness.  
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Unsurprisingly, the differences in access mainly affect the group of accession countries, even 
though variation within the EU 15 is traceable as well. Many smaller member states 
experience problem of access to essential pharmaceutical products. While access delay can be 
of temporary nature, with some countries experiencing significant delays and shortages, in 
other instances products never were brought on the market resulting in a permanent access 
problem (Task Force on Availability of Human Medicinal Products, 2007: 6-15). In light of 
these findings, the uniformity of access both from a temporary and permanent perspective 
within the European Union has not been achieved so far, pointing to a clear lack of single 
market completion. 
 
8.2.3 Impact of the approval regime on the completion of the single market 
As in the case of innovation, it must be asked how European regulation impacted on the 
completion of the single market and the stimulation of competition and access. Considering 
the impact on inter-originator competition, the creation of a European approval regime and 
more specifically the centralized procedure clearly represents a reduction of regulatory costs 
and therefore a reduction of regulatory barriers for companies entering the European market. 
However, the reduction of entry barriers does not suffice to stimulate entry of originator 
competitors into submarkets, requiring substantial R&D investment. Such decision will 
mainly depend on the prospective market size, the number of existing competitors, entry 
barriers (e.g. defensive patenting) and companies’ experience (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004; 
Pauly, 2007; Vernon, 2005). While regulatory conservatism can reduce the probability of 
actual market entry, the impact of the current regulatory setting on inter-originator 
competition compared to other strategic considerations should not be overstated. This 
assertion must be corrected when the contribution of regulation to originator-generic 
competition is considered. As in the case of inter-originator competition, the introduction of 
the European framework has streamlined the approval requirements depicting a reduction of 
entry barriers for generic substitution. Most notably, the introduction of the 8+2+1 provision 
leading to a harmonization of data exclusivity and the introduction of the biosimiliar 
regulation (Roox, 2006), facilitated generic competition. At the same time, the prevailing lack 
of generic competition in Europe calls for a reconsideration of the regulatory impact. As in 
the case of originator producers, generic manufacturers, despite substantially lower R&D 
expenses, will have to weigh the options before market entry. While approval has become 
easier under the European regulatory framework, generics still face entry barriers. Product 
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launch is hindered by the various strategies originator companies apply to prevent market 
entry. While the identified mechanisms clearly affect generic entry, the main barrier must be 
seen in the fragmented nature of national pricing and reimbursement approaches and 
respective national generic policies. European member states adopted distinct policies, 
approaches and structures to regulate generic entry, directly affecting market penetration. 
Despite the variety and associated regulatory costs, a general reason for the lack of generic 
competition must be seen in the increased pressure on generic prices, reducing existing and 
already comparatively small margins (Simoens, 2008). Following from this, the limited 
impact of (approval and safety) regulation on generic competition is revealed. Generic 
competition is mainly influenced by national policies, “because of European harmonisation, 
patent legislation and approval procedures no longer affect much the development of 
generics”(Garattini & Tediosi, 2000: 149).  
In contrast to the facilitation of supply side competition, the impact of the regulatory 
framework on access is much more intuitive. Both European procedures theoretically allow 
for the marketing of pharmaceuticals throughout the single market. A closer look reveals the 
impact of the regulatory framework and the decentralized procedure more specifically on the 
prevalent access problems within the European Union. Only a small number of countries, 
serving as concerned member states, are normally involved in the decentralised procedure.  
Graph 33: Number of involved countries (CMS) within the mutual 
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Applicants using this procedure do obviously not pursue a strategy of uniform marketing, but 
target a limited number of European countries.300 It can be argued, that the focus on a limited 
number of countries represents only a minor problem since drugs authorized through the 
decentralized procedure in most cases target established therapeutic classes.301 Nevertheless, 
this constellation negatively affects customer choice and aggravates the existing national 
differences in product availability. While the selective character of the MRP/DCP explains 
variations in permanent availability of pharmaceuticals, it does not explain the Atlantic drug 
lag and temporary drug delays within the European Union. As previously discussed, market 
approval times have converged both within the European Union and on the global level. 
While remaining national differences in the implementation of approval decisions as well as 
different organisational capacities of national regulatory authorities may serve as an 
explanation, such differences cannot be responsible for the considerable delays.302  
Again, the reasons for these developments are for the most part beyond the scope of the 
regulatory framework. Drug delays within the European market have been largely attributed 
to the distinct national pricing and reimbursement processes. While it is tempting to blame 
these regulatory burdens for the drug delays, it tends to downplay the role of strategic 
behaviour on behalf of the launching companies (Garattini & Ghislandi, 2007). This argument 
is connected to the interdependence of national pricings system and the phenomenon of 
parallel trade. Since certain member states use cross-reference pricing – based on prices in 
other member states – companies have an incentive to delay drug launches in some member 
states in order to maximize total profits (Danzon et al., 2005). Furthermore, pharmaceutical 
producers delay or even refrain from launching products in countries with low pricing levels, 
since this will reduce the negative impact of parallel export from these countries on revenues 
in high price countries (Ganslandt & Maskus, 2004).303 Unfortunately, the European market 
structure is conducive to such strategic considerations. While the biggest five markets – 
France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Spain – account for roughly 73 percent (DG 
Competition, 2009: 20), most European member states represent small market shares and in 
combination with lower price levels and specific pricing regulation, strategic considerations 
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 Note that the new procedures underlying the calculation can include reapplications and therefore might 
overstate the focus on few countries. However, the data do not allow for a verification of this assertion.   
301
 80 percent of pharmaceuticals under the MRP/DP procedure are generics (Kenny, 2008). 
302
 Industrial representatives are increasingly criticizing the insufficient regulatory capacities and specific 
national selection criteria for accepting RMS status, resulting in long waiting times for review timeslots of 
national agencies (Costa & Barea, 2009; Senior, 2010).     
303
  Parallel trade itself can lead to availability problems even in bigger markets if large quantities are exported 
from cheaper countries as the recent experience of drug shortages in the UK has shown (Pagnamenta, 2008).  
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of companies will result in delayed or no access at all.304 Put differently, while a drug may be 
authorized this does not mean that it will be marketed.305 The HMA report on the availability 
of medicines reaffirms the causal relationship between access, market attractiveness and 
companies’ behaviour:  
“The unavailability of some medicinal products poses a real threat to public health and welfare. […] 
The main reason for the industry not to put their products on the market in a Member State seems to be 
the size of the market. Size of the market and national language are closely connected, since translation 
of information and labelling of medicinal products to national languages is not a problem for big 
markets, but is considered unfeasible for small markets. The size of a market is an obvious reason why 
pharmaceutical companies are not willing to accept the extra costs involved (pharmacovigilance, 
translations, scientific service, pricing, country specific information, etc.) for markets that cannot 
sustain profitability. The combination of different prices and parallel import/export may be one of the 
reasons for availability problems in certain markets that is not due to the size of the market. [original 
emphasis]” (Task Force on Availability of Human Medicinal Products, 2007: 4). 
In light of these findings, it must be concluded that the current regulatory framework plays 
only a minor role, while national pricing regulation as well as company behaviour are crucial 
factors. These findings point to a problematic and asymmetric situation: While the creation of 
a European regulatory framework has increased choice and decreased regulatory burden for 
most producers, the identified shortcomings regarding access show that such positive 
developments are not necessarily traceable on the demand side of the market. While European 
regulation has helped to increase the quality and quantity of available treatments, by 
stimulating the development of innovative drugs, incentivizing research in orphan drugs and 
specific paediatric needs as well as streamlining approval for generics, this does not 
automatically translate into increased access and affordability.   
 
8.3 Safeguarding of public health  
The overarching goal of European pharmaceutical regulation is the provision of effective and 
safe drugs to the European citizens. Assessing the regulatory impact on public health should 
thus consider both aspects. First, effective pharmaceuticals can be expected to positively 
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 As the HMA report states, drug launch is delayed and sometimes permanent even in those countries serving 
as a reference member state (RMS), reducing the willingness of authorities to take over the role (Task Force 
on Availability of Human Medicinal Products, 2007).   
305
  To a certain degree this paradox situation may in fact result from the regulatory framework, which does not 
provide the right mechanisms to enforce availability. On the other hand, forcing producers to launch products 
in all markets would conflict with European economic freedoms. 
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impact on aggregated health outcomes. Second, improved product safety should have reduced 
the occurrence and impact of unwanted side effects.   
 
8.3.1 Pharmaceuticals and European health outcomes 
To assess the development and current state of public health within the European Union one 
could draw on several well-established and commonly used metrics. Starting with a rather 
general measure, life expectancy within the European Union can be considered. A second 
commonly used measure is the probability of infant death (Reidpath & Allotey, 2003). While 
measures of mortality provide an important indicator of public health, it is important to apply 
a qualitative perspective as well. A higher life expectancy surely is positive from the 
perspective of public health, but the quality of additional life years must be considered in this 
regard (Jagger et al., 2008). Therefore, disability-adjusted life expectancies (DALE) can be 
used, measuring the (expected) number of years to be lived in full health and without serious 
health constraints, adding a qualitative dimension to the assessment of public health (Mathers 
et al., 2000; Murray & Evans, 2003). Data was retrieved from the WHO Health for all 
database. Drawing on the development of life expectancy within the European Union, a 
positive trend emerges with life expectancy of EU citizens growing roughly 6 years between 
1980 (74.18) and 2008 (80.61). Unsurprisingly, growth has been more pronounced in the old 
member states. A comparable trend is traceable regarding the survival of infants, as the rate of 
children dying before the age of five has decreased continuously. While general life 
expectancy and at an early age has increased significantly both in the old and new member 
states, changes in quality have been less pronounced, even though pointing to a fairly high 
degree of full health within the European society as a whole. Drawing on the presented data, 
general public health as measured by these outcomes has improved significantly in the last 
four decades. While research on mortality has traditionally focused on socio-economic factors 
to explain life expectancy increases (Cutler et al., 2006), it can be assumed that better 
treatment of fatal diseases had an impact on the identified trends as well.  
This assumption is supported by the overall, yet moderate, decrease of death rates for 
common illnesses with a potentially lethal outcome in the same period. Accordingly, changes 
can be partially related to differences in the management of these illnesses and improved 
treatments. Indeed, studies have increasingly pointed to the relevance of healthcare regarding 
the increase of life expectancy (Arah et al., 2005; Nixon & Ulmann, 2006). More specifically, 
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it is argued that changes in public health can be attributed to changes in the availability and 
utilisation of pharmaceuticals (Cutler et al., 2006; Frech & Richard, 2004; Grootendorst et al. 
, 2009). In addition, the importance of innovative drugs has been increasingly considered as a 
major factor in explaining decrease of standard death rates (SDR), the increase of life 
expectancies and the quality of life (Lichtenberg, 2001, 2009; Weisfeldt & Zieman, 2007). In 
light of these findings, a link between European pharmaceutical regulation and improved 
public health can be established, since the centralized procedure as well as the orphan drug 
regulation intended to strengthen the development of innovative drugs and the introduction of 
paediatric regulation aimed at an improvement of drug therapy for children. Moreover, the 
framework has had a quantitative impact: Since approval of generic drugs has become easier, 
access for patients suffering from common (off-patent) diseases within the European Union 
has partially improved. Yet, the previous discussion of regulatory outcomes regarding the 
single market suggests, that both the impact of pharmaceuticals on public health and 
consecutively the impact of pharmaceutical regulation on public health has been much more 
limited.  
First, pharmaceuticals only represent one factor within the field of healthcare contributing to 
public health outcomes and their importance will vary significantly between therapeutic areas. 
Better diagnosis and prevention, new medical technologies and improved disease 
management are decisive in this regard as well (Grootendorst et al., 2009; Weisfeldt & 
Zieman, 2007).306 Moreover, several studies point to the limited effects of pharmaceuticals 
and healthcare on life expectancy in developed societies, especially in comparison to socio-
economic factors (Poças & Soukiazis, 2010; Stoddart, 1995; Ulmann, 1998) and this has been 
reconfirmed for the EU 15 by Nixon and Ulmann (2006). Second, the aggregated changes in 
life expectancy within the European Union should not be mistaken for uniform improvements 
(Jagger et al., 2008). Given the discussed problems of access, the possible contribution of 
drugs will vary between European member states and between different patient groups. 
Furthermore, differences between therapeutic classes both from a qualitative and a 
quantitative perspective remain. The public health impact of drugs will vary, for example 
because of a lack of generic substitution allowing for broader uptake or an outright lack of 
treatment, as in the case of orphan drugs.307 Another limiting factor for the contribution of 
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  However, due to the interconnectedness of these factors, it seems impossible to quantify the exact impact of 
pharmaceuticals, especially on the aggregated level (Grootendorst et al., 2009; Nixon & Ulmann, 2006). 
307
 Another important aspect affecting the impact of drugs on public health are the costs associated with 
generally increased pharmaceutical consumption and permanent medication (Moynihan & Smith, 2002). 
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new drugs to public health can be seen in the remaining national differences in diffusion of 
innovative treatments (Schöffski, 2004). Finally, the lack of fundamental innovations 
diminishes the aggregated impact of pharmaceuticals on European public health (Motola et 
al., 2005). Going back to the underlying question of this chapter, the influence of European 
regulation regarding the improvement of public health seems to be rather limited. Clearly, the 
impact of approval regulation can be decisive since a drug that has not been approved will 
have no public health impact at all. Apart from this fundamental gate-keeping function, the 
impact after approval is much more limited, since factors outside of the regulatory scope 
largely determine the possible public health benefit of pharmaceuticals. If new drugs are 
approved but access is delayed or even permanently restricted, the asserted positive impact on 
public health is severely impeded. Existing differences between different patient groups can 
only be partially reduced by the regulatory framework, for example, by developing incentives 
for the development of needed, but commercially unattractive, pharmaceuticals.  
 
8.3.2 Safety of (new) pharmaceuticals 
Leaving the extent of the relative impact on public health aside, pharmaceuticals clearly 
represent an important component of health care within Europe. While they should contribute 
to personal health, their consumption can negatively impact on personal and public health, if 
adverse drug reactions (ADR) are experienced. Accordingly, the discussion of the regulatory 
impact on public health must consider changes in pharmaceutical safety as well. Starting with 
a general observation, the absence of a major pharmaceutical crisis comparable to the extent 
of the Thalidomide disaster within the European Union can be interpreted as the result of 
improved drug safety and functioning regulation (Groenleer, 2009). Even though there have 
been several pharmaceutical incidences within the European Union in the last decades, with 
Lipobay and Vioxx being the most publicized ones, the number of severely affected European 
patients has been limited. While this argument has high face validity, the absence of crisis 
does not serve as a reliable estimate of risk levels stemming from pharmaceutical 
consumption. A more direct measure of pharmaceutical risks can be seen in the previously 
discussed reported numbers of ADRs. Unfortunately the number of (all) reported ADRs does 
not serve as a reliable indicator for the evaluation of drug safety.308 Instead the discussion of 
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 Evaluating drug safety solely based on reported ADRs would imply an unrealistic perception of 
pharmaceutical safety. Drugs will always have some side effects and it is therefore important to focus on 
those drug reactions representing unacceptable risks.       
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drug safety should focus on serious ADRs, representing the real challenge to public health. 
Accordingly, both serious ADRs resulting in hospital submissions and fatal outcomes 
represent more appropriate indicators of the drug safety impact on public health (McGavock, 
2004a).  
Even though adverse drug reactions are a common phenomenon, no systematic research on 
incidence of serious ADRs within Europe exists. While the interest in the subject has grown 
over the last decades, there are virtually no studies comparing incidence rates between 
European member states. Instead, research has focused on local studies monitoring 
admissions in specific hospitals, multi-centred studies and national databases. While 
differences in sample size and methodology call for a cautious interpretation, results are 
comparable to a certain degree.309 Based on this assumption, trends in hospital admissions can 
be charted. Drawing on the report by the Expert Group on Safe Medication Practices 
established by the Council of Europe (2006), selected studies from three different periods 
shed some light on the occurrence of serious ADRs. Between 1980 and 1990, ADR hospital 
admission rates varied between 0.2 – 11.5 percent. During the period of 1990-2000 rates have 
been between 1.0 – 10.8 percent and changed to 1.8 – 13.8 percent between 2000 and 2007. 
This trend is reconfirmed by the available multi-centre studies, estimating 1.1 – 3.3 percent 
for the period of 1990- 2000 and 2.4 – 6.5 percent after 2000. Similar but slightly higher 
numbers have been found for ADRs witnessed during hospitalization (Davies et al., 2007). In 
light of the available data, it seems that serious ADRs have been on the rise in Europe. 
Turning to the trends in fatal ADRs within Europe, the development is less consistent. 
According to data compiled by the WHO, the SDR caused by therapeutic agents has been 
partially declining.  
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 For a discussion of methodological differences see Beijer & de Blaey (2002).  
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Graph 34: Standard death rates therapeutic agents in Europe (1980-2008) 
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However, there is reason to question this trend. First, the reliability of the WHO data can be 
challenged.310 Second, SDR levels reported to the WHO seem to be lower than more recent 
European studies suggest. A prominent study by Munir Pirmohamed suggested a fatality rate 
of 0,15 percent for hospital admissions caused by ADR and 5700 annual deaths for the UK 
and even 10.000, if fatal ADRs after hospitalisation are included (Pirmohamed et al., 2004: 
18).311 Similar rates have been found for the Netherlands (van der Hooft et al., 2006, 2008), 
Sweden (Wester et al., 2008), Italy (Leone et al., 2008) and France (Pouyanne et al., 2000).312 
It is assumed, that incidence rates in Germany are close to these estimates (Grandt et al., 
2005). Since recent admission and fatality rates are comparable to studies conducted 20 years 
ago (Pirmohamed et al., 2004: 18), it must be concluded that the burden of ADR within 
Europe has at least remained constant or even increased (Völkel et al., 2009).  Putting the 
consequences of fatal ADRs into perspective, it has been estimated that ADRs rank 7th in 
Sweden (Wester et al., 2008), and 6th in Germany as the most common cause of death, 
accounting for 16.000 deaths in Germany each year (Wille & Schönhöfer, 2002: 478-479). 
Finally, an impact assessment conducted in context of the latest legislative review on the 
European level estimated that “197,000 deaths per year in the EU are caused by ADRs and 
that the total societal cost of ADRs in the EU is €79 billion” (European Commission, 2008: 
1). From the perspective of public health, these developments are worrying. Beyond the 
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 National data in the database are missing for many countries and considering the constant values across time 
it must be asked how reliable the data really are.   
311
 This number might even be too low, as it only considers identified fatal events, leaving those aside that were 
not detected.  
312
 While most of the cited studies refrain from calculating fatality levels, they would be much lower than the 
5700 annual deaths that the study of Pirmohamed and his colleagues suggests for the UK. These differences 
might be partially explained by different definitions of ADRs. 
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obvious personal implications of serious and fatal adverse reactions, their occurrence has a 
decisive economic impact and represents a growing financial burden for national healthcare 
systems (Gautier et al., 2003; Pirmohamed et al., 2004; Ritter, 2008).  
The prevailing level of serious and fatal adverse drug events can be considered as an outcome 
of regulatory failure. Again, this would imply that the European regulatory framework is 
decisive in this regard. As in the case of the previously discussed regulatory goals, it is argued 
that both the impact of ADR on public health and the regulatory influence are limited. What 
constitutes an ADR is a matter of definition, implying that the level of serious events as 
ADRs in general might be subject to under- and overestimations. While ADRs should be 
limited to those reactions that result directly from the drug, more inclusive definitions are 
commonly used (Fernandez-Llimas et al., 2004). Rather than focusing on side effects of the 
drug, it includes results of potentially wrong usage and administration. ADR levels thus might 
reflect the prevalence of medication errors and iatrogenic illnesses to a certain degree. From 
this perspective, the negative health impact of ADR is not caused primarily by the respective 
drug. This perception is reaffirmed by the fact that the considered ADR studies estimate 
between 22 and 80 percent of the serious and fatal adverse events preventable (Madeira et al., 
2007: 392). This shifts the focus of regulation from the pharmaceutical product towards the 
behaviour of actors involved in drug therapy. Considering the role of prescribers, most 
adverse events can be attributed to overprescribing (McGavock, 2004a) and overdosing 
(Pirmohamed et al., 2004). Furthermore, ADR can be the result of inadequate information 
regarding the risks and benefits of a given drug, individual patient data and a lack of 
pharmacological training leading to inadequate diagnosis (Aronson, 2009; Jonville-Béra et al., 
2005; Ritter, 2008). Turning to the patient’s role, ADRs are caused by the previously 
discussed issue of non-compliance (Raschetti et al., 1999). Finally, demographic change as 
well as current trends in drug therapy account for the prevailing levels of serious and fatal 
adverse events. It has been found that elderly patients have been affected by ADRs and 
inadequate prescription to a larger extent (Gallagher et al., 2007; Hamilton et al., 2009; 
Malhotra et al., 2001; Passarelli et al., 2005; Routledge et al., 2004). A contributing factor 
must be seen in polytherapy, including the simultaneous consumption of pharmaceuticals 
increasing the likeliness of drug-drug interaction (Becker et al., 2007; Madeira et al., 2007) 
and personal genomic factors (Severino & Zompo, 2004).  
Obviously, many of the root causes of adverse events are well beyond the scope of the 
European regulatory framework. They are the result of informational asymmetries, a lack of 
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error culture and risk awareness in drug therapy. However, this might not only be true for 
prescribers but reflects a more general public misunderstanding of pharmaceutical risks and 
personal responsibility. As James M. Ritter regarding effective and safe drug therapy noted, 
“it is the balance between benefit and harm that is key, rather than an unachievable ideal of 
absolute safety.” (2008: 451). Yet pharmaceutical risks seem to be downplayed by industry 
(Clark, 2003) and absolute safety seems to be publicly embraced within Europe. More 
importantly, most European patients do not seem to believe, that patient safety is within 
individual responsibility. In a recently conducted special Eurobarometer respondents were 
asked, which organisations, bodies or authorities were mainly responsible for patient safety. 
The result indicates that European citizens seem to consider personal influence as negligible 
(Eurobarometer 2010). Promoting public health from the perspective of pharmaceutical 
consumption will therefore necessitate a mind change on behalf of prescribers as well as 
consumers.313 Clearly, European pharmaceutical regulation has contributed to public health 
by providing a sound and continuous risk-benefit assessment of the drug, the provision of 
information and the adoption of necessary measures in case of drug risks. While these tasks 
help to reduce the inherent product risks, it cannot solve issues associated to the medication 
process. 
 
8.4 Conclusion: regulatory outcomes and the limits of regulation  
Previous studies considered European pharmaceutical regulation and the regulatory network 
as a prime example of effective European governance. The identified lack of regulatory goal 
attainment points to the difference of de jure and de facto effectiveness and calls for a critical 
reassessment of these claims. The innovation capacity of the European industry has been 
stagnating and the global competitiveness of the industry has decreased. While some 
European companies are still among the group of leading pharmaceutical manufacturers, US 
based companies have become the driving force within the industry. After more than four 
decades a single market for pharmaceuticals has not been achieved. Competition remains 
restricted and uniform access is not realized. Finally, while the introduction of new drugs has 
helped to increase life expectancy and reduce the burden of illness, the prevalence of serious 
pharmaceutical safety issues negatively impacts on public health. However, this does not 
mean that the European framework has resulted in regulatory failure, but points to the 
limitations of the current regulatory framework instead.  
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While the competitiveness of the European industry is partially influenced by European 
regulation, this influence should not be overstated. Innovation may be partially connected to 
approval, but it is hard to believe that regulatory burden alone determines innovation capacity 
and competitiveness. Pharmaceutical risk regulation has a gate-keeping function and impacts 
on the ability of a company to recoup its R&D investments. Yet there is little reason to 
believe that the European framework has unduly restricted these possibilities. Instead, the 
reasons for the reduced competitiveness should be seen in differences in investment, 
innovation systems and a lack of public-private partnerships in the European pharmaceutical 
sector, factors that are outside the scope of European regulation.  
The same holds true for the creation of the single market. While the streamlining of regulation 
has created a single market from the perspective of approval, the stimulation of competition, 
increased access and convergence of prices remains largely unaffected by European 
regulation. Competition result from potential gains and as the discussion of market structure 
revealed, the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market do not seem to stimulate 
competition. While the Europeanization of the approval regime has potentially eased market 
entry for originator and generic competitors, it does not determine strategic behaviour of 
companies. Moreover, it cannot influence R&D portfolio allocations, the decision to market 
products in specific national markets and the development of prices.314 While producers might 
be morally obliged to provide access to approved drugs to all European citizens, it remains 
within their discretion to do so. As a result, the single market may be realized from the 
perspective of producers, but is still far from completion from the perspective of (many) 
European citizens. The solution to this paradox situation and the remaining disparities 
regarding access must be seen primarily on the national level and rests with the national 
health authorities.  
While the protection of public health is connected to the provision of access, the issue of 
safety has been identified as vital in this regard. The development of new drugs has improved 
European public health considering the positive development of health outcomes, but the 
regulatory framework cannot ensure that all citizens get the drugs they need.315 In addition, 
the prevalence of serious and fatal adverse events negatively affects the public health of 
European citizens. Stricter pre-market controls might have prevented some of these adverse 
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events, but at the same time would result in a delay in access for those patients potentially 
benefiting from the new treatment. Furthermore, the analysis of serious ADRs revealed that 
the majority of adverse events are related to medication errors, something that is beyond the 
reach of European regulatory intervention. Instead, the solution must be seen within better 
control of the medication process, education, information and a more critical approach to drug 
therapy within society.  
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9.  Conclusion: the effectiveness of European pharmaceutical governance   
The present study has attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the developments and 
current state of regulation and European regulatory governance in the pharmaceutical sector. 
From the perspective of regulatory effectiveness it was shown that (European) governance 
matters and has helped to strengthen the control of pharmaceutical risks, to use a distinction 
employed in this study, not only de jure but de facto. Moreover, European activities have been 
instrumental in the advancement of the underlying legal framework and it seems questionable 
if the same dynamic would have been traceable in case of predominately national initiatives. 
This generally positive finding should however not obfuscate the limits of regulation which 
were revealed in course of this enquiry. In concluding this study, several aspects therefore 
ought to be considered. First, the three research questions developed in the introductory 
chapter should be revisited. Second, the implications of the study results beyond its initial 
scope must be worked out. Third, limitations and further research needs will be identified. 
Finally, current regulatory developments and their perceived impact must be reviewed briefly 
and additional measures to improve regulatory effectiveness will be proposed. 
 
9.1 European health policy, the delegation of risks and regulatory effectiveness 
Three interrelated questions forming the underlying structure of the study have been raised at 
the beginning of this study. First it was asked, if the emergence of a European health policy 
can be affirmed. Second, the study tried to answer, why member states would be willing to 
delegate risk regulatory competencies in such sensitive policy fields as pharmaceuticals. The 
third and central research question has been, in how far the current regulation of the 
pharmaceutical sector is effective.     
 
9.1.1 European health policy: focusing on public health and pharmaceuticals   
The study started from a paradox observation. Even though the European Union has no 
legislative competencies in the field of health, a growing number of studies identified the 
emergence of an increasingly Europeanized health policy. As the discussion of previous 
studies revealed, this finding was developed based on qualitative approaches and 
comparatively broad concepts of Europeanization and health policy.  
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Using a more focused definition of health policy and employing a quantitative method the 
alleged European health policy paradox was clarified. No European health policy does 
currently exist since no specific legislative and judicial activity in most constitutive health 
policy dimensions is traceable. While the European Union has clearly tried to advance its 
position in the European public health discourse for example by providing information, 
issuing health strategies and programmes and introducing a responsible Executive Agency for 
Health and Consumers (EAHC), this does not amount to the emergence of a distinct European 
policy field.316 Even though the emergence of a general European health policy is not 
supported, the analysis revealed that beyond policies related to public health, a European 
pharmaceutical policy has emerged since the early 1960s. The reanalysis of European health 
policy claims clarified the paradox of European health policy, but raised similar questions 
regarding the identified European pharmaceutical policy.  
 
9.1.2 Delegation and the emergence of a European risk regulatory state 
Beyond questions of legal competencies of the European Union justifying intervention in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the more decisive question has been why member states would be 
willing to share or even delegate responsibility in sensitive policy fields. Pharmaceuticals, for 
example, represent a significant share of national health expenditures and more importantly, 
their consumption is related to certain risks. Since one of the key tasks of the modern state is 
to protect the well-being of its citizens and its legitimacy depends on its performance in this 
regard, willingly giving up room to manoeuvre in such matters seems to be counter-
inductive.317 Starting from the premises of the grand theories of European integration – 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism – the study set out to identify a theoretical 
explanation for the delegation of pharmaceutical (risk) regulation and risk regulation in 
general. Since these approaches focus on how rather than why integration and/or delegation 
happened, the discussion advanced to the liberal intergovernmentalism theory of Andrew 
Moravcsik (1993) and rational choice approaches, introducing the concept of preferences into 
the integration debate. Drawing on the concepts of Principal-Agent theory (Kassim & Menon, 
2003; Tallberg, 2002a), several reasons for delegation were identified. While the forwarded 
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  Moreover, it was found that the issue of delegation is not limited to the pharmaceutical sector, but represents 
a general European development. Delegation of risk regulation expands to other risks as well, for example, 
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reasons for delegation advance the understanding of European developments, their 
explanatory value is reduced by a “functionalist fallacy” (Krapohl, 2008: 25): the reason for 
delegation is solely based on the outcome that is ought to be achieved by delegation, while a 
sound “micro-foundation” (Kassim & Menon, 2003) is missing. Accordingly, functional 
reasons for delegation can hardly serve as the singular explanation for the delegation of risk 
regulation, since they omit the individual motivations and preferences underlying the 
(political) decision to delegate. Moreover, the explanatory value of functional reasons in the 
pharmaceutical sector is diminished by the partial character of delegation: risk aspects have 
been delegated while financial aspects of pharmaceutical regulation remained on the national 
level. Based on the concepts of blame avoidance (Weaver, 1986) and depoliticisation (Buller 
& Flinders, 2006; Burnham, 2001), a complementary and preference-based explanation for 
the delegation of risk regulation in the European context was developed. Delegation of risk 
regulation is conceptualized as the consequence of individual cost-benefit assessments on 
behalf of governments and politicians (1) and the specific characteristics of risks (2). 
Politicians and governments need to claim credit for their actions including regulatory 
activities. At times, the possibility to claim credit is comparatively low and the potential risk 
to be held responsible for a wrong policy decision is high, causing rational governments to 
adopt blame shifting strategies. Considering risk regulation, the motivation to pursue the latter 
is amplified, since the possibility to claim credit is hard to predict as the regulation of risks is 
characterized by uncertainty. The decision to delegate may however not be viewed as 
avoiding blame in the first place, but as a strategy to avoid uncertainty involved in the 
regulation of risks. Uncertainty avoidance thus provides an alternative and micro-founded 
explanation for the willingness of member states to delegate regulatory competencies. 
Delegation to the European level is facilitated by willingness of the European Commission to 
take over more and more regulatory responsibilities to prove its regulatory abilities (Kelemen 
& Menon, 2007b).318 The urge of member states to avoid uncertainty is thus met by regulators 
on the supranational level, willing to try out their luck and accept the risk of taking the blame. 
The actual decision to delegate regulatory tasks to the European level can be stimulated by 
national regulatory failure and the resulting public pressure (Hood, 2002; Hood & Rothstein, 
2001; Hood et al., 2004) and this has been the case in the field of pharmaceuticals and the 
Thalidomide disaster (Krapohl, 2008; Permanand, 2006). Uncertainty avoidance does not only 
lead to delegation but has been found to impact both on the regulatory architecture (1) and the 
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European approach to risk regulation (2). Even though the European bureaucracy may appear 
less risk averse as national governments, the urge to avoid blame and uncertainty does affect 
their behaviour as well. As a result, the responsibility for the regulation of risks is distributed 
between multiple actors (Beck, 1992; Hood, 2002) resulting in the creation of regulatory 
networks (Dehousse, 1997) and increased use of independent regulatory agencies (Everson, 
1995) on the European level. In an attempt to reduce the inherent uncertainty of risk 
regulation, the regulatory approach is becoming more legalized, formal and is increasingly 
based on a risk-averse strategy, namely the precautionary principle. As a result, European risk 
regulation is becoming stricter, less science-based and potentially (re)politicised.  
 
9.1.3 Regulatory effectiveness in the European pharmaceutical sector 
The uncertainty avoidance argument provided a valuable theoretical explanation for the 
delegation of risk regulation. At the same time, it raised some concerns on the regulatory 
capacities of the European Union. Previous functional explanations were based on the claim 
of European regulatory superiority, arguing that delegation would result in better regulation. 
The discussion of the predominant European regulatory logic revealed that superiority is 
largely understood as higher efficiency, reflecting an economic and business perspective on 
regulation. From the perspective of European citizens however, it is regulatory effectiveness – 
understood as the realization of regulatory goals – that must be achieved in the first place. As 
a result, European regulation might not necessarily reflect public needs and preferences, as it 
potentially focuses on the achievement of an economic instead of a social optimum, 
prompting the need to reassess the performance of European regulation from a citizen’s 
perspective.   
 
9.1.3.1 An analytical framework for regulatory quality and effectiveness  
In order to structure the subsequent analysis of European pharmaceutical regulation, an 
analytical framework for the assessment of regulatory quality and effectiveness accounting for 
the characteristics of European regulation and risk regulation was developed. Acknowledging 
the dual character of regulation, as a distinct type of policy (Lowi, 1964b) and a mode of 
governance (Baldwin et al., 1998) four different levers for the realisation and analysis of 
regulatory effectiveness were identified.  
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First, certain preconditions of regulation ought to be realized. A regulatory goal advancing the 
public interest justifying intervention, a legal mandate and the necessity of European 
intervention has to be established. Second, regulatory policies should be based on a properly 
specified regulatory goal, covering all aspects of the regulatory problem. In addition, certain 
regulatory principles, synthesized from previous research on good governance, ought to be 
realized within the legal framework underlying regulation. Acknowledging the federal 
character of the European regulatory state (Kelemen, 2004), the transposition of European 
rules serves a precondition for effective regulation. Based on the neo-institutionalist claim that 
institutions do matter, governance structures have been identified as the third and most 
decisive lever of regulatory effectiveness. While the legal framework is instrumental in 
achieving de jure effectiveness, regulatory institutions need to ensure that de facto 
effectiveness is realized. Institutional design of “regulatory regimes” (Hood et al., 2004) has 
to account for the common critique of regulation (Francis, 1993) and most importantly ensure 
that regulatory capture is prevented. Regulatory institutions must be able to develop the right 
regulatory answers and establish an “equilibrium of interest” (Walras, 1954) between key 
stakeholders, ensuring compliance and support for the regulatory regime. Accounting for the 
distinct character of risk regulation and the European regulatory context, the general 
framework was adapted by introducing two additional requirements. First, a risk model fitting 
the specific character of the risk in need of regulation (Fischer, 2009; Millstone et al., 2004; 
Renn, 2008) should be traceable within the regulatory governance structures. Second, national 
regulatory bodies must be aligned and tied in (McGowan & Wallace, 1996) within a European 
regulatory network. Regulatory outcomes constitute the fourth lever of analysis, since the 
achievement of regulatory goals represents the key concept of regulatory effectiveness. 
Linking the general framework to pharmaceutical regulation, the regulatory lifecycle, 
covering all pre- and post-authorization aspects, was introduced.  
 
9.1.3.2 Evaluation of the regulatory framework  
The empirical investigation of European pharmaceutical regulation commenced with the 
assessment of precondition, the regulatory framework and the transposition of European rules 
on the national level. Based on the need to correct negative externalities and informational 
asymmetries and considering that less intrusive forms of regulation have been deemed as 
insufficient, a justification for public intervention was established. Acknowledging the 
continuous character of pharmaceutical product risk, a combination of pre-market controls, 
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licensing (approval) and monitoring mechanisms was identified as an optimal regulatory 
strategy. While such measures can be organized on the national level, the transnational 
character of the regulated industry, the relative genetic similarity of the European peoples, the 
completion of the single market and economy of scale consideration in safeguarding public 
health necessitate a European approach.      
The discussion of constitutional foundations for European intervention revealed an inherent 
tension between regulatory goals and the legal base. While the need for regulation results 
from the possible negative impact of pharmaceutical risks on public health, intervention is 
based on the approximation of national laws to reduce barriers to the internal market. Put 
differently, intervention to protect public health is disguised as a measure to reduce obstacles 
to internal trade, amplifying concerns whether pharmaceutical regulation strives for a social or 
economic optimum. 
 
Development and Performance of the European regulatory framework 
European pharmaceutical regulation has evolved into a dense regulatory framework over the 
course of more than four decades. Retracing the development of pharmaceutical policy, three 
phases were identified. The first policy phase spanning from 1965 to 1990 focused on the 
harmonization of standards and regulatory aspects related to pre-authorization. Beyond 
establishing approval criteria policies mainly affected the development process. While several 
attempts to Europeanize national approval were enacted, opposition of member states and 
more importantly national regulators hindered the institutionalisation of European approval 
structures. Realising the limited effect of voluntary commitment, the Commission decided to 
engage in a fundamental review process, marking the beginning of the second policy phase of 
institutionalisation. The introduction of a threefold approval regime consisting of (existing) 
national, decentralized and centralized procedures as well as the foundation of a coordinating 
European regulatory agency, the EMA, marked a critical juncture. The approval regime was 
changed by the introduction of binding European procedures. While national regulators before 
had engaged in voluntary cooperation, the supervisory and coordination role of the EMA 
established a regulatory network in the sector, tying in national agencies. The second phase 
marked an expansion of the regulatory framework previously focusing on pre-authorization 
aspects as more specific European rules in the field of production, distribution, information 
and monitoring (pharmacovigilance) were enacted. Starting with the second revision in 2000, 
the regulatory framework moved into the third phase of consolidation and differentiation. The 
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increasingly fragmented regulatory framework was integrated and the existing level of 
regulation was raised further, with the notable exception of distribution.  
Considering the development of the legal framework from today’s perspective, a 
predominately positive assessment can be drawn. Starting as a rather fragmented set of 
policies harmonizing development and approval standards, pharmaceutical policy evolved 
into a consistent regulatory framework throughout the different policy phases. In addition, the 
framework sufficiently incorporates identified regulatory principles, serving as indicators of 
regulatory quality. Reviewing the current state from the perspective of the regulatory 
lifecycle, however, the predominantly positive assessment must be qualified. The density of 
the framework regarding different regulatory aspects is subject to considerable variation. 
While pre-authorization aspects are regulated rather extensively, the regulation of post-
authorization, distribution and information more specifically, remains under-regulated. This 
finding is puzzling, considering the market-based justification for European intervention. 
While the completion of the single market has been invoked as the reason for regulation, 
those regulatory aspects closely related to trade are not controlled sufficiently at least on the 
level of policy. The increased complexity of the framework as well as the lack of clarity and 
vagueness of most European provisions impedes the de jure effectiveness of regulation. While 
it is intended to reduce uncertainty on behalf of regulatees and specify regulators’ 
expectations, the European regulatory framework does not necessarily fulfil these 
requirements.  
Comparing the transposition performance of member states throughout the policy phases, a 
generally positive compliance trend is traceable. In line with previous research on compliance 
within the European Union, national transposition records have been found to vary within the 
EU 15. Despite this variation, transposition performance in the pharmaceutical sector as a 
whole proved to be less problematic than in other sectors and policy fields.        
 
9.1.3.3 Regulatory governance in the pharmaceutical sector  
Turning to the sectoral governance, the distribution of regulatory preferences in the regulatory 
arena, its impact on the conduct of regulation and the development of regulatory governance 
throughout time were analyzed.    
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Regulatory interests: pharmaceutical risk cultures, alignment and reputation   
Based on the claim that the functioning of regulatory regimes depends on trust, cooperation 
and compliance both within the regulatory network and the regulatory arena, regulatory 
preferences of the public, regulatees and regulators were deducted. 
Starting from the notion that the public has a general interest in safe medicines, this assertion 
was specified by drawing on cultural theories of risk perceptions. Even though safe medicines 
represent an overarching public regulatory interest, what constitutes safe and acceptable risks 
varies throughout the member states of the European Union. National cultural differences 
impact on the public perception of risk and therefore the valuation of safety versus access and 
to a lesser extent on the preferred mode of governance regarding the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals, forming distinct national pharmaceutical risk cultures. Since cultural 
influences have been found to persist over time, the existence of these differences has several 
implications for regulatory governance: a commonly accepted European regulatory approach 
is harder to achieve, the input legitimacy of a supranational regulatory regime is reduced and 
most importantly, differences in risk perceptions translate into regulatory differences affecting 
the regulatory network. Turning to the position of the industry, pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
interests have been found to converge around the reduction of regulatory costs and the 
rationalization of safety regulation, translating into fast and cost-efficient market access. 
While regulators both at the national and the European level have self-interests, the pursuance 
of these interests will (partially) depend on their ability to accommodate the interests of the 
public and the regulated industry. In ensuring organisational survival, regulators will need to 
regulate in accordance with public perceptions and in order to ensure compliance need to 
meet regulatees’ expectations. As a result, regulators will need to build a reputation towards 
the public and the industry. The safeguarding of reputation towards the public results in a 
more risk-averse regulatory approach and little public exposure to maintain a positive public 
reputation. Building a reputation towards the industry is achieved by rationalization of 
approval procedures and regulatory requirements. Moreover, the regulator’s preferred 
secretive mode of governance advances the reputation towards the industry as well.  
Based on the discussion of preferences, a consensus between the three considered actors can 
be identified. The provision of safety is a shared goal, even though individual reasons for this 
consensus vary. While the public does not necessarily prefer a specific regulatory mode of 
governance, regulators and regulatees can be expected to prefer a science-based, secretive 
mode of regulation.  
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The identified congruence of interests proves to be positive from the perspective of regulatory 
effectiveness. At the same time two distorting effects can be identified. First, the shared focus 
on safety is limited to the pre-authorization stage, while the interest constellation moves 
towards access considerations during post-authorization. Given this time inconsistency, 
compliance with the regulatory framework of regulators and regulatees is lower in the post-
authorization stage. Moreover, the potential reluctance to repeal regulatory decisions on safety 
grounds can negatively impact on public health. Second, the equilibrium of interest in the 
regulatory arena does not prevent conflicts within the regulatory network, resulting from 
national regulatory approaches and more importantly pharmaceutical risk cultures. 
 
Regulatory governance before 1995: regulatory patchwork  
The regulatory regime in the pharmaceutical sector before the first revision is best described 
as a “regulatory patchwork”. The legal framework reached a considerable level of density, but 
the establishment of governance structures was lagging behind. Implementation of regulation 
was largely shifted towards private actors and the existing European institution, the CPMP, 
created to stimulate collaboration and alignment of national regulators, was lacking the 
necessary competencies to effectively tie in national authorities. While public health was 
safeguarded in principle, since market authorization based on specific criteria became 
mandatory, a single market in the sense of functioning mutual recognition was clearly not 
established. The patchwork of national procedures persisted and the introduced European 
procedures failed to eliminate duplication of assessment efforts. The lack of collaboration and 
appropriate structures was even more problematic regarding the post-authorization stage. 
National pharmacovigilance systems existed, but little was done to streamline and rationalize 
the exchange of information. Instead the situation clearly represented a state of under-
regulation and under-institutionalization. The prevailing ineffectiveness of the regulatory 
regime during the first three decades clearly reflected the previously identified imbalance of 
the regulatory policy framework, the impact of national pharmaceutical risk cultures and the 
underlying logic of uncertainty avoidance.  
 
Governance after 1995: institutional and cultural changes       
Comparing the performance of the regulatory regime after 1995 to the achievements during 
the first policy phase a fundamental improvement can be identified. Two institutional changes 
in the sector provided a more specific explanation for this advancement.  
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First, the introduction of European approval procedures based on a binding supranational 
decision (centralized procedure) and binding mutual recognition (decentralized procedure) 
reduced the distorting effect of deviating national positions in risk assessment. Second, the 
foundation of the EMA transformed the loosely connected group of national regulators into a 
regulatory network, aligning national regulators and increasing internal compliance. Beyond 
these obvious changes, two additional factors for the improved performance of the approval 
regime and governance in more general terms were identified. Institutional changes were not 
limited to the European level, but affected the regulatory network as a whole. Stimulated by 
the emergence of the EMA and starting in parallel to the first revision of the regulatory 
framework, agencification in the pharmaceutical sector led to a convergence of regulatory 
structures. Moreover, the institutional transformation resulted in increased external 
accountability of independent national regulators, as they became increasingly dependent on 
applicants’ fees. Closely connected to the previous argument, the newly created regulatory 
network emphasized a new regulatory approach, challenging existing national regulatory 
traditions. While the understanding of the regulatory role in most member states was that of a 
gatekeeper, the newly created European regulatory culture emphasized collaboration and the 
mutual goal of achieving market access. Driven by financial pressure, increased external (and 
internal) scrutiny of the Commission and the industry, national regulators had to adapt to 
these new rules, arguably resulting in decreasing regulatory discretion.  
           
The EMA, expert regulation, the potential for capture and social legitimacy 
The positive impact of the EMA and the new European approval regime on regulatory 
effectiveness can not be denied. At the same time, the creation of an independent European 
regulatory agency with a disputable public mandate, harbouring an expert body (CHMP) 
dominating regulatory decision-making, raised concerns regarding participation, transparency, 
accountability and control. The transparency of EMA’s work has clear improved since its 
foundation and has reached an advanced state compared to national agencies in the sector and 
other European agencies, even though full transparency is still not achieved. A comparable 
development has been traceable regarding the participation of the public, with the agency 
increasingly consulting patient groups and providing them with permanent representation. 
Several ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms to ensure (political) accountability and control of the 
agency were identified. While these measures should ensure a sufficient level of formal 
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control, the subsequent discussion revealed that de facto control of the agency is not as strong 
as the formal mechanisms would suggest.  
Turning to the approval regime and the work of the CHMP, the result has been much more 
heterogeneous. Starting with realisation of participation within the approval regime, the 
current approach is strictly science-based and creates a reserved domain for experts, deciding 
on market approval. Approval processes differ regarding transparency with the centralized 
procedure being the most advanced one, followed by the decentralized (MRP/DCP) and 
national procedures. The same rank order can be established regarding the accountability and 
control of the approval regime. The centralized procedure is controlled by defined approval 
criteria, strong guidelines, a peer-review system within the CHMP, the possibility of judicial 
review through the ECJ – even though reduced to actors affected by the decision – and finally 
a political control mechanism. While these mechanisms do reduce regulatory discretion, they 
reduce the effectiveness of political control at the same time. The only chance to stop a 
regulatory decision (opinion) by the CHMP in the political phase is based on scientific 
grounds, and this regulatory game has to be played against a body created to concentrate 
pharmaceutical expertise on the European level. Even though the same underlying approval 
criteria apply, most of the control mechanisms applied to the centralized procedure are absent 
in case of the decentralized procedure, at least before the stage of binding arbitration is 
reached. While regulatory discretion and the potential for capture is supposedly higher in case 
of the decentralized procedure, regulatory competition that has been found to hinder the 
smooth functioning and efficiency of mutual recognition serves as an additional lever of 
control. In contrast to the European procedures, accountability and control is largely absent 
from national procedures, with most agencies still practicing a science-based black box model 
of regulation. While the new approval regime surely is efficient and reduces the potential of 
capture these advantages come at the price of decreased social legitimacy. Decisions are made 
by an isolated regulatory body, in an approval process with a potential authorization bias 
towards unsafe products insufficiently tamed by political control mechanisms. 
 
Coverage of the regulatory lifecycle and the regulatory approach 
While the positive impact of European governance is reaffirmed regarding the regulation of 
different regulatory lifecycle aspects, general as well as specific drawbacks of the current 
regulatory approach ought to be highlighted. 
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A general problem of the regulatory approach must be seen in the strong emphasis of 
voluntary compliance as well as a lack of monitoring, for example via inspections, and 
sanctioning activities. While this is partially the result of the new European regulatory culture, 
other important factors in explaining the lack of policing are the insufficient national 
regulatory resources focusing largely on the approval process and the longstanding lack of 
sanctioning power. The shifting of increasingly complex regulatory tasks towards regulatees 
without providing additional guidance how to achieve compliance represents another 
worrying trend. Finally, the predominately European rather than global framing of regulatory 
problems resulting in insufficient regulatory answers has been traceable in several aspects of 
the regulatory lifecycle.  
Development has been one of the most regulated aspects covered by the regulatory 
framework. Beyond harmonizing trial registration throughout the European Union serving as 
a licensing mechanism, governance is exerted through monitoring activities. Considering the 
low level of inspections and the increased conduct of clinical trials outside the European 
Union, the effectiveness of this approach could be questioned. Beyond insufficient 
monitoring, regulatory governance of production does not account for the globalization that 
has affected producers of active ingredients (AI), representing the input factors for 
pharmaceuticals, increasingly shifting production to countries with insufficient quality 
regulation. The multiplicity of AI sources and increased trading further diminish the 
effectiveness of self-regulatory approaches mainly based on manufacturers’ activities.  
The limited level of regulation regarding distribution within the European regulatory 
framework is amplified by problems of governance. While member states employ licensing 
mechanisms to control wholesale activities, this intervention does not seem to provide 
sufficient control in an increasingly complex field. Global trade has transformed distribution 
from simple wholesaling into a complex trading activity involving long supply chains and an 
increased number of players. As a result the current approach is neither able to protect the 
traditional supply channels from the entering of counterfeit medicine, nor addresses the 
potential negative impact of e-trade and rogue pharmacies on public health. The previously 
identified regulatory gap therefore reflects a governance gap as well.       
The governance of information both regarding the work of regulatory agencies and products is 
hindered by prevailing national regulatory cultures. While the Europeanization of the 
regulatory network has increased obligations to provide information, most regulatory agencies 
still do not seem to be willed or staffed to take over a more active communication role 
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towards the public. While the provision of product information is mainly based on package 
leaflets, which currently do not seem to provide adequate information and ensure patients 
compliance, the provision of product information through the internet is increasingly used. 
However, the current approach does not allow for a more fundamental education of patients 
regarding pharmaceutical risks and benefits which would help to strengthen regulatory 
effectiveness. 
The governance of post-authorization monitoring has been strongly influenced by the creation 
of the regulatory network and the EMA, strengthening the exchange of safety information. 
Supported by heightened regulatory requirements for manufacturers entailed in the regulatory 
framework, the effectiveness of pharmacovigilance activities has been one of the key 
improvements of the new regulatory regime. In light of the perceived shift of regulatory 
interests towards the maintenance of access after product authorization, however, the 
regulatory approach and structure turns out to be problematic. Regulation largely focuses on 
the generation of information, largely provided by the industry. Acknowledging the potential 
dilemma of regulatees to report on product defects potentially resulting in withdrawal, the 
lack of independent research on behalf of regulators constitutes a decisive problem. A lack of 
monitoring activities and insufficient regulatory capacities of national bodies dedicated to the 
conduct of pharmacovigilance aggravates the situation. The dilemma of regulatees to provide 
all available information is complemented by a dilemma on behalf of the regulator. Since, 
according to the logic of reputation, a change of its initial assessment will negatively impact 
on its public perception, regulators will try to accumulate as much evidence as possible before 
far reaching regulatory measures (withdrawal) will be invoked. As a result, regulators resort 
to softer measures to regulate post-market safety. Drawing on available post-authorization 
data and the Vioxx and Lipobay example, supportive evidence for the dilemma was found. 
The possibility to pursue such a strategy is eased by several factors. Restrictions regarding 
availability and quality of safety data provide the regulator with higher regulatory discretion 
then during the approval decision. The institutional set-up of the process and more 
specifically the prevalent low level of transparency of post-authorization decision making is 
conducive as well.  
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9.1.3.4 Regulatory effectiveness and regulatory outcomes  
The assessment of regulatory outcomes regarding competitiveness, the completion of a single 
market and public health reaffirmed the previously indentified drawbacks of the current 
regulatory approach. The innovation capacity of the European industry has been stagnating 
and the global competitiveness of the industry has decreased. While some European 
companies are still among the group of leading pharmaceutical manufacturers, US based 
companies have become the driving force within the industry. After more than four decades a 
single market for pharmaceuticals has not been achieved yet. Competition remains restricted 
and uniform access is not achieved. Finally, while the introduction of new drugs has helped to 
increase life expectancy the prevalence of safety issues negatively impacts on public health. 
Paradoxically, these findings do not necessarily mean, that the current regulatory regime is 
ineffective, but point to the limits of regulation in achieving these goals. The regulatory 
regime may influence the pharmaceutical sector and provide a supportive regulatory 
environment. The attainment of the identified regulatory goals is however largely contingent 
on factors outside of the regulatory scope. It depends on the pharmaceutical industry, the 
member states and in the case of public health especially on the behaviour of prescribing 
doctors and patients. While the competitiveness of the European industry is partially 
influenced by European regulation, the reasons for the reduced competitiveness must be seen 
in differences in investment, innovation systems and a lack of public-private partnerships in 
the European pharmaceutical sector, factors that are outside the scope of European regulation. 
The same holds true for the creation of the single market. The streamlining of regulation has 
created a single market from the perspective of approval, but it can not influence R&D 
portfolio allocations, the decision to market products in specific national markets and the 
development of prices. Turning to public health, the regulatory framework cannot ensure that 
all citizens get the drugs they need and safety of pharmaceuticals and the occurrence of 
adverse events more specifically are mainly related to medication errors, something that is 
beyond the reach of European regulatory intervention. Recalling the initial research question, 
it can be concluded that the introduction of a European regulatory regime has had a major 
impact on the regulatory effectiveness in the pharmaceutical sector, aligning national 
regulators and counterbalancing the distorting effect of national pharmaceutical risk culture. 
At the same time, a divide between de jure and de facto effectiveness is traceable, pointing to 
the limits of regulatory governance both from the perspective of right problem framing and 
the scope of regulation.    
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9.2 Implications of the present study 
In trying to specify, what the present study adds to what is already known, three different 
levels should be differentiated: European pharmaceutical regulation, European risk regulation 
and European studies especially in the field of health. 
The present study has been the first to analyse European pharmaceutical regulation from a 
holistic perspective, going well beyond the focus of previous studies. First, it expanded the 
scope beyond the analysis of the regulatory framework, by including questions of 
transposition, governance and regulatory outcomes. Second, it introduced the concept of 
regulatory effectiveness. Third and most decisively, instead of focusing on the EMA and the 
approval regime, the introduction of the regulatory lifecycle, allowed a more precise and 
inclusive analysis of regulatory performance. The study revealed that the assumed 
effectiveness of the regulatory regime and governance of the sector can and must be 
challenged. While de jure effectiveness, despite the identified imbalance of the regulatory 
framework can be considered as accomplished, the discussion of governance and regulatory 
outcomes revealed a lack of de facto effectiveness. Furthermore, the study advanced the 
understanding of interaction within the regulatory network by drawing attention to the 
existence of national pharmaceutical cultures and implications for regulatory behaviour. By 
introducing regulatory preferences and the logic of reputation, a more advanced model of 
regulatory relations within the regulatory arena and its impact on regulatory effectiveness in 
the pharmaceutical sector is provided. Drawing on these concepts, more advanced 
explanations for the ineffectiveness of sectoral governance before 1995 as well as prevailing 
current deficiencies of sectoral governance are provided.     
The contribution to the field of European risk regulation is threefold. First, the developed 
explanation for delegation in risk regulation based on uncertainty avoidance provides a more 
fitting and micro-founded reasoning, avoiding the functionalist fallacy. Second, the identified 
national differences in risk perception and its general impact on the appropriateness and 
acceptance of European risk regulatory regimes can help to understand the functioning and 
effectiveness of current risk regulatory approaches. In addition, the identified dynamics within 
the regulatory network, sectoral agencification and the emergence of a European regulatory 
culture could constitute developments traceable in other sectors as well. As the discussion of 
risk perceptions revealed, general risk cultures do exist in the European Union and, as the 
discussion of the pharmaceutical sector exemplified, impact on public and regulatory 
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perceptions. Third, the basic analytical framework developed in the fourth chapter can be 
applied to other risk regulatory fields and serve as a structuring device for similar studies on 
regulatory effectiveness both on the European and national level.   
Turning to impact of the study on European studies and on health studies more specifically, 
the proposed approach to assess the Europeanization of policy fields, represents a 
complementary research strategy to existing qualitative studies and can by applied to other 
policy fields as well. Another important finding relates to the creation of a European 
administrative space, the emergence of European regulatory agencies and a European 
regulatory culture. Even though research on agencification on the European level has 
expanded considerably in the last few years, it seems striking that questions of social 
legitimacy regarding the delegation to unelected bodies have not entered the debate. If the 
European Union is primarily understood as a regulatory state, its legitimacy depends both on 
the conduct and outcome of regulatory activities. In light of the dominant European regulatory 
logic emphasizing economic aspects, it seems at least questionable if European regulation is 
superior from the perspective of citizens and businesses alike. However, if the social 
legitimacy of the European risk regulatory state is ought to increase, it is important to frame 
questions of better regulation from the perspective of effectiveness. Moreover, it would be 
important to analysis existing European regulatory regimes in this regard. As this study tried 
to show, European regulatory agencies can have a fundamental influence on the conduct of 
regulatory governance, potentially impacting on the everyday life of European citizens. 
Considering the isolation and potential lack of control that is exercised over these bodies, 
more research on the actual behaviour and activities of these bodies seems to be necessary as 
well.  
 
9.3 Current developments in the European pharmaceutical sector 
Unsurprisingly, developments in the pharmaceutical sector both on the level of the regulatory 
framework and the regulatory regime did not cease. A fundamental change to the sector has 
been the recent transfer of pharmaceuticals and the EMA from the DG Enterprise and 
Industry into the responsibility of the DG Health and Consumers at the beginning of 2010. 
While it is too early to speculate on the strategic and political implications, it will be 
interesting to see if the relocation will result in an increasing public health turn of 
pharmaceutical regulation and governance. Beyond several modifications to the existing 
regulatory framework, the Commission engaged in a new and still ongoing revision process of 
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the regulatory framework in 2007 and adopted a communication in December 2008, entitled 
Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharmaceutical Sector 
sketching out the future regulatory priorities. The second major project has been the so-called 
pharmaceutical package, consisting of two regulations and three directives. The package 
covers three main topics: information to patients, pharmacovigilance and fake medicines.  
The proposals regarding information to patients foresee to harmonize the provision of 
information to patients and grant more rights to market authorization holders in this regard. 
Based on a report published in 2007 and the subsequent consultations the Commission saw 
the need to streamline the availability of information and to clarify the borderline between 
(prohibited) promotion and information. Moreover, the proposal lays down measures for the 
monitoring of compliance with these rules.      
The changes to pharmacovigilance will both affect the collection, decision and 
communication stage. Direct patient reporting will be allowed under the new provision, a new 
Committee located within the EMA supporting the conduct of pharmacovigilance will be 
created and the decision process on safety measures is rationalized by clarifying roles and 
responsibilities. The role of the EMA and the CHMP in pharmacovigilance is strengthened 
further, especially regarding the collection of ADRs. Responsibilities of market authorization 
holders are expanded and rationalized at the same time. The Commission will be allowed to 
mandate post-authorization studies and the use of risk management plans is encouraged while 
duplication of reporting efforts is reduced by reporting all cases to the Eudravigilance 
database and the requirements for the description of pharmacovigilance systems are 
rationalized by introducing a pharmacovigilance system master file. Additional rationalisation 
affects the requirements for periodic safety update reports are which should be made 
proportional to the risks and the introduction of single assessments, including all products 
based on the same active ingredient. Communication is strengthened by the creation of web 
portal for citizens and the introduction of a key information section in leaflets.      
To combat the risks posed by fake medicine, the Commission proposed a number of changes 
to the current regulation of the distributional chain. Control is expanded to other actors 
(brokers) active in the trading of pharmaceuticals and by expanding licensing mechanisms 
throughout the distribution chain. The use of specific safety features (seals, serialisation) 
which not ought to be separated during distribution is proposed. Wholesalers will be obliged 
to certify the reliability of their business partners and product sources. The control of API 
production shall be strengthened by stricter import rules and audits of producers. Moreover, 
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stricter rules for inspections and the increased use of the EudraGMP database are highlighted 
as a means to improve drug safety.  
The pharmaceutical package has attracted a lot of controversy during the last two years and 
the plans for the improvement of pharmacovigilance and information of the public have been 
at the centre of a heated debate. While industry associations support the provision of 
information and rationalization of pharmacovigilance (EFPIA, 2009b), consumer 
organisations have opposed to the changes negatively impacting on the provision of public 
health (AIM & ISDB & MiEF & HAI Europe, 2009). With the package still in the legislative 
process at the time of writing, the final impact on regulatory effectiveness is hard to estimate 
at this point. Evaluating the entailed changes in light of the previous assessment of the 
European pharmaceutical regulation it is nevertheless possible to identify the most significant 
improvements and drawbacks from the perspective of public health.  
At first sight the pharmaceutical package arguably contributes to the reduction of most gaps 
of the regulatory framework identified in this study. Most importantly, the introduction of the 
measures to combat fake medicine would close the regulatory gap of distribution. The 
allowance of direct reporting of ADRs, increased collaboration and the extended role of the 
EMA in pharmacovigilance, as well as the introduction of more extensive post-authorization 
study requirements can be expected to broaden the (data) foundation of decision-making and 
potentially advance the public understanding of pharmaceutical risks. Moreover, the changes 
to leaflets and the creation of a safety portal will help increase the effectiveness of 
(pharmaceutical) risk communication. A similar effect can be expected regarding the 
provisions on information to customers providing both product-related information and 
contextual knowledge on pharmaceutical risks. However, there is reason to believe that the 
effect of the envisioned changes will be more limited than the Commission and proponents of 
the reform would like to admit.    
Starting with the issue of fake medicine, the clarification of roles and expansion of licensing 
as well as a product-based regulatory strategy employing tracing systems is important, but the 
real challenge must be seen in the implementation of these new rules. As the previous analysis 
tried to show, the monitoring of distribution has become increasingly complex and is 
complicated further by the insufficient resources of regulatory agencies, hardly able to fulfil 
their current and less extensive tasks. While private regulatory arrangements already do exist 
in wholesaling, past experience suggests that many companies do not necessarily have the 
resources to engage in auditing activities (Avellanet, 2010). Moreover, the current proposals 
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do (still) not account for the challenges of alternative supply chains and internet trade (Anon, 
2009a). Considering that the pharmaceutical package seems to put increasing emphasis on the 
responsibility of private actors in ensuring safety, distribution can be expected to remain the 
weak link of pharmaceutical regulation. 
While providing more information to patients is a laudable goal in itself, the proposals by the 
Commission raise some serious concerns. While it is true that pharmaceutical manufacturers 
do possess an informational advantage regarding their products it is questionable in how far 
allowing direct information will advance the consumers’ level of information: 
“What key data are pharmaceutical companies going to give to patients that have not been included on 
the patient leaflet or the assessment reports that are available at any time on the Eudrapharm European 
database and on the websites of the member states health authorities […] Countless recent examples 
show that pharmaceutical companies are not in the habit of divulging certain items of ‘key information’ 
which they possess, such as information on the risks associated with their drugs. [original emphasis]” 
(AIM & ISDB & MiEF & HAI Europe, 2009: 2-3).   
The Commission seems to misapprehend the meaning of more effective informing of patients. 
The issue is not primarily related to product information but the provision of information 
allowing for informed decision-making in therapy and a better understanding of 
pharmaceutical risks, as well as the comparison of alternative treatments. Pharmaceutical 
companies can hardly be expected to provide such information, considering the inherent 
conflict of interest. Instead of reducing agencies’ role to the control of industries’ 
informational activities, a task that will be extremely difficult, providing them with the 
responsibility to inform citizens in the previously mentioned way would prove to be a better 
solution. 
Finally turning to the proposals on pharmacovigilance, it can be argued that the changes will 
mostly benefit the industry while representing a modest advancement regarding public health. 
Beyond the fundamental improvement of involving patients, the streamlining of reporting 
might lead to unintended consequences. While the fear of consumer organisations that the 
new legislation will result in a privatisation of reporting and the crowding out of national 
pharmacovigilance structures (ISDB & MiEF, 2009: 3-4) is most certainly overrated, the 
changes in reporting will probably not only increase reporting rates but will impact on the 
possibilities of national pharmacovigilance experts to process and analyse these information. 
While improved reporting and the reduction of duplicated efforts is a laudable goal, data 
quality and the enabling of independent assessment by national agencies are vital in 
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improving pharmacovigilance. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the main goal of the 
pharmaceutical package, as more sophisticated reporting requirements (PSURs) are 
streamlined, depicting the reduction of reporting frequencies and level of detail. In addition, 
the proposals do not address the identified conflicts of interest in post-authorization decision-
making on behalf of regulators and regulatees and the prevailing lack of transparency and 
accountability. 
     
9.4 Implications for the improvement of regulatory effectiveness 
Significant progress towards more efficient and effective pharmaceutical regulation in the 
European Union has been made over the last fourty-five years. This study has attempted to 
draw a realistic picture of the current regulatory situation, highlighting progress as well as 
shortcomings of the regulatory regime. While the identification of possible improvements 
provides valuable insights, it seems to be of even greater importance to sketch out tentative 
solutions to increase the overall regulatory effectiveness of the regime.  
In supporting the completion of the single market from the perspective of access it is 
important to differentiate between changes within the scope of the current regulatory regime 
and factors out of the scope. Starting with the first set of changes, an option to reduce 
remaining disparities can be seen in the expansion of the centralized procedure to all products, 
leading to a uniform authorization throughout the European Union. Even though this would 
not guarantee uniform marketing it could be expected to increase access. An additional yet 
highly intrusive measure would be mandatory marketing in all member states as a condition 
for approval. The streamlining of pricing and reimbursement throughout the European Union 
– even though highly unlikely given persistent national reservations – can be expected to have 
a positive effect on the integration of the single market. In stimulating the competition and 
increase of access regarding generics beyond national policies, the Commission and the 
respective DG would have to engage in a stricter monitoring and sanctioning of market 
distorting practices. While the recent sectoral enquiry shows the commitment of the 
Commission, it remains to be seen if misconduct by innovator companies will have legal 
consequences.   
As the discussion of regulatory outcomes has shown, the strengthening of innovation 
capacities and competitiveness is largely outside the scope of the current regulatory regime. 
Beyond the provision of regulatory certainty as a lever to stimulate the development of 
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innovative instead of me-too pharmaceuticals, the provision of additional incentives, for 
example extended exclusivity and increased scientific support during development could be 
useful. A more drastic measure would be the change of approval criteria and the application 
of relative efficacy as a condition for market approval. However, the impact of these changes 
on the European pharmaceutical industry could be catastrophic and result in no innovation at 
all.319 Turning to the changes outside of the regulatory scope, the creation of a coherent 
innovation system within the European Union represents a major area of improvement. While 
recent initiatives like the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) represent a promising 
development, the European sector is still lagging behind the US regarding the creation of a 
conducive scientific environment.320    
 In improving public health several general and more specific recommendations can be drawn. 
Starting with the regulatory framework, the study showed that the body of regulation is 
marked by increasing complexity and vagueness at the same time. While this translates into 
regulatory burden, this is not only an issue of regulatory efficiency but regulatory 
effectiveness, as it increases regulatory uncertainty and potentially decreases compliance. It 
would be therefore necessary to review the framework from this dual perspective.  
The regulatory network is vital for the achievement of regulatory effectiveness. Drawing on 
the discussion of regulatory governance in the sector, two main issues need to be addressed. 
First, staffing and resources represent an increasing challenge. Most national agencies are 
understaffed and the distribution of staffing within national bodies is still skewed in favour of 
approval related tasks, rather than reflecting the increasing importance of post-authorization. 
In addition, staffing of agencies has to be expanded in certain disciplines and uniform training 
across the network is necessary. While current initiatives of the network are promising ( 
Sharma, 2009), greater efforts are necessary. Closely connected to the issue of staffing is the 
reform of agency financing. While agencification has increased alignment of regulatory 
agencies it has resulted in increased financial dependence of national regulators and the EMA. 
Unfortunately, the recent changes in the framework do not seem to encourage a return to 
greater public involvement in this area. Second, the current regulatory approach might not 
only foster cooperation but at the same time discourage compliance. While this study argued, 
that the building of regulatory relations is decisive in achieving compliance, this does not 
                                                 
319
 In addition, the valuation of innovation to some degree is conducted during pricing and reimbursement. 
However, as the recent developments in Germany show, rewarding innovation rather than reimbursing every 
new drug introduced to the market does not seem to be a political priority (Anon, 2010b).    
320
 The IMI is a partnership between the European Community and the EFPIA intended to strengthen the 
research environment especially regarding the development of biopharmaceuticals (IMI, 2010).   
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mean that traditional mechanisms and more importantly the use of sanctions to ensure 
compliance are obsolete. For a long time the regulatory regime has been somewhat toothless, 
and the power to sanction regulatees has just been supplemented lately. It remains to be seen, 
if the regime is willing to bite the hand that feeds it to ensure that compliance especially in the 
post-authorization stage is achieved.      
Improving public health will necessarily require changes to certain governance aspects of the 
regulatory lifecycle. In improving the approval process, the institutionalization of risk framing 
would improve the input legitimacy of the regime by integrating public perceptions of 
acceptable risks (Johnson et al., 2009). Reducing the risks to public health stemming from 
distribution, the collaboration between health authorities, regulatory bodies and other affected 
actors must be increased. Rather than shifting the responsibility towards regulatees, 
strengthening monitoring capacities especially in third countries will be necessary. Increased 
monitoring has to be supplemented by more vigorous sanctioning and criminal charges. 
Considering the global dimension of counterfeit medicines a joined approach between the 
EMA, the FDA and other regulatory bodies is inescapable and progress currently made in this 
area seems to be promising. However, the regulation of illegal e-trade remains virtually 
impossible and raising public awareness of associated risks seems to be the only option to 
reduce its negative impact. Repeating an argument developed in the seventh chapter, the 
improvement of information will necessitate a reframing of the task and a change of roles. 
Beyond the provision of product-related information strengthening public health needs will 
necessitate the provision of contextual information and education of patients. Promoting 
health literacy (Carmona, 2006) should be a prior task of national regulatory agencies. 
Embracing this role as well as creating the capacities to fulfil it will be one of the many 
challenges for the European regulatory framework. Finally, the monitoring of pharmaceutical 
risks and more effective pharmacovigilance represent the key area to advance the protection 
of public health. Rather than increasingly relying on industry assessments – potentially 
affected by the described regulatees dilemma – independent research by regulatory agencies, 
external experts and institutions must be encouraged and enabled. This implies improvements 
in data generation, training of physicians to detect signals (Durrieu et al., 2007), an increase of 
staffing in pharmacovigilance departments across Europe and stronger collaboration between 
existing national resources. Moreover, it will be necessary to improve the analytical tools and 
databases. A promising development in this regard has been the creation of the European 
Network of Centres for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance (ENCEPP). While 
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increasing post-authorization commitments of regulatees must be carefully weighed against 
the implicit regulatory burdens, it seems to be necessary to increase regulatory compliance 
with existing commitments in the first place. Turning to decision-making in the post-
authorization stage, more transparent and faster decisions are necessary to increase public 
trust. Dismissing such demands on the grounds of preventing public confusion ignores the 
potential gains of increased awareness for the continuous character of pharmaceutical risks. A 
fundamental, yet potentially decisive change would be the previously proposed institutional 
separation of approval and post-authorization decision-making. While this would result in the 
creation of yet another regulatory body, it resolves the prevailing regulators’ dilemma of 
revoking its own decision despite reputational considerations.  
 
9.5 Concluding remarks: merits and limits of European regulatory governance  
As this study has shown, the European regulation of pharmaceuticals has evolved from a 
fragmented patchwork into a coherent framework supporting the safeguarding of public health 
in the European Union. European regulation has remedied the existing shortcomings of 
national regulatory frameworks and the creation of a European regulatory network has 
resulted in effective sectoral governance. While the merits of European regulation and 
governance in realizing regulatory goals must be acknowledged, it also has been found that 
certain limits of regulation exist. Clearly, recent and future advancement in the regulation of 
the sector as well as in pharmaceutical development can be expected to further decrease 
pharmaceutical product risks. However, the current regulatory approach will not be able to 
reduce those risks not stemming from the product itself.    
It has been said that European citizens today live in medicated societies (Moynihan & Smith, 
2002). While it might be tempting to assume that increased consumption has been the result 
of demographic changeor an increased need and access to novel treatments, it has been 
stimulated as well by both private and political forces. National governments promote 
pharmaceutical consumption by switching drugs to over the counter (OTC) status and the 
pharmaceutical industry advances the “medicalisation” (Busfield, 2010) of society through 
lifestyle drugs. Increased consumption does, however, not lead to a more advanced public 
understanding of pharmaceutical risks.  
Most patients refuse to acknowledge the risks associated with consumption and 
(understandably) want to believe that drugs are absolutely safe. At the same time, every new 
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public drug scandal is accompanied by accusation against regulators and mounting distrust 
towards the industry. This inconsistent public perception can be seen as the result of a 
regulatory approach effectively isolating regulators and regulatees from public scrutiny and 
efforts by the pharmaceutical industry downplaying the risks of pharmaceutical consumption. 
While public unawareness of pharmaceutical risks might be conducive to short-term business 
interests it represents a disruptive potential in many ways. It amplifies the impact of drug 
scandals and can result in the short-term repoliticisation of regulatory policy leading to stricter 
yet not necessarily more effective regulation. Moreover, it may lead to a more hostile public 
perception of the industry and a more critical stance towards innovation. Most decisively from 
the perspective of public health, it tends to obfuscate the personal responsibility in mitigating 
pharmaceutical risks.  
The majority of risks involved in pharmaceuticals are not caused by the drug itself but are the 
result of medication errors. To react to this regulatory challenge implies an expansion of the 
current regulatory understanding beyond the product and towards the medication process. 
Producers, doctors, pharmacists and most importantly the end-user need to be aware of their 
respective roles in the medication process. Consumers also have to acknowledge the crucial 
importance of compliance to increase the benefits and decrease the risks of drug therapy. In 
other words, public unawareness must be replaced by a more critical understanding of 
pharmaceutical risks, benefits and most importantly individual responsibilities in drug 
therapy. Clearly, the need to increase health literacy goes well beyond the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals but represents a more general topic in safeguarding public health and the 
strengthening of individual responsibility in healthcare decisions.  
While this argument could be interpreted as additional supportive evidence, that governance 
and regulation only matters within a limited extent in the management of pharmaceutical 
risks, it should rather be understood as the need to adjust the regulatory scope. While the role 
of physicians and pharmacists in this regard must be acknowledged, it calls for a different role 
of regulatory agencies as well. By providing agencies with a more fundamental mandate in 
informing the patients, the impact of regulatory activity at least regarding public health would 
be increased significantly. Beyond the broadening of regulatory scope, however, a much more 
fundamental change of mind and behaviour in pharmaceutical consumption will be necessary.  
As a consequence, increasing drug safety will mainly depend on two factors. First, the current 
regulatory network involving the national agencies and the EMA, which has contributed 
tremendously to the protection of public health in the past, must accept a more proactive role 
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in drug safety, including the necessary changes in the current allocation of regulatory 
resources. The second and probably more decisive challenge will be to raise awareness and 
individual responsibility of patients and others involved in the medication process, for the 
benefits and risks pharmaceuticals pose. Even though representing major challenges for all 
stakeholders involved, it seems to represent the only feasible way, if drug safety ought to be 
increased in the future.  
The only real alternative in reducing the risks of pharmaceutical consumption would be to 
take no pharmaceuticals at all. While this radical approach would practically eradicate all the 
risks associated with drug consumption, the same would be true for its benefits.  
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Appendix  
A.1 Description of computation 
Starting off by selecting the menu item simple search the search function is started. By using 
the option search by date, search is limited to the respective period or interval selected. As 
outlined, parameters were set for the first interval between 1970 and 1975. The database will 
now display all documents issued in the given period. By using the menu item Refine the 
results can be reduced further. Using the option type of document the respective type of 
document can be selected e.g. regulations. By selecting a specific type of document, the 
number of hits gets reduced to the specific type of document within the given period. By 
selecting the option refine again, the search can now be conducted. Either the sides’ Search 
Terms or the Key words function can be used to search for a concrete term. While Key words 
allows the user to search the database based on a predefined list of categories (EUROVOC), 
using the Search Terms option enables free search of the data. Since the inquiry is based on a 
set of distinct terms, computation was conducted using the Search terms option. Using the 
entry mask, the specific search term e.g. health can now be entered. Finally, by selecting the 
option Title or Title and text, search function is either applied to document titles or title and 
full text. 
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A.2: Detailed results  
Legislative activity health policy (title search) 
  
1970- 
1975 
1976- 
1980 
1981- 
1985 
1986- 
1990 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2008 
total documents 33439 38505 51066 62772 73444 86211 83834 40581 
Regulations 6246 8224 8659 10411 12114 16512 14186 6774 
Health 1 0 2 5 9 6 20 28 
Public Health 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Prevention 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health Care 
System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ambulatory/Outpati
ent care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inpatient treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical/Medicinal 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 6/25 1/75 0/65 1/40/ 
Pharmaceutical 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 
Directive 385 644 653 793 1011 1146 1144 936 
Health 25 23 26 47 80 49 32 23 
Public Health 3 0 0 2 3 1 0 3 
Prevention 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health Care 
System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health Insurance 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ambulatory/Outpati
ent care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Outpatient care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inpatient treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical/Medicinal 0/3 0/4 2/5 3/20 5/22 8/8 7/20 6/3 
Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decisions 2052 3485 3148 3448 4944 5950 6435 4568 
Health 9 63 109 90 197 175 265 108 
Public Health 1 8 9 5 6 32 34 8 
Prevention 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
Health Care 
System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 
Ambulatory/Outpati
ent care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inpatient treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health care 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 
Medical/Medicinal 3/0 21/0 20/0 14/0 15/0 17/0 14/1 2/4 
Pharmaceutical 2 1 1 2 16 18 3 0 
Source: EUR-lex 
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Legislative activity health policy (title and full text search) 
  
1970- 
1975 
1976- 
1980 
1981- 
1985 
1986- 
1990 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2008 
Total 
documents 33439 38505 51066 62772 73444 86211 83834 40581 
Regulations 6246 8224 8659 10411 12114 16512 14186 6774 
Health 21 37 114 192 265 278 655 628 
Public Health 6 5 10 5 21 31 88 114 
Prevention 1 0 0 0 3 6 32 32 
Health Care 
System 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 
Health 
Insurance 1 0 1 1 2 3 8 10 
ambulatory/outp
atient care 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 
inpatient 
treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health care 0 0 5 2 4 17 16 27 
medical/medicin
al 11/2 28/10 65/16 38/0 85/47 64/101 111/130 123/105 
Pharmaceuticals 2 29 59 47 75 63 84 79 
Directives 385 644 653 793 1011 1146 1144 936 
Health 25 123 149 247 366 357 478 330 
Public Health 3 44 33 73 90 85 117 71 
Prevention 0 9 8 18 17 22 38 19 
Health Care 
System 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Health 
Insurance 1 1 0 4 4 2 9 4 
ambulatory/outp
atient care 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
inpatient 
treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
health care 0 0 0 5 10 15 25 13 
medical/medicin
al 17/17 27/25 29/43 43/47 80/62 80/62 ? 95/84 71/23 
Pharmaceuticals 6 6 16 25 25 20 43 14 
Decisions 2052 3485 3148 3448 4944 5950 6435 4568 
Health 17 115 455 470 1075 1279 1762 1271 
Public Health 2 19 69 64 219 230 352 227 
Prevention 0 1 3 7 22 40 83 55 
Health Care 
System 0 0 0 1 2 4 5 0 
Health 
Insurance 0 0 0 3 11 12 21 10 
ambulatory/outp
atient care 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
inpatient 
treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
health care 0 0 5 9 28 57 77 48 
medical/medicin
al 5/(4) 42/(4) 60/(5) 50/10 92/25 146/45 171/32 140/35 
Pharmaceuticals 6 22 43 38 89 113 117 71 
Source: EUR-lex 
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A.3: Key European pharmaceutical directives and regulations  
 
Directive Release Date Regulation Release date 
65/65/EEC 26 January 1965 EEC 2309/93 22 July 1993 
75/318/EEC 20 May 1975 EC 540/95  10 March 1995 
75/319/EEC 20 May 1975 EC 541/95  10 March 1995 
75/320/EEC 20 May 1975 EC 542/95  10 March 1995 
83/570/EEC 26 October 1983 EC 2000/141 16 December 1999 
87/19/EEC 22 December 1986 EC 2004/27  31 March 2004 
87/22/EEC 22 December 1986 EC 726/2004 31 March 2004 
89/552/EEC 3 October 1989 EC 1084/2003  3 June 2003 
89/341/EEC 3 May 1989 EC 1085/2003 3 June 2003 
89/342/EEC 3 May 1989 EC 847/2000 27 April 2000 
89/343/EEC 3 May 1989 EC 507/2006  29 March 2006 
89/381/EEC 14 June 1989 EC 1901/2006  12 December 2006 
89/105/EEC 21 December 1988 EC 1902/2006 20 December 2006 
91/356/EEC 13 June 1991 EC 658/2007  14 June 2007 
91/507/EEC 19 July 1991 EC 1394/2007  13 November 2007 
92/25/EEC  31 March 1992 2049/2005/EC 15 December 2005 
92/26/EEC  31 March 1992   
92/27/EEC  31 March 1992   
92/28/EEC  31 March 1992   
92/73/EEC  22 September 1992   
93/39/EEC 14 June 1993   
2001/20/EC  4 April 2001   
2001/83/EC 6 November 2001   
2003/63/EC 25 June 2003   
2003/94/EC  8 October 2003   
2005/28/EC 8 April 2005   
2008/29/EC  1 March 2008   
2009/120/EC  14 September 2009   
2009/53/EC  18 June 2009   
Source: Eudralex  
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A.4: multi-state procedure 
 
 
A.5: concertation procedure 
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A.6: Centralized procedure (initial concept) 
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A.7: Decentralized/Mutual Recognition Procedure 
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A.8 List of National Agencies 
 
Country Abbreviation Name Location Webpage 
Austria  AGES-PharmMed LCM 
Austrian Agency for Health 
and Food Safety Vienna www.ages.at 
Belgium  FAMHP 
 
Agence Fédérale des 
Médicaments et des 
Produits de Santé 
Brussels www.fagg-afmps.be/ 
Bulgaria  BDA 
Bulgarian Drug Agency / 
Institute for Control of 
Veterinary Medicinal 
Preparations 
Sofia  
www.bda.bg 
Cyprus  n.a. Ministry of Health - Pharmaceutical Services Nicosia 
 
www.moh.gov.cy 
Czech 
Republic SUKL 
State Institute for Drug 
Control Prague http://www.sukl.cz/ 
Denmark DKMA Danish Medicines Agency Kopenhagen www.dkma.dk 
Estonia  SAM State Agency of Medicines Tartu www.sam.ee 
Finland FIMEA Finnish medicines Agency  www.fimea.fi 
France  (Afssaps) 
Agence française de 
sécurité sanitaire des 
produits de santé 
Paris www.afssaps.sante.fr 
Germany BfArM 
Bundesinstituts für 
Arzneimittel und 
Medizinprodukte 
Bonn www.bfarm.de 
Greece EOF National Organization for Medicines Athens www.eof.gr 
Hungary  OGYI National Institute of Pharmacy Budapest www.ogyi.hu 
Ireland IMB Irish Medicines Board Dublin www.imb.ie 
Italy AIFA Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco Rome www.agenziafarmaco.it 
Latvia ZVA State Agency of medicines Riga www.zva.gov.lv 
Lithuania  n.a. State Medicines Control Agency Vilnius www.vvkt.lt 
Luxembourg  n.a. 
Direction de la Santé Villa 
Louvigny Division de la 
Pharmacie et des 
Medicaments 
Luxembourg www.ms.etat.lu 
Netherlands CBG-MEB College ter Beoordeling 
van Geneesmiddelen  Den Haag www.cbg-meb.nl 
Poland n.a. 
Office for Registration of 
Medicinal Products, 
Medical Devices and 
Biocidal Products 
Warsaw www.urpl.gov.pl 
Portugal INFARMED 
Instituto Nacional da 
Farmácia e do 
Medicamento 
Lisbon www.infarmed.pt 
Romania ANM National Medicines Agency Bucharest www.anm.ro 
Slovakia  SUKL State Institute for Drug Control Bratislava www.sukl.sk 
Slovenia JAZMP Agencija za zdravila in 
medicinske pripmocke Ljubljana www.jazmp.si 
Spain AGEMED 
Agencia Española de 
Medicamentos y Productos 
Sanitarios 
Madrid www.agemed.es 
Sweden  MPA Medical Products Agency Uppsala www.lakemedelsverket.se 
United 
Kingdom MHRA 
Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory 
Agency 
London www.mhra.gov.uk 
Source: agencies’ websites 
 
 
Appendix 
 
303 
 
A.9: Withdrawn products approved through the CP (1995-2010) 
 
Name approved withdrawn voluntary commercial 
reasons 
prior 
suspension 
Acomplia 19.06.2006 05.12.2008 Yes n.r. 13.11.2008 
Allex 15.01.2001 10.03.2004 Yes Yes  
Bextra 27.03.2003 27.03.2008 Yes n.r. October 2005 
Cea-SCAN 04.10.1996 27.09.2005 Yes Yes  
Clopidogrel BMS 16.07.2008 12.11.2009 Yes Yes  
Cotronak 07.05.1999 10.03.2004 Yes n.r.  
Daquiran 27.10.1997 02.02.2006 Yes Yes  
Destara 25.06.2006 22.11.2005 n.r. n.r.  
Duloxetine Boehringer 08.10.2008 26.05.2010 Yes Yes  
Dynepo 18.03.2002 17.03.2009 Yes Yes  
EchoGen 17.07.1998 22.01.2001 Yes n.r.  
Ecokinase 29.08.1996 30.07.1999 Yes n.r.  
Evotopin 15.04.1997 28.01.2000 Yes n.r.  
Exubera 24.01.2006 26.09.2008 Yes Yes  
Forcaltonin 11.01.1999 29.10.2008 Yes Yes 17.12.2003 
Fortovase 20.08.1998 27.06.2006 Yes Yes  
Hepacare 04.08.2000 23.10.2002 Yes Yes  
HumaSPECT 25.09.1998 24.09.2003 Yes n.r.  
Indimacis 125 04.10.1996 30.09.1999 Yes n.r.  
Infanrix HepB 30.07.1997 25.04.2005 Yes Yes  
Infergen 01.02.1999 05.05.2006 Yes Yes  
Irbesartan BMS 19.01.2007 11.11.2009 Yes Yes  
Irbesartan 
Hydrochlorothiazide BMS 19.01.2007 11.11.2009 Yes Yes  
Ixense 28.05.2001 28.09.2004 Yes Yes  
Leeviax 09.07.2001 18.12.2007 Yes Yes  
Monotard 07.10.2002 14.11.2006 Yes Yes  
Nespo 08.06.2001 05.12.2008 Yes Yes  
Neupopeg 22.08.2002 05.12.2008 Yes n.r.  
Nyracta 11.07.2000 08.12.2004 Yes n.r.  
Olansek 07.10.1996 17.03.2003 Yes Yes  
Opulis 15.01.2001 10.03.2004 Yes Yes  
Orlaam 01.07.1997 19.04.2001  n.r. 28.03.2001 
Parareg 22.10.2004 05.12.2008 Yes Yes  
Patrex 15.09.1998 15.09.2003 Yes Yes  
Paxene 19.07.1999 26.11.2009 Yes Yes  
Posaconazole SP 25.10.2005 20.11.2008 n.r. n.r.  
Primavax 05.02.1998 27.07.2000 n.r. n.r.  
Procomvax 07.05.1999 14.05.2009 n.r. n.r.  
Protopy 28.02.2002 22.08.2008 Yes Yes  
Pylori-Chek 15.06.1998 05.07.2000 Yes Yes  
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Name approved withdrawn voluntary commercial 
reasons 
prior 
suspension 
Quintanrix 17.02.2005 28.08.2008 Yes Yes  
Quixidar 21.03.2002 11.03.2008 Yes Yes  
Raptiva 20.09.2004 09.06.2009 Yes* n.r. 19.02.2009 
Rayzon 22.03.2002 24.06.2005 Yes* n.r.  
RotaShield 07.05.1999 24.01.2001 Yes n.r.  
Taluvian 28.05.2001 13.07.2004 yes yes  
Tecnemab K1 05.09.1996 09.02.2000 yes n.r.  
Tekturna 22.08.2007 02.09.2009 yes yes  
Tenecteplase 23.02.2001 09.08.2008 yes yes  
Theryttrex 07.01.2003 02.02.2006 yes yes  
Tikosyn 29.11.1999 02.03.2004 yes Yes  
Trazec nateglinide 03.04.2001 20.11.2008 yes yes  
Triacelluvax 11.01.1999 28.02.2002 yes Yes  
Trovan/Turvel 03.07.1998 20.03.2001 Yes n.r. 
10.08.1999 
(renwewed 
september 2000) 
Trovan IV 03.07.1998 20.03.2001 Yes n.r. 
10.08.1999 
(renwewed 
september 2000) 
Trudexa 01.09.2003 09.07.2009 Yes Yes  
Turvel 08.07.1998 20.03.2001 Yes n.r. 
10.08.1999 
(renwewed 
september 2000) 
Turvel IV 03.07.1998 20.03.2001 Yes n.r. 
10.08.1999 
(renwewed 
september 2000) 
Ultratard 07.10.2002 14.11.2006 Yes Yes  
Uprima 28.05.2001 28.05.2006 Yes Yes  
Valdyn 27.03.2003 24.06.2005 Yes Yes  
Velosulin 07.10.2002 30.01.2009 Yes Yes  
Venvia 11.07.2000 08.12.2004 Yes Yes  
Viraferon 09.03.2000 13.10.2008 Yes Yes  
Vitrasert Implant 18.03.1997 02.04.2002 n.r. n.r.  
Vitravene 29.07.1999 30.07.2002 Yes Yes  
Xapit 22.03.2002 02.03.2004 Yes Yes  
Zartra 18.09.1998 11.06.2002 Yes Yes  
Zenapax 26.02.1999 10.06.2008 Yes Yes  
Zimulti 19.06.2006 05.12.2008 Yes n.r. 23.10.2008 
Source: EMA  
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